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Summary 
This thesis aims to explore the socio-spatial control mechanisms, termed as Informal land controls 
– used by informal power intermediaries termed informal structures to produce space to claim 
public resources in Karachi-Pakistan. Such informal structures include but are not limited to: 
political parties, bonds of tribe and kinship, religious authorities, neighbourhood committees, 
gangs and other criminals. The concept of informal land controls is integrally embedded within 
the processes of informality and production of space in Karachi and is used to examine political 
conflicts, social divisions and the spiral of violence evident in Karachi, especially from mid-2000 
onwards.  
The study introduces the concept of informal land controls to address the gap in the literature, 
both on informality and production of space, which currently remains focussed on the state, 
market and the poor, and thus, neglects the role of power intermediaries. Such informal 
processes of production of space that are neither ‘from above’ i.e. state and market driven, nor 
‘from below’, but ‘from between’.  
The research is based on four case study areas in Karachi – North Nazimabad, Lyari, PIB Colony 
and Scheme 33 – which demonstrate how multiple and overlapping informal structures initiate 
and maintain informal land controls, and how these are linked with the failure of formal 
government and prevailing informality in planning decisions. A wide range of licit and illicit 
measures are used – including political domination; religious discourse; cultural practice; tribal 
identity; property control; barriers, flags and wall-chalking; harassment; extortion; violence, street 
control and homicides. The result is a complex network of socio-spatial divisions that form ‘no-go’ 
areas of varying degrees, which have exacerbated social divisions and violence in the city.  The 
research argues that understanding such processes is essential to underpin interventions to 
reduce violence and extortion, and ensure more equitable access to urban resources.   
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Disclaimer 
This research has been conducted and the document produced for the sole purpose of academic 
research and understanding, without any political or monetary objectives. The analysis and 
conclusion of the research are based on the interviews of the relevant people, whose names have 
been anonymised due to ethical and security reasons, and secondary sources that are referenced 
appropriately. The author is not responsible for the authenticity of the degree of validity of the 
facts reported in the newspapers, however, such news reports have been triangulated by 
confirming that it is reported by all major newspapers. The nature of the research topic entails to  
talk about political parties and their role in the city in connection with the research, however, 
utmost care has been taken to present the viewpoint of both the conflicting groups wherever 
possible. However, the aim of the research is not to target any political party and to damage its 
popularity or question its ideology, the research is done in good faith to identify urban problems 
of Karachi that its residents are facing. 
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1.1 Introduction  
Since the year 2000, Karachi has been facing rising violence and spatial segregation along ethno-
political lines. Almost 18,500 killings took place during the last 15 years, with 2,789 killings in 2013 
alone (Chapter 4, Table 4.1 & 4.2). Karachi, once called the ‘Paris of the East’, cleanest city in 
South Asia (Sibtain, 2013), and ‘city of lights’ (Gayer, 2014, p. 17-18) is now seen as a ‘divided city’ 
(Gayer, 2003), ‘contested city’, ‘city up for grabs’ and an ‘arena for national conflicts’ (Gayer, 
2014).  
The majority of killings have been along ethno-political and sectarian lines, especially of people 
with an active political-party affiliation. As a result, there has been increasing segregation, with 
the emergence of enclaves and gated communities partitioned along ethnic, sectarian, religious 
and political lines. Although gated communities  were designed, and enclaves emerged, to protect 
against violence, they have added to the security problems (Kaker, 2014), with organised groups 
including military cadres of ethno-political parties, religio-political parties, gangs and organised 
crime groups competing for power (Yusuf, 2012; Gazdar, 2011; HRCP, 2011; DGR, 2014; SMC, 
2013).  
Current violent events, described above, cannot be seen in isolation from the socio-spatial and 
political developments, planning decisions and regional issues since partition of 1947. The current 
situation, briefly described below, is multifaceted, however, the overall outcome of the situation 
is that; the state is weak and partially absent in service provision while the state’s absence is filled 
by multiple informal groups who claim and channel the state’s resources to their legitimising 
groups and thus compete with each other. Land plays a central role in this competition as a 
resource itself, financial and political both; thus a reason of conflict and a subject of control.   
The thesis intends to theorise the whole situation, connecting the described processes and actors, 
with an emphasis on control over land as the focus of study, since land links social and spatial 
domains both - covering all actors, processes and resources under discussion (Section 2.3).  
1.2 Background 
The background dynamics of the events identified are connected with a variety of processes that 
range from historical socio-spatial and political development, planning decisions, issues around 
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service provision, market dynamics, security issues etc. (Chapter 4). Some of these will be briefly 
discussed here to describe the rationale of the thesis. 
Multiple processes, actors and role of land 
The thesis identifies multiple processes and actors crucial in understanding the background 
dynamics (Chapter 4). For example; the state, over the years, failed to provide various services 
impartially, such as housing from 1960s onwards, security from 1980s onwards, and water 
provision is lacking since long. Informality in services provision has become widespread, which is a 
symbol of state’s failure. This failure has provided opportunity for informal groups, which work 
along political, religious or ethnic identities, for political entrepreneurship and claim over public 
resources. 
At another level, the regional conflicts such as Soviet war in Afghanistan and later war on terror 
has led to drug trade and presence of militants in the city, adding to the deterioration (Gayer, 
2014). Karachi’s role being the business hub of national and international trade and 
transportation in the country, has also played a vital role in attracting migrants, militants and 
criminals from the region. The provincial and national politics has added another layer of 
claimants to the public resources in Karachi and has weakened governments due to politicisation 
and blurring of formal-informal divide for political claims and benefits. Various ethno-political 
groups, corresponding to the city, provincial and country levels, claim for the legitimacy to own 
the city and its resources; which is a crucial reason of political conflicts and violence.  
The competition to control public resources is played out on both formal and informal domains 
(Chapter 4). The formal domain encompass the city and national levels, and covers various tactics 
including; competition over formal decision making bodies, local government system, service 
provision institutions, electoral boundaries, housing and other policies etc. While the informal 
domain links to the city level but is operationalised at the local level; and covers both social and 
spatial control mechanisms (Section 2.5). Several control mechanisms are being used to ensure 
supremacy over opponents however, control over demography which is ensured through 
production of space – territoriality - is central for political as well as financial gains (Section 2.3).  
Production of space through territoriality i.e. control over land, along with other resources, plays a 
vital role in both formal and informal domains (Section 2.3 & 2.5). Various tactics have been 
systematically employed to ensure control over settlements either through policy decisions on 
formal level such as Gothabad Scheme and Katchi Abadi Regularisation Program etc., while, 
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demography control, control over property transactions, violence and other inclusion-exclusion 
tactics are found to be employed in the informal domain (EC 1, EC 3, Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7).The 
socio-spatial polarisation and politics.  
The socio-spatial pattern i.e. presence of multiple ethnic groups at particular locations in the city, 
has played a vital role in the overall situation of Karachi (Section 4.2). Various reasons are 
identified; first, migrations since the emergence of the city, second, pre partition and post 
partition planning decisions, third, violence in 1980s along ethno-religious lines, and fourth, rise of 
private sector in land and housing etc. In this connection, since the partition of Pakistan and India 
in 1947, politics in Karachi has been aligned with ethnic and religious identities, thus struggle to 
control the city has its roots in history, while the spatial distribution of social groups has made it 
worse (Budhani et al., 2010, p. 07; Gazdar & Mallah, 2013, p. 2; Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2014, p. 17-
52).  
The city has been subject to multiple waves of in-migrations. In each wave of migration different 
ethnic groups came and settled at a particular geographic location, thus the city polarised both 
along social and spatial dimensions (Chapter 4).  
This settling of various social groups, at particular locations, led to incidents of ethnic and religious 
polarisation, conflicts, violence and segregation in the city, from 1970s and especially during 
1980s. The city went through enclavisation in which people preferred to live with their own social 
groups out of fear and convenience (Chapter 4). 
Periods of military rule, uneasy democracy and pollicisation of institutions have created an 
uncertain context of urban governance (Chapter 4). Local government system in the city has 
remained under political exploitation since long;  most recently, the system (SLGO 2001) 
introduced in 2001 was suspended in 2009, adding to a political and urban management vacuum.  
This void, over the years, has been augmented by power intermediaries , including political 
parties, religious groups, gangs, tribal leaders, and ethnic groups, who emerged to fill this gap for 
their respective social groups.  
Power intermediaries, especially political parties, compete for territorial control and limited public 
resources, formal or informal, to consolidate voter power (Gayer, 2014, p. 21-30). Such power 
intermediaries, defined here as informal power structures, increasingly use force, rhetoric, or 
intimidation to delineate and control territory, using a variety of measures to entrench power, 
including: control over water; intimidation by vigilante groups; establishment of sectarian 
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religious centres and schools; setting up informal road blocks and gates, and control over 
purchase of property. These measures, defined here as informal land controls, have resulted in an 
acute spatial segregation of the city and rapid escalation of urban violence (Chapter 4 for detailed 
background). 
It is important to mention, here, that the situation in Karachi is unique as compared to the larger 
national context of Pakistan; the socio-political polarisation, the politicization of administration, 
political conflicts, competition to control public resources and to channel the resources to 
legitimising groups in competition is completely localised.   
1.3 The Research Problem 
In cities of the developing world, informality is shaping the city and defining the development 
paths (Roy, 2005). In many such contexts segregation along social identity and territorial lines is 
linked to crime, violence and social unrest, as is the case of Karachi (Yusuf, 2012). Karachi has seen 
unrest over a long period but it has also been observed that such conflicts never cross the line to 
become a city level civil war, highlighting presence of ‘regulatory mechanisms’ that ensure order 
within the visible disorder (Gayer, 2014, p. 13). Such regulatory mechanisms vary from the city to 
the local-level, and from structure to human agency, and are moulded into the formal to informal 
institutional fabric, adopting specific control mechanisms that ensure control over public 
resources. There has been very little research into the mechanisms used by informal structures to 
consolidate power, a gap which this research aims to address. 
The concept of informal land controls refers to the means through which informal structures 
establish control over communities and productive assets, by defining a geographic area through 
visible and invisible boundaries of influence. Such control is exercised through a wide variety of 
socio-spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent, which operate both locally 
and at city-wide scale. The operation of these controls is the subject of this thesis. 
1.4 Research Hypothesis and Questions 
This research study aims to analyse and examine the establishment and operation of informal 
land controls through a case study of Karachi. The research seeks to explore the causes of 
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segregation and territoriality including ethno-political and religious conflicts, the emergence of 
informal power structures that pursue segregation, and the dynamics of relations between various 
actors that enable the operation of informal land controls.   
The research questions emerged with the identification of gaps in the literature. First, literature 
on power in social sciences, encompassing Marxist strands, is largely seen as dialectic between 
the state and market, and the role of non-state and non-commercial actors is not widely explored. 
Second the operation of such ‘informal power structures’ that cut across formal and informal 
divides and work ‘from between’ is not fully understood. In addition, the mechanisms through 
which such operations are translated into social and territorial control in Karachi, and the violent 
outcomes that result, remain dynamic and emergent. Each is addressed through this thesis.  
Although this qualitative research is organised around research questions, however, it is neither 
purely deductive nor inductive research approach but benefits from both approaches and is 
termed as ‘deductive-inductive hybridity’ (Chapter 3). This enables the researcher to have a 
preconceived stand on the issues based on the initial understanding developed during literature 
review and researcher’s own experience in the context.  Thus, the starting hypothesis of the 
research is that: 
“The emergence of a socially and ethnically distinct enclave-based spatial structure in Karachi is, 
to a significant extent, a result of the emergence of informal (or non-state) land controls. This is a 
result of power wielded by key political, religious, ethnic or other actors through various channels, 
including control over space and establishment of actual or perceptual boundaries. Together these 
combine to exacerbate social and spatial segregation and exclusion underpinning ethnic and 
political tension.”  
To examine this hypothesis the following research questions are posed: 
1) Drawing on a literature review, how can the concept of informal (non-state) land controls 
be formulated and theorised, and their operation be understood (Chapter 2)? 
2) What are the city level dynamics (or structural reasons) behind the operation of informal 
land controls in Karachi (Chapter 4)? 
3) Through case studies of different districts in Karachi, representing different enclaves 
(exhibiting both spatial segregation and political/ethnic tension), how are informal land 
controls played out? Who are the main actors and what are the main mechanisms of 
control? These are examined through case studies of different enclaves, in order to 
explore:  
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a) Social processes and outcomes: explore how and why informal structures 
emerge and earn legitimacy; and how this impacts the legitimising and non-
legitimising social groups? (Chapter 5 and 7) 
b) Spatial dimensions and outcomes: explore how space and connected resources 
are controlled and then defended, i.e. what socio-spatial mechanisms are used, 
furthermore, how the controlled space reflects the relation between the informal 
structures and their identity-based social group;? (Chapters 6 and 7) 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured around the research questions.  
Chapter 2, deals with Research Question 1), with the aim to review the literature and theorise 
informal land controls. The literature explores the complex relationships between actors – the 
state, political parties, market, informal actors and social groups – both through classic literature 
and authors focused on South Asia and other similar contexts, examining informal processes of 
urban development in order to define the concept of informal land controls. The chapter then 
examines the literature on power, considering the role of non-state actors as power 
intermediaries in space production, before examining mechanisms of spatial control and the 
relevance of the divided cities literature to the context of Karachi. 
Chapter 3 outlines the philosophical underpinnings of the research methodology leading to 
methods for data gathering and analysis. The theoretical framework produced after the literature 
review formed the basis for developing the hypothesis and as a means to organise the research 
methods, data gathering and analysis process in the deductive-inductive hybrid model. A critical 
realist approach forms the epistemological basis for the creation of valid knowledge used in this 
thesis, in order to look behind the apparent events, or issues in the context of Karachi, and 
explore the background relations, structures and mechanisms. The chapter explains the detailed 
analysis undertaken to select the main case study of North Nazimabad, and the supporting 
analyses in Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33, to represent different eras of development, 
geographical locations and political influence. The chapter also explains the limitations of the 
research due to security reasons.   
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Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7 deals with the analysis of case study of Karachi. More specifically, Chapter 4 
sets the context examining Karachi city as a whole, and is organised around Research Question 2. 
This chapter looks at the historical development of Karachi that led to current socio-spatial 
patterns, along with performance of government and its institutions, private sector, rising 
informality and the role of various informal structures in the whole process. It explores the 
background issues and covers the macro level or structural dimensions linked to informal land 
controls.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 look at case studies within Karachi, and are organised around Research 
Question 2. More specifically, the case studies are explored under two broader thematic 
questions i.e. social domain and spatial domain. The social domain intends to look at social 
processes and their outcomes and also to explore various queries such as; how informal 
structures emerge; what social control mechanisms are used to establish and retain control; what 
services they provide to earn legitimacy; what are the trade-offs of such service provision, and 
what kind of social divisions emerge as a result? Whereas, the spatial domain intends to seek 
answers to queries around spatial and territorial outcomes of the land controls. More specifically 
it tries to examine; how urban space is defined to reflect the relation between the informal 
structures and their identity-based social group; what types of spatial control mechanisms are 
used to control space and public resources in these enclaves; and what is the result if boundaries, 
physical or non-physical, of the enclave representing a power-society nexus, is violated by other 
competitors? 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the main case study of North Nazimabad. Chapter 5 is dedicated to 
exploring the emergence of various informal structures and their operation, and the various social 
groups with which they are linked. The chapter highlights the reasons for the legitimacy of 
informal structures and the trade-offs that the residents have to accept to gain their protection 
and service provision.  
Chapter 6 deals with the operations of spatial control in North Nazimabad. In that, the impact of 
social identities is linked with spatial dimension to explore how social relations have shaped space 
and how segregation and territoriality are practiced.  
Chapter 7 examines the three smaller case studies. First, the case of Lyari covers the old city and 
examines the operation of criminal gangs as informal structures and their strong link with city-
level power politics. Second, PIB Colony highlights the central city, and explores the rise and fall of 
a gang who challenged the monopoly of a political party which first lost and then regained 
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territory. Third, Scheme 33 explores the outer and peri-urban parts of the city, and highlighted 
how a weak local state triggers political conflicts and competition between parties, religious 
groups and criminals to control land.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It draws together the analysis and reiterates the analytic 
conclusions by addressing each research question summarising the whole thesis. It also discusses 
the implications of the power-society-space nexus observed for urban development processes. 
The chapter also suggests various policy recommendations, along with reiterating the theoretical 
contribution. The chapter concludes with the reflection on the validity of the hypothesis.
10 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review:  
Towards a Theoretical Framework 
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2.1 Introduction 
‘Informal land controls’, the term adopted in this research, requires an understanding and 
theoretical framework that covers the complexity of social and political control over land in 
Karachi. Karachi has been experiencing acute political and ethnic conflicts, which affects the 
spatial development of neighbourhoods and their urban functions. The outcome is social violence 
and segregation, spatial informality and territoriality, accompanied by partial failure of the state 
in the provision of urban goods and services.  The literature on underlying urban processes that 
contribute to this process of violent territorial control is explored in this chapter. 
The literature explores the complex relationships between actors – the state, political parties, 
market, informal actors and social groups - and the formal and informal processes through which 
development takes place – including informality, political conflicts, violence, segregation and 
territoriality, but there are gaps in this discussion. Two main gaps are identified; first, the 
literature on informal processes mainly deals with spaces beyond the formal legal framework, 
whereas, the issue of informal land controls in Karachi cross the formal-informal legal divide. 
Second, although informal processes are often seen as the failure ‘from above’ of the state in the 
provision of goods and services in connection with the rise of neo-liberal policies and market 
mechanisms, and as an entrepreneurial project of the poor ‘from below’, the debates ignore the 
role of non-state actors who fill the gap in state provision, providing services ‘from between’.   
After the introduction, Section 2.2 discusses the nature of informal processes of urban 
development, in land, housing and infrastructure and in economic development. Section 2.3 
examines the literature on the production of space, based on the work of Lefebvre (1974). 
However, this debate focusses on society, space and power relations defined by state and 
capitalist structures, ignoring the role of non-state actors as power-brokers and contention 
between social groups in the production of space. Section 2.3 concludes by developing the 
definition of ‘informal land controls’ used in this thesis. 
Section 2.4 explores the literature on power, addressing the gap in the literature that lacks 
discussion on the role of non-state actors as ‘power-intermediaries’ in space production ‘from 
between’, or the role of multiple competing non-state actors in claiming access to space and 
resources and the resultant partitioning of spaces. Section 2.5 explores the practical mechanisms 
that combine to produce space, including various socio-spatial control mechanisms used in 
producing and reproducing the balance between power, society and space. There is also a 
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relevant body of literature dealing with mechanisms of control over land and linked resources, 
but this focusses on formal mechanisms involving the state and formal institutions i.e. ‘from 
above’ (see Yiftachel, 1990; 1992; 1996; 1998; 1999; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Yiftachel and 
Ghanem, 2004). Some of the relevant literature explored is contextually different such as the 
discussions on divided cities e.g. Beirut and Northern Ireland; first, due to dominant role of state 
and formal policies and second, due to the nature of conflicts embedded in national, international 
and historical contexts as compared to Karachi’s localised and more recent conflict.  
Each section concludes, defining essential working definitions and concepts including informality, 
informal power and governance structures, power intermediaries, production of informal spaces, 
socio-spatial controls and informal land controls. The conclusion in Section 2.6 links all the 
sections leading to development of a theoretical framework through which to examine informal 
land controls in this thesis. 
Given the fragmented literature and gaps, the overall focus of Chapter 2 remains to develop a  
theoretical framework to understand the link between actors and processes in the production of 
informal land controls. Some theories explored are relevant and help to developing a framework 
for this research, such as debates on the social production of space (Lefebvre, 1974), informality 
(Roy, 2005), power (Foucault, 1982), concepts around territoriality (Sack, 1983; Brower, 1980) and 
socio-spatial controls (Tilly, 2004; Yiftachel, 1990; 1992; 1996; 1998; 1999; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 
2003; Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004). However, the role of non-state actors needs to be examined 
in connection with the use of informal land controls; each of these ideas is developed further 
below.   
Lack of an appropriate theoretical framework is not unusual. Sometimes, where theories are not 
completely relevant and are unable to explain the problem under study, “the literature acts as 
proxy for theory. In many instances, theory is latent or implicit in the literature.” (Bryman, 2012, 
p.22). In that case, research questions are outlined in order to enquire about the problem 
identified, as in this thesis, where the first research question examines how the concept of 
informal (non-state) land controls can be formulated and theorised.  
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2.2 Informal Urban Development  
In the cities of the developing world, informal processes can no longer be ignored as ‘informality’, 
but have developed into a “generalised mode of metropolitan transformation” (Roy, 2005). The 
importance of informality and informal settlements has been discussed for many years since Keith 
Hart (1970, 1973) introduced the concept of informal sector employment. Still, there is much 
disagreement in the literature on informal urban development processes; whether such 
informality is a process ‘from above’ or ‘from below’; whether informality is beneficial or 
problematic; whether informality is limited to economic sectors or a term for a ‘generalised 
mode’ of urban development irrespective of sectoral limitations and, where informality stands 
between legality and illegality?   
This section thus explores various interpretations of informality and the reasons for its 
emergence, to examine the connections between state, market, non-state actors and citizens, and 
the socio-economic and power dynamics that underlie those connections. More specifically, the 
section explores the role of informal actors (section 2.4) in informal development processes. This 
understanding aims to interpret informality and underpin the analysis of ‘informal land controls’.     
2.2.1 Various Interpretations  
A variety of interpretations are available around informality and related processes, with a 
multitude of terms that vary with the context for example: informality, urban informality, 
informal sector, informal space, informal processes etc. (explored in the following sections). This 
research looks at outcomes, such as informally developed settlements, processes of urban 
development and its underlying politics, and actors such as religious bodies or tribal leadership 
etc. In this background, this research uses the term ‘informality’ generally to cut across sectors, 
processes, and status of land, with the aim to examine domains other than ‘formal’ in its common 
sense applied to land tenure. In other cases sometimes terms such as ‘informal spaces’ or 
‘informal structures’ are used for specific meanings and are defined when required.   
Early debates in the literature on informality have been characterised by later commentators as 
expressing a “simplistic dualism” and “binary thinking”, and as oscillating between legality and 
illegality (e.g. by Varley 2012). As Roy notes, informality (urban) represents the absence of legality 
but does not fully fit in the definition of illegality (2009, p.80). Gayer (2014, p. 39-40) use the term 
‘unofficial’, for informal transactions or status, especially relating to land, to reject the formal-
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informal dichotomy and identify the intentional deregulation of the ‘officials’ for financial and 
political benefits, and by this, he tries resolve this issue of interpretation of ‘informality’ in the 
context of Karachi.  
The literature on informal urban development processes covers many aspects, including the 
informal economy, the spatial and settlement domain, and (self) governance, including aspects of 
socio-economic fragmentations. The literature defines and explains informal processes within five 
larger categories, i.e. informality as; i) relative, ii) independent, iii) interdependent, iv) marginal or 
un-intentional and v) central or intentional.   
First, informality is defined as a ‘relative’ process, i.e. informality is interpreted in reference to the 
formal processes and structures. For example, “legalists”, a term used by Rakowski (1994), see 
informal processes as alternative to the complex and legally bound formal or official domain. 
Similarly, the literature dealing with “spatial categorization”, as Waibel and McFarlane (2012) 
highlight, i.e. the concept of informal settlements, is also relative to the legality of land titles.  
Second, informal processes are seen as distinct and ‘independent’, beyond any connection to 
formal sector structures or processes. Chen (2006) describes this approach as “dualist”, but 
argues that such interpretations fall in the trap of considering as formal-informal dichotomy 
where the two domains are distinct and separate.  
The third type of interpretations could be termed as ‘interdependent’ i.e. the formal and informal 
are linked together and form a ‘continuum’ and are ‘symbiotic’. “Structuralists” see the informal 
sector as sub-ordinate and having two-way working relations and productive transactions with 
the formal sector in this approach (Rakowski, 1994).  
Fourth, informality is also looked at as a marginal, un-intentional and un-organised process, 
driven indirectly “from below” often by poor and marginal social groups, and which results in low 
quality, unorganised and ill-disciplined sector, services or spaces. Such interpretations are in line 
with interpreting informality as “organisational form” highlighted by Weibel and McFarlane 
(2012). Similarly, Roy and AlSayyad (2004) also highlight a similar approach in the literature where 
informality is taken as local, every-day and self-governing related to urban development in the 
global South, and thus, considered as undesired in the literature. 
The fifth category of interpretation looks at informality “from above”, i.e. as an ‘intentional’ 
process, ‘central’ to the formal processes deployed by the state. This strand of literature 
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highlights that defining formality enables the state to differentiate between the formal and the 
informal, and to carry out processes of inclusion and exclusion with political intent thus, in this 
case, informality behave as “government tool” (Weibel and McFarlane, 2012). In other situations, 
state actors and institutions intentionally keep the boundaries between formal and informal 
vague, and can intentionally “deregulate” rather than “un-regulate”, as Roy (2009, p. 83) 
suggests, while Weibel and McFarlane (2012) term the same as “negotiable value”. Actions such 
as “un-mapping” (Box 2.1), in which governments do not map parts of the city, or do not adopt 
master plans, mean that they remain flexible and use development processes for political or 
economic benefits.  
 
Box 2.1: Un-mapping 
Roy (2003; 2009, p. 81) elaborates one of the practices of the city government in Calcutta-India, 
which she call “un-mapping” or not developing maps of the city demarcating the exact 
boundaries of properties along with its ownership and land use. “Un-mapping” also includes 
not developing master plans for future development and not mapping the existing 
development.  This “un-mapping” provides the government officials and politicians the liberty 
to use the land, particularly contested land, without clear ownership or beyond permitted 
zoning limits, to be vested and to be used for political objectives or financial gains. Mapping, as 
information, generates a kind of knowledge-power for the state to control land and related 
social and financial aspects and to guide and control development. Formal maps also show the 
areas ‘under control’ i.e. the areas for which the state is responsible for providing services etc.  
In contrast, “un-mapping” means to give away state powers of ‘control’, i.e. encouraging 
informality. By un-mapping the government deliberately refrains from exercising its powers to 
control urban development and provide services, and creates a partial vacuum, leading to 
space for informal actors to fill this gap. 
 
Recent commentators have tried to define informality and informal spaces beyond the trap of 
“binary thinking”, but still falling within the confines of the five above. According to Roy and 
AlSayyad (cited in Roy, 2005, p. 148) attempts to understand urban informality as a sector should 
be rejected in favour of seeing it as a “series of transactions”. Roy (2005, p.148) explains that:  
“along with Nezar AlSayyad, I have used the term urban informality to indicate 
an organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban 
transformation itself. Against the standard dichotomy of two sectors, formal 
and informal, we suggest that informality is not a separate sector but rather a 
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series of transactions that connects different economies and spaces to one 
another.”  
That analysis rejects formal-informal dichotomy and suggests considering informal processes as 
‘interdependent’, forming a ‘continuum’ or ‘symbiosis’ with the ‘formal’.   
Roy (2009) notes that those in formal power allow informal process to flourish in order to fill 
shortcomings of resources, faulty regulations, and the influence of the market forces. Roy (2009, 
p.80) defines informal settlements as “a state of deregulation, one where the ownership, use and 
purpose of land cannot be fixed and mapped according to any prescribed set of regulations or 
law.” Informality is not planned, or operated by the formal institutions of governance (public or 
private) using laws and regulations laid down by the state (i.e. “from above”). Instead, informality 
depends on de-facto controlling structures, that are not illegal or completely ‘from below’, but 
represents processes in transition, highlighting ‘symbioses’ and ‘continuum’. 
Beyond the academic debates, international donor organisations and governments are more 
influenced by the ‘relative’ definition i.e. informality as opposed to formality. The UN definition of 
informal settlements refers to “ i) residential areas where a group of housing units has been 
constructed on land to which the occupants have no legal claim, or which they occupy illegally; ii) 
unplanned settlements and areas where housing is not in compliance with current planning and 
building regulations (unauthorized housing).” (UN, 2001, p. 111-112). However, this definition of 
informality, in terms of informal settlements and land tenure, makes it transient, as when titles 
are regularised a settlement is considered as ‘formal’, irrespective of who actively controls it and 
provide goods and services, whether formal institutions or non-state actors. In addition, this 
narrow link to land titles takes no account of the quality of infrastructure, service provision or 
dimensions of governance etc., The empirical evidence in this thesis suggests that informal urban 
management is experienced in settlements with formal land tenure. 
2.2.2 Impacts of informal urban development 
The literature on informal urban development processes differs on its outcomes. Hall and Pfeiffer 
(2000, p.129) in Roy (2005, p.148) consider informal governance to be a problem that makes cities 
ungovernable. Similarly Hasan (2010) also thinks that informality has made cities difficult to 
govern. In contrast, as discussed above, Roy (2009, p.80) and Davis (2004, p.15-16) argue that 
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informality is deliberately used by governments as a tool to exploit the poor and create obedient 
subjects.  
Second, informality is also seen as having a reformist nature as revolution “from below”. Amos 
(1984), de Soto (1989), and Bayat (1997) consider informal actions as a way for the poor to fulfil 
their needs, particularly where the state acts as regulator rather than provider and market 
dynamics make commodified goods and services unaffordable for the poor (Section 2.2.3). For 
example, de Soto (2000) describes informal settlement as a “heroic entrepreneurship” that can 
reduce poverty and boost the economy by giving the informal settlers titles to land. In the context 
of Karachi, Budhani et al. (2010) argue that “informality has done well” in providing urban goods 
and services to the poor. Bayat (1997) sees informal urban development as a “quiet 
encroachment of the ordinary”, an autonomous way of living and functioning, based on the silent 
claim of housing, services and the domain of work. However, this concept of silent claim is too 
simplistic as there are often actors that exploit uncertainty. Moreover, informal development may 
solve problems for a limited time and for a few people but it can create issues in the long run, for 
example facilitating violence and criminal control, as in Karachi.  
Third, processes of informality and resultant outcomes are also seen as worth learning as these 
have achieved goals that a planned activity could not, and thus could be seen as a planning 
strategy (Innes et al. 2007), and an opportunity to learn from the informal processes and (socially) 
innovative actions (Berner, 2001). 
2.2.3 Drivers of Informality 
In general, the literature commenting on the emergence of informal urban development 
processes examine the phenomena at two different scales. The first strand, adopted by Marxist 
theorists, links informal development processes with capitalist driven processes of urbanisation 
and globalisation, linking these to neo-liberal and capitalist development policies (Sassen, 1999; 
Purcell, 2002; 2003; Harvey 2008; Marcuse, 2009). This highlights how capitalist development 
creates spaces of injustice in which the urban poor are excluded socially and spatially from the 
benefits of urban life (Harvey, 2008).  
Capitalist driven neo-liberal policies and profit-oriented development result from class divisions 
that exclude the poor from formal domains, who thus finds ‘alternative’ mean to access housing 
and related services. Such ‘alternative’ means and processes are then categorised as informal 
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(Soja, 2010). Although this exploratory route goes back to Karl Marx, however Lefebvre (1968), 
and Harvey (2001, 2008) have extensively written about it.  
Harvey (2008) elaborates the link between capitalism and urbanization arguing that capitalism 
strives for profit-making, and produces surplus value that needs to be reinvested for further 
profits, while urbanization provides the best conditions for such cyclic operations. However, 
history has shown that these cyclic dynamics of capitalism have resulted in class divisions and 
exclusion of the poor from commodified spaces and services. In the same light, Sassen (1999) and 
Purcell (2003) suggest that economic globalisation weakens nation states and see a new global 
political and social order emerging; creating a network of capitalist cities that forms the unit of 
the global enterprise, and influences the production of space through multi-site operations, which 
diminishes the role of state. 
The crux of this debate is that there exists a strong link between neo-liberal policies, urbanization 
and capitalism, and that the capitalist processes have led to weakened governments and 
commodification of land, resulting in exclusion, dispossession and disjunctive citizenship on the 
basis of ownership of formal property rights. 
The second strand of the literature identifies the failure, inaction or incapacity of the state to 
provide goods and services to its subjects as the reason  for the rise of informality, seen from two 
different angles. First, a body of literature sees a diminishing role for the state under neo-liberal 
policies, explored above, with its role changed from provider to enabler (UNESCAP, 1997). This 
‘intentional’ absence of the state, suggests that urban residents have two choices: either to buy 
the goods and services available in the market, or to create informal ‘alternatives’. The second 
debate considers informality as a failure of formal planning processes and thus a failure of the 
state (Roy, 2005), which opens up new avenues for capitalist-driven bodies to invest and re-invest 
and thus exclude the poor, by differentiating the formal from informal through legal standards 
(Mayer, 2009). This failure of planning and inability to provide services is due to technical 
shortcomings, lack of material resources, or an ‘intentional’ failure for political benefits (see 
Section 2.2.1). Thus state or government is itself a political construct with political ambitions 
affected by intentional practices of “deregulation” (see Roy, 2009; Gayer, 2014) to benefit from 
global investments. ‘Un-mapping’ is one such example of intentional failure or inaction of the 
state (see Box 2.1).  
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The last category defined by state failure or incapacity holds potential for this research. However, 
the literature does not explain who fills the gaps, although empirical evidence suggests that non-
state actors may fill the gap ‘from between’. Weinstein (2008) has identified the link between the 
liberalisation of markets, government, organised crime syndicates and political parties in Mumbai, 
suggesting the criminals have stepped in to provide services where government regulation has 
failed. This situation has escalated with the liberalisation of the Indian economy, where 
international investors are looking to invest in real estate. Meanwhile criminal gangs in informal 
settlements are profiting from real estate investment, or provision of informal services, making 
them a powerful stakeholder in informal urban settings. In addition Kudva (2009) (citing Megaly, 
2006; Perlman, 2006; Gooptu, 2007) argues that the absence of the state creates opportunities 
for criminals to fill the gap, by exploiting public resources, leading to segregation, crime and 
violence.  
2.2.4 State and Market  
The role of the state and its link to market forces is also important to explore. The rise of the state 
as a concentration of political power has been discussed by many including Foucault (1982, p. 
782-783) who argues that the modern state, as compared to medieval religious authorities, gets 
legitimacy to rule from citizens based on promises to fulfil the basic needs, covering domains such 
as safety, security, shelter, health and general wellbeing. In relation to urban land supply, with the 
rise of capitalism and the liberalisation of economies, the role of the government has changed 
from being a provider of land to being a regulator of land markets (UNESCAP, 1997). Viewed in 
this critical light, the state has ceded basic responsibilities to the market, which sells the goods 
and services to citizens, on the basis that whoever has the buying power can get their needs 
fulfilled irrespective of identity. Citizens who do not have the capacity to afford these goods and 
services are automatically excluded and must resort to informal markets to fulfil their needs.  
When the state regulates the market it create systems, mechanisms and tools to ensure the 
proper functioning of the land market (see Section 2.3), including the institutional framework for 
land management. These institutions are termed the “gate-keepers” by Farvacque & McAuslan, 
(1992, p. 17), since through them the land enters into the market and they work as the 
representatives of the government and regulate the land market. Thus for any state, the main 
characteristics of a functioning land market is to ensure its efficiency, equitability and 
environmental sustainability. Compatibility with the social, physical and legal contexts is also 
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essential (UNESCAP, 1997). However, the role of the state is still questionable because of neo-
liberal policies and elite control of decision-making (Yiftachel, 1998). 
2.2.5 Critical Analysis of the Literature on Informality 
An overview of the literature on informality has identified useful insights for this thesis, but also 
several shortcomings. Informal urban development processes are sometimes defined as part of a 
dichotomy with formal processes; these debates remain focussed around the state, capitalist 
structures and the poor, a typically Marxist approach, but ignore identity-based and class divisions 
amongst the urban poor. This approach also ignores the role of non-state actors in the provision 
of ‘alternative’ means of survival for the poor, while remaining focused on informality as the ‘self-
help project’ of the poor, in which the poor are considered as unified, ordered, and working 
together for common objectives such as accessing housing or livelihoods. A further challenge is 
that debates see informality in relation to incapacity of the state, which does not explain how 
gaps in formal service provision are filled. Meanwhile these debates ignore the nuanced nature of 
informality when applied to different facets of urban development, e.g: land tenure, service 
provision or employment. However, the broad critique is summarised below. 
First, informality is definitely ‘alternative’ to formal, but not illegal. In addition, in state and 
market-controlled domains of life, informal processes cannot be seen in isolation, as forming a 
‘continuum’ or ‘symbioses’ with formal development processes. Informality can also be seen as 
the intentional failure of formal government and state processes, or as a “negotiated value” in the 
provision of urban goods and services, exploited by the political actors for political or material 
gain (Roy, 2009). In such cases, informal processes are never an ‘un-intentional’ or marginal 
activity but a ‘central’ and ‘intentional’ process of governments with defined objectives. 
Second, the identification of informal settlements is again ‘relative’ in that formal tenure systems 
set the conditions for informal tenure. However, this poses a challenge in contexts such as 
Karachi, where settlements with both formal and informal tenure are experiencing controls by 
non-state actors through informal processes (see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). In such cases, land 
tenure alone cannot define the nature of formality or informality, but settlements enjoying 
impartial state services should be considered as formal and vice versa. This definition of informal 
settlements cuts across the tenure type and urban control yet identifies spaces serviced or 
excluded by the state.  
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Third, the identification of capitalist processes as the reason of rise of informality is valid, yet 
poses issues of contextualisation. This Marxist notion of subject-power relations limits itself to 
relatively few actors; i.e. state, the capitalist structures and the poor, but does not comment on 
social or identity divisions within the groupings of the urban poor, nor explore the presence of 
non-state actors. This limitation diminishes the role of non-state actors, as the empirical evidence 
suggests (Weinstein, 2008; Chapter 5, 6 and 7) in the provision of ‘alternative’ means of survival 
and space production. This poses a theoretical limitation in explaining informality and production 
of informal spaces.   
A generalised critique on the literature on informal urban development processes is the variety of 
concepts discussion sometimes embraces, including governance, economic transactions, 
employment, the legal status of land, and informally built settlements etc. However, this thesis 
looks at ‘informal land controls’ in connection with a wider definition of informality that is not 
limited to legal status of land, economic sector, services provision and governance but cuts across 
all of them.  
2.3 Land, Space and its Production 
This section focuses around the topics of land and space generally and production of space 
specifically. The concept of space has changed over the period of time, from a ‘uni-dimensional’ 
material, tangible or geometric meaning to a more abstract meaning having ‘dual dimensions’ of 
physical and social domains. This transformation is quite recent; “until the 1970’s most human 
geographers considered space to be a neutral container” (Hubbard et al, 2004, p. 4). The 
geometric concept of space was seen as a container or a passive backdrop to social life, thus 
having nothing to do with people, societies, cultures, economies and politics, but this material 
concept of space was countered, by Marxist writers such as Lefebvre (1968) and Harvey (2008), as 
a central issue in the capitalist society highlighting handling of ‘land’, in terms of impact on city 
and its people, as the essential problem in the land-labour-capital trio. 
Lefebvre (1968) argued that this ‘uni-dimensional’ use of space made it a commodity. This, he 
argued, has transformed cities, from a traditional city, with an emphasis on social value, to a 
capitalist city emphasising exchange value, a city where citizenship rights and opportunities are 
linked to the ownership of property, essentially land (Purcell, 2003, p. 578; Harvey, 2008; Simone, 
2010, p. 59; Brown, 2010; Brown, 2013, p. 958; Brown and Kristiansen, 2009, p. 14-15). The 
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transformation of land into an urban commodity also divided society by economic status and 
buying power, eventually leading to exclusion of those without formal property (Section 2.2.3). 
Lefebvre (1974) also saw space as a social product, having a ‘dual dimension’ incorporating both a 
physical and social domain. Thus society and space are interrelated and affect each other 
mutually to create dialectic (Soja, 1980). However, it is interesting to note that the physical 
dimension of space as ‘land’ is almost exclusively adopted at official level, e.g. the UN definition of 
informality contains only the physical dimension of space, and formal spatial policies and 
institutions all emphasise the same aspect.   
This section thus explores both the ‘uni-dimension’ and ‘dual dimension’ of space. The literature 
on the spatial domain, in connection with informal land controls, can be categorised in two 
distinct, yet linked, categories to further explore production of space. The first category deals with 
tangible, geometric and economic aspects of space as a commodity, termed as ‘land’. The second 
category deals with the theoretical concepts of space in connection with social relations. 
2.3.1 Land  
Land is a physical finite resource that links people, resources and processes of controlling powers 
within its geographic limits. Moreover, it underlies the relationship of government to its subjects 
(Moore 2005, Peluso and Lund 2011, UNESCAP 1997). Control over land ultimately provides 
people with control over resources within the limits of a given territory (Peluso and Lund 2011); in 
addition, land is a pre-requisite for food, shelter, other economic activities and urban 
development (Amos 1984, UNHABITAT 2008). UNESCAP (1997) considers land as a prime factor in 
the capitalist economic system along with labour and capital, thus the land market can influence 
the capitalistic economic system.  
However, this interpretation of the importance of land focuses on conditions of free-market 
economies that are widely criticised because of their unjust distribution of wealth. Marxist writers 
such as Lefebvre (1968) and Harvey (2008) argue that such free-market economies exacerbate 
class-based divisions and exclude the poor (Section 2.2). Nevertheless, the importance of land is 
not itself contested and the efficient functioning of land markets is considered a pre-requisite for 
any city to function properly and is often the reason for many of the problems of development 
(Amos, 1984, p.406). 
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Land market and management of land 
The way land is used, controlled and transacted highlights interconnections between the state, 
market, and the un-official but traditional structures such as tribal and religious authorities that 
influence access to land. It also provides a glimpse of power dynamics in any society as in ‘who 
controls land and how?’ and in that debate, state and market have largely been explored. 
When land is traded as a commodity, a land market is said to exist (UNESCAP, 1997). 
Governments, are the main owners of public land through land management institutions, and 
often initiate development processes and release land to satisfy social and economic need (Amos 
1984, UNESCAP 1997). However, treating land as a commodity has led to class divisions and 
exclusion, disjunctive citizenship further leading to informality as the excluded groups survive 
with ‘alternative’ options (Section 2.2.3). Countering the effect, more recently particularly in Latin 
America, advocacy and practice has challenged capitalist land markets, by arguing for the social 
function of property in which people’s need for housing land is balanced with the rights of private 
sector owners (Harvey, 2008; Parnell and Pieterse, 2010) 
In cities of the global South informal tenure systems arise partly because formal systems have 
failed to meet the needs of the poor, and in many cities a wide variety of tenure systems and land 
submarkets coexist (Brown, 2015). Land tenure is described as “The way land is held or owned by 
individuals and groups, or the set of relationships legally or customarily defined amongst people 
with respect to land. In other words, tenure reflects the relationships between people and land 
directly, and between individuals and groups of people in their dealing in land.” (UN-HABITAT, 
2008, p. 5).  
Different land tenures describe different types of lands in terms of management. Payne (1996, p. 
3-11; 2001 p. 416-418) identifies five main categories of land tenure: customary, private, public, 
religious and non-formal tenure types. UN-HABITAT (2008, p.6) describes private and public 
tenure systems as ‘formal’ with sub-categories of freehold and leasehold (the latter including both 
public and private rental), and ‘informal’, but does not distinguish between informal land tenure 
types. 
Often, in the formal domain, governments bring forward urban land for sale and development 
through institutions of land management or ‘gate-keepers’. For the disposal of land, institutional 
arrangements vary depending on the country. Farvacque and McAuslan (1992) identified the core 
institutions usually involved in land sale and disposal as: land administration agencies, local 
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governments and development authorities and private organisations, but these formal structures 
may vary with context.   
However, under liberalised market conditions state institutions do not serve the end-user or the 
citizen directly. Payne (2001) considers public land to be better than private land in terms of 
equity and inclusiveness. The latter introduces a tier of private organisations in the form of 
builders, developers and investors between the end user and the state institutions. Such private 
bodies work for profits leading to difficulties for the poor in accessing land and shelter (UNESCAP, 
1997). The poor then look for ‘alternatives’ to both the public land and private land options for 
their shelter, and thus the informal sector fills that gap and informal settlements emerge. 
2.3.3 Space and Production of Space 
Lefebvre’s book, “The Production of Space” (1974), transformed understandings of space by 
moving from describing space as a physical entity to a social product. Space and society are 
mutually constitutive, each is defined in relation to other; “space is not a reflection of society, it is 
its expression. In other words, space is not a photocopy of society, it is society” (Castells, 2000, p. 
441). Society impacts, constructs, controls and produces, space and vice versa (Soja, 1980). 
The nature of space produced through social activities reflects the nature of social relations. 
Space is thus a social construct and produced through human activities and the reproduction of 
social relations; thus it is a spatial manifestation of social relations and activities (Lefebvre, 1974). 
Madanipour (1999) further explains that the spaces we inhabit define our social existence, and 
space and spatial relations together define social reality.  
Lefebvre (1974) introduced ‘spatial triad’ to explain, through organisational analysis of space, the 
way that social production of space takes place. The triad consists of three fundamental aspects 
related to space, i.e. “spatial practice”, “representation of space” and “spaces of representation”. 
These three linked processes take place over time (space-time relation) to produce social space. 
Spatial practice represents “perceived spaces” that result from everyday practices involving 
tangible configurations in space, i.e. “the directly experienced world of empirically measurable 
and map-able phenomena” (Soja, 1999, p. 265). These everyday interactions create an awareness 
through bodily experience, termed perceived space. Thus, Soja (1980, p. 31) suggests that “space 
itself may be primordially given, but the organisation, use and meaning of space is a product of 
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social translation, transformation and experience”. This represents a ‘co-production’ of space 
created by humans working within the natural environment (Goodman, 1999), that combines 
nature (mountains, river, land) and manmade infrastructure or ‘second nature’ i.e. roads, dams, 
bridges, houses, parks etc. This argument suggests that space is intrinsically linked to society and 
its practices. 
Representation of space represents the “conceived spaces” that are first envisioned before 
coming into existence, drawn from theories and formalised representations used by 
‘professionals’ such as scientists, planners, or related organisations. Conceived spaces also 
depend on processes of attaching meaning to a space, followed by production of space. Such 
spaces highlight the power dynamics in a society, for example Lefebvre (1974, p. 49) described  
such spaces  of capitalism as “repressive”, he says “… monuments have a phallic aspect, towers 
exude arrogance, and the bureaucratic and political authoritarianism immanent to a repressive 
space is everywhere.”. This also suggests that power shapes space and society and that space is 
produced “from above” in this case. 
Spaces of representation involve everyday practices and use of available space, so are also 
termed as “lived spaces”, combining perceived and conceived spaces to highlight how humans 
actually use conceived spaces irrespective of the formally assigned, mapped and codified use. 
Lefebvre (1974) considered such spaces as a resistance to the hegemonic conceived spaces. This 
also suggests that society shapes space and that space is produced “from below”. 
Lefebvre (1974) identified a change in the nature of space over time, with respect to the process 
of its production, from an “absolute space” to an “abstract space”. The “absolute space” refers to 
space produced after human activity of assigning usage to the natural environment. “Absolute 
space was made up of fragments of nature located at sites which were chosen for their intrinsic 
qualities (caves, mountains etc.) but whose very consecration ended up by stripping them of their 
natural characteristics and uniqueness. “Thus, natural space was soon populated by political 
forces” (Lefebvre, 1974, p. 48). ‘Absolute space’ is more in line with ‘spaces of representation’ as 
it covers the co-production of space involving humans and nature. 
Conversely, “abstract space” emerged with the industrial revolution, and rise of capitalism, which 
stripped space from its natural settings to transform it into a commodity. Commodification 
emphasised life derived from economy in that social relations became sub-servient to economy 
rather than economic processes meant to serve the society (Yiftachel, 1998), whereby 
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“reproducibility, repetition and reproduction of social relationships” accomplish preference over 
nature (Dimendberg, 1998; Lefebvre, 1974). The commodification of space highlights space whose 
use value is only liberated through materialisation of its exchange value by selling it in the market. 
In this scenario, “representation of space” becomes the starting point of space production “from 
above” and thus the instrument of producing society, in which, “spaces of representation” and 
“spatial practices” are influenced through such power practices.  
However, Lefebvre’s spatial triad does not fully explain emergence of informal settlements, here 
described as a process of production of informal spaces. The spatial triad lacks in this context 
since, there is no “representation of spaces” in this case, as informal settlements (spaces) are 
beyond the formally laid out, codified and planned spaces that are also commodified spaces. 
Informal settlements do incorporate “spaces of representation” and the “spatial practices” of 
common people, but this concept misses out the role of informal actors in developing such spaces 
‘from between’, and thus is not fully explained through the spatial triad.  
2.3.4 Power and Social Production of Space 
The link between space and society is reiterated throughout the literature on social production of 
space, yet the role of power remains hidden and the discussion is generally limited to state and 
market. “Representation of space” remains the only way of organising space that identifies power 
dynamics, and within larger globalised economies such conceived spaces dominate spatial 
intervention. Space itself is an expression of power (Hirst, 2005), while Peluso and Lund (2011) 
have shown that controlling land (the physical dimension of space) gives bundles of powers to the 
controller (Section 2.4).  
In a capitalist city, owned-space as property forms the basis of access to many aspects of urban 
life, which strengthens the role of capitalist structures in social relations (Purcell, 2002). Lefebvre 
(1968; 1974) and Harvey (2008), both find a strong link between space and social relations in a 
society. Social relations can be controlled by controlling the space and vice versa, elaborated by 
Soja (1980).  
Within the debates around space, public space is a central theme. Brown & Lloyd-Jones (2002, in 
Brown 2006, p. 11) suggest that “the public realm is symbolic of the civic and community life of 
cities, but control of urban public space is also important as a demonstration of municipal power”.  
Public space also forms the space of contestation, conflict and exclusion as it is here that the 
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interests of both groups, capitalists and the deprived, clash with each other (Mitchel 2003, p. 18). 
Capitalists find, as always, the possibility of profit and seek power to control such spaces, while 
the poor find opportunities for livelihoods and social networking. Mitchell (2003, p.34) questions 
the role of governments in restricting access to the poor in public space, clearly favouring the 
exchange value of capitalistic structures. In fact, public spaces serve as a barometer to gauge who 
has the control over the city (Brown, 2010, p. 4). 
Thus, space as a social product is unavoidably infused with power relations, demonstrated above. 
However, Marxist writings often focus on the state-market-poor trio in examining power 
dynamics in society. This analytical approach overlooks the role of non-state actors in informality 
as noted in Section 2.2.5. Although, the role of power is embedded within society and social 
relations, merging power with society does not explain the effect of power on space and society. 
It is important, to consider power as a driving force influencing spatial and social relations.  
Thus the power-society-space link specifies a nexus between the three linked factors, as the 
literature, especially Lefebvre’s spatial triad, has suggested (Figure 2.1). This nexus argues that 
power, space and society are linked, and produce and reproduce each other in a dynamic way, a 
core concept used to examine the role of state and non-state actors in informal land controls 
analysed in this thesis.  
 
Figure 2.1: Power-Society-Space Nexus two-way and yet dynamic relation 
2.3.5 Defining Informal Land Control; a Type of Production of Space? 
Drawing on the discussion above, this section seeks to explore and define the concept of informal 
land controls. Apart from social processes involved in the production of space, various spatial 
28 | P a g e  
 
mechanisms are also used, including territoriality, land grabs, and land controls considered below, 
which all fall under the larger umbrella of informal land controls.  
The concept of territory is helpful in this research, as it brings together power (by the individual or 
group effecting control), society (objects, people and relationships) and space (by delimiting and 
asserting control over a geographic area) and thus reiterates the importance of power-society-
space nexus.  The literature discussed in Section 2.2 suggested that informal land control is 
carried out by middle men - mafias, organised crime groups, criminals or political parties. These 
actors seek to create and maintain a distinct territory, by establishing a system of informal 
governance by controlling and overseeing the land and land access, development processes, the 
occupants and their relationships, and any potential revenue streams. Sack (1983, p. 56) describes 
territoriality as “The attempt by an individual or group (x) to influence, affect or control objects, 
people and relationships (Y) by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” or 
“territory”. Similarly, Brower (1980, p. 179-180) in the book “Human Behaviour and Environment” 
writes “... the act of laying claim to a geographic area, marking it for identification and defending 
it when necessary against others of the same kind is called – territoriality”.  
Peluso and Lund (2011, p.669) examine how territoriality is associated with land control, and how 
different mechanisms and practices are used to “… acquire, secure and exclude others from land 
in intense competitions over control”. Peluso and Lund (2011) have explored new frontiers of 
“land controls” in the context of agricultural or productive land. The authors have explained that 
new strategies are evolving to control productive land, as such strategies give “bundles of 
powers” to influence people, land and resources. Peluso and Lund (2011, p. 668) further argue 
that “by ‘land control’ we mean practices that fix or consolidate forms of access, claiming, and 
exclusion for some time. Enclosure, territorialisation, and legalization processes, as well as force 
and violence (or the threat of them), all serve to control land”. Furthermore, they argue that “land 
controls direct our attention to how actors are able to hold onto the land, and to institutional and 
political ramifications of access, claims and exclusion.” (Peluso and Lund, 2011 p. 669).  
Although Peluso and Lund (2011) explore “land controls” in an agrarian context, however, it is the 
‘productive nature of land’ which makes it the focus of struggle and conflict, an argument that can 
also apply to urban land, particularly in neo-liberal economic context in which land is a commodity 
and a setting for production. Thus, Yiftachel (1998) rightly argues that under capitalist land 
markets, society becomes subservient to economy instead of markets serving society. This 
productive nature of land, operating in the interest of elites, tends to result in the poor being 
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dispossessed from developed land (areas) of the city, enabling informal actors to develop new 
spheres of control, particularly over informal settlements developed on un-productive land with 
limited market value (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey 2008). 
The concept of ‘informal land control’ highlights a different kind of space production, as it 
involves controlling existing settlements or spaces, both formal or informal, establishing territory 
and claiming resources within a territory. The concept thus deals with ‘lived spaces’, involving 
both physical and social dimensions of space. 
Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘informal land control’ is defined to mean 
establishing control over people and productive assets, both physical and non-physical, by 
delimiting a geographic area through visible and invisible boundaries of influence, wielded by 
individuals or groups in intense competition. Such competition embraces preserving and practising 
culture, religion or political ideologies, claiming control over physical or financial assets such as 
informal rent and votes, through bounded territoriality, brought about through various social and 
spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent (Section 2.5).   
The concept of land controls thus links the concept of power with space and its project of 
controlling space and resources. It can be seen that social conflict will always remain a part of 
urban society, since, defence of territory is one of the goals of territoriality (Section 2.5.3). The 
terms “divided city” and “segregation” often refer to the presence of territoriality and informal 
land controls in a city (Section 2.5.3 and 2.5.5).  
It is also important to distinguish between informal land control as a means of space production, 
and the mechanisms of control (socio-spatial controls explored in Section 2.5) as a combined 
effect of various processes, for example dynamics involving identities, and various socio-spatial 
mechanisms. Thus, socio-spatial control mechanisms are one of the many aspects used to 
establish informal land control.  
2.3.6 Informal Land Controls: Linking Social and Spatial Domains 
In seeking to frame and define the concept of ‘informal land controls’ this section has highlighted 
various gaps in the literature.  
First, while Lefebvre’s work (1974) is useful, his spatial triad - spatial practice; representation of 
space; and spaces of representation (see Section 2.3.3) - does not fully encapsulate the processes 
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of production of ‘informal’ spaces in the global south, for example Karachi.  Second, the narrow 
formulation of power structures as relating only to state and capitalist institutions, limits the 
scope of this body of work in explaining non-capitalist forms, other than the state and the market, 
of space production and exclusions. Both are discussed below. 
Informally developed settlements form an exception to Lefebvre’s spatial triad (1974), as such 
spaces do not incorporate ‘representation of space’ derived from formal physical planning 
processes, but are a symbol of absence of, or reaction to, exclusion from such ‘conceived spaces” 
and processes ‘from above’. However, ‘perceived spaces’ and ‘lived spaces’ do influence informal 
settlements at various scales. Informal settlements develop from “spatial practice” of various 
informal actors; for example in Karachi, such settlements are usually developed on hazardous 
lands through invasion and illegal subdivision – on river banks, railway reservations, steep slopes, 
vacant public or private land, or on peri-urban agricultural land. After delimitation of such 
informal spaces, communities define “lived spaces” through their own divisions between public, 
private and community spaces. It also includes claiming control over existing settlements, formal 
or informal, and thus deals with ‘lived spaces’ that are ‘conceived’ by hegemonic structures 
beyond the state and market. Thus informal settlements represents different type of 
‘representation of spaces’ in which state, capitalist structures or state institutions (city or local 
government) are not involved but alternative groups act to control to plan, codify and manage 
spaces. 
Second, the concept of production of space follows the Marxist path of analysing poverty through 
processes of capitalism and commodification, and hence focuses on the state, capitalists and the 
poor. In addition, the literature tends to see the poor as a homogenous group and disregards the 
city as a space of struggle for power (Mayer, 2009, p. 368-369). Earle (2011) explores different 
case studies analysed from a rights perspective, and argues that there are many power structures 
other than capitalist powers responsible for restricting people’s rights, “…the city can also be a 
space where citizenship is denied or compromised, for example in slums and informal settlements 
where life is dangerous, and where the right to a dignified standard of living is undermined. A 
city’s heterogeneity can be a double-edged sword.” (Earle, 2011, p. 2).  
Thus, the power-society-space nexus is helpful in the conceptualisation of any process of 
production of space, as it opens the debate to any type of power structure and its role in the 
informal production of space. 
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Against this background, the concept of ‘Informal land control’ suggests that land, its social 
structures and productive resources, are being controlled by informal or non-state actors, 
resulting in a process of territorialisation. Furthermore, processes of control are developed and 
maintained through the use practices, mechanisms or tactics explored in Section 2.4 below.  
2.4 Processes of Control – the Role of Power 
This section explores the literature gap, identified in the previous two sections, regarding 
processes of land control, and the social structures underpinning that control, lying beyond the 
remit of the formal domain of the state and legitimate legal processes (defined to include the 
state, its representatives and institutions, and the legal private sector). This thesis describes such 
non-formal processes and structures as ‘informal power structures’ (shortened to ‘informal 
structures’) in contrast to ‘formal power structures’ (or ‘formal structures’). This section explores 
the nature of informal structures and the power relations these entail.  
The literature available on power is diverse, its concepts and meanings are varied and contested 
(Gaventa, 2006), with different theories and perspectives adopted in different fields such as 
sociology and political economy etc. In this review, the concept of power is approached mainly as 
a social relation, and as a driving force leading to social ordering and the production of space, thus 
the literature in connection with these social and spatial aspects is reviewed in this section.  
The section is divided into three sub-sections. The first sets out to define power and power 
structures in general terms; its types, dynamics of working, its basic characteristics and nature. 
The second develops the basic understanding of power relations covering the emergence of 
power structures, and legitimation, etc. This section will also address the role of informal 
structures operating in the spatial and social domains of a society. The third section examine 
issues of the liberalisation of economies, social control, and production of space that forms the 
background of developed understandings of power. 
2.4.1 Understanding ‘Power’ 
In the social sciences, power represents a social relation, referring to the ability to influence 
individual or group behaviour, with or without the consent of the individual or group falling under 
this influence. Goldhamer and Shils (1939), Bierstedt (1950), Gerth and Mills (1953), Luke (1974), 
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Foucault (1982), Gaventa (2003,2006), and (Vermeulen, 2005), among others, seem to agree to 
this widely accepted definition with slight variations, e.g. Luke (1974) sees power “as the 
imposition of internal constraints, and those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their 
consent or their adaptation to domination by either coercive or non-coercive forms” (in Lorenzi, 
2006, p.88).  
However, it is not enough simply to understand power in terms of social relations, since 
production of space through informal land controls involve both social as well as spatial 
dimensions. Power should also be seen as a project of control over productive resources and their 
exploitation, and as argued by Gaventa (2003): “the political economy approach sees power as 
the ability to command control over resources, and may be especially useful for conceptualising 
‘powerlessness’ as well as power.” In this definition, the political economy approach broadens the 
definition of power seen as a process of social control to include controlling both people and 
productive assets (resources), either physical or non-physical, suggesting an additional dimension 
that should be explored in examining informal land controls. 
In summary, power refers to an ability produced from having a relatively superior position (due to 
moral, knowledge-based, legal, institutional, physical, resource-based, religious, social, or cultural 
assets), that allows the power holder to influence and control the individual or group behaviour of 
subjects, their resources and actions, with or without consent of the people so influenced. The 
process through which this ‘relatively superior position’ is achieved refers to process of 
‘production of power’, while the agents or the structures that control and use power are termed 
‘power structures’ in this analysis.  
The concepts of French philosopher Foucault about power are intriguing as he saw power freed 
from agency, personality or institution, arguing that “power is everywhere” (Foucault, 1978, p. 
93). In his concept, power cannot be counted or calculated and cannot be located, it is relational 
and is produced, and thus can be traced only when exercised (Rowland, 1997, p.12).  
Nature of power 
Power itself is a neutral term but its usage defines its nature, which may be both ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’, reformist or oppressive, depending on its objectives, means of implementation, 
outcome, and from whose perspective the outcome is seen.  
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Lukes (1974) sees power as negative in terms of domination, authority, superiority, prestige, use 
of force, manipulation etc., suggesting that a sense of subjugation and oppression is necessary for 
the power-holder to achieve a ‘superior position’ over subjects. However, power is not always 
negative and oppressive.Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (1977, p. 194) 
challenged this notion of negativity: “we must cease once and for all to describe the effect of 
power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it 
‘conceals’. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals 
of truth. The individual and knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.” 
Previously, Bierstedt (1950) had already pointed towards the positive side of power by saying that 
“power supports the fundamental order of society and the social organization within it, wherever 
there is order. Power stands behinds every association and sustains its structure. Without power 
there is no organisation and without power there is no order.” Similarly Lukes (1974) when he 
introduced his famous concept of the “three dimensions of power”, also pointed out that power is 
not only a negative term but also helps in political decision-making and problem-solving.  
Lukes’s (1974) book, Power: A Radical View, described three dimensions of power that underpin 
political decision-making. “One-dimensional” power is visible, the power that is written and 
everybody can see and access, and can try to change, such as powers of heads of state or 
constitutional power. The “two-dimensional” view of power refers to hidden power wielded as a 
tool of exclusion from the main topics of debate, e.g: by not allowing access to the sources of 
information or knowledge in order to exclude certain ethnicities, religious groups or genders from 
decision making. “Three-dimensional” or invisible power refers to the power tactics which develop 
a “false consciousness” in the subjects or subordinates, where the subjects ‘internalise’ 
powerlessness and consider that they are not worthy of taking part in decision making. Although 
the literature considers the three attributes of power in relation to class struggles and the 
dominance of one economic class over other, the approach is broad enough to analyse any type 
of power structure. 
However, this literature does not adequately explain the ‘relative’ nature of users of power. Some 
power-holders maybe positive and supportive towards their subjects, but their actions may also 
result in negative outcomes for subjects or other competing or contending power-holders. For 
example, as already discussed, informal urban development processes sometimes benefit the 
poor, yet at the same time, have made cities ungovernable (Section 2.2). Thus, power against the 
background of informality has a relative and ‘dual nature’ that is also ‘scalar’, positive on the 
local-level for one type of stake holder while negative for another and at the city-level.  
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Power as action or having capability of action and inaction 
Power refers to the capacity and ability to influence behaviour or action. Bierstedt (1950) sees this 
as an inherent capability: “Power itself is the predisposition or prior capacity which makes the 
application of force possible. Only groups which have power can threaten to use force and the 
threat itself is a power” (Bierstedt, 1950, p. 733). However the capacity can be an illusion until it is 
applied, as  Foucault (1982, p. 789) argues: “something called Power, with or without a capital 
letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. 
Power exists only when it is put into action.” Further, (Ibid, p. 789), “what defines a relationship of 
power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. 
Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which 
may arise in the present or the future”. However when Foucault (1982) discusses actions that may 
arise in the future, the argument resembles Lukes’s (1974) third attribute of power, i.e. “the 
power to prevent the formation of grievances by shaping perception, cognitions, and preferences 
in such a way as to ensure the acceptance of a certain role in the existing order” (in Lorenzi, 2006, 
p. 92). Sometimes the threat of power is more important than its action. Luke argues that 
‘inaction’ may be a tool of the power-holder who might abstain from using power to avoid 
conflict, so ‘avoidance’ when the capacity exists is another strategy open to power-holders.  
The decoding of ‘inaction’ is difficult, since it is possible that the power structure might not have 
the required power to take action. For example, Amos (1984) and de Soto (1989), identify the rise 
of informal settlements as the people’s response to the incapacity or ‘inaction’ of the state, but 
here incapacity or failure symbolises lack of power. The state is not abstaining from exercising 
power; in this case  there is no capacity or resources to exercise power. For example in Karachi 
various influxes of refugees have been allowed to encroach on undeveloped spaces because the 
state did not have the capacity to accommodate them (Hasan, 2002, see Chapter 4). Furthermore, 
as seen in Section 2.2, informality is used as ‘negotiable value’ where the government can assume 
power through ‘inaction’ to allow “deregulation” (i.e. ignoring the rules) rather than “un-
regulation” (i.e. changing the rules) in order to maintain flexibility when required. 
Power relations and expression of power 
The concept of power implies a two-way social relation, which describe the production of power. 
The power-holder cannot exist in isolation, but requires subjects to influence, rule, or gain 
legitimacy over, in order to control behaviour, actions or resources. Simmel (1950, p. 136), for 
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example, explains that “where the significance of the one party sinks so low that its effects no 
longer enters the relationship with the other, there is as little ground for speaking of sociation as 
there is in the case of the carpenter and his bench.” This two-way relation can be of two types i.e. 
“A power relation is ‘unilateral’ if only one party to the relationship exercises power over the 
other and ‘bilateral’ if both parties exercise power over each other.” (Goldhamer and Shils, 1939, 
p. 175). Furthermore, the nature of this two-way relationship can be coercive or voluntary 
depending on the type and objectives of power and its working dynamics. In the case of non-state 
actors, there can be cases of both unilateral and bilateral power. For example, in informal 
settlements, where the provision of goods and services can be organised by criminal groups or 
political parties, the relationship is usually bilateral i.e. the power providing the service gets 
something in return; money in the case of criminal groups, political obedience and votes in the 
case of the political parties representing the state (Weinstein 2008, Roy 2009). In the case of 
informal structures involving drug gangs and violent methods of control, power is usually one way 
and a total obedience is required from the subjects – this is a kind of ‘unilateral’ power, as 
explored in detail by Rodgers (2005) in Nicaragua. 
Some authors identify how power is practiced and produced (Rowland, 1997). First, “power over” is 
widely linked with the negative connotations of power, “Power is seen as a win-lose kind of 
relationship. Having power involves taking it from someone else, and then using it to dominate 
and prevent others from gaining it. In politics, those who control resources and decision-making 
have power over those without. When people are denied access to important resources like land, 
healthcare, and jobs, ‘power over’ perpetuates inequality, injustice, and poverty” (VaneKlasen & 
Miller, 2002, p.45). Space production under neoliberal market policies is seen from the same 
perspective (Holloway, 2005), where state and capitalist structures use “power over” subjects as 
the policy tools to keep the cycle of surplus value moving.  
Others highlight more just and collaborative ways of producing and using power i.e. “power with”, 
“power to” and “power from within” (VaneKlasen & Miller, 2002, p. 45). “Power with” highlights 
the potential power of collective action derived from common or shared objectives. It requires 
the identification of common strengths and potentials to collaborate towards achieving common 
interests, so that collective action ‘empowers’ the otherwise weak and powerless group. “Power 
to” argues that every individual has the “power to” bring change based on their unique strengths. 
Such potential when nurtured and utilised collectively, as “power with”, makes a difference. 
“Power within” is focussed around agency of the individual that is ‘empowered’ through building 
self-consciousness and self-esteem, with important potential to bring about change.  
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One aspect of power structures less explored in literature is the scope for a power structure to 
develop and renew itself; e.g. through creating competition or expansionist agendas. This project 
of growth leads such structures (i) to increase the number of people/subjects controlled, (ii) 
expand productive resources, and (iii) strengthen the structure of the organisation. These three 
aspects have been described by Bierstedt (1950, p.737) as sources of power. The non-state actors, 
as power structures, have the same tendency, e.g. to upgrade from being informal to being a 
legal, and hence legitimate, formal power structure. Legal legitimacy gives further access to state 
institutions and benefits thus enabling further control, as explored comprehensively by Yiftachel 
(1998).  Similarly, the involvement of informal structures in electoral politics is similar, as winning 
an electoral seat gives an otherwise non-legitimate structure or individual legal powers. Organised 
criminal groups and their links with the political parties has been identified by Weinstein (2008), 
Kudva (2009) and Roy (2009) in India, and Yusuf (2012), Gayer (2014), Hasan et al. (2015) in 
Karachi-Pakistan. In addition, non- state actors are always working with state officers, politicians 
and other institutions to keep increasing their formal power. This is documented in many of the 
cases discussed by Weinstein (2008), Roy (2009), Kudva (2009), Budhani et al. (2010), Hasan 
(2010), Utas (2012), Gayer (2014) and Hasan et al. (2015). 
Although the literature seems to cover the power-subject relation, it does not shed much light on 
power-power (power-holders) relations. A situation in which there are two or more powers 
structures wielding their power through control over the same resource like land, electoral votes 
or settlements as a market for their products becomes competitive. The power-power relation is 
also important to explore because to understand and interpret situations when state power is 
weak or absent, often more than one power structure arises to fill the gap, leading to competition 
which, in many cases, can be termed as conflict, civil war, gang war etc.  
2.4.2 Types of Powers and Power Structures 
There are many ways to define types of power control or structures. Some authors have looked at 
it through the lens of legality, or the way in which power operates and how decision-making takes 
place. However, the literature has very little to offer around non-state actors, political parties, or 
religious groups as power structures. The debate around power also oscillates between legal and 
illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, welfare based, voluntary or oppressive.  
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Systems of differentiation 
The literature explores various systems of differentiations i.e. that “which permits one to act upon 
the actions of others” (Foucault, 1982, p. 792). This approach is useful to help examine various 
forms of control, and the relationship of superior-to-subordinate and means through which the 
superior party gains legitimacy to exercise power, whether through legality, oppression, tradition, 
resources, knowledge and class etc. 
Existing hierarchies 
Relative superiority based on existing hierarchies and status can take various forms. Simmel 
(1950) explored “domination” as a power. Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 171-172) examined 
the “type of influence brought to bear upon the subordinated individual" including: physical 
power or “force”; “domination” conveyed through the order to act, and “manipulation” when the 
influence is on behaviour without clarifying the purpose i.e. objectives are intentionally made 
hidden or wrongly described as the truth might not fetch the same results – the latter resembles 
the three-dimension of power identified by Lukes (1974), already explored.  
Power structures can gain legitimacy on the basis of “coercion”, by threat, blackmail and violence. 
Although Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 172) consider such coercions as points of departure 
from legitimacy, since this coercion is the basis for acceptance of power and no resistance is 
posed, it can also be seen as a form of legitimacy, as there is still freedom and without freedom 
there is no power relation (Foucault, 1982, p. 790, Simmel 1950, p. 136).  
Legality 
This refers to the acceptance of exercise of power by virtue of the rule of law. Such powers are 
usually termed as “legal legitimate” powers, e.g. a government formed by political parties has 
legal powers to devise and control policy and institutions. Weber (1946) call such legitimacy 
“authority”, whereas, Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 172) go a step further and define the types 
of legitimacies or “right to rule”, however it can also be termed a typology of power. When power 
is acknowledged and accepted by subordinates it is a “legitimate” power and when it is not, it is 
called “coercion”. They further define the sub-types of “legitimate” power as (i) “legal” when the 
law legitimates power; (ii) “traditional” when the norms and culture of society allow power to 
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flourish; (iii) “charismatic” if power is accepted on the basis of  its personification in a ‘hero’ or on 
the basis of other qualities. 
Tradition  
Traditions and values in many societies are accepted as the basis of legitimate power. Some 
traditional roles gain legal recognition and a formal position in national or local governance and 
administration, while others are informally accepted and respected by people. Bourdieu’s (1989, 
p. 21) concept of “nobiles” is relevant – i.e. those who acquire ‘symbolic power’ and attain social 
‘authority’ as a superior position due to access to social, cultural or economic capital. Various 
examples can be quoted; e.g. the role of tribal chiefs in land management in some parts of Africa 
is legally accepted, and in the tribal areas of Pakistan tribal elders are legally accepted (Shinwari 
2012). Some modern democracies still retain a monarchy, as in the UK. In many sects of Islam, 
religious leadership traditionally transfers to family members, e.g. amongst Bohri Muslims and 
Ismaili Muslims (Lokhandwalla, 1955; Daftari, 1998). Similarly, many Arab and African countries 
still follow ethnic or tribal leaders in their social lives (Utas, 2012). Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 
172) call these traditions a ‘charismatic’ legitimacy that involves emotional attachment to a 
position or institution. 
Identity discourse 
Discourse is central in the production of power, especially around the issue of identity, which 
helps people accept the exercise of religious, ethnicity, gender, politics or other discursive power 
structures (Foucault, 1978, p. 100-01; Laclau and Mauffe, 2001).  Foucault (1982, p. 777) identifies 
“bio-power” as a type when “it operates through techniques of disciplining, ordering, ranking, 
making visible and subjecting to knowledge” and relates this power to schools, hospitals, jails etc. 
Similarly, Foucault (1978) identified discourse as important in power production, suggesting that a 
power that emerges around discourse can be called a “discursive power”. 
Power and the state  
Foucault argued that, “... a new political form of power has been continuously developing. This 
new political structure, as everybody knows, is the state” and he compares the state as a power 
structure with the religious authorities (structures) in Christian society (Foucault, 1982, p. 782-
783). However, he argues that despite various similarities between “state power” and “pastoral 
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power”, the state is based on a political power structure that earns its legitimacy from promises 
to provide services to ensure the needs of wellbeing of its citizens, whereas “pastoral power” is 
oriented around a need for ‘salvation’.  
In the context of spatial development, Gaventa (2003, p.12), exploring Scott’s (1998) concepts, 
explained that government and formal structures seek rational strategies and to make power 
“visible” in order to create governable subjects, whereas informal structures try to keep their 
subjects and space “invisible” and under control on the promise of upgrading to a formal status. 
The concept of informal power structures is dealt in detail below (Section 2.4.3)  
Fulfilling ‘need’  
Many powers are produced and obtain legitimacy around the subjects’ ‘need’, either real or 
perceived (based on discourse). When Foucault (1982, p. 782-783) talks about state power, he 
argues that state power gains legitimacy from ‘worldly aims’ and the basic needs of people i.e. 
safety, security, shelter, wellbeing etc. Thus people elect or legitimate political parties who can 
best serve to their needs, while conversely political parties can develop or invent needs e.g. the 
‘need’ for protection from an enemy (ethnic, religious, national) to increase their legitimacy. 
Likewise, informal structures also seek legitimacy around the concept of fulfilling people’s ‘needs’ 
e.g. for land, shelter, services or formalising informal settlement, as explored by Roy (2009) and 
Weinstein (2008). 
Resource control 
Bierstedt (1950) considered productive resources as a core foundation of power, suggesting that 
“resources are media through which power is exercised as a routine element of the instantiation 
of conduct in social reproduction” (Gidden, 1984, p. 15-16). People or organisations with access to 
social, economic and material capital, to finance or an army of support, can accumulate power at 
scale. Social networks can also be understood as a resource and a network of supporting actors 
can increase the legitimacy of power. For example, markets can be manipulated if the numbers of 
producers are limited. Informal structures also prove resourceful in claiming legitimacy over their 
subjects, but may have to compete for power with another claimant over the same territory or 
subjects. 
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De facto power 
Some power structures are relative or reactionary, a counterpoint to the action or inaction of an 
opposing power structure. Foucault (1982, p. 780-781) considers ‘struggle or resistance’ as, “a 
type of power which makes individuals a ‘subject’, subject not In the sense of controlled by 
someone else. Foucault (1982, p. 781) identifies three types of struggles (or power) i.e. (i) struggle 
against domination (e.g. ethnic social or religious), (ii) struggle against the exploitation of 
dispossession or primitive accumulation, and  (iii) struggle against subjection or complete 
submission.  
The concept of “substitute” power proposed by Goldhamer and Shils (1939, p. 174) seems the 
most directly relevant to this research and the concept of informal structures emerging from this 
discussion. Goldhamer and Shils (1939, p. 174) explain that, “If attempts of a person to exercise 
power fail, the power act may be followed either by a substitute power act or by a sanction. A 
substitute power act is intended primarily to attain the original aim of the first act. Substitution 
may take place both within or between types of power.” 
2.4.3 Defining Informal Power Structures 
The above conceptualisations of power structures help in defining the role of informal and non-
state actors, and in addressing the gaps identified in the literature on informality, production of 
space and power, and will help in theorising informal land controls. These concepts are 
summarised in Figure 2.2. 
In this thesis ‘informal power structures’ (shortened here to informal structures) are understood 
as the concept of “substitute power” put forward by Goldhammer and Shils (1939, p. 174) which 
substitutes for government-held power, and can be held by either individuals or organisations, 
both legally legitimate organisations such as political parties, or illicit structures such as organised 
crime groups. There are many types of power-holders between these two extremes, which draw 
legitimacy from various domains including: “tradition” e.g. tribal structures and elders; 
“discourse” e.g. by religious authorities, or “charismatic personalities”, such as individuals with 
resources and social or religious standing, criminals such as drug gangs, and “neutral” power 
structures such as neighbourhood committees, civil society organisations or NGOs (Figure 2.2). 
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Some of power structures, given in figure 2.2, cannot be fixed as either formal or informal. For 
example, political parties are formally registered and work according to their manifesto within the 
boundaries of the law. However, the empirical evidence suggests that such structures blur formal-
informal divide; since they channel public resources and development through the legally non-
legitimate infrastructure such as political party offices and their representatives. In such cases, the 
role of elected representatives becomes subservient to the party hierarchy (See chapter 5, table 
5.3). Similarly, formally elected representatives and government employees equally blur the 
formal-informal boundaries.     
Such informal structures work ‘from between’ as ‘power intermediaries’ that connect formal 
structures that work ‘from above’, in implicit and open ways or may even be part of the politically 
elected government, as explored in literature on informality (Section 2.2). Furthermore, they are 
also connected with the people in many ways, e.g. through political parties, religious authorities 
and tribal leaders, or gangs, and work ‘from below’, and often control people through ‘informal 
land controls’ as they earn legitimacy by providing urban services to the people (Sections 2.2.5 
and 2.3.6). 
Thus, the concept of ‘informal structures’ is used here to refer to any form of leadership or social 
control mechanism operating illicitly in the fields of urban development, urban management or 
territoriality. In Karachi, these include political parties operating through informal mechanisms, 
tribal elders and Jirga (councils of elders), Baradary (brotherhoods), religious councils and 
committees, neighbourhood committees, criminal gangs and musclemen (thugs) (Chapter 5, 6 
and 7). Such informal structures bank on the “needs” of their constituents, either material e.g. for 
housing or water, or non-material e.g. religious or cultural needs, that enable the poor and 
minorities to gain acceptance. Such informal structures build on established social groups, but 
assume status as informal structures once the formal government fails to provide services 
impartially. 
The concept of ‘informal structures’ is seen in contrast to ‘formal structures’ that include the 
legal, legitimate power structures of the state, together with legitimate structures of the private 
and commercial sector, which holds powers vested by the state. 
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Figure 2.2: Hierarchy of power structures 
 
Power structures 
Formal power structures  
Elected government 
 city government,                      
local government,               
political parties 
Service providers 
water/electricity companies, 
telecoms & broadband,              
the Police, Rangers 
Private sector services 
 Builders, developers etc. 
Informal power structures 
Political  
political parties using non-legal or 
illegitimate processes,                         
vigiliante groups with  political aims 
Social identity-based 
 religious committees                        
tribal groups,                       
neighbourhood committees 
Criminal  
e.g. gangs 
Neutral  
Civic non-identity  need-based groups, 
neighbourhood committees 
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Structure for governmentality  
Foucault coined the term ‘governmentality’ to refer the way in which the state governs its 
citizens. Here, this term is examined to explore how informal structures are able to exercise 
controls in relation to their structure and hierarchy both in organisational terms and in human 
resource. 
Informal structures can be agency-based or have a hierarchical structure. When agency-based, 
they depend more on the ‘charisma’ of the personality that may be due to ‘tradition’ e.g. tribal 
systems, ‘discourse’ e.g. religious personalities, or out of ‘need’ fulfilment. In hierarchical 
structures, e.g. political parties, religious hierarchies etc. a system of networks is essential. This 
network is used to implement controls and to earn legitimacy, for example through surveillance, 
threats or punishments (Section 2.5). Such networks can be of two types:  
i) A closed network, with restricted and monitored membership, having a hierarchy and 
defined roles and limitations. For example, Rodgers (2005) has demonstrated how drug 
peddlers in Nicaragua have a sophisticated hierarchy of operations, Hossain (2012a) has 
identified how political hierarchies operate in Bangladesh, and Gayer (2014) has 
elaborated on Pakistani political parties (especially MQM) and their strong hierarchies 
that enable them to resist any attack or call the city to a halt through a strike call.    
ii) The second type may cover informal networks based on tribal, family, kinship, ethnic or 
political ties. These can be an extension of first type and might help the formal hierarchy 
in achieving its control and legitimacy. For example, Budhani et al. (2010) has explored 
the role of solidarity networks of kinship, ethnicity and family as a basis of establishing 
territoriality and producing space in the ethno-politically diverse context of Karachi.  
An established network can be used in many ways, for example in conflict resolution and contract 
enforcement. Budhani et al. (2010) consider contract enforcement as an essential and central 
service operated by informal structures in informal settlements that reduces the demands on 
formal government and increases dependency; make the informal structure the guarantor and 
arbitration authority in the settlement.  
2.4.4 Concluding Debate on Power 
Power refers to an ability produced due to having a ‘relatively superior position’ (due to moral, 
knowledge-based, legal, institutional, physical, resource, religious, social, cultural or other 
superiorities). Such power allows the controller to influence and control both, individuals and 
group of subjects, their resources and behaviour, with or without their consent, in order to 
achieve the desired ‘objectives’. Such power is not tangible or containable, but is diffused, and is 
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found both in ‘action’ and ‘in-action’. It is not limited to institutions but can be found in 
structures, in agency and in individuals, and is a two-way or “bilateral” relationship, in which, the 
subject ‘produces power’ while the ‘structure’ accumulates power. This two-way relationship is 
based on mutual interests, for example, in the case of the state and citizens, or capitalist 
structures that profit from users of commodities, and informal power structures which provide 
goods and services to deprived and marginal communities. “Patron-client” relations are another 
example of such bilateral relations.  
The main distinction that arises between two types of power structures are the ‘legally 
legitimate’, termed ‘formal structures’ in the text, and the ‘non-legally legitimate’ power 
structures, termed ‘informal structures’ here. As noted at the start of the Section 2.4, formal 
structures are considered those that act according to defined rules and objectives, including the 
state, governments and their representatives and institutions. Here, the formal structures are 
often linked to state governance systems and dedicated to the provision of goods and services, 
with citizens seen as subjects, and the state having responsibility to ensure their wellbeing. 
Formal structures also include the private sector and legally legitimate organisations, developed 
and working according to state rules, widely termed the ‘market’ in the literature.  
In contrast, ‘informal structures’ are ‘substitute power structures’ that can be seen as the ‘power 
intermediaries’ working ‘from between’ as an alternative to the formal structures, and 
channelling state resources to citizens for political and material benefits using informal means. 
Informal structures embrace a broad spectrum of superior-subject relations, from legally 
legitimate structures such as political parties using coercive means through to illegitimate 
structures such as organized crime groups. There are shades between these two extremes that 
draw on various sources of legitimacy including; tradition, discourse and charismatic personalities. 
Informal structures also draw on subjects’ needs, either civic, religious or cultural. Thus, informal 
structures are able to produce and reproduce social relations with the people they control and 
thus impact on the production of space. In Karachi, the intentional and unintentional failure of the 
state’s governance systems have left a void which ‘informal structures’ have claimed resulting in 
the acute spatial segregation and violent power struggles that characterise  everyday life in many 
parts of Karachi.  
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2.5 Mechanisms of Socio-Spatial Control 
Socio-spatial controls discussed here are means of developing and maintaining power relations 
through the process of subject-making, establishing social order, leading to the control of a 
territory, variously described as making “pure” space (Sibley, 1996) or a “homeland” (Yiftachel 
and Ghanem, 2004, p. 651). This also provides an understanding about the importance of the 
linkage between social relations, space and power. 
The literature reviewed here does not generally distinguish between formal and informal 
structures or issues of scale. However, the section suggests that there is a huge gap in the 
literature in the identification of ‘mechanisms’ of ‘informal land control’ as a means establishing 
subject-power relations and production of spaces (informal spaces). The connection between 
socio-spatial controls and ‘informal land controls’ has already been discussed (Section 2.3.5) in 
that socio-spatial controls are specific mechanisms that are operationalized to achieve informal 
land control.  
This section is divided into two parts. The first explores the links between socio-spatial controls, 
territoriality, boundary-making, segregation, exclusion, and other socio-spatial concepts, and the 
second section examines the identification and implementation of controls and their 
categorization in the literature. Control mechanisms are examined in terms of social and spatial 
controls, reflecting back to the power-society-space nexus, to see how each affects the other.  
2.5.1 The Concept of Control  
The term control here means the ‘mechanism’ used to regulate the order, relations and identity 
of social groups, and to regulate the production and distribution of space and other resources, 
with the purpose of developing and maintaining social, political and economic domination and 
ownership. It is similar to the idea of “societies of control”, i.e. “to tax rather than to organise 
production, to rule on death rather to administer life” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 3). 
Three broad themes are evident in the literature: (i) Debates on social control from the 
perspective of social psychology and urban sociology and the specific mechanisms used as 
controls (ii) spatial controls found in political geography, human geography and urban and 
regional planning literature, and (iii) topics dealing with the outcomes of socio-spatial controls, 
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such as division within cities, like boundary-making and divided cities etc.  Each is discussed 
further below. 
2.5.2 Social Control 
The concept of social control, first coined by Ross in 1901 (Coser and Rosenberg, 1969), has 
developed from a debate in social psychology with positive connotations to being seen as a policy 
tool of exploitative nature.  
The concept extends from externally imposed mechanisms to exploiting internalised control; from 
an individual’s interaction with their environment to the state control and exploitation (e.g. of 
ethnic groups); from obvious and visible actions to invisible and hidden policy tools, and from 
legally defined control mechanisms to informal tactics of domination. 
The early literature, covering Ross (1969), Durkheim (1969), Mead (1969), Piaget (1969), and 
others, is found dealing with the relation between the individual and society (the environment), 
and controls related to norms, values and customs, and how these are maintained and 
transferred to the next generation. The literature also highlights that social controls are there to 
bring order to society and ensure sufficient conformity by individuals to social norms. Coser and 
Rosenberg (1969, p. 97) argued that, “Social control refers to those mechanisms by which society 
exercises its dominion over component individuals and enforces conformity to its norms and 
values”.   
Ross (1969) suggested that some social controls are necessary for “social and moral order” while 
others such as law, belief, ceremony, education, and illusion are consciously used as policy tools 
for exploiting people and resources. However, social control is seen to embrace both the 
formalised legal frameworks, and informal structures of control. As Coser and Rosenberg (1969, p. 
97-98) suggest, “there is a wide range of control mechanisms and that law, which had earlier been 
seen as the only important mechanism, was one of many, and possibly not even the most 
important”. 
Ross (1969) identified social controls that work “externally” and require some mechanism to keep 
people in line, such as traffic laws. Ross (1969) distinguished between controls related to moral 
values and sentiments like religion, art etc. and political controls dealing with class benefits. Other 
commentators such as Durkheim (1969), Mead (1969), Piaget (1969), and Foucault (1977, 1982), 
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identified controls that are “internalised’, some of which were indirectly discussed in the 
literature around power, e.g. ‘manipulation’ as described by Goldhammer and Shils (1939), or 
Lukes’s (1974) third dimension of power (Section 2.4.2), which reflects ‘invisible’ mechanisms of 
social control. 
Implementing social controls 
Social controls can be further grouped under two sub-categories, (i) controls related to 
demography and, (ii) controls related to discipline and obedience. 
Demographic control 
Demographic control is a broad mechanism to restrict the population of an area to a specific 
group. Demography in an urban locality can be controlled in many ways (e.g. through voluntary 
clustering, in-migration of group members, property transactions, harassment, or evictions). 
Demographic control can also involve converting identities from “them” to “us” through discourse 
– encouraging people to invoke new identities, change their political support or change identities. 
The most extreme form of demographic control is conversion by force, for example, the deadly 
mechanism of ethnic cleansing which usually has the same objective. 
Demographic control has been widely explored in the literature. Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004) 
have examined state-level ethnic-oriented policy interventions in Israel, Sri Lanka and Estonia 
intended to control “others”. Yiftachel (1998) has explored the role of urban planning, including 
tools of demographic control, as a controlling mechanism in detail, while Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 
1999) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003) have identified cases of “demographic engineering” in Israel, 
where different formal strategies, explored below,  control the ethno-religious composition of a 
settlement and are used for establishing territorial control.  
Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003) expose the project of the Judaising of 
Israel, in which new settlements and international in-migration were designed to increase the 
Jewish population, to strengthen the Jewish state and reduce the land occupied by Muslim ethnic 
minorities. Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003) also describe policies to 
convert settlements with an Arab population concentration into ethnically mixed 
neighbourhoods, i.e. changing the demography through positive discrimination in property 
occupancy. Demographic control by informal structures has also been identified in informal 
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settlements in Karachi where people from the same ethnicity are allowed to live while others are 
forced out, resulting in ethnically divided neighbourhoods (Yusuf, 2012) . 
Demographic controls are also achieved through land agents that act as middle-men in buying, 
selling or renting properties as identified by Hasan et al. (2013, p. 44-48) in the context of Karachi. 
In many urban settings, social networks of friends, family, relatives and relations of kinship and 
solidarity play a vital role in creating ethnically homogenous informal settlements (Budhani et al. 
2010; Hossain, 2012a, 2012b). Property prices too tend to group people of different income levels 
together. 
Demography is also controlled through control of identities. As everyone has multiple identities 
(Tilly, 2004) and power structures invoke identities (Foucault, 1978; Laclau & Mauffe, 2001), thus, 
the demography of “us” versus “them” is malleable and can be controlled. Discourse plays a vital 
role in invoking identities and creating symbolic boundaries based on identity. Social boundaries 
later convert into physical boundaries and the aim of the discursive power of making ‘homeland’ 
is achieved. 
Obedience and conformity 
Creation of obedient and disciplined subjects is a core objective of controls. The act of control is 
not necessarily oppressive (Bierstedt, 1950; Luke, 1974; Foucault, 1977), but can also be for the 
benefit of people as control can bring order and stability. Discourse around identity can help 
create social stability and disciplined subjects, i.e. the subjects ‘internalise’ and act upon the 
control voluntarily.  
The concept of punishment and sanctions forms the most common means of both establishing 
power relations/disciplining subjects, and as a tool of power to facilitate other controls. “A 
sanction is a power act initiated primarily as a reprisal for non-conformity with a prior act of 
power; its intent is punitive and not primarily directed toward achieving the goal of the prior 
unsuccessful power act.” (Goldhammer and Shils, 1939, p.174). The punishment could be verbal, 
monetary or physical. Violence and threat of violence are commonly used forms of punishment, 
and are often used by informal structures to create power relations. As Rodgers (2005, p.9) 
reports in the case of drug traffickers in Nicaragua “...perhaps the most basic form of social 
regulation is achieved through the use and threat of violence”, and also, “violence, the on-going 
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threat of it, and its memory as a residual threat, is a major component in the making of territory, 
property, and of course the state.”  
Sanctions and punishments can be imposed on subjects, while the use of violence on ‘others’ or 
outsiders is another important tool that works in two ways. Firstly, it excludes ‘others’ and keeps 
the boundary intact, and secondly it shows power to save subjects from the ‘enemy’.  For 
example in Karachi, the ethno-political violence has been explored by many such as, Budhani et al. 
(2010), Yusuf (2012), Hasan (2010), Javaid and Hashmi (2012), Gayer (2012), as further described 
in (Section 2.5.3 and Chapter 4). 
Sanctions such as social boycotts, peer pressure and ties of kinship are not debated in the 
literature. Such sanctions are effective in contexts where social networks are based on ethnicity, 
religion or tribal customs. Furthermore, sanctions related to money are also not widely addressed 
under social controls, although Budhani et al (2010) and Yusuf (2012) has identified cases of rent-
seeking in Karachi.  
Many commentators have also identified indirect controls in informal settlements, which makes 
residents of the settlements compliant. Roy (2009, p.80) and Davis (2004, p.15-16) consider that 
the ‘inaction’ of government which allows informal settlements to develop is a way of controlling 
large poor communities, and of avoiding any political challenge. The ‘informal’ status of the 
settlement keeps the poor obedient to the state, which enjoys this obedience reinforced by the 
threat of evicting ‘illegal’ occupants of public and private land. Similarly, political parties earn 
political loyalties as a trade-off for their protection against evictions, against promises of lobbying 
for settlement upgrading, land titles, welfare works and basic services provision (Weinstein, 2008; 
Kudva, 2009). Budhani et al (2010) and Shahdat Hussain (2012a, 2021b) also supports this 
argument through their case studies of informal settlements in Karachi-Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Against the background of discursive identity and boundary making, power-seekers use the threat 
of the “enemy” to justify their acts of exploitation and control, convincing subjects that loyalty will 
save them from a common threat, as Christensen (2012, p. 64) found in Sierra Leone, and others 
confirmed e.g: in the discussion of Africa’s ‘Big Men’ and their networks (Utas, 2012); Hardt and 
Negri’s (2012) “securitised person”, and examples from Israel by Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999). 
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Controlling decision-making and institutions 
Control over decision-making provides an opportunity to manipulate institutions in one’s favour, 
in both formal and informal domains. Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1999, 2000) has identified how urban 
planning policies can be devised to support the project of control, “planning, that is, the public 
regulation and ‘production of space’ is shown to serve as instrument of social control” (Yiftachel, 
2000, p. 419). This is important because, in the context of global South, many informal structures 
are able to influence formal structures, either through employees who may be sympathisers, or 
through elections. Secondly, controlling cash can give an edge over rival groups, e.g. by directing 
development funds to specific areas and depriving other areas (Yiftachel, 1999). Yiftachel (2006, 
p. 504) has also identified manipulation of administrative boundaries such as municipal 
boundaries as an important tool to “include” or “exclude” areas from development. Similarly, 
establishment of electoral constituency boundaries are of great importance, although not much is 
found in the literature linking administrative boundaries with power and production of space; 
however, Yusuf (2012) and Gazdar & Mallah (2013) identified electoral constituencies and ethnic 
segregation as a key reason for violent conflict in Karachi. Gazdar and Mallah (2013) identify the 
importance of geographic location of polling stations (where the votes are cast) with the results as 
polling stations in controlled areas lead to results favouring the controller due to illicit ways of 
influencing voting patterns. 
Again in the context of Karachi, Hasan et al. (2013) and Gayer (2014) mentioned an example of 
the control of land-owning agencies by rival political parties when in government, in order to 
control land, and eventually voters, in order to retain electoral power. Similarly, Budhani et al. 
(2010) has identified how in Karachi political parties develop links with government officials in the 
land-owning agencies and also with the police as an important way to influence institutions. 
2.5.3 Spatial Control 
Space is a social construct, and an outcome of social processes (Lefebvre, 1974); hence, the 
concepts of spatial controls are largely associated with the social relations of a society. 
Conversely, space itself confers power on its occupants (Sack, 1993), as “...territory becomes a key 
group resource for asserting ethnic control, collective identity and economic superiority.” 
(Yiftachel, 1998, p. 397)  
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Defence of the territory is part of the objective of territoriality and often results in social conflict 
(Sack, 1983). Sack (1983) suggests that territoriality is established through the control of people, 
activities, space and the resources. Such territorial control can be benign, working for the 
conservation of identity or for the survival of a group, but it can be malign as for example in the 
operation of a criminal gang or mafia ‘group feeding’ as Weinstein (2008) explored in the context 
of Mumbai. 
The literature does not define the concept of ‘informal land control,’ and the debates are mostly 
limited to the legitimate power of the state, or people’s relations within a group.  However, the 
issue of land control is central since access to land is often a reason behind struggles over 
distributive justice, inclusion/exclusion and urban rights in cities.  
Mechanisms of spatial controls 
The concepts of territoriality, land control, rent-seeking, segregation, boundary-making, divided 
cities, ghettoization etc., all are associated with and are manifestations of the spatial dimensions 
of social control. Inherent to the concept of spatial control is the idea of control over productive 
resources, particularly land, but also financial resources and the basic necessities of water, shelter 
and other utilities. The concept of productive resources was forwarded by Bierstadt (1950), 
explored earlier.  
Land control  
A core element of spatial control is the control of land as a physical asset. Control may take place 
through legal ownership, occupancy or expropriation, or through extra-legal means including 
force.  Demographic controls as outlined above can also strengthen control over neighbourhoods 
or localities.   
Yiftachel (1990, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000) and Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003), examine the case of the 
ethno-religious Jewish majority of Israel and its project to control land, and identify many spatial 
control mechanisms. Demographic control forms the main strategy through two mechanisms, the 
infiltration of predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods, and building new settlements in occupied 
areas in order to safeguard the boundaries of the national state (Yiftachel, 1990, 1996, 1999) and 
Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003). Yiftachel (1996, 1999) also identified ‘property transaction control’ as 
another spatial control mechanism, in which minorities are restricted from land-occupancy in 
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certain areas, ‘expropriation’ whereby land is taken away from the minority group, and 
encouraging in-migration by the majority group. Similar methods have also been observed in 
Karachi, where use of violence has been reported as tool for excluding “others” from territory 
(Yusuf, 2012), and property transactions are monitored by land agents and middle men (Hasan et 
al. 2013, p.44-48).  
There are also indirect, subtle and invisible mechanisms for controlling land. Classic examples are 
given by Harvey (2008) and other Marxist writers such as Weinstein and Ren (2009), who identify 
the expulsion of poor groups of people in redevelopment and regeneration projects, both through 
market dynamics and through expropriation and evictions, leading to processes of gentrification. 
Peluso and Lund (2011, p. 671) suggest that this, “primitive accumulation, enclosure, and 
privatization are important ways of establishing control of land and resources”. 
The use of violence and force is also a mechanism to control land. Budhani et al. (2010) and Yusuf 
(2012) identify land grabbing and encroaching on public and private land as one way of 
establishing control and as reason of conflict between contesting groups in Karachi. Forced 
purchasing or incentive purchasing i.e. purchasing at prices above the market rates, could also be 
another category (see Chapter 6). 
Rent-seeking 
Financial gain proves to be an important reason for establishing power relations in informal 
settlements. Budhani et al. (2010) find that in a context of weak government, informal structures 
milk public resources and fight over their domination. Hossain (2012a, 2012b) has highlighted the 
process of contestation and negotiation in land, electricity and water supply in a Bosti (informal 
settlement) in Bangladesh, finding that middle men - from local offices to NGOs - have a key role 
in strengthening political networking in informal settlements, often partly financed by control of 
utility distribution networks. 
Rent-seeking is an important form of financial control. Budhani et al. (2010) and Hasan et al. 
(2013) highlighted the rent-seeking behaviour by political parties and land mafias in Karachi, 
which includes land-grabbing, encroachments, and controlling public land including pavements, 
amenity spaces, parks and play grounds etc. to gain land for leasing, selling or for different forms 
of rent-seeking. Yusuf (2012), in her work on Karachi, identifies tactics of taking money from well-
to-do residents, commercial enterprise owners, vendors etc. as extortion or protection money for 
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leaving their assets safe and to ‘protect’ against others and the administration. This also includes 
seeking charity money, and donations of valuable hides of animals sacrificed at Eid, to sell on for 
profit. Thus, rent-seeking is used both for financial gain, and to force undesired people out of the 
area although this needs further research as not much is written about it.  
Segregation and boundary making 
Boundary-making through controlling access and policing plays an important role in controlling 
land. Segregation can be internally or externally driven. Ploger (2006) examines how marginal 
communities in informal settlements in Lima avoid insecurity by creating enclaves in settlements 
in order to control ‘access’ or unwanted incursions, by using gates, barriers, boundary 
demarcation, walls, security guards and a communal policing system. Similarly, Bollens (2012, 
p.58) identifies the use of walls and barbed wire in Belfast to partition groups, while Calame and 
Charlesworth identity similar measures in other cities such as Beirut (2009).   
However, the resulting ‘spaces of power’ created through boundary-making tactics have largely 
been ignored in the literature e.g. the local political unit offices, mosque or seminary, office of the 
NGO, a meeting place of community elders etc., which form an important symbol in political 
geography and boundary-making tactics. Segregation can also be externally driven, such as when 
particular groups are confined to specific areas, or low-income areas are given poorer service 
connections, as in Karachi.  
Boundary-making and territoriality is not limited to physical barriers and objects, and writers on 
political geography also explore the use of graffiti (Brighenti, 2010), processions and other cultural 
celebrations involving parades, mass gatherings, displays of cultural artefacts, shouting slogans, 
and singing songs (Marston, 2002; Harney, 2006), and also, use of other symbols like wall 
chalking,  flags, emphasising entryways etc.   
Mechanisms of attack and defence 
Defending boundaries is an important means of establishing and maintaining territoriality. This 
may include controlling access (described above) and ‘attack and defence’ mechanisms (Tilly, 
2004).  Budhani et al. (2010), Yusuf (2010), Javaid and Hashmi (2012), Gayer (2007, 2012), and 
Inskeep (2011) have highlighted the ethno-political boundaries, both symbolic and physical, in 
Karachi and the presence of military wings in political parties that try to defend territory and 
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attack the ‘enemy’ or ‘others’ both physically and politically – those who infiltrate within their 
boundary. These political parties have a strong network of surveillance and policing, and 
thousands of people have been killed on an ethno-political basis since mid-2000 (See section 1.1; 
4.2; table 4.1; Inskeep, 2011; Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2012; Gazdar & Mallah, 2013). 
Controlling information 
Knowledge is an important tool of control, and mapping is used by formal institutions as a tool for 
including areas within formal jurisdictions and service provision regimes. Controlling access to 
information becomes especially important in the case of voter registration and service 
connections. 
2.5.5 Outcomes of Socio-Spatial Controls 
The outcomes of socio-spatial controls have various spatial manifestations. Kliot and Mansfeld 
(1999) comment on segregation and divisions; “… this is basically a problem which results from 
hierarchy of power and wealth in which those in political and economic control decide and others 
are decided for.” (p. 167), while Marcuse (1993) declare that such segregations will remain there 
while such power hierarchies exists. The chapter has already looked at the concept of power 
(Section 2.4) while here it looks at the outcomes of power hierarchies in the form of: dynamics of 
identities (group or individual), segregation, and ghettoization, divided cities etc.  
Identities, conflicts and segregation 
Identity is an essential topic in understanding spatial division, and it is reflected in many socio-
spatial concepts such as boundary, borders, nation states, ethnocracy, economic class divisions 
etc. Every person has multiple identities as Tilly (2004, p. 215) suggests, through which he or she 
is perceived and recognised by him/herself and by others. Identities activate and deactivate with 
the contextual conditions, similarly, Barth (1969) cited in Lamont and Molnar (2002, p. 174) 
explains ethnic identity as a relative phenomenon rather than an absolute social category, 
“…feelings of communality are defined in opposition to perceived identity of other racial and 
ethnic groups”.  According to social identity theory “pressures to evaluate one’s own group 
positively through in-group/out-group comparison leads social groups to attempt to differentiate 
themselves from others” (Tajfel and Turner 1985 cited in Lamont & Molnar 2002, p. 170). The 
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emphasis here is on group dynamics and social psychology, and the link with power is weak, the 
argument being that conflict arises from the leadership rather than the group itself.  
The concept of identity is not just a social category but is often manifested spatially (Paasi 2001, 
p. 10). Identity is linked to a socio-spatial dialectic, i.e. identity produces space (boundary making, 
territoriality etc.) while identity itself is a spatial product, “the meanings of boundaries are thus 
underlined by the fact that identities are produced through these boundaries.” (Paasi 1998, p. 81). 
Kliot and Mansfeld (1999) suggests that spatial divisions or partitions are a result of the 
movement of identity groups, or conflict. Social identities – economic, ethnic or religious – in 
contested contexts lead to the creation of boundaries, both physical and non-physical, which can 
result in various forms of segregation including housing, economic and political. If these occur on 
larger scale they can lead to divided, contested, polarised or partitioned cities. 
Divided cities  
Cities bring together people with diverse backgrounds, having different ethnicities, cultures and 
economic backgrounds, and segregation is not a unique occurrence (Javaid and Hashmi 2012, 
Vaughan and Arbaci 2011). A common identity binds communities, often leading to ethnic 
concentrations; as a result, phenomena of segregation and divided cities are observed. Vaughan 
and Arbaci (2011, p. 128) declare spatial segregation as “un-deniable urban reality”, similarly, 
Marcuse (1993, p. 355) finds the divided city as “nothing new historically”.  
The literature on divided cities is discussed only briefly here, but is not explored in detail, as the 
debates usually refer to city-wide partitioning, rather than the local ghettoization observed in 
Karachi. Nevertheless, several terminologies used to describe spatial outcomes of socio-spatial 
divisions are relevant, e.g. spatial segregation, enclaves, ghettoes, territories, and are discussed 
below. Various other terms used to describe the cumulative impact of such divisions at city level 
(e.g. divided cities, contested cities, polarised cities, dual cities, frontier cities etc.) are less useful 
and not covered in detail below. 
Segregation 
Gaffikin and Morrisey (2011, p.58-59) argue that all  cities are tainted with inequalities on the 
basis of income, status, or power.  In addition to economic inequalities (Section 2.2.3), many 
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identity-based segregations exist such as “the racial ghetto or the gay precinct, or in the case of 
communities like the Amish, distinctive religious settlement” (Ibid, p. 58). However, “it is right to 
distinguish between imposed and intentional ethnic enclaves…” between say, in the case of the 
US, the black ghetto and the Orthodox Jewish community (Varady, 2005 in Gaffikin and Morrisey, 
2011, p. 58-59). “Spatial segregation can be defined as the relative residential separation of 
population categories from each other … Spatial segregation exists when some areas show over-
representation and other areas show under-representation of one population category.” 
(Musterd et al, 1999, p. 575-576) 
Spatial divisions – the neighbourhood level 
Segregation may result from either ‘inclusion’ or  ‘exclusion’, and it might be from choice or 
imposed; both the latter result in ‘territoriality’ or marked territories. Such territories or 
‘ghettoes’ can be the location for social contest including social unrest, crime or violence (Vauhan 
and Arbaci, 2011). Implicit in the definition of territoriality, is the issue that the group or individual 
claiming the control is not always benign, working for the conservation of identity or for the 
community, but can be malign in the form of a criminal gang, mafia or organised group. 
‘Enclaves’ is another spatial term, and although this does not have a negative connotation such as 
ghetto or territory, it implies segregation with intent of ‘inclusion’ rather than ‘exclusion’, 
although exclusion is implicit in its practice. Conventionally, an enclave is defined as “a small piece 
of territory that is culturally distinct and politically separate from another territory within which it 
is located … a city neighbourhood displaying distinctive economic, social and cultural attributes 
from its surroundings.” (Gregory et. al. 2011, p.191). This definition suggests that an enclave is a 
socio-spatial configuration not conforming to the surrounding context. However, in this thesis, the 
term enclaves refers to socio-spatial units mainly occupied by a particular social identity group, 
representing resident dominant social identity that contrasts with the surrounding area, 
sometimes with sub-divisions.  
Spatial divisions – the city level 
Gaffikin and Morrisey (2011, p. 55) finds the term ‘divided cities’ ambiguous, as many writers 
refer to the term but there is no consensus on a definition and thus, the concept is indistinct. 
Musterd et al. (1999, p. 575) define a divided city as; “a city in which spatial segregation is 
manifest in such a way that at least some of the residing population categories involved, and 
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possibly a broader range of people, consider this a problem.” Furthermore, Musterd et al. (1999) 
reject the prevailing notion that the concept is limited to economic inequalities; “divided cities are 
about cities, (ghetto) neighbourhoods, separated areas, but not automatically about poor people 
or unemployment. But usually it is supposed that statements about divided cities also deal with 
poor and/or unemployed people.” (p. 576). In fact the concept of divided city represents “a 
physical crisis nestled within a political crisis” (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009, p. 171 in Bollens, 
2012) 
‘Contested city’ is another term used in similar context. Bollens (1999, p.3 in Gaffikin and 
Morrisey, 2011, p. 79) identify the ethnic ‘contested city’ as the one “where identity and 
nationalist claims combine and impinge significantly and consistently” on the city. Such cities 
experience conflicts over sovereignty such as in Nicosia, Belfast, and Jerusalem (Gaffikin and 
Morrisey, 2011, p. 79).  
Gaffikin and Morrisey, (2011, p.55) highlight work of Hepburn (2004) that distinguishes ‘divided’ 
and ‘contested’ cities; “the former can arise from antagonism between two or more ethnic or 
religious groups, while the latter relates to a more fundamental hostility about the ownership and 
control of the city”. In addition, Hepburn (2006 in Gaffikin and Morrisey, 2011, p. 55) define the 
contested city as: “a major urban centre in which two or more ethnically conscious groups—
divided by religion, language, and/or culture and perceived history co-exist in a situation where 
neither group will recognise the supremacy of the other”. Thus, a divided city is a partitioned city 
along economic, political or ethnic lines manifested in consolidated physical terms, whereas, the 
contested city shows a city in progression and experiencing constant competition over its control 
for a range of reasons including ethnic, national, political and religious antagonisms. 
‘Polarised city’ is another term used to describe political or social contest.  Bollens (2012, p. 6) 
explains such cities as characterised by political, spatial and other social contestations and have 
an antagonism far greater than ‘divided’ cities. In addition, in such contexts the competing 
political groups try to establish political systems and spatial enclaves along identity basis to 
protect themselves, and such attempts often lead to conflicts and violence.  It is also found 
debated that the reasons of polarised cities are often embedded within the wider national and 
international conflicts whereas ‘divided’ cities corresponds to more localised conflict; for example 
the city of Jerusalem can be considered as a polarised city (Benevenisti, 1987 in Gaffikin and 
Morrisey, 2011, p. 55).     
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Other literature refers to ‘frontier cities’, as contested cities with a geographical emphasis, or 
‘dual cities’ having a similar connotation to ‘polarised’. ‘Division’ is generally taken as imposed 
from outside, while ‘partition’ works from the inside when the city is split because of a schism 
that splits society (Kliot and Mansfeld, 1999, p. 171). In addition partitioned cities are also 
spatially divided through physical means such as walls or barriers making them fortified enclaves, 
which can become an accepted formal policy as Calame and Charlesworth report on Belfast, 
Beirut and other divided cities (2009, p. 4). 
So to avoid use of terms with narrow differences, the thesis will limit itself to ‘divided cities’. In 
any case use of such terms serves the objective to understand the context of Karachi; “If the 
concept of ‘dual’ or ‘polarising’ city is of any reality, it can serve only as a hypothesis, the prelude 
to empirical analysis.” (Musterd et al., 1999, p. 576) 
Many cities in the world are considered to be divided, on religious and ethnic grounds such as 
Beirut and Belfast, or on a racial basis including cities of South Africa and North America (Kliot and 
Mansfeld, 1999, p. 168-170). Racial segregation in South Africa took place at a policy level through 
apartheid, which was reflected in the spatial geographies of development of both cities and 
regions (Kliot and Mansfeld, 1999, p.170). Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004) argue that some states, 
e.g. Israel, Sri Lanka and Estonia are ‘ethnocracies’, in which minority groups are controlled and 
excluded from urban domains through policy tools. Calame and Charlesworth explored several 
partitioned cities in detail, such as Beirut, Belfast, and Jerusalem and suggest that the social 
schism and religious and sectarian antagonisms were not local but already existed at a global 
scale, while physical partitions were used formally to avoid violence. 
Karachi is quite different from such cases; first, there is no simple social division but many, 
ranging from ethnicity, religion and socio-economic divides; second, the antagonism is local; third, 
political parties are prominent in exploiting social identities and public resources (See section 1.2 
and Chapter 4); fourth, the national government is neither ethnicised nor physical partitioning a 
formal policy, and fifth, as Gayer (2014) mentions, the conflict never reaches a situation of civil 
war, highlighting a controlled and informal institutional fabric that uses violence for political 
bargaining (See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis).  
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2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter, aimed at theorising informal land controls, has explored a variety of literature 
strands covering concepts and theories around; informality, production of space of various nature 
including territoriality, power, socio-spatial controls and divided cities. The literature explored has 
highlighted the complex relationships between actors – the state, market, informal actors and 
social groups - and processes through which development takes place – including informality, 
political conflicts, violence, segregation and territoriality.  
The broader theoretical discussion suggests tolook at informal land controls as a process of 
production of space, conceptualised by Lefebvre (1974), which sees space as a social product and 
emphasises the interrelationships between society and space. However, this literature review 
suggests an added emphasis on the role of power, originally seen as embedded within the social 
role, as a separate actor in the process of production of space. Exploring power as a separate 
actor enables a better understanding of non-state actors, as a basis for gauging their impacts on 
production of space. Thus, this power-society-space nexus is helpful in linking the aforementioned 
actors and processes, further conceptualisation and in the fieldwork, explored below.  
Two main gaps are identified in the literature review; first, the literature on informal urban 
development deals mainly with spaces beyond the formal legal framework, whereas, the issue of 
informal land controls in Karachi cross the formal-informal legal divide. Second, informal urban 
development and service provision are largely seen as failure ‘from above’ involving state and 
market, or as ‘from below’ by the poor, but not as services provision ‘from between’ organised by 
informal structures. Thus, the role of informal structures as ‘power’ is crucial, along with the 
‘society’ and ‘space’ and their interrelationships to better understand the reality. 
Two core concepts are developed, embedded in the power-society-space nexus, to address the 
identified gaps; first, informal land controls and second, informal power structures. Informal land 
controls are defined as: establishing control over people and productive assets, both physical and 
non-physical, by delimiting a geographic area through visible and invisible boundaries of influence, 
wielded by individuals or groups in intense competition. Such competition embraces preserving 
and practising culture, religion or political ideologies, and claiming control over physical or 
financial assets such as informal rent and votes, through bounded territoriality, brought about 
through various social and spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent (Section 
2.3.5).   
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Informal power structures are seen as “power intermediaries” which substitute for government-
held power. Such power can be held by either individuals or organisations, both legally legitimate 
organisations such as political parties, or illicit structures such as organised crime groups. There 
are many types of power-holders ‘between’ these two extremes, which draw legitimacy from 
various domains including: tradition, discourse, and can include; charismatic personalities, 
criminals such as drug gangs, and neutral power structures such as neighbourhood committees, 
civil society organisations or NGOs. Informal structures work ‘from between’ as ‘power 
intermediaries’ that connects to the formal structures and the people who they control through 
‘informal land controls’ as they earn legitimacy for formal services provision.  
Various theoretical aspects of informal land controls drawn from the literature review have been 
used to guide the fieldwork.  
First the thesis explored the nature of informality and scope of informal practices in the case 
study areas, and the extent to which informal urban development processes contribute to the 
social production of space, emerging as “substitute power” (Goldhammer and Shils, 1939) after 
state withdrawal of urban services provision. The concept that the state ‘inaction’ might be 
intentionally guided by political opportunism leading to “deregulation” (Roy, 2009) was also 
explored.  
Second the fieldwork looked at ‘power intermediaries’ and the informal structures that occupy 
the void in effect state management, investigating the nature of informal structures and their 
links to political, baradary (brotherhood) kinship, ethnicity, or religious identities. The thesis then 
examined socio-spatial control mechanisms, territoriality and boundary making that operate in 
the case study areas, drawing on demographic control, violence, or cultural and religious codes, 
identified as relevant from the literature.  
The Interrelationship between various informal power structures in the city and neighbourhoods 
forms a crucial link in the study. Thus, the overall analysis seeks to examine both the city-level and 
the local-level and the resultant impact of informal structures and informal land controls on social 
exclusion, conflicts and segregation. 
The fieldwork is used to explore the argument that Karachi is quite different from the examples in 
the literature on divided cities, because of the complexity of social, religious, economic and 
political divides, because antagonism is local, because of its historical legacy and modern-day 
political manipulation, and because of a delicate balance of restraint by informal structures in 
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which violence is a means of political bargaining, rather than a route to civil war.  These concepts 
are further analysed in detail, in Chapters 4 to 7 below. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This research about ‘informal land controls’ face several challenges, which made the research 
unique, but also formed limitations to the research. The challenges were both theoretical to 
practical. Theoretical challenges included issues in defining and theorising informality (Varley, 
2012, Roy, 2005), lack of similar research as the most relevant studies dealt with formal controls 
(see Yiftachel, 1990; 1992; 1996; 1998; 1999; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Yiftachel and Ghanem, 
2004; Calame and Charlesworth, 2011). Some of the relevant literature is contextually different 
from Karachi, such as the discussions on Beirut and Ireland (see Calame and Charlesworth, 2011). 
Also there is no single comprehensive theoretical framework that explains the operation of 
informal land controls in Karachi, although some theories are relevant, such as debates on the 
social production of space (Lefebvre, 1974), informality (Roy, 2005), power (Foucault, 1982), 
concepts around territoriality (Sack, 1983; Brower, 1980) and social controls (Tilly, 2004) that are 
used in this research.  
Several practical issues have influenced the research. Karachi is a city of 23 million people, spread 
over 3,600 sq. km., and so could not be documented in full. However, the problem of security was 
the most decisive factor in shaping the research methodology. The research topic was quite 
sensitive owing to prevalent ethno-political violence, social segregation, the nature of informal 
actors and groups, including banned religious outfits such as the Taliban, and the social identity of 
the researcher himself. Several activists and researchers have been threatened or killed while 
documenting activities of such groups, for fear it would threaten informal rent-seeking (Section 
4.4.3). However, since 2000 several foreign and local researchers and news reporters have 
managed to explore the ethno-religious fault lines underpinning violence in Karachi, whose work 
has been consulted throughout this research (Verkaik, 2004; Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar, 2011; 
Khan, N. 2010a; 2010b; 2007; Hasan et al., 2015; 2013; Yusuf, 2012; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013; 
Gayer, 2014; 2003).  
The chapter describes the research strategy and research design to provide the ‘chain of 
evidence’ (Yin, 2009, p. 123) that forms basis for the overall structure of the thesis, including the 
theoretical framework, methods of investigation, data collection, fieldwork, analysis and 
conclusions. 
The research aims to explore the causes of the events leading to violence, segregation, informality 
and territoriality in Karachi and its subsequent link with diverse actors including state, market, 
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informal structures and citizens. This is explored through critical-realist epistemology following a 
deductive-inductive hybrid research design strategy, discussed in Section 3.2 on the research 
strategy. Section 3.3 deals with the research design and the case study approach is adopted as the 
most practical option in difficult circumstances. Section 3.4 explains the research methods 
employed for the data collection and field work, and the strategy for data analysis. The fieldwork 
is then explained along with the difficulties of access and the extremely helpful role of 
gatekeepers who vouched for the researcher. Section 3.5 discusses the limitations of the study 
and the ethical considerations.     
3.2 Research Strategy 
The logical basis of research rests on the research strategy (Blaikie, 2010, p.8), outlined in the 
following section.  
3.2.1 Theorizing Informal Land Controls 
Theory can be considered “… as an explanation of observed regularities.” (Bryman, 2012, p. 21), 
or it may also be considered as “…something that guides and influences the collection and 
analysis of data” (Bryman, 2012, p. 24). It plays a central role in research, either in a deductive 
approach by applying or testing an existing theory, or in an inductive approach developing theory 
as an outcome of a research (Bryman, 2012, p. 21). In other cases, the link between theory and 
research is not definitive, linear or one-directional, but implies both types of strategies, and may 
be termed as deductive-inductive hybridity (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  
Theories in social science research are of different types depending on their connection with the 
research and levels of abstraction and their ability to guide research. Merton (1967, cited in 
Bryman, 2012, p.21) describes two major categories. Grand theories have higher levels of 
abstraction and it is generally difficult for these to guide in the process of empirical evidence 
collection (Merton 1967, cited in Bryman, 2012, p.21). Mid-range theories are considered 
appropriate to guide comparative and empirical enquiry but their scope is more limited (p.21-23). 
Sometimes, where theories are not completely relevant, “the literature acts as proxy for theory. 
In many instances, theory is latent or implicit in the literature.” (Bryman, 2012, p.22). In that case, 
research questions are outlined in order to enquire about the problem identified. 
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The literature review in Chapter 2 forms the theoretical basis for this research. Given the nature 
of the research, a single comprehensive theory did not fully cover the complexity of the research, 
but several bodies of literature were evaluated looking at informality, the social production of 
space, power and socio-spatial controls. The resulting gap identified a need for understanding the 
contextual phenomenon of informal land controls, within broader theories on production of 
space and power relations, and the role of informal power structures in facilitating informal land 
controls. This complex dynamic was theorised as a power-society-space nexus (Section 2.3.4).    
3.2.2 Deductive vs. Inductive Strategy 
There are several reasons that guide selection of either a deductive or an inductive approach. 
Deductive research strategy is mostly related to, but not limited to, quantitative research 
strategies where the hypothesis is deduced from theory and forms the basis for empirical enquiry 
(Bryman, 2012, p.24-26). The hypothesis is either confirmed, rejected or is amended according to 
the analytical findings (Bryman, 2012, p.24). However, it is often difficult to follow such a linear 
research process, and starting with a theory to explain a context disengages with the complex and 
unique context found in social science research (Lennon, 2013, p. 80-81).  
In contrast, the inductive approach intends to develop theory from the empirical data, which is 
then generalised leading to a theory that may then be used deductively in other research 
(Bryman, 2012, p.25-26). However, it is rare that generalisations can be developed that are 
context-free (Lennon, 2013, p. 81). An inductive strategy does not work linearly, but entails an 
iterative process, which involve deduction from theory at the end of each iteration (see Bryman, 
2012, p.26).  
In contrast, deductive-inductive hybridity (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006) employ both a 
deductive basis for theoretical underpinning, but also gives weight to themes emerging from the 
empirical evidences to influence theory, which makes the researcher review the hypothesis and 
theory.  
This research effectively uses a deductive-inductive hybridity, as informal land controls have been 
theorised from the literature review using a deductive approach at the start. However, feedback 
is provided from the fieldwork and the researcher’s own experience in the field leading to an 
inductive research strategy that shaped the selection of case studies, and analytical themes 
generated from the data. The requirement for macro-micro (city-local) level split was also 
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identified during the data analysis process, and the research process adjusted accordingly 
following the deductive-inductive hybrid method.  
3.2.3 Epistemological Basis  
The validity and acceptability of any empirical research deals with the fundamental question of 
epistemology, i.e. “the theory of what constitutes valid knowledge” (Johnston et al. 2000, p. 226). 
The discussion on epistemology is important as it describes the rationale behind all the research 
decisions adopted for this study, which seeks to explore and theorise the causes of the ‘reality’ of 
informality, segregation, ethno-political conflicts and violence in the city of Karachi. The research 
aims to explore and theorise the dynamics, structures and relations between various actors and 
factors behind ‘informal land controls’ (Figure 3.1). This process of causal explanation, and 
knowledge generation, can be explained under a ‘critical realist’ research paradigm.  
 
Figure 3.1: Various levels of understanding the reality in this research 
Critical realism falls in between positivism and relativism, and implies that social reality cannot be 
understood either completely through observable facts, or through subjective speculation, but 
employs both approaches (Bhasker, 1989; Sayer, 1998; Bryman, 2012). The critical realist 
approach seeks to look behind events (observable) and explore relations, structures and dynamics 
(causes) that make reality (Bryman, 2012, p.29). It implies that, as opposed to realism, events are 
observed but reality can only be interpreted (Bhasker, 1989; Sayer, 1998, 2000). As Bhasker 
(1989, p.2) argues, “we will only be able to understand - and so change - the social world if we 
identify the structures at work that generate events and discourses … these structures are not 
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spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through 
the practical and theoretical work of social sciences” (Bhasker, 1989, p.02).  
The approach tries to understand reality in two stages, first through a theoretical framework to 
try and explain the underlying mechanisms and structures, and second through empirical analysis 
to explore the dynamic complexities of these (Lovering, 1990; Peet, 1998; Sayer, 1998; 2000). The 
analysis flows in a two-way relation between the ‘concrete’ and the ‘abstract’ (Sayer, 2000). 
Understanding the complexity of the concrete requires abstract concepts that can explain the 
relations and structures behind events (Sayer, 1998).  
Background mechanisms and structures are interconnected, and could be of two types: ‘external’ 
and ‘internal’ (Sayer, 2000). In the case of Karachi, the ‘external’ context includes national politics, 
the history of planning, the private sector, and regional events such as the Afghan war, natural 
disasters and the migrations they produce. The ‘internal’ context plays essential role in informal 
land controls and the resulting segregation, and is significantly influenced by individuals, ethnic 
groups and the ethnicity-based politics of Karachi. These two understandings also help define the 
a ‘macro‘ and ‘micro‘ split  in the influences that affect informal land controls in Karachi. This 
inductively developed macro-micro split has also shaped the research design, and methods of 
enquiry. 
3.3 Research Design 
Bryman (2012, p. 45) defines research design as the “… framework for collection and analysis of 
data … a framework for the generation of evidence that is suited both to a certain set of criteria 
and to the research question in which the investigator is interested.” Social research 
fundamentally follows answers to two basic research questions; firstly, what is happening – 
termed as ‘descriptive research’, and secondly ‘why’ such happening is taking place, which 
explores the causes – termed as ‘explanatory research’ (De Vaus, 2001, p. 1-8; Hancock and 
Algozzine, 2006, p.33). This thesis reports facts and events such as the violence, segregation, 
territoriality and conflicts in Karachi, and then seeks to analyse various mechanisms behind such 
territorial issues. Furthermore, the research also tries to answer why such events are taking place, 
through theoretical assumptions and hypothesis, and in this context the case study approach is 
the most appropriate method because of its ability to cover both descriptive and explanatory 
research issues (Yin, 2009, p.10-11).  
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3.3.1 Case Study Research Study  
The phenomenon of informal land controls in Karachi cannot be fully understood without 
understanding the context. The case study research design helps to understand the phenomenon 
as it is inseparable from the context, and allows the context to be part of the study (Yin, 1993, 
p.3).  
Several case study approaches are found in research methods literature (see Stake, 1998; 
Creswell, 1998; Travers, 2001; Ryan et. al, 2002; Yin, 2009; Bryman, 2012), but this study could be 
described through two categories, namely descriptive and explanatory case study research 
designs. As this study intends to describe and explore the case study in order to analyse the causal 
relations outlined in the research hypothesis and questions, thus the case study approach 
adopted here will be a hybrid of a descriptive (documenting control mechanisms) and explanatory 
research design (exploring the background dynamics and structures).   
3.3.2 The Macro and the Micro Level Analysis 
Given Karachi’s spatial and demographic scale, the study has been split into two scales, macro and 
micro-level analysis (i.e: city and the local-level). The macro scale deals with the city-level aspects 
including the historical context and present-day socio-spatial patterns, the politics, the formal 
institutional set-up, the private and informal sectors (land and housing) and the city-wide 
conflicts, segregation and violence. The micro-level investigation tries to understand how these 
macro level dynamics are played out at the local-level, in specific districts and neighbourhoods. 
The micro-level investigation examines the social and spatial aspects of power politics including; 
territoriality, segregation, violence and control over public resources. The analysis considers the 
extent to which micro level case study areas can be generalised at the city-level.  
The macro-micro level split corresponds to the objectives of identification of ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ relations as part of understanding the background forces that determine urban realities. 
Each scale of investigation can be taken as a complete case in itself, however, to understand the 
causal mechanisms both complement each other. At macro level, power politics amongst various 
political parties underpins state failure in the provision of goods and services and conflict over 
access and control of public resources, which fuels violence, territoriality and segregation; while, 
the mechanisms through which territoriality and segregation are played out, and informal 
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structures (Section 2.4), are used to develop visible and invisible boundaries, must be examined at 
local-level. 
3.3.3 Selection of Micro Level Case Study Areas 
The case study selection followed a systematic approach. First, city-level experts (interviewees) 
were consulted to identify possible case studies, on the basis of which typologies of enclaves 
(defined in section 2.5.5) were identified, and a table was developed identifying possible case 
studies (Table 3.1). From the initial key informant interviews, four broad categories of enclaves 
were identified:  
 
 Types of Enclaves 
(based on nature of 
control) 
Legal Category Social Characteristics Examples 
1 Politico-ethnic 
Enclaves 
(Controlled by 
Political Parties) 
 
Formal Areas 
 
Multi-ethnic  Middle Income P.I.B Colony,  
North Nazimabad, 
Gulistan-e-Jauhar, KDA 
Scheme 33 
Multi-ethnic low income  Khuda ki Basti 
Single-ethnic middle income Liaquatabad, Sharifabad 
Single-ethnic low Income Nishter Basti,  
Angara Goth. 
Informal Areas 
(+notified) 
Multi-ethnic Lyari, Orangi 
Single-ethnic Several 
2 Faith based Enclaves 
(Religion 
Based/Political/Apolit
ical) 
Formal Areas 
 
Religion ased Parsi colony, Ismaili 
settlements 
Sectarian based Rizvia Society/ 
Abul Hasan Isphahani 
Road & surroundings 
(Scheme 33) 
Informal Areas 
(+notified) 
Religion based Eisa Nagri/Pahar Gunj 
Sectarian based Parts of lines area and 
many other areas.  
3 Ethnic/Clan Based Formal Areas 
 
Ethno-religious Shabbir Abad/ many 
others 
Ethnic Old Villages 
Informal  
(+notified) 
Ethno-religious  Azam Basti. 
Ethnic Several /Baldia 
4 Socio-Economic 
(Class Based) 
High Income Ethno-religious Ismaili settlements 
Multi-ethnic (open) Defense Housing 
Authority (DHA) 
Table 3.1: First-stage categorisation of case studies (areas in bold selected for further analysis) 
(Source: derived from KI interviews) 
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 Politico-ethnic enclaves, controlled by political parties but with strong ethnic affiliation; 
 Faith-based enclaves, religious-based and both political and apolitical; 
 Ethnic/clan-based enclaves linked to rural urban migrations, and 
 Socio-economic or class-based enclaves, linked to formally developed and informally 
developed status, income groups and the Muhajir/non-Muhajir split to some extent (see 
Section 4.2.2) 
The second step was to identify case study areas representing a mix and maximum number of 
divisions (identity based, formal-informal, and economic-based) controls and contending 
groups/powers. A table was developed to assess the advantages and disadvantages of each of the 
possible local case study area (Table 3.2). 
The assessment of advantage and disadvantage was based on various aspects. Given the volatile 
security issues in the city and the sensitivity of the topic, and considering the ethnic identity of the 
researcher1, several criteria were used to assess the potential interest of the shortlisted cases 
including: links to the community; easy and safe accessibility to the location; possible threats, and 
whether the area had already been documented. The aim was also to analyse different localities 
within Karachi through several micro level case studies.   
Based on discussions with Key Informants, one main case study was selected within North 
Nazimabad. The case study area includes the informal areas around Kati Pahari, and formal areas 
of UC2 and Blocks A and C, as the area has a significant variety of divisions and social groups 
(Chapter 5; Map 5.1 and 5.2). It represents the 1960s urban outskirts and upper middle-income 
area of the city. 
Three smaller case studies were also selected, Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33 in order to:  
 Confirm the processes emerging from North Nazimabad; 
 Cover maximum range of social groups, enclaves, informal structures and their 
mechanisms, or situations which were not covered in North Nazimabad, and 
 Analyse different spatial locations of the city in terms of inner-city, centre and periphery, 
representing different times of development, having diverse socio-economic 
                                                          
1
 The researcher is a ‘Muhajir’ by ethnicity and would not ordinarily be welcome, without a local referee, in 
Sindhi, Balochi or Pashtoon dominated settlements experiencing political conflicts and violence, found in 
large parts of the proposed case studies. 
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characteristics, so as to explore whether similar processes were observed throughout the 
city (Chapter 4).  
 Types of 
Controls/Controllers 
Against In Favour 
Gulistan-e-Jauhar 
(Around Jauhar 
Chorangi) 
- Political Enclave. 
- Ethnic Enclave. 
- More than two Ethno-Political 
parties against each other. 
- Poor Vs Middle Income. 
- Formal Vs Informal. 
- Relatively New development. 
- Less connection in 
the area. 
- Less of existing 
work. 
- Un-predictable 
results and safety. 
- It could be good, if role of 
builders is analysed, along 
with the informal 
transactions. 
- Links could be developed 
once decided. 
- Could be a detailed case 
study. 
Orangi  
(Qasba and 
surroundings) 
- Politico-Ethnic Enclaves. 
- More than two Ethno-Political 
parties against each other. 
- Poor Vs Poor. 
- Informal Vs. Informal 
- Safety issues. 
- Much has been 
written and 
explored about it. 
- Good with respect to 
connections and 
availability of data. 
- Already known in the 
literature. 
- Could be a detailed case 
study. 
Lyari             
(Baloch and Kutchi 
areas) 
- -Politico-Ethnic Enclaves. 
- Two Ethno-Political parties 
against each other. 
- Poor Vs Poor. 
- Informal Vs. Informal. 
- Religious Enclave.  
- Historic quarter.  
- Forced ethno-religious 
migrations.  
- Accessibility is an 
issue. 
- Difficult to deal 
with the gangs. 
- Good, if connections are 
found. 
- Lots of available exposure 
b/c of recent violence. 
- Could supplement the 
detailed case study 
because of less variety of 
controllers and 
segregations. 
North Nazimabad 
(Kati Pahari area) 
- Politico-Ethnic Enclaves. 
- Religious Enclaves. 
- Sectarian Enclave. 
- Formal Vs. Informal.  
- Poor Vs Poor. 
- Poor Vs middle /upper income.  
- Less explored and 
lack of data. 
- Violence is on the 
rise. 
- Bad image due to 
Kati Pahari. 
- Less explored. 
- Gives a vast variety of 
controls and controllers. 
- Could be a detailed case 
study. 
PIB Colony - Political Enclave. 
- More than two Ethno-Political 
parties against each other. 
- Poor Vs Middle Income. 
- Formal Vs Informal. 
- Post partition development 
- Less explored and 
lack of data. 
- Monopoly of one 
group. 
- Less explored. 
- Gives a good example of 
change in control of one 
group. 
- Could supplement the 
detailed case study. 
Scheme 33           
(Abul Hasan 
Isphahani Road 
and surroundings) 
- In the periphery, developed 
and developing parts. 
- Political and sectarian conflicts 
and controllers. 
- Monopolistic and contested 
territories both. 
- Middle income. 
- Less explored and 
lack of data. 
- Good example from 
periphery. 
- Covers various types of 
conflicts and controllers. 
- Could supplement the 
detailed case study. 
Table 3.2: Second-stage of identification of case studies (Source: derived from KI interviews) 
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The three additional case studies covered (Map 3.1) are: the old inner-city area of Lyari with 
unique problems of drug gangs and their controls; PIB Colony, the post-partition middle-income 
Muhajir locality in the centre of the city; and Scheme 33 (Abul Hasan Isphahani Road and 
surrounds), a developing middle to low-income area on the periphery representing developed 
and developing parts and reportedly the worst affected by the contest over control of land. As 
Scheme 33 is quite large, two detailed localities were selected for study, one abutting Abul Hasan 
Isphahani Road and the other beside the Super-highway) (Map 7.6 and 7.7).  Orangi was not 
included as it has already been explored as compared to North Nazimabad case study area, while 
Gulistan-e-Jauhar was not included due to unavailability of any reliable gatekeeper and possible 
security threats associated. 
 
Map 3.1: Location of case study areas in Karachi 
All the case studies have a mix of formal and informal settlements, which ensured a blend of 
social groups from different socio-economic backgrounds in the study areas. Here, formal 
areas/formal settlements are those that were formally planned and developed, whereas informal 
area/informal settlements refers to informally developed settlements that may have been 
regularised or notified (formally accepted to be regularised and going through administrative 
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procedures) for regularisation2, but the areas usually contain distinct socio-spatial characteristics 
in contrast to formal areas (e.g: as home to rural migrant communities), so they are called here 
informal areas. The term informal/formal area usually refers to a broad area of several 
settlements, while informal/formal settlement refers to a specific and defined locality. The scale 
of enclaves varies in the city (Section 4.2.2), whereas, it is also relative e.g. A large Pashtoon 
enclave comprises of UC2 in North Nazimabad (Chapter 5) when compared with Muhajir enclave 
of Block A and C, whereas, there are sub-enclaves within the larger Pashtoon enclave based on 
tribal identities. 
3.4 Research Methods 
Research methods refers to “… techniques of collecting data” for the research design and strategy 
(Bryman, 2012, p.46). Given the sensitive nature of the study and lack of data covering the 
enquiry around power contestations leading to power politics and control mechanisms; 
qualitative methods, mainly interviews, were employed. Other supporting methods were used to 
fill the gaps and for triangulation, including; informal talks, observation, photography, mapping 
and extensive document analysis mainly of news reports/articles.  
Interviews   
The main method of data acquisition in this study was interviews, given their practicality and 
because this is “one of the most important sources of case study information” (Yin, 2009, p.37).  
Interviews are suited to collecting data on issues around social perceptions, experiences and 
description of events (Punch, 2005; Silverman, 2005). Interviews are also instrumental in 
exploring complex and dynamic contexts and help in developing an in-depth understanding 
because they are flexible and issues can be clarified during the process of interview (O’Leary, 
2005; Denscombe, 2007; Kumar, 2014). Interviews also complement the observational research, 
given the sensitive research topic and issues of security and complex social relations. However, 
the interviewer must be careful to account for any bias presented by the interviewee (O’Leary, 
2005; Denscombe, 2007; Kumar, 2014). This issue has been taken care of through triangulation 
and appropriate sampling that includes ensuring equal representation from the contending sides. 
                                                          
2
 Regularisation refers to the formalisation of the informal settlement/property by granting lease 
documents.  
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Interviews can either be structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Bryman, 2012, p.469-470; 
Kumar, 2012). Structured interviews use structured questionnaires and are also termed as 
questionnaire surveys. Semi-structured interviews use semi-structured questionnaires or prompts 
for a flexible but focussed discussion, while unstructured interviews follow an open discussion 
around the issue under research (Ibid).  
Given the security issues, the researcher had to be circumspect to avoid any confusion about his 
identity (e.g: being taken as a political worker or from law enforcement agencies) and thus, 
avoided structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews guided most of the interviews both at 
the city-level and in the case studies. Detailed questionnaires were developed according to the 
interviewee type (Section 3.5; Table 3.3; Appendix 3.1-3.4), but these were not filled at the time 
of interview due to various reasons including security and  avoiding public exposure, since the 
majority of the interviews were conducted in public spaces or on the street. More specifically, in 
the informal areas, questionnaires were not used as some residents were alarmed and reluctant 
to discuss issues when these were recorded in writing and unwanted attention needed to be 
avoided, thus the unstructured interview method was adopted and the prompts identified in the 
questionnaires were followed. In contrast, in the formal areas the researcher was asked to show 
identity, authority letter and a formal questionnaire was much appreciated but since these 
interviews were also conducted in public space, prompts and audio recording served the purpose.  
Semi-structured interviews were used for Key Informants. Interviews at macro or city-level were 
designed to help understand the emergence of segregation, dynamics of power and informal land 
controls in Karachi and its typologies leading to identification of case studies. Interviews at the 
micro or local-level case studies were intended to identify the power relations, processes and 
mechanisms through which informal land control is consolidated. Different questionnaires were 
developed for each group. The topics explored are covered further in Section 3.5, and interview 
pro-forma given in Appendix 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.  
Informal talks 
Unstructured interviews, referred as informal talks here, were used with several individuals in the 
informal areas. Conversations were held with different people of different age groups, while the 
researcher spent time in the case study area, talking to interviewees or spending time sitting in 
local shops with the initial contact and gatekeepers. The discussions were mostly unstructured 
but around the topics of concern and helped to understand society and people’s attitudes, and 
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were helpful in understanding the interview answers and for triangulation, and in developing 
locality profiles. Informal talks with labours and street vendors were also quite helpful, especially 
in PIB Colony and Scheme 33, as they formed additional interviewees to support the key 
informant information. 
Observations  
Observation as a method of collecting data, triangulation and a way of understanding the 
complexity of social relations proved to be a useful tool. Observation leads to undiscovered data, 
from other methods, as the researcher can develop a rapport with the subject(s) and their 
environment, both physical and non-physical, to attain unique information (Kumar, 2012).  
The utmost objective of the observation is to study the subjects within their natural settings 
without making them conscious about it (Gray, 2004). Observation tries to capture the reality of 
what people really do instead of recording what they say (O’Leary, 2005). It helps in triangulation 
and to observe and understand relations that are not mentioned by the interviewees, reflecting 
social relations and culture instead of depending on subjective accounts (Foster, 1996; Mason, 
1996). This method was very helpful in understanding topics that the residents did not wanted to 
talk about openly, or felt very strongly  about, clearly identifying the power dynamics in the 
settlement. Similarly, in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment it is important to observe 
how identities are played out and defined in spatial terms. In that case language, clothes, the role 
of women and their clothes, were defining factors for a non-resident of the area. Similarly, graffiti 
and the presence of flags are worth observing, which at times contradicted the narrative of power 
politics within the settlement, e.g. flags and graffiti related to religious groups which residents 
sometimes avoided talking about in detail. 
Observations were mainly carried out during interviews, spending time with the gatekeepers at 
their shops or while walking or going on motorbike through the area with the gatekeeper 
especially in the informal settlements of North Nazimabad. Field notes were taken whenever 
possible and safe, while a detailed account was written after the fieldwork on each day. The 
gatekeeper was questioned on the spot, or at later suitable time, for triangulation.    
Photography was used where possible with the permission of the local people and the people 
facilitating the fieldwork, although usually a local representative had to be present. Photographs 
of indicators of controls were important, including wall-chalking, barriers, flags etc. 
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Documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis refers to use of secondary data related to the case studies at both macro 
and micro scale. Yin (2009) considers this a common strategy in the case study approach. Data 
sources may include news reports/articles, government publications, minutes of meetings etc.  
The use of documents may help in triangulation, to detail events mentioned by an interviewee, or 
to fill voids in the series of events in a narrative with the aim to strengthen the data-collection 
process (Mason, 1996; Yin, 2009). Some documents may also provide knowledge that otherwise is 
difficult verify e.g. due to death of a key person (Mason, 1996; Henn et. al. 2006). In this research, 
it was impossible for the researcher to access the Head of the Sindh Rangers (a paramilitary force 
in Karachi), but he was interviewed in a daily newspaper that gave insights into the issue. A local 
investigative journalist documented several issues that the researcher could not access e.g. 
mechanisms that Taliban militants used to control settlements, but unfortunately, a senior police 
officer, Inspector Chaudhry Aslam, who had agreed to an interview was killed in a bomb blast a 
few weeks before the planned interview. 
However, documents such as news reports might be biased, and could be unreliable (Finnegan, 
1996; Macdonald, 2004; Henn et. al. 200), and thus require triangulation. One of the most 
insightful journalists, whose reports describe several reported events in this thesis, was 
interviewed to talk about his reports and the methods he used for it, to check the reliability of 
these reports.  Luckily there were a number of news reports on the most inaccessible case study, 
Lyari.  The case study write up of Lyari is thus rather different from the other areas, as many of 
the key characters behind power struggles and local conflicts were named in the press, so the 
research could use secondary sources to document family feuds.  Although the researcher is 
aware of some of the characters who dominated the other areas, their role had to be somewhat 
played down. 
In this study, relevant news reports/articles were collected from December 2012 onwards, and 
other archives were consulted when required. Two major English daily newspapers, Dawn and 
The Express Tribune, were used, supplemented by other reports from The News, Jang (Urdu). This 
method was instrumental in linking the case studies with the wider urban and national context.  
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Mapping 
Mapping or cartography is supposed to be the best way to document, understand and 
communicate spatial attributes (Schuan and Brewer, 2010). Maps are now seen as “flexible tools 
for knowledge building. In addition to platform for representation of static information” (Schuan 
and Brewer, 2010, p.146), having the ability to represent qualitative data and analysis, in parallel 
with spatial aspects. Maps in this study are used as a data collection tool and visual form of 
representing data for better analysis.    
Maps of the formal and informal localities were derived from aerial photos, and further 
developed, with the help of interviewees, to show socio-physical layers, such the social 
composition, the territorial boundaries, the administrative boundaries, the barriers, the 
encroachments and the amenities, political affiliations and controls in different sub-localities. 
Other maps including maps of violent events and electoral results were also used to understand 
the dynamics and links of enclaves, and informal land controls with the larger issues in the city.  
Mapping helped analyse the definition of territories or enclaves that were eventually reflected in 
the violence data (map) at the city-level. 
3.5 Field Work 
The city-level fieldwork started in January 2014, and continued till the end of February to help 
identify cases studies.  Potential case study sites were visited to check the potential safety, and 
existence of a ‘gatekeeper’ who could facilitate the research. The case studies were finalised in 
mid-February, and interviews in the main case study area, North Nazimabad, started at the end of 
February 2014 with the help of a social worker and activist from the Urban Resource Centre, an 
NGO working throughout Karachi. Fieldwork continued till May 2014. 
The interview process was slow, because of safety concerns and the difficulties outlined above. 
Interviews were conducted in Urdu, and a research assistant was hired to help transcribe the 
Urdu audio recordings, and help with the AutoCAD mapping. Interviews continued until the final 
day of the researcher’s fieldwork in May 2014, when the Ismaili community representative finally 
agreed to a meeting. 
In total 50 interviews were carried out as follows. Most were semi-structured but a few had to be 
unstructured informal interviews for safety reasons: 
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- City-level interviews: 16 interviews, with three interviews covering city and local-level:  
Interviewees included; urban planners, sociologists, economists, researchers, academics, 
representatives of government planning agencies, the City Commissioner, journalists, and 
political representatives etc. The objective was to examine broad issues of informal land 
controls. Most of the interviews were recorded but two respondents did not give consent 
for recording so notes were taken (Table 3.4). 
- Case study interviews: 31 local interviews plus the three which covered both scales: 
These included 26 focussing on the main case study of North Nazimabad, and 5 in the 
supplementary case studies in the city. The interviewees represented a mix of 
stakeholders including residents, business people, social workers, politicians, community 
leaders, community elders, political representatives, and professionals such as doctors 
and teachers etc. Most of the interviews were recorded while three respondents did not 
consent to be recorded, so notes were taken during the interview (see Table 3.5 for list of 
interviewees). 
As mentioned different stakeholders were interviewed, and five categories (Table 3.3) can be 
identified: 
i) City-level experts and professionals: interviews tried to look at phenomena from the 
perspective of city-level experts and to examine various types of segregation, informal 
structures, control mechanisms and the reasons behind these.  
ii) State representatives: interviews sought to explore the perspective of the appointed state 
officials’, running the state institutions, attitudes to segregation, conflicts, violence, rising 
informality and weakening state writ. Officials of land development and owning agencies 
were specifically interviewed.  
iii) Politicians: Politicians representing their political parties and not the state institutions; 
these interviews sought to explore political objectives which were very similar to state-
related interviews and tried to explore power perspectives on the issues.  
iv) Residents: these interviews aimed to understand how informal structures are able to 
control land and related functions, win legitimacy and exclude “others” at the local-level 
and the implications for residents. The research specifically explored what power 
hierarchies exist, and what kind of services are provided and what socio-spatial controls 
are practiced. 
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v) v) Social activists and journalists: these interviews explored perspectives of people 
observing      the phenomena as bystanders to enquire about power hierarchies that exist, 
and the nature of relations between them, relations between residents and the informal 
structures, and mechanisms used to control settlements and the people and oust the 
opponents. 
 
 Interviewee & Questionnaire Type Objective 
1 Urban planners, sociologists, 
economists etc. 
Questionnaire 1 (Appendix 3.1) 
From the perspective of experts: to understand how what 
types of segregations, informal structures and enclaves exists 
and what and how informal land control are practiced? What 
is the reason of the phenomenon, both current and historical? 
Role of state, market, informal actors and the citizens? 
2 Officials from the state institutions. 
(Appointed officials running institutions 
e.g. Commissioner, officials of the 
formal land agencies etc.) 
Questionnaire 2 (Appendix 3.2) 
From the perspective of the state power and formal 
institutions (representatives): To understand the perspective 
and role of state officials in the issues of segregation, informal 
land controls, violence and its impact on the city. What is the 
reason of the phenomenon, both current and historical? Role 
of state, market, informal actors and the citizens? 
3 Politicians/Religious group leaders/ 
(controllers, politicians as 
representatives of their political party 
even when they are elected, similarly, 
the religious group leaders have their 
own informal influence over people and 
areas) 
Questionnaire 2 (Appendix 3.2) 
From the perspective of political power: To understand 
objectives of control, reasons of conflicts, narrative around 
such power politics and earning legitimacy, in addition 
perspectives about other informal structures. Opinion about 
the major conflicts in the city including governance system, 
migration, violence and the role of state in all these processes. 
4 Locals – Residents, business owners, 
local political workers. 
Questionnaire 3 (Appendix 3.3)  
From the perspective of residents (subjects that are 
included/excluded): To understand how informal structures 
are able to control land and related functions, win legitimacy 
and exclude “others” at the local-level. What power 
hierarchies exists? What kind of services are provided and 
what socio-spatial controls are practiced? 
5 Social activists of the area, NGOs, 
Journalists, Suppliers 
(Grocers/Salesmen from other areas) 
and others. 
Questionnaire 4 (Appendix 3.4) 
From the perspective of the bystanders or stakeholders 
observing the phenomenon: What sorts of power hierarchies 
exists, and what is the nature of relations between them? 
What kind of relation exists between residents and the 
informal structures? What mechanisms are used to control 
settlements and the people and oust the opponents?  
Table 3.3: Objective of interview and related interviewees 
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3.5.1 The Process of Field Work in Micro level Case Studies 
North Nazimabad 
North Nazimabad formed the main micro level case study area for data collection. In the case 
study area, sampling followed connections from the initial contact, who introduced three of the 
key community elders (gatekeepers), which led to a snowball effect. The identity of the initial 
contact has been anonymised for his security.  
Response to interviews varied between the informal and formal areas. People in informal areas 
were more cooperative and willing to talk without fear and were willing to invite the researcher 
into their homes once the gatekeeper had introduced the researcher. People in the formal parts 
of the case study area were unwilling to talk about political and ethnic issues, suspecting the 
reasons for the interview. Almost half of interviews in the formal areas were conducted on the 
street, as respondents were hesitant to welcome the researcher into their home, despite being 
introduced by a gatekeeper. Only one interview with a woman was achieved but this was difficult, 
as her older children investigated the researchers’ details and she was accompanied by one of her 
sons during the interview. In addition almost half of the respondents in the formal area did not 
disclose their employment; however the gatekeeper filled that gap from his sources. 
Other case study areas 
The other three case studies, including Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33, were chosen to 
investigate informal land controls in other areas of Karachi. The respondents of these areas were 
identified through the experts and social workers from the Urban Resource Centre (URC), an NGO. 
The fieldwork and interviews followed the same pattern as for North Nazimabad, with the 
exception of Lyari, which was too dangerous to visit, so the interviews were held elsewhere such 
as the URC office and NED University3, and the primary research was supplemented with 
secondary newspaper reports. The number of interviews in these areas were limited but were in-
depth. The researcher has been living in PIB Colony for the last 30 years, which helped in 
understanding the complexities in a short period of time. Scheme 33 had been observed by the 
                                                          
3
 NED University of Engineering and Technology, the biggest public sector engineering and technology 
university in Karachi, the researcher is employed at the university.   
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researcher during other projects since 2000, and was coupled with extensive field survey, 
observations and informal talks which substantiated the limited number of interviews. 
The role of the gatekeepers 
The role of the gatekeepers has been of immense importance in successfully carrying out  the 
fieldwork, especially in North Nazimabad. The gatekeepers are local people who facilitated the 
researcher’s work by introducing the researcher to the case study area, its people and its intricate 
social and political details.  
Several gatekeepers have been involved during the process of field work on different scales. Mr. 
Rashid4 was the first person who introduced the researcher to the case study area (North 
Nazimabad) and his chain of introductions covered 75% of the case study area. Mr. Rashid 
introduced Mr. Khan, Mr. Abid and Mr. Wali as three gatekeepers for different communities. 
Amongst the three, Mr. Khan proved to be the overall gatekeeper introducing the researcher to 
almost all the communities from formal and informal areas. Mr. Abid covered the Christian 
minority community; while Mr. Wali did not involve much in the research process as he is a senior 
person having high rank in a political party (ANP).  
Mr. Khan further introduced some of the locality based gatekeepers in particular communities 
and in particular localities, such as Mr. Habib without whom it was not possible to talk to people 
in Balti Community area, similarly, Mr. Khan introduced Mr. Pir who is the community leader and 
controller of one of the important informal settlements and whose approval was needed to work 
in the settlement. Furthermore, Mr. Khan introduced the researcher to Mr. Saad, his master chef 
in a restaurant, who was instrumental in introducing the researcher to the Hasan Zai Pashtoon 
community, an area supposedly inaccessible for  non-Pashtoon outsider. Mr. Khan was not only 
instrumental in informal areas but was also helpful in the formal areas; it was he who helped in 
getting the only woman interviewed. Furthermore, he introduced the researcher to others in the 
formal Blocks A and C. Mr. Khan was unable to find links in the Bohri community and the Ismaili 
communities, for which other contacts were used. 
For the Bohri community, the researcher found a colleague Mr. Yasin from his university who 
lived in Block C. He introduced a Bohri friend who then made it possible to enter the Bohri 
neighbourhood in Block C. The researcher also found that one of his students lived in Block C; who 
                                                          
4
 Names and professions have been changed to protect anonymity of respondents. 
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became the gatekeeper for the Bohri neighbourhood. The Ismaili community in Nizari Society 
remained inaccessible for a long time, but a breakthrough came when the researcher identified 
another student from the university who made introductions to the community leader.  
Mr. Khan was immensely helpful as a gatekeeper to North Nazimabad, introducing the researcher 
to people and explaining the delicacies of the social patterns, especially in the complex setting of 
the informally developed area. More than 20 meetings took place with Mr. Khan within the case 
study area.  The researcher also had to inform Mr. Khan, when coming and leaving the area, for 
security reasons.  
In return, the community asked the researcher to use his connections to address the issue of 
water shortages in the informal area. This expectation helped the researcher to move in some of 
the inaccessible localities. The researcher tried to meet the expectations by developing a proposal 
for a water desalination plant as there are a few brackish wells in the localities. The gatekeepers 
also used this as an excuse to people whom they thought might be a danger to the researcher or 
the gatekeepers, explaining that the research is on the issue of water.  The researcher will further 
address the issue of water supply to the area when he returns to Karachi. The issue is complex as 
lack of supply is due to political problems, and involve various risks but there are some simple 
technological solution that could partially address the issue, for example, using ground water or 
community water tanks to mobilise collective resources.  
3.5.3 Difficulties 
Several difficulties were encountered during the fieldwork. The first was size. Karachi is a city of 
23 million spread over a 3600 Sq. km, it cannot be studied in its entirety, but a smaller case study 
may not be typical of whole of the city.  
The most critical issue was regarding security. The volatile security situation, ethno-religious fault 
lines, inaccessibility of certain areas, and presence of militant groups was a barrier for the 
researcher (see Section 3.7.2). Several activists and researchers have been targeted and killed for 
identifying such informal groups and their rent seeking businesses (Section 4.4.3). However, 
researcher’s links that led to reliable gatekeepers made the fieldwork possible.  
It was very difficult to select the case study because of the informal territorial controls that exist.  
First, within North Nazimabad, the neighbourhood of Kati Pahari has a very violent image based 
on media reports, although the violence had subsided. Second, there was concern about Taliban 
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presence in the areas, as reported by the media, law enforcement agencies and political parties. 
Third, because of ethnic tension between Pashtoons and the Muhajirs, the researcher, as a 
Muhajir, was advised to wear the local shalwar qameez in the field, although this restriction 
became less essential as people started know him and he was always with a local person (Section 
3.7.2). Fourth was the problem of timing of interviews, as the researcher was advised to leave the 
case study area before sunset, while workers would return after sunset, which meant that many 
interviews had to be conducted on Saturdays or Sundays.  
 Code Identity 
1 EC1 City Expert, Planner, Academic 
2 EC 2 City Expert, Planner, Academic 
3 EC 3 City Expert, Planner, Academic 
4 EC 4 City Expert, Ex. Chief Planner (Govt.) 
5 EC 5 City Expert, Economist, Researcher 
6 EC 6 City Expert, Activist, Researcher 
7 EC 7 City Expert, Planner, Academic 
8 EC 8 City Expert, Planner, Ex. Civil Servant 
9 EC 9 City Expert, Planner, Ex. Civil Servant 
10 GC10 Expert, Government Land and Planning Department  
11 GC 11 Expert, Government Land and Planning Department 
12 GC 12 Expert, Government Land and Planning Department 
13 GC 13 Expert, Karachi Municipal Corporation 
14 GC 14 Commissioner Karachi 
15 PC 15 Political Party Leader 
16 JC 16 Journalist, Crime reporter 
17 PCCS 1 Political Leader, Resident of Case Study Area 
18 ECCS 2 City Expert, Activist, Researcher, Resident of Case Study Area 
19 JCCS 3 Journalist, Resident of Case Study Area 
20 KI Key informant (Anonymised) 
Table 3.4: City-level Interviewees and codes 
Issues were also faced in accessing people, getting permission to talk, and making them realise 
that the study only had academic objectives. Government officials were particularly difficult to 
approach and they kept deferring appointments. Some residents, especially from the Ismaili 
community, were unwilling to meet. Talking to women in the area was the most difficult, as under 
Pashtoon traditions women are not allowed to go out alone and meet non-related men. Most of 
the women from the Hasan Zai Pashtoon community were not even allowed to go to polling 
stations or to attend schools or colleges, which explains why only one interview was managed 
with a woman in the area.  
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Code Identity Affiliation/Locality 
INN1 Shopkeeper, resident (INN: Informal area North Nazimabad) Block Q, N. Nazimabad 
INN 2 Resident, social worker, community leader/elder Balti Shia community area 
INN 3 Resident, Social worker, political & community leader/elder Balti Shia community area 
INN 4 Resident, social worker, political & community leader, doctor, 
Jamat-e-Islami (JI) Political Party 
Kohistani community area 
INN 5 Resident, social worker, political & community leader/elder, 
shopkeeper, JI Political Party 
Kohistani community area 
INN 6 Resident, social worker, community leader/elder, Doctor Kohistani community area 
INN 7 Resident, social and political worker, political & community 
leader, shopkeeper, Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI) Political Party 
Kohistani community area 
INN 8 Resident, social worker, community leader/elder Kohistani community area 
INN 9 Resident, social worker, political & community leader, cottage 
industry, PTI Political Party 
Kohistani community area 
INN 10 Resident, social worker, community leader, Gatekeeper, 
Businessman 
Kohistani community area 
INN 11 Resident, political & community leader, Awami National Party 
(ANP) Political Party 
Kohistani community area 
INN 12 Resident, activist, community leader/elder, gatekeeper Pahar Gunj, Christian Comm. 
INN 13 Resident, activist, community leader Pahar Gunj, Christian Comm. 
INN 14 Resident, social worker, political & community leader, 
businessman, ANP Political Party 
Hasan Zai community area 
INN 15 Resident, political & community leader, ANP Political Party Hasan Zai community area 
INN 16 Resident, political & community leader, social worker, ANP 
Political Party 
Hasan Zai community area 
INN 17 Resident, social worker, teacher Hasan Zai community area 
INN 18 Resident, political & community leader, employer Deer Colony 
FNN 19 Resident, social worker, political leader Block Q, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 20 Resident (FNN: Formal area North Nazimabad) Block C, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 21 Resident Block C, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 22 Resident Block C, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 23 Resident Block C, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 24 Resident Block A, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 25 Resident, political activist, JI Political Party Block A, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 26 Resident, community leader Nezari Society, N. Nazimabad 
FNN 27 Resident Block C N. Nazimabad 
GH 28 Resident (GH: Gulzar-e-Hijri Scheme 33) Scheme 33 
GH 29 Resident Scheme 33 
LY 30 Resident (LY: Lyari) Lyari 
PB 31 Resident (PB: PIB Colony) PIB Colony 
PB 32 Resident, political activist, MQM Political Party PIB Colony 
KI Key informant (Anonymised)  
Table 3.5: Micro case study level Interviewees and codes 
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Due to reasons of anonymity, codes have been used instead of names of the interviewees in the 
text. The tables for codes and its corresponding interviewees are given in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.  In 
the write-up even the codes did not always provide sufficient anonymity, and in that case a 
generic reference for key informant (KI interview) has been used. 
The city-level interviewees with experts who knew the researcher were easily accessible. 
However, many others were very difficult to access such as leading politicians and government 
officials, including the commissioner and the police, and the journalist writing on the topic could 
not be reached. The researcher’s affiliation with a local public sector university played a vital role 
in getting in touch with the government representatives. The Registrar and Dean of the University 
were extremely helpful in putting the researcher in touch with the interviewees. The Dean 
managed to put the researcher in touch with the political leadership of MQM5, the Commissioner 
and the representatives of the public land owning agencies. Three reporters interviewed were 
introduced by a friend of the researcher who is a sub-editor in a local newspaper. However, all the 
efforts to find the right person from the Law Enforcement Agencies (the police and Rangers) did 
not work out. The researcher had an introduction to one of the senior police officials known for 
his in-depth knowledge about informal actors in the city, but sadly the police officer was killed in 
an attack before the researcher could meet him. Similarly, real estate agents would not talk about 
the informal actors as they may face life threats. 
3.6 Analysis Process 
Analysis usually refers to the process of managing, scrutinising and interpreting the collected 
data; however, the analysis process covers the whole process of research (Coffey and Atkinson, 
1996, p.11).  
The analytical approach adopted here follows a pre-defined analytical approach. This is usual, as 
there is no hard and fast rule for analysis and it depends on the researcher’s interpretation (Yin, 
2009, p.127).  However, the analysis process, specifically regarding coding and categorisation of 
interview, largely follows a deductive part of deductive-inductive hybrid model. While some parts 
of analysis could be considered as ‘strategic discourse’ analysis as they depend mainly on 
interviews, to examine the links between power, society and space. Thus the emphasis was on 
                                                          
5
 Muttahida Qaomi Movement (MQM), representing Muhajirs. See Appendix E for details. 
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logical consistency in interpreting data in a systematic way (Coffey and Atkinson 1996, p. 13).  The 
analysis process is described graphically in Figure 3.2 below. 
The first step was to transcribe all the interviews verbatim in Urdu. These were then translated 
into English, in two ways.  First, interviews were summarised to extract the core meaning of what 
the interviewee wanted to say according to the main themes identified in accordance with the 
questionnaire, the hypothesis and research questions. The summaries generated are not made 
part of this thesis due to possible risks for the interviewees and the researcher; however the 
summaries can be made available if required as an evidence for analysis. Second, quotations used 
in the analysis were fully translated as accurately as possible. The summary and the specific 
quotations are used through the analysis chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) as indented 
‘quotations’ and does not distinguish between the summarised and the specific quotes. This 
process enabled the first level of ‘thematic’ coding to be undertaken. The following first-coding 
themes were explored, identified from the literature review and an initial reading of the 
transcripts: 
 City-level interviews: background of interviewee/organisation; safety and security; 
informality; boundary making; social divisions; social enclaves; segregation; politics; 
sociology; politics of control; informal land controls; law enforcement and future 
directions of change.   
 Case study interviews: background of interviewee; history of settlement; sociology; 
politics; safety and security; conflict and conflict resolution; services and future 
expectations (undertaken for each case study).  
Next, the resultant transcripts were uploaded into NVivo software, which is a qualitative data 
management and coding software and helps in analysis by allowing to tag or code the data that 
can be reorganised according to the themes or codes (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.45). This 
process could also be termed as de-contextualising to later re-contextualise according to the 
theoretical framework, hypothesis or research questions (Tesch, 1990; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996, 
p. 31-32; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 201-203). 
The third step involved a painstaking process of coding the transcripts, followed by separation of 
macro level and micro-level data. The data was further coded according to the themes in steps; 
first according to the broad deductive themes i.e. power, society and space. Secondly, within each 
broad category, themes were identified both deductively and inductively - see Figure 3.2 for the 
long list of codes/tags employed on both scales under larger themes of power, society and space.  
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Figure 3.2: The analysis process 
The categorised data was then analysed according to the themes and codes, and each was 
examined to identify linkages, to weave a narrative to explain the data. This process is actually the 
analysis because coding is only a step in the analysis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996, p.27). The de-
contextualised data when put together revealed several linkages and themes to address and 
refine the research questions and validate the hypothesis, using the deductive-inductive hybrid 
approach. 
In the final stage, the data was re-contextualised and assembled into case studies at city and local 
scale. All the analysis chapters were structured around the themes and narrative, which argued 
that failure of formal power structures, has facilitated the rise of informal structures that compete 
over public resources and wield power through various control mechanisms.  
The quotations from the interviews are used extensively in the analysis chapters, to keep the 
analysis embedded in the context, such quotations are written without inverted commas in a 
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centralised indented paragraph in the text. Meanwhile, other quotations, from published works, 
are mentioned within the text but identified by quotation marks and related citation. The 
interviews are identified through the codes mentioned in Table 3.4 and 3.5, while code ‘KI’ is used 
to anonymise the interviewee as the key informant (Section 3.7.2).  
3.7 Research Ethics 
Social research demands attention to research ethics throughout the research process (Kvale and 
Brinkman, 2009, p. 62). Such consideration becomes essential when involving people, recording 
their views and stories in a contentious context. Furthermore, research in developing countries 
entails far more complex social realities that include positionality of the researcher and power 
relations between the researcher and the society being researched and of process of “knowledge 
generation, ownership and exploitation.” (Schyvens et al. 2009, p.139). Thus several steps were 
taken to address ethical considerations in this study.  
To address ethical issues, as per standard procedure and given the sensitivity of the topic, various 
steps were taken. The researcher first obtained an ethics approval from Cardiff University, 
according to standard practice before embarking on field work. The ethics committee was 
provided with all the questionnaires and possible ethical issues that might occur at any point of 
the research were highlighted. Other considerations are explored below. 
3.7.1 Informed Consent 
Informed consent is given high priority amongst the other ethical considerations in academic 
research (Wilson, 1992, p. 185). Informed consent entails agreement of the research participants, 
interviewees in this case, to participate in the research process based on clear understanding of 
the research project and its possible uses (Schyvens et al. 2009, p. 142). This also gives them the 
right to withdraw from the research process at any stage (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009). This 
becomes more important when the participants are accessed through gatekeepers, in that power 
relations may play a role as a social pressure (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 71). 
The interviewees at the city-level were duly informed and asked for written consent for an 
interview and its recording, and several interviewees requested that certain parts of the interview 
be anonymised where they talked about political parties and certain powerful personalities. The 
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interviewees from the local case studies were asked for verbal consent, as many could not read 
and, especially in informal areas, residents avoid formal procedures linked with the government 
and resist any attempt to document them and the settlement that might be harmful for them in 
future. The gatekeeper often had to explain the research and introduce the researcher in their 
native tongue that gave the residents the confidence to speak openly. Two of the case study area 
interviewees, both political leaders, did not allow audio recordings of the interview, while one 
city-level politician requested the same.  
3.7.2 Anonymity, Confidentiality and Issues of Harm 
Anonymity and confidentiality should be given due importance during the research process 
(Wilson, 1992). Anonymity entails confidentiality of the research participants, while 
confidentiality requires non-disclosure of personal information and views of the participants that 
may or may not cause them any issues, including security issues, in future if disclosed. The 
analysis process followed these guidelines, in that the identities of the interviewees were 
anonymised and given codes (Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). Several interviewees requested that their 
interviews be anonymised due to possible security threats and the sensitivity of the topic, 
discussion and views. In some parts of Chapters 4-7, even the specific interview code has been 
withheld, replaced by ‘KI’, for fear that specific reports might be traced back to their originator, to 
protect sources.  
The researcher’s safety was also an issue, both during the fieldwork and in the write-up, as some 
actors have extensive research organisations that trace relevant published material. The research 
talks about political parties and their informal actions, and actions of the government, which is 
usually represented by a political party, and might create issues for the researcher. For example, 
political critique of the processes and policies of government may bring threats to the researcher 
(Scheyven et. al. 2009). This may be a problem for the researcher, and thus several experts 
recommended that the language be toned down and the researcher should avoid using the names 
of the political parties in some contexts. Also, during the fieldwork, the researcher had to 
accompany the local gatekeeper or the person identified by the gatekeeper, especially in the 
informal settlements. In addition, extreme precaution was observed while photographing people, 
especially women were not covered to avoid any conflict due to cultural limitations. Furthermore, 
the researcher also followed the local dress code, especially in the Pashtoon dominated areas, 
while fieldwork was never carried out after sunset to avoid any possible harm (Section 3.5.3).  
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3.7.3 Ethics Involving Researcher and Gatekeepers 
 Involvement of researcher and gatekeepers in the context, where they are part of the social and 
political realities, involves various ethical considerations. “Power dynamics and researcher 
positionality have relevance for researchers working in any area where gatekeepers are used to 
access participants, though these may be particularly significant in relation to research with 
minority groups.” (McAreavey and Das, 2013)  
It is accepted that in contexts, like Karachi, research cannot be fully independent of such ‘insider’ 
influences (Sayer 2000; Flyvbjerg 2001; Atkinson et al. 2003).However, this value-laden research is 
consistent with the adopted critical realist approach (Bhasker, 1989; Sayer, 1998; 2000) that 
emphasise to understand reality by looking at the facts or events and its subjective interpretation. 
In this critical connection, the researcher’s position in this research has various dimensions. First, 
as a researcher already involved in various researches in the city (e.g. Sadiq et al. 2010; Hasan et 
al., 2013; Ahmed, 2013; Hasan et al. 2015) that helped understand and analyse the complex 
social, political, spatial and historical context. Secondly, being a resident of the city, and growing 
up with people of various ethnic groups, provided a basis for understanding sensitivities of 
cultures of the communities under study. Third, being staff at a local university did help find the 
right networks and gatekeepers to carry out fieldwork. However, this ‘insider’ position also 
created some challenges. The Muhajir ethnicity of the researcher was a problem on various levels; 
first, access to areas dominated with ‘other’ ethnic groups was a challenge that was solved by the 
gatekeepers. Second, winning confidence of the ‘other’ ethnic groups while interviewing and 
discussing the issues that are usually attributed to Muhajir ethnic group and their representative 
political party was another sensitive issue, which may have forced the interviewees to hide their 
emotions to avoid any controversy.  However, this also was solved by involving the gatekeepers 
and introducing the researcher and the actual objectives of the research. Third, to counter 
‘insider’ influence in terms of ethnic bias in interviews and analysis, all the groups are given equal 
opportunity in the interviews and all the political parties are equally discussed in terms of their 
informal land control measures and related activities.  
Involvement of gatekeepers in the data collection process generally, recruiting interviewees and 
conducting interviews more specifically, has various methodological constraints and ethical 
requirements. Involvement of gatekeepers in accessing difficult to reach population, such as 
minority groups, is considered very important, in fact helpful (Eide and Allen, 2005). However, this 
requires the researcher to take ethical decisions regarding recruitment strategy to evaluate 
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gatekeeper’s position and motives and how the relation between researcher, gatekeeper and the 
interviewee is established (McAreavey and Das, 2013), since these relations carry power relations 
and can influence the authenticity of the research. The researcher is usually reliant on the 
gatekeeper as it provides access to the community and thus has the power to allow or influence 
the interviewees, either to cooperate or to opt out (McAreavey and Das, 2013). Gatekeepers as 
an interpreter (Eide & Allen, 2005; de Laine, 2000; Jezewski, 1993; Whyte, 1993) help the 
researcher learn the local culture. However, gatekeepers may have biased or preconceived 
ideas about the research that may influence the research outcomes (McAreavey and Das, 
2013).  
Another body of literature, from health related research that highlights the role of interpreters in 
cross cultural contexts, is also relevant. Interpreters in such context are more like gatekeepers of 
information. There are different views on whether the interpreter should be from the ethnic 
group of the community under study or not. Some researchers recommend that the interpreter 
should be from the community (Baker, 1981, Hennings et al. 1996), while others consider it a 
hindrance in confidentiality (Pernice, 1994) because it can influence the interviewee to hide 
information. The interpreter might also decide to hide information as per his/her perception of 
possible harm to the interviewee (Murray and Wynne, 2001) and even, interpreter may  answer 
him/herself assuming the interviewee will answer in the same way (Jentsch, 1998).  
Various steps were taken to counter ethical challenges related to involvement of gatekeepers.  A 
detailed account of the process of finding gatekeepers and their facilitations has already been 
mentioned in section 3.5.1. First and foremost, interviews of the gatekeepers were also 
conducted as local residents and community leaders, to understand the power dynamics in the 
locality. This also gave insight of the politics between gatekeepers, and thus provided opportunity 
to know both sides of the story and to triangulate information from other sources. The main 
gatekeeper in North Nazimabad, was previously a religious political party representative, who had 
quit his political party to become apolitical and started working as social worker. Such a 
background of the gatekeeper was quite helpful in neutralising researcher’s ethnic background, in 
front of interviewees, and developing confidence in interviewees to talk their hearts out. The 
gatekeeper always left the interview place after introducing the researcher; this helped in 
confidentiality and in triangulation of information given by the gatekeeper about interviewee.  
It is also important to mention that the gatekeeper introduced the researcher across the board 
irrespective of ethnic affiliations of the communities and the political affiliations of the 
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interviewee. However, the researcher had to accept the gatekeeper’s recommendation to avoid 
certain people that were notorious about their alleged criminal connections and illegal 
businesses. At one occasion, the gatekeeper had to introduce the researcher, when encountered 
with such people in the field, as the person researching about water shortage in the area and 
welfare works of local community leaders to mitigate that shortage, as the researcher was 
specifically there to visit community leader owned water wells. This did pose ethical issues, but 
this was one time happening and was used to avoid bigger threat. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined philosophical basis of the research methodology leading to methods for 
data gathering and analysis. It has also explained the whole process of fieldwork. Deductive-
inductive hybrid model is identified suitable for this study, corresponding to the theoretical 
framework developed after the literature review, to organise data gathering and analysis process.  
Critical realist approach is identified as the suitable epistemological basis for the creation of valid 
knowledge, that looks behind the apparent events and explore the background relations, 
structures and mechanisms, which is an appropriate framework for the complex context of 
Karachi. The chapter also explained the process of selection of the main case study of North 
Nazimabad, and the supplementary case studies of Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 33, to represent 
different eras of development, geographical locations, social groups, and political influence. It is 
also highlighted that, due to sensitive nature of the study, data has been anonymised, while the 
study has limitations as it did not explore the religious extremism factor in informal land controls. 
In addition, use of gatekeepers in the research process and positionality of the researcher posed 
various ethical issues that have been countered systematically. 
The subsequent analysis is spread over various chapters. The city-level analysis drawing on 
interviews is outlined in Chapter 4. The analysis of North Nazimabad is divided into two chapters – 
Chapter 5 discusses formal and informal structures in connection with resident social groups, and 
Chapter 6 looks at the spatial controls. Chapter 7 covers the three smaller case studies according 
to the defined themes. Chapter 8 is the conclusion.3.8 Limitations 
There are many limitations to this study, including the sensitivity of the research topic, cultural 
issues, the variety of informal structures and their control mechanisms, the scale of the city, lack 
of data and absence of any previous study. First, the study is limited to exploring informal land 
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controls in connection with ethnicity based political parties on broader level including various 
identity based structures under their umbrella. Other informal structures are also operating such 
as religious extremists but these were intentionally avoided due to security reasons. However, 
irrespective of the empirical data, the theory seems to be enough to explain their mechanisms. 
Similarly, the drug gangs and the areas they control areas were not examined for safety reasons, 
but secondary information and off-site interviews provided enough depth to analyse the 
situation, particularly in Lyari.  
Cultural-religious codes were also responsible for some limitations. Only one female was 
interviewed in the micro-level case study areas and that with enormous difficulty as the 
researcher was male.  This limits the study from the perspective of women and how they 
experience and look at informal Land controls, and although some of the secondary data does talk 
about such experiences but still it is not immediate enough to answer the main questions. 
Similarly, children were not contacted, given the limited accessibility for the researcher to the 
case study areas and sensitivity of the topic. It was also not possible to interview representatives 
of law enforcement agencies.   
However, the chapter has tried to elaborate the authenticity and credibility of the whole process, 
which included data gathering methods and process, analysis and theoretical outcomes. It has 
also tried to ensure a clear trail for any future audit. 
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Chapter 4  
The Context of Karachi 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses research question 2, with the objective to exploring city-level and 
structural factors that underlie informal land controls, in the context of ethno-political conflicts, 
violence, segregation and territoriality in Karachi. It discusses key mechanisms of power and 
control across the city that eventually shape and leads to informal land controls in the production 
of space. The chapter explores two aspects; first the background of city-level power 
contestations, for example the local and regional historical events, politics, policies and planning 
decisions, and second, how such power contestations are played out, for example between 
political parties, and their linked informal structures, kinship, clan or religious affiliation. This 
chapter sets the background for the local-level case studies in Chapters 5 to 7. 
The contextual analysis largely draws on primary interview data. This is corroborated by 
secondary data drawn from official documents, news reports, investigative and analytical and 
research articles and books. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.2 introduces Karachi and sets the background 
for the issues, processes, relations and structures identified in the chapter and for the analysis 
chapters that follow. The section highlights current political and socio-spatial settings featuring 
segregation rooted in historical developments, including migrations and the resultant politics of 
power between the groups, urban planning decisions, and security issues. Section 4.3 explores the 
role of the state, in terms of government services and its link to current socio-spatial divisions. It 
highlights the reasons underlying the state’s gradual withdrawal from providing urban goods and 
services and the rise of alternatives, both formal-private and informal structures, and the 
engagement of these groups in power politics and contest over resources. Section 4.4 focuses on 
the politics of Karachi, focussing on ethnicity based politics and political parties, to explore the 
various formal and informal control mechanisms used.  
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4.2 Karachi: The Background 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The current situation, featuring violence, segregation, territoriality, informality and ethno-political 
conflicts, is complex and multifaceted. First, it is embedded in historical developments that led to 
current socio-spatial settings featuring migrations and planning decisions. This is coupled with 
emergence of informality and informal structures including criminal groups such as land mafias 
which started to operate as the security services weakened in certain areas. Local conflicts 
overlap with political and religious conflicts at city and the national level and are interwoven with 
regional issues such as the war in Afghanistan (Kaker, 2014, p. 94; Hasan et al., 2015). However, 
this research focuses mostly on ethno-political conflicts and the involvement of various power 
intermediaries at a city and local level. 
For many decades, Karachi has been a city of migrants. Karachi is sometimes termed ‘mini-
Pakistan’ having representation from all over Pakistan (Appendix 4.1). Politics has often been 
aligned with ethnic and religious identities (Budhani et al., 2010, p. 7; Gazdar & Mallah, 2013, p. 2; 
Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2014, p. 17-52). The government has weakened over the course of time 
(Section 4.3.3) and political parties, and other organised structures, sought to fill the power and 
governance vacuum, by controlling public resources and taking on roles in the provision of goods 
and services; in parallel there has been a rise of informality and the private sector (Gayer, 2014, p. 
21-30). Conflicts between political parties and religious groups have severely affected social life, 
leading to the emergence of ethnic and identity based enclaves throughout the city, with a 
resulting segregation that has added to safety issues and violence in the city (Kaker, 2014).   
Since partition in 1947, Waseem (1996, p.623) has identified four waves of migrations to Karachi, 
reflected in the city’s current ethno-political enclaves. The first wave came during partition, 1947, 
with the arrival of some 600,000 Muslims from India, known as “Muhajirs” (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 
14-21) more than doubling the city’s population. This migration created resentment amongst 
Sindhi locals, as incoming Muhajir political leaders controlled many aspects of government 
(Gayer, 2014, p. 27-28). The second migration wave occurred from 1960-1980, when Punjabis and 
northern Pashtoons moved to Karachi, mostly to informal settlements around the SITE industrial 
area, and the urban periphery on the Orangi Hills. These Pashtoon enclaves were at the forefront 
of the first Pashtoon-Muhajir riots in 1965 and 1985-86.  
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Pashtoon-Muhajir riots are important to mention as these have important impact on the socio-
spatial pattern of Karachi. The first Pashtoon-Muhajir riot occurred after the presidential elections 
of 1965, which took an ethnic colour as the Muhajirs supported the Muhajir female leader, Fatima 
Jinnah, while the Pashtoons supported the Pashtoon candidate, the military dictator General 
Ayub Khan. Ayub won the election and the procession to celebrate winning turned into, allegedly, 
organised attacks on Muhajir settlements in which several people were killed and injured (Gayer, 
2003; Baixas, 2014).  Second, Qasba-Aligarh massacre of 1986 is famous for organised attacks by 
Pashtoon mobs, allegedly, appearing from Orangi hills to attack nearby Muhajir localities that 
resulted in riots throughout the city, killing hundreds of people (Gayer, 201, p.83-86; Baixas, 2014, 
2.1). The rise of MQM is said to be embedded such events, apart from the political resentment.  
In the third migration wave, during the 1970-90s a number of rural Sindhis shifted towards 
Karachi which deepened the Muhajir resentment, as Sindhis dominated the provincial 
government due to the supporting policies of Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the  then prime minister 
belonging to Larkana-Sindh. The fourth migration wave during the 1980s-1990 was the most 
turbulent time, when the Afghan immigrants flocked to the city following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. This period also saw the rise of MQM6 the main Muhajir party (Gayer, 2014, p. 79-
100). A fifth migration mainly of Pashtoons and rural Sindhis started in 2000, but was intensified 
after natural disasters of the 2005 earthquake and 2010 flooding and later due to military 
operation and Taliban insurgency in the North. As the Pashtoon population swelled, ANP emerged 
to challenge MQM as the major political rival in the city, especially during post 2000 period 
(Gayer, 2014, p. 24-27; Gazdar, 2011, p. 4-8).   
In 2011 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), in its fact-finding report, captured a 
fraction of the issues, focussed around violence, while terming Karachi the most dangerous city: 
In addition to crimes common to most big cities, organised gangs of 
extortionists, land grabbers, mercenaries in turf wars among political parties, 
ethnic groups and criminal gangs … have complicated the city’s law and order 
woes … Those involved in violence are armed with sophisticated weapons, 
including automatic rifles and hand grenades, and even rockets … (HRCP, 
2011). 
                                                          
6
 For introduction to political parties, see table. 
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The report urged that the “state must use all means at its disposal to safeguard people’s right to 
life and fundamental human rights”, and that “mainstreaming and integrating all communities in 
Karachi is fundamental because of the polarisation of the city” emphasising the dormant role of 
the state in the whole situation (HRCP, 2011). The role of the state is far more important given the 
central role of Karachi in the economy and politics of the country. 
Karachi is considered to be the country’s engine of economic growth (Javaid & Hashmi, 2012). Its 
economy is about one-fourth of the national GDP, it produces 30% of the total manufactured 
products, and it handles almost 95% of the imports and exports of the country and contributes 
more than 65% of national revenues (CDGK, 2007). Almost all the banks in the country have their 
head offices in Karachi, and there are around 15,000 industrial units involved in the 
manufacturing sector (Javaid & Hashmi, 2012). 
 
 
Map 4.1: Map of Karachi with district and town boundaries (http://www.kmc.gos.pk/) 
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Karachi is the largest and the most developed city of the country covering an area of 3, 600 sq.km 
(CDGK, 2007). The population is estimated to be around 23 million (WPR, 2014). It is the capital 
city of Sindh Province and the financial capital of Pakistan (See Map 4.1). It contains 7% of the 
total population and 23% of the urban population of the country (Ahmed, N. 2010, p. 120). The 
current rate of population growth is between 3.5% to 5% (CDGK-2007), if it continued to grow 
with the same speed the city could soon become the world’s second most populous city  (Cox, 
2012), given that the population doubled in the last 15 years (Saiyid, 2014). The evolution of 
Karachi from a fishing village to a mega-city has taken a relatively short time. 
The history of Karachi is traced back to 356-323 BC, when it was known as “Krokala”. However, 
the history of modern-day Karachi dates back to 1729 when, as a fishing village of Baloch and 
Sindhi fishermen and wa called “Dirbo”, later as “Kalachi-jo-Goth”, it was selected as a port town 
by local Hindu merchants (Lari and Lari, 1996, p. 4-10).  
 
Year 1985-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2014 Total 
(1985-
2014) Year Killings Year Killings Year Killings Year Killings 
1   1990 576 2000 471 2010 1595  
2   1991 431 2001 598 2011 1923 
3   1992 366 2002 591 2012 2432 
4   1993 371 2003 585 2013 2789 
5   1994 866 2004 798 2014 1810 
6 1985 190 1995 1687 2005 782   
7 1986 277 1996 557 2006 834   
8 1987 271 1997 804 2007 929   
9 1988 389 1998 1009 2008 1177   
10 1989 370 1999 532 2009 1146   
Total7 
Killings 
1497 (5.5%) 7199 (26.5%) 7911 (29.1%) 10549 (38.8%) 27156 
Ave/Year8 299.4 719.9 791.1 2109.8 905.2 
Table 4.1: 30 Years of Karachi homicide data (Arfeen, 2015) 
 
                                                          
7
 Totals are calculated for each column having particular number of years. Division of years are mentioned 
at the top of each column. 
8
 Average number of people killed per year in the given division of years. 
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Karachi city, once called the ‘Paris of the East’, the ‘cleanliest city of whole of India’ (Sibtain, 
2013), or ‘city of lights’ (Gayer, 2014, p. 17-18) is now termed as a “divided city” (Gayer, 2003), 
“contested city”, “city up for grabs”, and “an arena for national conflicts” (Gayer, 2014). Recently 
writers have compared Karachi’s Lyari Town with Colombia (Kirmani, 2014). Some have 
considered it ungovernable (Marshall, 2012) and others see it the most dangerous city of the 
world (Abbas, Q. 2011). Almost 18,500 killings took place during the last 15 years, mostly owing to 
political conflicts, with 2,789 killings in 2013 alone (Arfeen, 2015, See  Table 4.1). The violence is 
mostly attributed to ethno-political and religious conflicts (Kaker, 2014; Tables 4.1 & 4.3). 
 
Political Party Full name and major support base 
MQM Muttahida Quaomi Movement: Muhajir 
PPP Pakistan People’s Party: Sindhi, Baloch 
ANP Awami National Party: Pashtoons. Claim to represent Pashtoons beyond 
religious affiliations, while majority of other political parties with 
Pashtoon support base are religious political parties. 
PTI Pakitan Tehreek-e-Insaaf: General but majorly Pashtoon 
JI Jamat-e-Islami: Religious party with majorly Pashtoon support base 
PAC People’s Amn Committee: Baloch, Sindhi. Worked as de facto militant 
wing of PPP. Initially shared support base with PPP. However, PPP has 
officially denied any connection with PAC. 
JUI Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam: Pashtoon 
Table 4.2: Major political parties and their support base in Karachi 
Despite the gravity of the issues identified, Gayer (2014, p. 4-5) sees an order in this apparent 
disorder, which makes it possible for people to live, survive and enjoy life, despite the widespread 
violence, owing to invisible rules, and regulatory mechanisms that keep conflicts under control.  
Political parties play an important part in the territoriality and segregation examined in this thesis.  
There are several national and local level parties operating in Karachi;four national level liberal 
and two national level religious political parties are important to mention, while several local level 
political parties also operate, summarised in Table 4.2 below and examined further in the rest of 
this chapter and Chapters 5 to 7. 
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District9 Killings Specific Areas Killings 
West 6718 (25%) Orangi  718 (10.6%) 
Peerabad 649 (9.5%) 
Malir 3897 (14%) Sohrab Goth  1186 (30%) 
Korangi  995 (25.5%) 
Quaidabad 585 (15%) 
Central 4830 (18%)  
East 6499 (24.5%) 
South  4495 (17%) 
 26439  
Table 4.3: District wise, 30 years of Karachi homicide data (Arfeen, 2015) 
4.2.2 Karachi, A Divided City? Current Socio-Spatial Pattern  
Urban planning experts interviewed for the thesis agree that there exist various social groups, 
both economic and identity-based, who are associated with specific geographic locations (EC 1, EC 
2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 7, EC 8, ECCS 2). The experts also agree that the city is segregated along 
such social groupings, but the categorisation of divisions varies with the frame of reference of the 
expert, as outlined below. 
Experts on the city tend to categorise social groups as two overlapping categories, first on the 
basis of class (EC 1, EC 2, EC 5, EC 8) and second on the basis of identity that includes ethnicity and 
religious affiliations. Some experts (EC 3, EC 5, EC 8) also argue that there is a distinction between 
dwellers in planned settlements and un-planned or informal settlements, since residents of 
informal settlements carry out different political struggles to access resources that eventually 
impact on the city politics (EC 3, EC 5, EC 8). However, whatever the larger frame of reference, the 
economic and identity-based divisions largely, if not completely, overlap, with political affiliation 
in an identifiable geographic pattern. 
… there are three types of major divisions, while there are many minor 
divisions within those larger divisions, that are reflected in space as well. First, 
is the class-based division, which … is on a formal level, such as on the basis of 
plot sizes, and so different classes are segregated and get services accordingly. 
The second is on an ethnic level, but there are sub-divisions as well, such as 
within Muhajir areas there are further divisions on political or on language 
basis, and in Pashtoon areas there are divisions on a tribal basis. Third is the 
                                                          
9
 Five districts of Karachi, see map 4.1 for their relative location in Karachi. 
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religious division, including the Muslim-non Muslim divide and segregations on 
the basis of sectarian affiliations between Muslim sects. (EC 3) 
A senior expert (EC 1) considered the city is divided into ‘four smaller cities’10, which are very 
different to each other in relation to history, the nature of development and planning, land 
records, means of land transactions and identity-based groupings, and these cities work in almost 
isolation. He also saw a fifth city developing in the periphery along class-based and identity-based 
divisions.  
Another expert (EC 2) described five social categories in the city, which correspond broadly to the 
categorisation by EC 1, summarised below; 
1. Elites are beyond identity-based divisions and live in the south, but a few identity-based 
enclaves exist as exceptions (EC 3).  
2. The majority of upper middle groups are found in the Central District of Karachi, in areas 
such as North Nazimabad, Gulshan-e-Iqbal etc. and are mostly Urdu speaking “Muhajirs”, 
but include other communities such as Punjabis mixed with Muhajirs.   
3. The middle-income and lower-middle income groups are much larger, with two different 
sub-categories; 
a. The Urdu-speaking group, concentrated in Karachi Central district, North Karachi, 
Landhi and Korangi.  
b. Non-Muhajirs including Sindhi and Pashtoons that are either in pockets in the city or 
on the periphery.  
4. The low-income group is also very widespread, found in various locations but mostly in 
the North-West, and is divided on identity bases, including: 
a. The old city areas are dominated by Baloch and Gujrati, and more recently Pashtoons. 
b. Qasba, Orangi, Landhi and Korangi have low-income groups mainly divided between 
Muhajir and Pashtoon enclaves.  
c. Peripheral areas which are still developing are divided along ethno-religious lines, but 
are often dominated by Pashtoon and Sindhi in-migrants or original Sindhi villagers.  
                                                          
10
 The expert meant to mention multiple nuclei in the city, and how strong they are in thier characteristics 
such that these could be termed as ‘cities’. 
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5. Within these defined layers, certain patterns create exceptions; 
a. There are historic Sindhi/Balochi villages throughout the city. Such villages or “Goths”, 
as they are locally known, have now become part of the larger planned localities and 
create zones of exception in the larger homogenous enclaves. These have increased in 
size to accommodate informal settlements, accommodating other communities such 
as Pashtoons and Baloch villages, particularly along the Lyari and Malir Rivers. 
b. Religious enclaves are spread throughout the city including Hindu and Christian 
enclaves. There are also sectarian enclaves spread out through the city irrespective of 
income including Ismaili, Bohri and Shia enclaves, and some ethnic enclaves mainly 
for Pashtoons many of which are controlled by extremist Sunni groups such as the 
Taliban, and local religio-political groups such as  banned outfits like Sipah Sahaba 
Pakistan.  
c. Informally developed areas are also common zones of exception. Such settlements 
are found throughout the city except in Defence Housing Authority (DHA) areas11. 
These are mainly found along river beds, on hills, along the right-of-way of railway 
lines, or around historic villages, abutting high income group areas or in the periphery 
etc. (EC 8). The informally developed areas (referred to as informal areas in this 
thesis) are further described in Section 4.2.3.   
Given the scale of the city and variation in social characteristics, it is very difficult to find 
generalizable conclusions or typical areas, but the four case studies cover almost all the categories 
of social groups and geographic zones noted above except the elitist group and their respective 
areas (Chapter 3). However, the city is not divided along very clear lines, and the scale and nature 
of enclaves varies throughout the city. 
Scale and nature of enclaves 
The literature on segregation and division in Karachi (Yusuf, 2012; Gayer, 2014) gives the 
impression of clearly defined enclaves and a partitioned city, but many analysts do not see 
                                                          
11
 The Defence authorities are developing former military cantonment areas for elite housing 
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identity-based divisions as large enough to add to segregation in the city. The exceptions, 
described in Point 5 above, give a sense of a city with a mixed social configuration.  
The term ‘enclave’ in this text is not used strictly in its conventional sense.  In this text, the term 
refers to socio-spatial units predominantly consisting of a particular social identity group. Here, 
the enclave is not a sub-set of larger surrounding area, but shows a dominant social identity that 
contrasts with the surrounding area, which might also be further sub-divided into smaller 
enclaves with contrasting social characteristics (Section 2.5.3).  
In Karachi, there are larger enclaves that can be clearly defined and influence electoral results, 
and smaller enclaves within such larger enclaves (EC 1). Central District is a good example, 
consisting mainly of an Urdu-speaking population but containing smaller enclaves of other 
identity-based groups (EC 1). This suggests that the city is not completely or clearly divided on an 
identity basis and there is no clear pattern (EC 1, EC 5; Gazdar, 2011). Although the dominant 
identity group counts, there is evidence that smaller identity-based enclaves have contributed to 
violence and demographic change (EC 1).  Apart from apparently isolated social groupings, 
political affiliations in the middle- and low-income groups have led to a hierarchy in social 
patterns reflected in space. Several researchers have developed maps of the dominant ethnic 
composition of the city to show social segregation and the resultant violence (Maps 4.2 & 4.3; 
Yusuf, 2012). Map 4.2 shows dominant ethnic groups and their spatial concentration, while Map 
4.3 maps the violence pattern in 2012 that eventually relates to various ethnic enclaves, 
highlighting a relation between the concentration of social groups, enclaves and violence. 
Not all social enclaves add to social segregation and territoriality. Territories can be closed or 
relatively open, depending on how easy it is for non-residents, other social groups and the law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs), especially police, to access the settlement and the kind of 
mechanisms used to control entry and exit (Kaker, 2014).  When an enclave is completely in-
accessible for outsiders or the LEAs then it is termed a no-go-area. Access control mechanisms are 
explored in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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Map 4.2: Map of Karachi with dominant ethnic enclaves (Jacobson, 2011; Dawn-GIS [No date]) 
 
No-go-areas are defined as places the LEAs cannot enter, and the police have admitted before 
court that no-go-areas exist in the city (see Sahoutra, 2013). The Karachi Operation was a 
response to a court order in 2013 for the police to clear such areas (The Express Tribune, 2013d; 
Section 4.3.2). However, a no-go-area is a relative term, as an area closed to the police is not 
necessarily closed to all and some areas can be accessed with precautions e.g. by accompanying a 
local person (EC 1). 
Khan (2013a), an investigative journalist, has categorized such enclaves in two categories: first, 
areas that are complete no-go-areas inaccessible for the LEAs, often linked to religious militants 
such as the Taliban or to gangs such as in Lyari (case study, Chapter 7); second areas that behave 
as no-go-areas for certain ethnicities at times of conflict and tension, largely attributed to political 
party territories and turf wars (ibid), such as PIB Colony (case study, Chapter 7).  
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Map 4.3: Pattern of violence in reference with ethnic enclaves (Dawn, 2011b) 
The majority of complete no-go-areas, as identified by Khan (2013a), are mostly linked with 
Pashtoon settlements, except for Lyari. As described in Section 4.3.2, the Pashtoon population has 
multiplied in recent years, and certain journalists have identified specific geographic Pashtoon 
locations in the city (see Shah and Hasan, 2014), linked to the ‘eight most violent flashpoints in 
Karachi’ (Dawn, 2013d), which mostly include Pashtoon settlements, as the Taliban (Pakistani 
factions) are Pashtoons from various tribes that live in various parts of Karachi mostly in informal 
areas.  Shah and Hasan (2014) mention that Pashtoon settlements are mostly located at the entry 
and exit points of the city and it is feared that the Taliban might take over these settlements as 
they have swept out ANP from these areas during 2012-2013 (The Express Tribune, 2013i; EC 3, EC 
8, EC 9). However, such geographic configuration is not a conspiracy (EC 2) and mainly results 
from the engagement of Pashtoons in intra- and inter-city transportation.  
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4.2.3 History of Enclave Formation & Social Divisions 
The current socio-spatial settings in Karachi, explored in the previous section, are attributed to 
four historical causes: migrations; planning decisions; religious and political violence in the 
context of religious extremism and ethnicity-based politics; and the growth of informal areas. A 
brief description is provided below (see Appendix 4.1 for detail). 
Migrations and socio-spatial changes 
As noted above, Karachi has been a migrant city for many years (Gayer, 2014, p. 23). Migrations 
towards Karachi have been considered as an unavoidable process due to regional, rural-urban, 
and socio-political realities in Pakistan (EC 1). Migrations have also been described as planned and 
politically motivated with the aim of developing a political power base, resulting in political 
resentment and conflict in Karachi (EC 3, EC 2, EC 8, EC 9, EC-13). The ensuing socio-spatial 
configuration has resulted in enclave formation, which facilitated the current ethnicity oriented 
politics and conflicts. Figure 4.1shows a change in ethnic demography and that is eventually 
reflected in the politics of resource distribution. 
 
Figure 4.1: Trends and projections of the city's ethnic demography-1981 to 2025 (Gazdar, 2011) 
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Planning decisions 
Formal planning decisions have also contributed significantly to the city’s current socio-spatial 
pattern and to shaping ethno-political (EC 5) and economic divides (EC 8) (Appendix 4.1). For 
example, the post-partition planning decisions to rehabilitate Muhajirs ended up in developing 
Muhajir enclaves (EC 5). In addition, development of industrial areas without adequate provision 
of housing for the low income groups has resulted in rise in informal settlement, that later gained 
ethnic orientation as well. 
Ethnic and religious conflicts and violence 
Issues around safety and security, rooted either in ethno-political or religious conflicts, are also a 
major reason for enclave formations (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 6, EC 8, GC 10). In the 1980s, in the 
context of a failure of formal security provision, ethnic and sectarian riots undermined confidence 
between various social groups, so that people preferred to live with their social groups or in gated 
communities and enclaves. Enclavisation further exacerbated the violence (Kaker, 2014). 
Rise of informal settlements 
Informal areas have been an important development that shaped the city’s current socio-spatial 
pattern. It is difficult to generalise, but those coming from rural areas with strong ethnic 
identities, often end up in informal areas (EC 5). Punjabis and Pashtoons were the earliest low-
income rural migrants, and most rural migrants prefer to live with their relatives because of tribal 
and kinship ties (EC 5, EC 8).  
Enclaves, a problem or symptom of problem? 
It is evident that Karachi is experiencing violence in connection with ethno-political conflicts, in 
which various actors including political parties and criminal groups are involved. Politics is aligned 
along ethnic identities while various identify-based groups live at particular locations. Thus the 
conflict shows a very strong spatial dimension and the violence follows this socio-spatial pattern. 
Many other cities in the world have such socio-spatial pattern and enclaves, but in Karachi the 
unique element is that this socio-spatial division has provided basis for identity-based political 
entrepreneurship involving competition to appropriate power and resources using ethno-political 
rhetoric (Section 4.4.2).  
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Thus, the current pattern of social enclaves has ascended because of four main factors: in-
migrations to specific localities; state planning decisions to house post-partition immigrants in 
public housing schemes; the rise of informality especially in housing, and security threats and 
violence especially faced by minority religious groups. However, this spatial division has proved to 
be a cyclical process in which the segregated pattern of development has further exacerbated 
conflict, violence, and segregation.   
4.3 Role of Formal Sector 
However, failures in the performance of government have played a decisive role in the rise of 
informal structures, and the resultant conflicts in the city. Government performance can be 
analysed in various ways, from the performance of the institutions set up for the provision of 
goods and services such as housing and security to various tiers of the government including local 
government, provincial etc. 
4.3.1 Institutional Performance 
Several factors point toward institutional failure in housing provision, planning, development and 
provision of security etc. including politicization, temporariness, and a multiplicity of aims without 
a clear coordinating strategy. The role and status of local government is discussed separately later 
in this section. 
There are many different agencies in Karachi with overlapping functions. Because of Karachi’s 
strategic, political, historic and economic position, both the federal and provincial governments 
have interests in the city, reflected in the structure of local governance, and the presence of 
different federal, provincial, military and private land management agencies (Hasan et al., 2013).  
According to Karachi Strategic Development Plan-2020 (CDGK-2007), there are 20 different and 
parallel development authorities/agencies responsible for planning, development and land 
management without a coordinating body. This results in contested powers between various tiers 
of government and conflicts over the interests of the multiplicity of land-owning and planning 
agencies and thus planning, development, maintenance and service provision suffers (Hasan et 
al., 2015). For example the city is unable to get any master plans approved by the provincial 
government while the Master Plan 2020 was the only one approved and adopted by local 
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government. Similarly, the responsibility for security has been divided between the provincial 
Sindh Police and federal Sindh Rangers and shows conflict of interests. 
The experts interviewed for this research including representatives from land regulation, planning 
and development agencies agree that the institutions are politicised and that the creation of 
multiple agencies has served political ends due to which service provision has been affected (EC 4, 
GC 10, GC 11, GC 12). In this context, comparing formal housing supply per annum with housing 
demand in Karachi clearly shows the shortage of low-income housing (Hasan, 201412, Table 4.4). 
In addition, vast tracts of public housing land allocated in the 1980s are still vacant, for example 
Hawks Bay Scheme No. 42, Taiser Town, Shah Latif Town and many others (GC 10, GC 11, GC 12, 
GC 13; Table 4.6). This failure is due to speculation, land hoarding, and failure to provide land for 
the low-income target groups (GC 10, GC 11, GC 12, GC 13). Since the late 1980s, no housing 
announced by the public sector has achieved its occupancy targets, leaving informal settlements 
as the only housing option for the poor (Hasan et al., 2002, p.59-60).  This has led to development 
of 1.0 - 1.2 million informal low-income housing plots along the Northern Bypass (Hasan et. al., 
2015, p. 138) which has triggered political strife, and conflicts over land control among various 
political power structures (EC 3). In addition, more than 200,000 plots have been allocated for 
elite housing in Bahria Town and the outskirts of DHA City irrespective of demand (Table 4.5; 
Ahmed, N. 2014), a clear failure in government policy on housing for the poor (Hasan et al. 2013).  
Table 4.4: Housing demand and supply in Karachi. (Hasan, 2011) 
                                                          
12
 According to Hasan’s (2014) calculation from the Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (CDGK, 2007), 
the housing demand is 80,000 housing units per year. Building permits are issued for only 30,000 units, 
whereas 32,000 units are built informally, while the rest is accommodated through densification of existing 
settlements.  
13
 Katchi Abadi is a local term for informal settlements. Literally means the temporary housing settlement, 
but legally, a settlement without legal land rights and formal tenure. 
Category Housing Units Percentage 
Demand 80,000 100 
Formal Sector Supply 27,600 34.5 
Katchi Abadis13 32,000 40 
Densification Remaining is met through 
densification process. 
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Furthermore, the corruption in government land and housing agencies is widely discussed, in 
connection with political parties, mafias and other interest groups, considered as a key reason for 
the failure of impartial service provision. 
Government officials are also involved in corruption, issues of encroachment 
and informal settlements formation in the city. Many of the officials are 
running their own private companies and they take part in bidding for 
development and construction works, so it is quite a difficult task to control 
here. The government officials take 3% to 5% kickbacks officially, while the 
rate goes up to 10% to 15% unofficially. So how can one expect the 
government machinery to improve the situation? (KI) 
Government officials who are keen to solve the problems face several issues, such as pressure 
from senior staff and politicians e.g. a high-ranking official from the government land agency (KI) 
explained how he was demoted several times because he did not wanted to be part of the 
corruption. Similarly, another official (KI) explained that they get threats while carrying out anti-
encroachment drives and recently a deputy director of KMC was killed by the land mafia (EC 6, GC 
11, GC 12, GC 13; Khan, 2014a). Furthermore, another official (KI) mentioned that the 
encroachments on government land are backed by politicians and enforced through fully 
equipped musclemen, and government officers cannot counter them as the law does not protect 
them:  
Government officers fear the mafias while enforcing the law, because the 
state machinery does not come to rescue them when they need it. Take the 
case of Wali Babar (a journalist who was killed, allegedly by a political party 
workers; see CPJ, 2014) all the eye-witnesses were killed one-by-one until the 
case was transferred to the interior of Sindh (KI). 
Household Category % Total No. HHs Avg. Plot Size  
Low Income 62% 1,000,333 120 
Middle Income 31% 502,026 240 
High Income 7% 114,081 500 
Total 100% 1,616,440 - 
Table 4.5: Demand identified by KSDP-2020 for 2005-2020 (CDGK, 2007b14). 
                                                          
14
 Details of housing unit requirements were available in the first draft version of KSDP-2020, but were later 
removed in the final version in which only percentages were mentioned. 
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Table 4.6: Recent public sector housing schemes (CDGK, 2007b) 
Complex formal procedures are another aspect that makes people avoid government agencies (EC 
7) as the informal processes of provision of goods and services have become ‘one-stop 
operations’ where everything is done at the same place by the same person without cumbersome 
paperwork. 
Utility and other civic services 
Just like the housing sector, the utility services provision is marred with limited services provision 
due to un-intentional reasons such as lack of funds and incapacity, and due to controllable 
reasons such as politicisation of institutions, corruption and use of such services for political and 
material gains by the employees and the political structures involved in power politics at the city 
and national level (Section 4.4).  
Karachi is facing a water shortage since long age and at the moment the demand is 972 MGD 
(Max) against the supply of 670 MGD excluding 35 percent of line losses leaving 435.5 MDG for 
the citizens (KWSB, [no date]). The Karachi Master Plan 2020 (KSDP 2020) also sheds some light 
on the appalling situation; only one hour average supply was recorded in the city (Table 4.7) . 
Given that formally developed areas get better supply for 2-3 hours every 2-3 days , the informal 
settlements are the worst hit with an average of a few minutes per week (Rehman, 2008). The 
targets identified in KMP 2020 for the year 2015 are not realised by fraction and the situation 
prevails as was in 2005. This demand and supply gap is also further marred with corruption and 
political influence, in that hundreds of illegal water hydrants are operating on main supply lines 
syphoning off water to be sold off to the citizens at high rates, further exacerbating the situation 
(Maher and Ilyas, 2015). Thus, it is clear that water supply services is clearly a failure and has not 
shown improvement over the last decade. 
 Name Of Scheme Year Of Notification Current Occupancy Status 
1 Scheme No.25-A 1980 5.0% 
2 Scheme No.33 1971 20% 
3 Scheme No.42 1983 5.0% 
4 Scheme No.43 1986 0.0% 
5 Scheme No.45 1986 5.0% 
6 Scheme No.25-A 1980 5.0% 
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Indicator 2005 Baseline 2010 target 2015 Target 2020 Target 
% households connected to 
water supply network 
60% 85% 100% 100% 
Hours of water service per day 1 6 24 24 
Tariff collection/billings 60% 70% 80% 85% 
Non-revenue water 40% 35% 30% 25% 
Table 4.7: Benchmarks for water supply system performance, 2005-2020 (CDGK, 2007b) 
Solid waste management is not an exception to the formal service provision trends. Mahar et al. 
(2007) finds that municipalities collect solid waste in Pakistan, and Karachi is not an exception, in 
which the efficiencies range from zero percent in informal settlements to 90 percent in formal 
settlements. Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) only has collection capacity around 40 percent 
whereas disposal capacity is even less (Ali and Hasan, 2001). The remaining garbage is taken care 
of by KMC employees in private capacity and by throwing away garbage in the nearby rain water 
drains, open sewage channels and open plots (EC 2). The trend continues in other services 
including electricity supply. 
Security 
Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are blamed for the rising crime statistics – for example their 
inability to quash the attacks against the anti-polio campaign staff and the ‘Karachi Operation15’ 
(EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9, EC-12, JCCS-16) (Table 4.8). These are discussed further below.  
The Supreme Court, in its verdict over law and order in Karachi, blamed the Sindh Police for the 
decline in safety and security in the city and due to political influence, also substantiated by the 
DG of Sindh Rangers in an interview (DGR, 2014; SMC, 2013). If political influence in policing is 
reduced substantial security issues will be solved (DGR, 2014).   
As a result of poor police performance the Rangers, a paramilitary force under the Army, was 
brought into the city in the mid-1990s.  Now Rangers work in parallel with police, and recently 
have been given new powers including policing and investigations when required, thus creating 
another layer of rift between provincial and federal governments. 
… in three ways the LEAs are unable to curb trouble, firstly … LEAs have 
deflected from their main purpose and corruption has penetrated in the rank...  
                                                          
15
 At the time of field work, in 2013, the ‘Karachi operation’ did not show any betterment in the violent 
crime scene of Karachi, in fact 2013 proved to be the most violent year in the history of Karachi.  
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Secondly … even when they apprehend criminals, then criminals influence the 
legal system to be freed: this may involve threatening or influencing the judge 
and making the witness withdraw or even by killing them. Thirdly … strong 
mafias are often at behind these criminals, including powerful political 
personalities who can threaten police officers with losing their job or 
demotion. Thus police officers also become a target of the criminals as they 
see him as hurdle… they (LEA) opt for swift retribution by killing criminals in a 
fake encounter.  (EC 4) 
The formal security apparatus is considered to have collapsed during the 1980s, as discussed 
earlier in connection with spatial divisions and enclave formations (Section 4.2.2). The free 
movement of war-hardened people from the Soviet-Afghan war, and the availability of arms and 
ammunition, eventually led to the collapse of formal security services and the rise of informal 
structures (EC 5). Informal structures are discussed in Chapter 5. Alternative security services 
provided by private guards or political parties took over security responsibilities (Ali, R. 2014), to 
the extent that currently private guards in the city outnumber the police force (Hassan, 2008). In 
addition several separate formal security services have been set up for elites (Ali, R. 2013; The 
Express Tribune, 2014d; Section 4.4).  
Anti- polio campaign 
Various groups had criticised the anti-polio immunization campaign for more than 15 years, as a 
symbol of western influence due to various myths attached to it, such as; it being sterilisation of 
male children to control Muslim population etc. (EC 1, EC 2). However it took a violent turn when 
paramedics, especially the female workers administering the vaccine door-to-door were attacked 
and killed (Reuters-Dawn, 2014). The most violent day was when four different teams were 
targeted simultaneously in four different districts, Orangi, Baldia Town, Ittehad Town and Landhi, 
all Pashtoon localities (BBC, 2012) and the problem continues.  In the last incident, in 2015, a police 
guard was killed (The Express Tribune, 2015b) and the campaign had to be halted in 24 Union 
Councils, mostly Pashtoon-dominated and assumed to Taliban-infested (The Express Tribune, 
2014g). The police have several times stated that it is difficult to provide the security necessary 
for the campaign and thus, the Police could not take up the responsibility (Bhatti, 2015), although 
the Chief Minister had ordered to establish a special force for the purpose (The Express Tribune, 
2014i).  
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Karachi Operation 
The deteriorating safety and security issue in Karachi (Table 4.8) had led to a suo moto notice 
taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2011 (Zulfiqar, 2011a). In 2011 the court announced its 
verdict – that the militant wings of various political parties, sectarian organisations and crime 
syndicates are the main culprits and reason for lawlessness (SMC, 2013; Zulfiqar, 2011b). The 
court directed the law enforcement agencies and the government to take appropriate action.  
Thus, a paramilitary operation was launched by the federal government, through the interior 
ministry in September 2013 (called the Karachi Operation) to root out criminals and terrorist 
elements across the city (Dawn, 2012b). Rangers and police were given responsibility of planning 
and executing the actions (The Express Tribune, 2013n). Initially the police and Rangers showed 
some success, but reportedly, police performance soon fizzled out due to political influence and 
the core police team was dismantled (Ali, I. 2014a). However, the Rangers continued according to 
the plan. The Rangers even raided the headquarters of MQM in April 2015 (Khan, 2015a), which 
was considered previously invincible.  
 Crimes Numbers 
1 Killed (Civilian) 2,715 
2 Killed (Police & Rangers) 191 
3 Killed (Criminals) 125 
4 Kidnappings 108 
5 Cases of extortion 519 
6 Cases of robbery  3,082 
7 Vehicle thefts  4,068 
8 Motorcycle thefts  22,284 
9 Cell phone thefts  10,501 
Table 4.8: Crimes reported in 2013 (OSAC, 2014) 
The start in 2013 did not see any significant fall in the crime rate, as 2013 was the most violent 
year in the history of Karachi (Table 4.1), although the LEA’s argued otherwise (Arfeen, 2014). 
However, 2014 showed a downward trend in crime, as per LEAs claims (Daily Times, 2014). The 
decline continued in 2015, in line with the Rangers’ target and claims of halving the crime rate 
from the start of operations (Express Tribune, 2015e). There are also counter claims by citizens’ 
organisations (Shahbazi, 2014; Ali, I. 2014b) and allegations of extra-judicial killings, in alleged 
armed encounters of apprehended criminals carried out by the LEAs (Ahmed, M. 2015; Ali, I. 
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2015a). In connection with morale-damaging criticism and protests by political parties, the high 
command of Army reportedly backed the Karachi Operation and has reassured the public that the 
operation will continue till its logical end and will root out all mafia elements in the city (Yousuf, 
2015). Political parties, especially MQM, blame the para-military forces for biased behaviour 
against MQM and of extra-judicial killing of its workers (Dawn, 2015d; Dawn, 2015e). 
The local government 
Good governance and the better division of resources are only possible if there 
is third tier of government or local government. Things in Karachi were 
improving while there was such system (SLGO 2001). Every feudal system had 
become absorbed into local government, the poor were happy and 
development was taking place, but now just because of political issues, the 
local government system is hanging in air. This city badly needs a local 
government system. (GC 13) 
Elected local government has been a very strong symbol of the state’s governance during the last 
15 years since it was launched in 2001 (SLGO 2001). From 1987-2001 the city was a District, run by 
an appointed Commissioner in five districts and six municipal councils for rural areas. In 2001, the 
military government introduced elected local government throughout the country – in Sindh this 
fell under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 2001 which set up the devolved system of 18 
Towns and 178 Union Councils, but local government elections scheduled for 2009 never took 
place since then, despite political debates and agreements (Box 4.1).  
Experts mentions the political conflict over resource and power distribution as the main reason 
behind the halt in local government elections, as it diminished the role of provincial government 
and hence its control over institutions, decisions and development funds (Box 4.1, EC 1, EC 3, EC 
4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9, PC 15, ECCS  2).  
The experts, the government representatives and even the case-study interviewees (Chapter 5 
and 6) argued without exception that a local government system is badly required. The residents 
were happy with the former system, as it gave them voice and access to people who could 
address their problems.  
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Box 4.1: Sindh Local Government Ordinance (SLGO 2001) & City District Government Karachi 
(CDGK) 
Between 1987 and 2001 Karachi had appointed local government system when before 2001, 
Karachi was divided into five administrative districts, run by appointed bureaucrats, namely; 
Central, East, West, South and the Malir District. Along with these urban districts, six rural councils 
were responsible for peripheral rural areas (Ahmed, N. 2010). The municipal functions were run by 
Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC), with a Commissioner at the head of the administration, and 
five Deputy Commissioners heading each district administration.  
As part of a process of national devolution, the Sindh Local Government Ordinance (SLGO 2001) was 
announced in 2001, introducing a three-tiered local government system in Karachi. The military 
ruler General Pervez Musharraf, who took over power in a soft military coup in October 1998 issued 
the ordinance. According to the SLGO 2001, Karachi was declared a City District and the government 
was called the City District Government Karachi (CDGK), with 18 Town Councils, and 178 Union 
Councils (Ahmed, 2010).  An elected Nazim (mayor) was the head of the city council, while towns 
had Town Nazims and Union Councils had elected union councillors. KMC and other city 
administrative offices, previously under provincial control, were brought under the city 
government. The elected administration was supported by the appointed staff, previously in district 
administration and the within the various institutions, at all tiers.  
The first local government elections for 2001-2005 were held on a non-party basis, but each political 
party had their own panel of contestants.  Jamat Islami (JI), won the first term and their candidate 
was made the City Nazim. MQM boycotted that election.  
An MQM based-panel won the second term (2005-2009) elections an MQM candidate became the 
City Nazim. At that time, MQM controlled both the city and provincial government, and had a good 
political position at federal level, under national military rule.  
With the introduction of local government, Karachi witnessed an abundance of development funds 
and projects, partly as transfers from provincial government, and partly because development funds 
previously directed through provincial and national assembly members were now channelled via 
local governments. The funding transfer is supposed to be one of the reasons why the post 2009 
provincial and federal government opposed local governments. The developments funds were 
mostly invested in underground infrastructure, transportation and especially parks and playgrounds 
in both terms.  
With the general elections in 2008, the PPP-led democratic government came to power at both 
federal and provincial levels. With the end of second term of CDGK, the third elections never took 
place, and instead political disagreements between MQM and PPP continued over the nature of 
system and distribution of power between provincial and local government. In the absence of 
elected local government, the provincial government reinstated the five pre-2001 Districts, but 
included the 18 Towns as administrative sub-divisions. Union Councils ceased to function.  After the 
Supreme Court ordered the provincial governments to expedite local government elections on 
several occasions (Dawn, 2015a), political conflict over power distribution between the two tiers is 
said to be the main reason behind the halt in local government elections (KIs). 
Local government elections were finally held in December 2015, and again, MQM took the majority. 
However, even after three months the elected representatives, and the related system, is not 
materialised increasing political resentment and creating further issues in services provision.  
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However at provincial and federal level, political parties avoided local government. MQM found 
the SLGO-2001 based local government system ideal because they had a majority of local 
government seats in Karachi and they could control the city government, but had little chance of 
controlling the provincial government. In contrast, the PPP found it difficult as they had very little 
support base in Karachi and wanted a commissioner system to ensure their grip on the city 
administration (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 5, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9). This conflict forms one of the many tactics 
of power politics in the city that shows city-local level split in interests and struggle to capture 
public resources. 
4.3.2 Private Sector Performance 
Given the problems of efficient and impartial government-provided service provision efficiently, 
especially for low-income groups, private entrepreneurs have filled the void especially in the 
housing sector (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 4, EC 5, EC 7, EC 8, EC 9, GC 10, GC 11, GC 12). If the 
informal sector housing provision is considered as private then, it is the only sector currently 
catering to the needs of the urban poor (EC 1).   
All experts contacted for this research considered the current pattern of formal, private-sector 
housing development has negative effects. Examples of housing schemes by private-sector 
enterprises include Bahria Town and DHA City, both elite housing totalling almost 200,000 plots16 
developed on the city limits (Azmat, 2013; The News, 2014a). There is no housing in the vicinity 
for workers in the service sector that these housing projects will generate, so such developments 
are likely to exacerbate the growth of informal settlements, (EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 7, EC 
8). In addition, the extent of high-cost land controlled by the private sector has eroded the 
capacity of government planning agencies to cross-subsidise land development for middle and 
lower middle-income groups (GC 11, GC 12).  
Some government representatives, however think that land-cost escalation is a market-led 
process and it does not create divisions in the city (GC 13, GC 14), although they were unable to 
explain the disparities of land supply in relation to high- and low-cost housing areas (Table 4.4 & 
4.5).   
                                                          
16
 The latest and largest housing supply in the formal sector has been by either Defence Housing Authority, 
who is developing 12000 acres of land outside the city with the name of DHA city for the elites (Azmat, 
2013), while the other private developer is “Bahria Town” with their already sold-out 100,000 plots for the 
elites (The News  2014a).    
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The private authorities are providing 90% of the housing units per annum for 
the 5% population of the city while they are unable to support low-income 
groups because the profit margin is too small. Government authorities develop 
their schemes on no-loss-no-gain basis, in which the smaller plots for poor 
groups are cross-subsidized through the sale of commercial and larger sized 
plots, and all government schemes have 80% plots for middle and low income 
groups. However, land speculation has been a major problem in development 
of government housing schemes, as there is still not more than 10% occupancy 
rate in the Hawks Bay Scheme 42, released in 1985. All these factors 
contribute to the development of informal settlements (GC 12). 
Some experts and government representatives find no conspiracy in the rise of the private and 
informal sector as it is fulfilling the demand (EC 3, GC 14) and is working beyond ethnicity, political 
or religious divide and thus depoliticizing land (EC 2). However, some also see the rise of the 
private sector for elite housing as another form of control. Strengthened by the rise of the military 
as the developers of former military cantonment land and large housing companies such as Bahria 
Town PVT. Ltd., like informal actors, such developers use mechanisms to evade planning and 
development control laws (EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 8). DHA, the military real-estate enterprise 
has launched 27 housing schemes in the country in just 12 years from 1991-2003, and more have 
been added since after 2003 (Dawn, 2003). Commenting on Bahria Town’s new project in Karachi, 
one interviewee identified several irregularities and administrative changes were introduced in 
the government land owning agency to facilitate the developer; highlighting a close nexus 
between the private sector and the intentional de-regulation of the land agencies and the political 
parties in power. 
 …currently, a huge theft of lands in Karachi is taking place, this is done by 
Bahria Town (Private Development Authority) … they announced a housing 
scheme publicly in Karachi without having a land and without approval of 
layout plans. However, by law no builder or developer is allowed to advertise a 
project for public sale until the developer has leased the land and the proposal 
is according to the land-use zoning in the Master Plan. However, this 
(particular project) has been made possible by creating changes in the 
government institutions like that making of SBCA17, and then merging of 
Master Planning department under SBCA, which is illogical. (KI) 
In addition, Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd is also alleged to use the power politics of Sindh to facilitate 
several development projects. A report in the Dawn newspaper noted the chairman of Bahria 
Town’s proposed university development had the name of the MQM premier, ‘Altaf Hussain’ 
                                                          
17
 Sindh Building Control Authority. 
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(Dawn, 2014c), and also MQM’s ex-mayor of Karachi, Mustafa Kamal, is supposedly employed by 
Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd. to look after the projects in Karachi (Salim, 2014). Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd. is 
also, reportedly, planning to develop a bus rapid transit system, worth 25 billion Rupees in Karachi 
(Salim, 2014). Bahria Town also provided soft loan of 1.89 billion Rupees for public transport 
infrastructure to KMC, to facilitate the development of a high rise building (The Express Tribune, 
2015f) – although off-site development to support major new housing schemes can be 
acceptable, processes should be transparent, which seems missing as the examples of 
deregulations in approval of scheme and facilitation of infrastructure without involvement of 
stake holders. In addition the role of government as regulator is evident rather than provider. 
Experts (KIs) are also critical of the involvement of the military as a housing provider in Karachi. It 
is fast converting cantonment lands reserved for army purposes into elite housing, and buying 
new land such as the DHA City project. Experts (KIs) informed that, the army uses it powers to 
influence land agencies, and has bypassed normal planning mechanisms by its own by-laws that 
do not follow the master plan and city or provincial government directives (see Hasan, et al., 
2013).  
4.3.3 Has the State Failed in Providing Goods and Services to All? 
In conclusion it appears that the government has lost control, intentionally or un-intentionally, 
over several aspects of the development processes. The homicide data (Table 4.1) shows the 
worsening situation over more than a decade, although ‘Karachi operation’  brought a relative 
peace but it is also marred with political conflicts, e.g. the Sindh government refused to extend 
special powers to Rangers creating a rift between Federal and Provincial governments (Tunio, 
2015), making the future of ‘Karachi operation’ questionable. Similarly, the anti-polio campaign 
has facing security threats since long. Furthermore, service provision, especially in housing sector 
and water supply has shown a clear failure. Several reasons have been identified in this 
background; firstly, experts (EC 1) think that the government and its agencies have no capacity to 
solve the housing needs of the poor, and that there is an anti-poor bias at official level that 
favours the private sector (EC 1, EC 3). Others (EC 2, EC 3) think that enclave formation, and 
informal settlements (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 7, EC 8, EC-11, EC-12, GC 14, PC 15) show the 
dominance of market-led development, as informal or private providers have taken on services 
that the state is supposed to provide. The case of extremist religious enclaves, particularly those 
where the Taliban have some control, and the encroachment on peripheral land, has led to 
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government losing control over land in specific areas. One of the experts (EC 5) commented that 
state failure is different in intensity and form at different locations of the city. Others think that 
the failure of government is actually intentional, and could be avoided if corruption and power 
politics is controlled (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6). Government institutions are highly 
politicised and thus, development follows the same line as intentional de-regulations and blurring 
of formal-informal divide are common.  
4.4 Rise of Informal Structures and Power Politics 
Political infighting and the lack of consistent functioning local government, has resulted in three 
outcomes. First, has been the rise in informality across all sectors including housing; second, there 
has been a strengthening of informal structures; and third informal structures have adopted 
state-like attributes, including co-opting state funds, raising local revenue and territorial 
sovereignty resulting in segregation and socio-political conflicts (EC 5). The nature and scale of 
such informal structures varies, ranging from formal organisations such as political parties and 
religious groups to organised crime groups, banned outfits, or gangs, to some more benign 
structures such as neighbourhood committees. One expert aptly summarised the situation, 
 … different organisations emerged (in the 1980s) who saw that the state had 
left a vacuum that they could fill to benefit their community. When this starts 
to happen, then ethnic issues start to emerge, and it gets politicised and can 
take a violent turn. In such a situation other groups think that they can save 
themselves by using the same ethnic and organizational tactics to become 
disciplined and armed … each group is deriving legitimacy from other groups 
and because there is no power that is accepted by all – the role that the state 
is supposed to have … however, this is not a complete picture because in 
parallel negotiations are taking place according to market or other dynamics … 
(In addition) after the breakdown of state organizations, different models 
emerged to fill the gap, many were successful but others were not … Political 
parties adopted a model of organization of the state … under the classical 
state territorial control, is included so they (alternative groups including 
political parties) adopted state-like characteristics and practiced territorial 
control. When other organizations saw this successful model they copied it 
and established territorial control reflected in boundary-making, so if a 
political party claims to control a settlement their supporters may give them 
legitimacy … as a result a sense of territorial division along ethnic lines started 
to emerge. (EC 5) 
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4.4.1 Role of Informality and Power Politics 
Thus, informal processes and structures have become the main way through which essential 
goods and services, such as housing and transport, reach Karachi’s urban poor, and as a result 
play a central role in the city politics. Many experts see this as positive, and even say, “informality 
has done well” in providing goods and services to the urban poor (EC 1, EC 5, Budhani et. al. 
2010). Furthermore, it is argued that informality facilitates access by the poor and avoids 
cumbersome processes, as compared to discriminatory, elitist formal processes, especially for 
housing and services (EC 1, EC 4, EC 3, EC 5, EC 7). In contrast, others argue that informality has 
reduced opportunities for better governance in the city (EC 2, GC 14), and that crime, violence 
and conflicts have become part and parcel of informality;  
Informality is making city growth more difficult; it becomes more and more 
difficult to ameliorate the problems of informality, and see a transition into 
formality if the first becomes larger than the latter; informality is not providing 
desirable options to the city but it is creating long-term problems for the city 
in governance, administration and service delivery. (EC 2) 
Experts (EC 3, EC 5, EC 7, EC 9, EC-14, ECCS-20) also accept that despite the benefits, informality in 
service provision, spatial domain, and governance is not an ideal situation.  Furthermore, the 
dominance of informality, especially in housing sector, will continue given current socio-economic 
and political realities, although a continuous process of upgrading and regularization is required 
(EC 5). 
However, the scale at which informal housing and urban processes are currently taking place is 
exacerbating political conflicts and security issues. Much violence is concentrated around informal 
settlements (Map 4.3) and also occurs in no-go-areas (Khan, 2013a).  In addition, many criminals 
have been apprehended in informally developed localities, especially for terrorist activities. For 
example, the Mehran base, a naval air force facility in Karachi, was attacked by terrorists in 2011 
and one of the points of entry was through the informal settlements abutting its rear wall.  
Likewise, the Karachi airport attack in 2014 was followed by another attack on its training 
academy, again the adjoining informal settlements were reportedly the main entry route for 
terrorists (Siddiqui and Khan, 2011; BBC, 2014, The News, 2014b). Similarly, a tunnel was 
discovered from Ghousia Colony, an informal settlement abutting the central jail Karachi, with 
supposed motives of getting the terrorists freed from the central prison (The Express Tribune, 
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2014h). Furthermore, many political workers comes from informally developed settlements or the 
poorer communities (EC 5), this highlights the role of informal settlements in the current issues.   
In fact, political parties often use poor communities for political gain, as Roy (2009) and Weinstein 
(2008) identify  in Indian cities. They develop rhetoric and political campaigns around the needs of 
the poor and then provide them the services to consolidate their control (Roy, 2009; also See 
Chapter 5 and 6).  Some of the experts interviewed for this research even describe politics in 
Karachi along formal-informal lines (EC 5, EC 6, EC 9); given the overlap between ethnicity and 
politics, such settlements and their residents play a central role in the electoral politics, and thus a 
patron-client relation develops between the political parties and the residents of such 
settlements through which both parties benefit. 
… the urban area of today has a salient class division, particularly around 
planning status, in contrast to the classical distinction around work… this class 
division has impacted the politics … The collective action taken to become 
regularised, to get infrastructure, is significantly impacting the city especially 
the urban politics. (EC 5) 
Section 4.2.3 has argued that informality existed well before the rise of identity-based politics and 
politicization of the administration. However, informality did provide a basis for the gradual 
usurping of the state-led service provision. Ethnicity-based politics and conflicts have co-opted 
and, in the process, exacerbated informality, resulting in consolidation of informal structures that 
later engaged in power politics. 
4.4.2 Power Politics and its Connection with Socio-Spatial Pattern 
“Historically, Karachi’s ethno-political violence has pitted Urdu-speaking 
Muhajirs of the MQM against Pashtoons represented by the ANP. But clashes 
between the rural, Sindh-based PPP and Karachi-centric MQM are increasing 
as part of a broader power struggle between the city and provincial-level 
governments ... The armed wings of major political parties, including the 
MQM, PPP, and ANP, are the main perpetrators of urban violence. The parties 
clash over city resources and funds generated through extortion.” (Yusuf, 
2012, p.3).  
This section looks at how the current socio-spatial pattern is also shaping current politics and 
conflicts, in addition to the historical developments covered in Section 4.2.3. The alignment of 
politics with ethnicity coupled with the geographic concentration of ethnic groups underpins 
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various problems in the city. For many years, the majority ethnic group in Karachi has been the 
Muhajirs, represented by MQM, but changing demography has led to fear that this dominance is 
slipping away (Gazdar, 2011, p.4-8). Groups with increasing political and demographic power, 
such as Pashtoons, aspire to the same status and access to resources and power as the Muhajirs 
(Gayer, 2014, p. 24-29). Furthermore, Sindhis, the indigenous ethnic group in the province, think 
that the city and its resources are slipping out of their hands, especially as city government is 
dominated by MQM, so they use Baloch and Sindhi rhetoric to claim that they are owners of the 
land (Gayer, 2014, p. 17-30).  
Essentially, the conflict is about control over Karachi’s public resources 
including jobs, revenue, higher education institutes, health facilities, which are 
more concentrated in Karachi than in the rest of Sindh, so who controls 
Karachi essentially controls employment in Sindh. PPP can only succeed in 
controlling the city if there is a centralised system of governance, whereas, 
MQM profits more from a highly decentralised system as their supporters are 
scattered around the city. Thus PPP does not have control over the province’s 
capital city, but MQM (Muhajirs) feel as though all the non-locals (Sindhi in 
provincial government and administration and Army and other LEAs being 
predominantly Punjabi, while Sind Rangers comprise of mostly Sindhi 
speaking) are ruling them as most of the Sindh Government employees (the 
Provincial government) are Sindhi speaking. (KI) 
The politicians also agree that the issue is about the changing demographics of the last 15 years 
(Appendix 4.1 and figure 4.1) and the resultant distribution of resources . There has been no 
census since 1998, so MQM claims that the population has increased, but the budget and number 
of electoral constituencies and seats are still based on the last census (PC 15). 
The future of the city is good, if and only if the resources at the Province and 
State level are distributed according to the population … the resources are 
distributed here according to the 1998 census, in which the population was 9.8 
million and now it is 25 million (an exaggeration18). Most of the population are 
now migrants and the population in their home towns must have declined 
considerably, but there is no reflection of this in their budget … these people 
are accounted for in their native provinces but are sucking resources from the 
city as well. Similarly the seats in the Provincial and National Assemblies are 
still the same, which should have been adjusted; in a way they are consuming 
the resources twice, and if this continues, it is bound to have destructive 
effects on the city. (Representative of the city’s majority political party) 
                                                          
18
 Author’s view. 
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There is also an urban-rural ethnic divide within the Province of Sindh i.e. the predominantly 
urban Muhajirs versus mainly rural Sindhis. At provincial level, the urban and rural populations 
are almost equal, but the rural areas are geographically large and Sindhis claim ownership of the 
larger Province including Karachi (EC 3, See Section 4.2.3 on Migrations). Historically, control over 
Karachi has been a source of conflict since independence (Section 4.2.3). The administrative set-
up and electoral jurisdictions led to PPP dominance in the Provincial Assembly, while MQM 
almost dominates Karachi and holds a few seats in other cities in Sindh (ECP, 2013; Alahsan, 2013; 
Map 4.4). Thus, the city level administration was always at loggerheads when MQM led (including 
the institutions where MQM worker unions held power) with the Provincial administration. 
 
Map 4.4: Party position provincial assembly Sindh-election-2013   (Alahsan, 2013) 
Quota (in Jobs and educational institutions) system is blamed as a tool to deprive residents of 
Karachi the right to equal access to jobs and other opportunities. In return, the rivals claim to be 
owners of the land, the PAC leader, in a published interview, claimed that the majority political 
party of the city is controlling all the resources, and that either PAC will take its ‘share of the cake’ 
or destroy the ‘whole cake’ (Sama TV, 2013; Section 7.2). In opposition, Karachi residents blame 
the in-migrants (EC 4, GC 11) and allege that the rural ethnic immigrants treat Karachi as a free 
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service as it does not affect their original villages, similar arguments prevail in provincial legislative 
level. 
 … there is an urban-rural conflict in the (Sindh) assembly as most of the 
members are from rural areas and don’t belong to the urban areas, and for 
any bill to get approved, support from these members is required so they 
remain indifferent or act negatively… The Master Plans have never been 
ratified by the Provincial Assemblies just because of this urban-rural divide … 
keeping matters flexible is better for them. Now there are no plans and the 
vacuum is filled by office orders that give much flexibility and freedom to 
manipulate things. (KI) 
Several experts argued that the conflict is actually between political parties, who portray this 
conflict as ethnic. However, others (EC 1, EC 3, EC 6, EC 9) thought that root cause is conflict over 
resources, but the ethnic rhetoric is actually for material benefits and not the other way round. 
Ordinary people do not fight along ethnic lines (ECCS 2), although they have developed a fear that 
eventually shapes their choice of housing location and access to services (EC 3).  
It is quite clear that, given the polarised political context, socio-spatial patterns play a crucial role 
in electoral politics, hence the reason for various mechanisms to control it, from ethnic rhetoric to 
migrations and from demography control to an extent of using violent tactics (explored in the 
coming sections) in order to achieve territorial sovereignty.  
4.4.3 Other Manifestations of Power Politics 
The contest over resources is played out at several scales, from formal to informal, but formal-
informal divide is blurred.  For example, as one expert said,  
…the whole situation of power-politics in Karachi should be looked at three 
levels first at the national and internal political levels and how this impacts on 
the city, second politics at the city level, and thirdly trade, commerce and the 
economy. The economy is a powerful factor in Karachi, and in many cases 
influences ideology rather than other way round. (EC 3) 
The City-level conflicts are played out at the local-level and vice versa with the ultimate project of 
control:    
“These competitive claims over the ownership of the city are at the heart of its 
increasingly complex conflicts, where the battle for votes (formal) overlaps 
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with a contest for economic rents (informal) (land, water, electricity, jobs, 
development funds, Bhatta…). For the smaller stakeholders, such as the PPP, 
the ANP and the PAC, ownership entails the exclusive control of the 
populations and economic rents of their respective turf. MQM remains more 
ambitious. Although its militants are involved in a small-scale turf war (Local-
level) against political rivals or criminal groups, MQM is not merely fighting for 
the turf in Karachi, but for control over the local state (City-level) and its 
different organs – the city government, the police, the courts, universities and 
colleges, and so on.” (Gayer, 2014, p. 30) (Bold italics in brackets, author’s 
additions) 
Power politics in the formal domain 
At city level, power politics is mostly formal, and involves the co-option of various planning and 
development mechanisms to influence local government and service-provision agencies.  
Formal policies are widely used for the politics of control, (see Sections 4.2.3 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1, 
4.4.2). Other policies with an underlying agenda of control include the Goth Abad Scheme, Sindh 
Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) Act and Master Planning and development decisions made under 
the MQM-led city government, outlined below. 
Goths are villages, and in 1985, the Goth Abad scheme was introduced when Mr. Junejo, the 
Prime Minister under military rule, as part of regularisation promoted under the ‘Million Houses 
Program’.  The Goth Abad scheme was used in rural areas to regularise established housing, and 
to release people from the threats of feudal landlords. Families were given title deeds to 
formalise their occupancy, but the scheme was also used politically to reward voters (EC 1, EC 4, 
EC 8, GC 12). 
Then, the Sindh government introduced Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) Act-1987 (GOS, 
1987) with the objective of upgrading and regularizing informal settlements (EC 8). A cut-off date 
was identified, before 23 March 1985, later extended to 30 June 1997 that defined the eligibility 
of settlements for inclusion in the programme. The possibility of regularization created scope for 
political entrepreneurship, as residents demanded regularization, which was exploited by 
politicians (EC 8). Currently, a large number of villages and informal settlements on the outskirts 
of Karachi are using the Act and Goth Abad schemes to get their settlements regularised as urban 
settlements, mostly benefitting PPP which gains from Sindhi support (EC 1). However, other 
actors are now also involved.   
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Under the Goth Abad scheme settlers on land could get legal title if they had 
lived in a location for more than 40 years, although the process had a long list 
of legal formalities … However, for any villager it is virtually impossible to get 
the documents following formal procedures. Instead, this has provided an 
opening for informal entrepreneurs, who contact villagers and offer a deal for 
legalising the land and completing the procedures. This deal is subject to an 
agreement that 80% of the land will be developed in partnership with the 
owner, the developer, the police and the land department government 
officials (and presuming that politicians also get their cut).  
The partnership ensures protection for the owner, plots for the owner, police 
and government officials, while the developer, carries out subdivision, 
marketing and selling the plots. Although PPP tried to benefit politically, the 
benefits were not large-scale since the newcomers after subdivision were 
Pashtoons. MQM was also unable to profit politically, as although the 
investors are usually Pashtuns, the landowners, government officials and the 
police are Sindhi, and usually only the middlemen are Muhajir or Punjabi. 
However, there has been no ethnic violence amongst the groups and this 
procedure has 100% helped the poor, and is much more effective than formal 
methods of housing schemes and land development. (EC 1) 
The local government system established from 2001 until 2009 (SLGO-2001) poured 
unprecedented development funds into the city. MQM was completely in charge of the city from 
2005-2009, as PPP was not in provincial government at that time (Gayer, 2014, p. 101-109; Box 
4.1). Attempts by opposition parties to regain control, particularly PPP and ANP, were thwarted. 
Control over land was one of the main arenas of local government’s intervention with political 
consequences, many experts mentioned. 
Experts identified several manifestations of power politics and control by the local government 
during 2005-2009. Anti-encroachment drives and evictions in informal settlements hit the 
Pashtoons and Sindhis (although low-income Muhajir settlements were equally affected e.g. the 
Lines Areas Project, Lyari Expressway project etc.); controls on rickshaws, including banning two-
stroke rickshaws and introduction of Qingqi and CNG-based rickshaws also affected the Pashtoon-
dominated intra-city transport business (KI). Although, such development measures were openly 
taken, since some ethnic groups dominate in certain trades, e.g. Pashtoons in the transport 
sector, such policies disproportionately affected them. The ANP and PAC, allegedly, emerged to 
counter the advances of MQM, resulting in conflict and violence in the city.  
The MQM-led local government also oversaw huge infrastructure developments, especially roads. 
Much of this development was concentrated in and around MQM-dominated electoral 
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constituencies, as many allege, particularly around formal settlements, however, most of the 
constituencies are MQM dominated so it is difficult to generalise. However, several projects with 
political intent have been identified by experts, for example the North Nazimabad-Orangi Link 
road (the Kati Pahari Road), adjacent to the main case study area selected for this thesis, and the 
Bacha Khan flyover built to enable Muhajir commuters to avoid the Pashtoon-dominated Banaras 
Chowk (crossroads). The, alleged, intention was to give an alternative route for Muhajir 
commuters from Orangi at times of conflict between MQM and ANP (EC 1, EC 3), in addition to 
the technical benefits of shortening of distance and travel time from Orangi to the city centre.  
Control over governing bodies, including local government, is one of the most important aspects 
of the power politics in Karachi (ECCS 2). For this purpose, various tactics are used from 
demographic control to affect the vote bank or controlling constituency boundaries.  
Several formal policy mechanisms are used, including changing constituency boundaries, not 
allowing elections to take place, or changing the geographic limits of the constituency through 
formal procedures (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 6, EC 8). In 2012-13, the conflict between MQM and PPP 
over local government took another turn, when the Provincial government introduced a policy to 
carry out boundary definition on the Supreme Court’s orders with the objective to avoid 
territoriality and ensure mixed social groups (SMC, 2013, p. 152). In response, new constituencies 
were proposed by the Election Commission of Pakistan, incorporating recommendations by the 
Sindh Government, which were heavily criticised especially by MQM as being politically biased 
(Abbas, M. 2012; The News, 2013b). 
… *under the former system of local government+ in the whole of Sindh there 
were around 1,200 Union Councils, while in Karachi there were only 178. With 
a 50-50 population ratio between rural and urban, how could this 
inappropriate distribution be justified? The same bias can be seen in recent 
boundary definitions, and we are thankful to the Supreme Court that they kept 
the Sindh High Court decision intact, which declared it unlawful for the 
Provincial government to redefine boundaries, which should be the 
responsibility of the electoral commission. The Provincial government was 
trying to impose control on the city, taking 50,000 as the population base for 
an electoral ward, whereas in other areas it was 20,000, how can you justify 
this? … Some researchers predict that if migration continues at the same pace, 
by 2,040 Pashto will the most dominant language in the city. (MQM 
representative) 
Control over institutions, service provision and decision making, is another tactic that enables 
control over resources. After the introduction of elected local government (SLGO 2001), many 
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institutions that were formerly controlled by the Province were put under city government 
administration and development funding was transferred from the National/Provincial assembly 
representatives to locally-elected representatives. The SLGO 2001 was not revived after the end 
of the second term of local government in 2009 (Box 4.1). 
Although before SLGO 2001, there was a rift between the Provincial (PPP) and 
local administration (MQM influenced) over the control of development 
agencies such as KDA, after 2001 two new departments, Malir Development 
Authority (MDA) and Lyari Development Authority (LDA) were created that 
controlled all the undeveloped peri-urban land while KDA was left with only 
the already-developed area. 
… KDA itself was a political entity … There were three labour/staff unions in 
KDA, supported by MQM, PPP and JI respectively, of which the MQM-
supported union was the strongest. However, under the PPP government, the 
PPP considered that the MQM group was controlling the whole of KDA19. 
When the labour union referendum was due, a Minister from PPP visited KDA 
and made a speech to the PPP union and other staff, suggesting that if they 
developed PPP support then KDA will develop significantly … otherwise, he 
threatened, the government would tear KDA apart … However, in the 
referendum the MQM labour union won and then the operation to break up 
KDA started, with the justification that KDA focussed development on the 
urbanized area of the city, while the peripheral areas including Malir and Lyari 
(PPP strongholds) were neglected … and this gap could be addressed by 
creating MDA and LDA, effectively a political decision to dissolve KDA, as MDA 
and LDA got the assets of undeveloped land while KDA got only liabilities. Two 
housing schemes of KDA (Shah Latif Town and Hawks’ Bay Scheme 42) were 
transferred to MDA and LDA20. (KI) 
In 2009, the Provincial government (PPP controlled) brought back all the institutions that existed 
before the SLGO-2001. The Provincial government also set up a new building control agency and 
gave it precedence over the master-planning department, an illogical but lucrative decision (EC 1, 
EC 2, EC 3, EC 4, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9, GC 11, GC 12). There was also conflict about control of the water 
board and over party-based distribution of jobs (see Tunio, 2014a). The solid waste management 
department was also brought under the Province’s Chief Minister in 2014 (Ali, I. 2013, Tunio, 
2014b), although waste management should be a local government function, which then led to 
the privatization of waste management. The Health Department (Mansoor, 2014), Education 
                                                          
19
 Staff unions did play an important role in KDA, however, the institution was under the Ministry of 
Housing and Town Planning of Sindh province. 
20
 MDA refers to Malir Development Authority  and LDA refers to Lyari Development Authority 
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department (The Express Tribune, 2014e) and Universities (The Express Tribune, 2013k) also 
ended up under Provincial control. Although, these changes show devolution of power from 
federal to provincial level, but the Provincial Government is not willing to delegate powers to local 
government that is against the rule of devolution. 
The issue of land control has also led conflict of interest among various institutions with a political 
bias that have economic and land-holding interests, such as the Army and other agencies, MDA 
and LDA(EC 6, EC 9). 
… the Hawks Bay scheme was originally subdivided and put out to ballot by 
KDA, but the Board of Revenue grabbed large amount of land along the road, 
in an attempt to profit from the land, as KDA represented the MQM-led city 
whereas Board of Revenue (BoR) represents the Provincial government or PPP. 
(EC 6) 
Power politics in the informal domain (informal land controls)  
Apart from the formal mechanisms of policies and administration discussed above, several types 
of control mechanism operate informally, and sometimes illegally and against basic rights, but are 
part of wider power struggles involving both formal and informal actors. These include 
territoriality, demographic control, rent-seeking, control over land, control over utilities, violence 
and threat of violence etc. Most of such mechanisms operate at the local-level but impact on city-
level power politics. These mechanisms are discussed in detail in Chapters 5, 6 & 7, but briefly 
introduced here.  
Territoriality: Establishing ‘turf’ is a powerful mechanism of power politics in Karachi and is at the 
heart of the city’s conflict and violence (EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 6, EC 8, EC 9). Thus 
territoriality is a spatial term but can be defined by a location-specific community and their 
structures of control, which leads to segregation on an identity basis (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
Shutting down the city, organising rallies and political gatherings have also become symbol of 
showing power and territoriality. The most recent by-elections (April-15) in NA-246 constituency 
is an example of territoriality in which PTI faced obstacles in campaigning in an MQM stronghold 
(see The Express Tribune, 2015c; Khan, 2015b).  
In such acts of ‘power-play’, the controlling power always needs a base, a … 
territory … that they can defend, so that they can control the community 
residing in that ‘base’. Violence and fear of violence is one mechanism through 
which communities are controlled; … second is the ideology that gives 
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legitimacy to the controlling forces to control the people … It is the ideology 
through which legitimacy is attained …, violence is legitimized, and sympathies 
are gathered. (EC 3) 
Demographic control also help in territory making, and involves facilitating supporting groups and 
excluding opponents from a territory, by controlling property, land grabbing, encroachment to 
house political supporters or certain groups, illegal conversion of land etc.  
Rent-seeking of various types is part of territorialisation, and billions of Rupees are earned 
through various forms of rent-seeking in the city, as the city has a huge informal business market 
(see Bengali and Sadaqat, 2002, p.7-9; The News, 2013a). Territoriality defines which group has 
the right to extort in a particular zone, which often underpins conflict and violence. The Director 
General of the Rangers has stated that the political parties and their leaders are behind much 
rent-seeking (Ranger DGR-2014). The most lucrative form of rent-seeking is ‘extortion’, which 
includes: rent from informal businesses; money to provide protection from opponents or formal 
public agencies such as transport companies etc. Rejecting an extortion demand could be fatal 
(Siddiqui, T. 2011) – the most violent event is said to have been the Baldia Town Factory carnage 
in 2012, in which more than 250 textile factory workers were burned to death when a fire was 
reported as being deliberately started after the owner refused to pay an extortion demand, and 
the joint investigation team alleged one of the political party worker’s involvement (Sahoutara, 
2015; Figure 4.2), however, the party denied any such claims. A detailed account of extortion in 
North Nazimabad is given in Section 6.3.3. 
 
Figure 4.2: An Extortion demand receipt   (Reuters-Dawn, 2013b) 
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Encroachment, land grabbing and property controls are also forms of rent-seeking. Karachi has 
long experienced land-grabbing but since 2000 the involvement of political parties has increased 
(EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, EC 5, EC 6, EC 7, EC 8, EC 9, GC 11, GC 12). Several studies and news reports also 
allege that political parties are actively involved in the process (Baloch, 2011; Ousat, 2014a; The 
Express Tribune, 2012c). However, interviewees and the press report that that criminals related to 
a ‘land Mafia’ take refuge within political parties and create a two-way patron-client relations 
(ECCS  1). Land encroachment is locally known as ‘China-cutting’. China cutting refers to illegal 
subdivision of encroached amenity plots, open spaces including parks and play grounds to be sold 
as residential and commercial plots, sometimes apartments are also constructed in the process 
and flats are sold. The land mafia, in connection with political musclemen, provide guarantees and 
contract enforcement. Often, the name of a political party or its political leaders is used to 
enforce contracts, although the parties are never directly involved21 (EC 6). 
Control over utilities is another dimension of control, particularly over water supply. Illegal water 
services provide an estimated 35% of the city’s water supply system (EC 2; Ousat, 2014b; Mumtaz, 
2008) (see Chapters 5 and 6 for a discussion of the illegal water trade and illegal water hydrants). 
TV cable and Internet services are also controlled (Chapter 7). 
Violence and threat of violence 
… violence is inevitable in Karachi as informality is dominant … (over the last 
15 years) violence has occurred over economic activity and to profit from the 
large economic sectors in the city, and availability of money in the market, 
whether in real estate, the stock market, or commodity shortages such as flour 
or sugar etc. (EC 3) 
Violence itself is a control mechanism that supports other mechanisms. Many experts consider 
that violence is unavoidable at present due to several reasons (EC 2, EC 5, Gayer, 2014, Budhani 
et. al., 2010). First, violence, and threat of it, is a regulating mechanism enforcing informal 
transactions. Second, the contract-enforcement function has been taken over by informal 
structures underpinned by the threat of violence (Budhnai et. al., 2010). Third, violence is 
essential for maintaining territoriality: for example riots on 12th May 2007 occurred because 
MQM-linked militants claimed territoriality by opposing the arrival of the Chief Justice in Karachi, 
                                                          
21
 According to an interviewee, the term ‘China’ reflects the perception that Chinese products are usually 
for one time use, small in size and un-reliable to use 
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in opposition to an alliance of other political parties including PPP, ANP, JI, (HRCP, 2007; Budhani 
et. al., 2010, p. 8-9). Similarly, riots which erupted following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on 27th 
December 2007 were said to be reaction to MQM’s territoriality. On that day anti-MQM political 
parties brought the city to a halt to show their control clearly dividing the city into centre and the 
periphery while rioting, arson and theft took place on a mass scale (Budhani et al., 2010). 
According to a Supreme Court verdict, DG Rangers and many other authors, the armed wings of 
political parties are involved in violence (Yusuf, 2012; Gazdar, 2011; HRCP, 2011; DGR, 2014; SMC, 
2013). It is also noted that violence has been used as mechanism of influence during political 
bargaining (Gayer, 2014, p-15). Violence also influences people’s locational choices and thus 
shapes the ethnic demography of settlements, which in turn consolidates territorial control (EC 1, 
EC 6).  
Religious and more recently Taliban factions are also influential, and resort to violent tactics. 
Several law enforcement personnel, especially the police, have been killed around the Orangi 
area, and the LEAs mostly attributed homicide to Taliban factions (Rehman and Walsh, 2014; Ali, I. 
2014c). 
Violence has been extensively used to silence opposition and even civil society and NGOs have not 
been spared. Seventeen estate agents have reportedly been killed over land transactions (Dawn, 
2009c). The director, Perveen Rehman of the Orangi Pilot Project, the world-renowned NGO 
famous for community-led infrastructure provision, was killed in 2013 as she documented issues 
of land grabs, including illegal water businesses, and her successor was later attacked, but 
survived (Ahmed, N. 2014). A famous social activist, Nisar Baloch was killed as he ran a campaign 
against encroachment on Gutter Baghicha the parkland in Lyari, allegedly by a dominant political 
party representative (Shehri, 2009), while Waheed, a Pashtoon social worker, was also killed as he 
ran an anti-polio campaign in Ittehad Town, said to be Taliban stronghold (Dawn, 2013c). These 
are many other examples. 
Other mechanisms of control are also used, such as discourse and narrative of identity, which 
most ethno-political actors use to claim legitimacy (EC 3). Control over particular economic 
sectors such as transport is another example (See Khan, 2013b and Ahmed, M. 2015 for a brief 
discussion of other mechanisms).  
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Power politics, the reason behind weak government and strong informal structures 
Thus it is clear that the governance of Karachi is marked with politicization of the administration 
and the rise of informality that has gradually eroded the government’s capacity to provide 
services, creating a spiral of decline. The socio-spatial pattern has resulted in rise of contending 
informal structures who vie for territorial sovereignty. Power politics – political tactics to claim for 
more power to claim for more resources in a competition and to oust the other competitors – is 
played out at all levels and scales from formal level involving mechanisms to control formal 
institutions and policy to informal domain involving local level rent seeking, territoriality and 
violence. Power politics eventually blurs the formal-informal divide and is the main reason behind 
weak formal structures and strong informal structures controlling public resources.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified several aspects that form the basis for understanding the prevalence 
of violence, segregation and conflict in Karachi, drawn from interviews carried out for this 
research, a detailed review of newspaper reports and other research studies.  First, it is evident 
that social groups in Karachi, based on identity or economic divisions, have consolidated over 
time due to in-migration, planning decisions, violence related security problems and the growth 
of informal settlements. Although it is not unique to have multi-cultural enclaves in any megacity, 
in Karachi the socio-spatial pattern has meant that ethnicity has become aligned with politics. The 
competition between ethnic/political groups to control territory and dominate the rent-seeking 
potential of areas, furthers socio-spatial divisions. Second, conflict over resources and segregation 
has been exacerbated by the rise of informal processes and informal structures. Given, the week 
state control and other neutral structures, various groups strive to control public resources and 
provide these to their legitimising groups, which results in competition between claimants and 
leads to conflicts and violence often, thus, informality has been one of the reasons of conflict. In 
the same connection, the groups claiming for the public resources essentially work from between, 
they are neither in the government nor they are fully part of the common citizens, but they 
connect the both ends by connecting with the state resources and channelizing it to the 
legitimising groups.  Third, the gradual rise of informality undermines the operation of formal 
governance and state-led service provision. Infact, it is found that the boundaries between formal 
and informal are intentionally  blurred, usually it is intentional e.g. in the case of providing public 
resources to the legitimising group through the process of active connection between elected 
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representatives and party representatives, to claim for political benefits. Thus, informality forms a 
symbiotic relation with the formal. 
The success of the informal processes, in Karachi, depends on their efficiency, non-cumbersome 
processes and predictability, while these aspects depends on the ability of informal structures to 
enforce contracts largely through territorial controls or violence. The outcome of all of the 
processes discussed is that enclaves have emerged and citizens want to live in particular enclaves 
for security reasons, deepening divisions in Karachi to a much greater extent than other cities. 
Three periods of social change can be distinguished in Karachi that have shaped the current 
power politics and socio-spatial configuration of the city:  
a. Until the late 1950s the government provided for housing need through various housing 
schemes, but with the rise of industrialisation and other capitalist interventions, during 
1960s, housing need for the poor was neglected giving rise to informal labour settlements 
that later expanded uncontrolled.  
b. The 1980s was marked by the failure of formal security services leading to the rise of 
identity-based informal structures, to ensure security for their groups. As politics 
increasingly became aligned with ethnicity, especially with the rise of MQM, such groups 
gained legitimacy by taking over service-provision, including water, security, contract 
enforcement, provision of jobs and protecting the physical, political, ideological interests 
of their communities. The politicization of the administration and blurring of the formal-
informal divide, led to competition between different groups to access public resources, 
resulting in on-going conflict. In parallel, the private-sector provision continued. 
c. Finally, from the late 1980s onwards, each informal structure including the private sector 
consolidated geographically, consisting of: the social group that legitimized the control; 
the territory controlled, and the mechanisms, or rules of control.  
The correlation between power, in terms of government, various social groups representing 
society and the city representing space, identifies variety of situations. First, the federal and 
provincial interests clash in Karachi over control of revenue and other resources, as Karachi is the 
economic hub of the country, although identity rhetoric is not used at this level. Second, Karachi 
faces contested control between provincial and local level, which is transformed into identity 
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politics between Muhajir and Sindhi communities. The Sindhi political parties (PPP) has upper 
hand due to control over larger province and its administration, whereas Muhajir (MQM) is urban 
and more specifically Karachi based. This rift has been established for a long time, manifest in 
terms of power politics regarding demography, control over institutions and policy tools. The third 
level is within the city; due to migration Pashtoons have become the second largest social group 
in the city and is continuously increasing due to its larger social base in the north, while Muhajir 
population is increasing only slowly as they form an urban group with no other population base. 
The ensuing power and economic contestation is displayed in almost all the venues ranging from 
formal to informal and from legal to illegal mechanisms of power politics.  
The resultant, on the city-level, is a socio-spatially segregated city, weak government and strong 
informal structures. This has created a cyclic process in which the segregation is a further reason 
for conflicts around electoral politics, conflicts over resources, violence and power politics along 
ethnic lines, which eventually form a political rhetoric for ethnic political and counter power 
politics involving informal land controls. However, on the micro-level the legitimising groups are 
able to get services which the state fails to provide. 
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Chapter 5 
 North Nazimabad:  
A Symbol of Karachi’s Socio-Spatial Divide 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the social dimensions of informal land controls by analysing the empirical 
findings around power and society from the case study area of North Nazimabad. The objective is 
to analyse the rise of informal structures at the local-level and their social dimensions. More 
specifically, the chapter aims to explore: how informal structures emerge; what social control 
mechanisms are used to establish and retain control; what services they provide to earn 
legitimacy, what are the trade-offs of such service provision, and what social divisions result. The 
chapter explores the social control mechanisms used in establishing and retaining control over 
different social groups and the kind of social relations that result. This discussion also links the 
city-level power contestations and social divisions (Chapter 4) to local, everyday practices. 
Chapter 6 then explore the role of spatial practice in North Nazimabad.  
The chapter also addresses at least two gaps identified in the literature. First, it highlights how, in 
Karachi, informal structures have moved in to fill the gaps state-supplied service provision, in the 
case study area, both in the poor and informal areas but also in middle income formal areas. 
Second, informal structures – including political parties, and identity-based structures based on 
the bonds of ethnicity, kinship and religion etc. – play a central role as non-state actors, and 
‘power intermediaries’, in the processes of informal development and informal urban 
management in Karachi. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 5.2 gives background information on North 
Nazimabad, and analyses the socio-spatial configuration of the area. Section 5.3 looks at the role 
of power in the case study area, first analysing the operation of formal governance structures in 
service provision including the performance of elected representatives and institutions. The 
chapter then examines the rise of informal structures in North Nazimabad drawn from social 
identity, political affiliations and people’s collaboration, explored in order of influence from 
political groups and Baradary-based groups, to religious and neighbourhood committees.  
Section 5.4 covers the social dimensions, exploring relations between the informal structures and 
the corresponding social group. It identifies the emergence, legitimacy and survival of informal 
structures, and the goods and services they provide, or strive to provide. It also examines 
contestation amongst various informal structures that correspond to their political, ethnic and 
religious identities, resulting in social divisions. Finally, it explores the trade-offs that the residents 
have to make to attain services provision from the informal structures.  Section 5.5 is the 
conclusion. 
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The data and analysis is drawn mainly from site observations and interviews, and distinguishes 
between informal and formal areas, as the outcomes are very different. Comparisons between 
areas are thus also made.  
5.2 North Nazimabad, the Context 
The main case study area (termed ‘the area’), the North Nazimabad neighbourhood, falls within 
the administrative boundaries of North Nazimabad Town (Section 3.3.3), one of 18 administrative 
towns established under the Sind Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (Box 4.1). North Nazimabad 
Town lies within Central District, one of six commissioner-based administrative divisions in 
Karachi (Map 5.1).  
 
Map 5.1: Location of North Nazimabad Town and case study areas in Karachi 
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The area covers 2.5 Sq. Km, stretching 1.8 Km. along Shahrah-e-Noorjahan Road (SNJ Road) with a 
depth of 1.4 Km on both sides of SNJ Road, and is divided into two administrative blocks. The first 
covers one complete union council, UC2 (Pahar Gunj), while the second covers parts of two union 
councils UC3 (Khandu Goth) and UC4 (Hyderi) (Table 5.2).  
The area is further divided into formally developed and informally developed areas (Map 5.3). The 
concept of formal and informal in North Nazimabad is complex.  Formally developed areas were 
those laid out in the formal Planning Scheme. Informally developed areas were originally 
squatted, and although land titles in these areas have now been granted so they are no longer 
technically informal, they remain distinct in many ways (Section 6.2.3).  As noted in Chapter 3, for 
ease of writing these are referred to as formal areas and informal areas, but this terminology 
refers to their origin rather than current status, and also reflects the perception of the residents 
and the government especially when looking at informal areas. 
 
 
Map 5.2: Case study 1 North Nazimabad; spatial divisions, including formal-informal divide 
(Author) 
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The formal areas known by their planning names as Block A (part of UC3) and Block C (part of 
UC4) are combined together for analysis (termed UC3-4) as they have similar socio-spatial 
characteristics. UC2 lies to the northwest, divided from UC3-4 by SNJ Road, and includes both 
formal and informal areas (Map 5.2; Section 6.2.4). 
The formal area of UC2 includes Blocks U, P and Q (termed as F-UC2). The informal area of UC2 
(termed I-UC2 in this text) climbs up the hillside to the Orangi Hill, a steep ridge dividing North 
Nazimabad from Orangi Town (Map 5.1 & 5.2; Table 5.2).  
North Nazimabad has generally been considered as an upper-middle income settlement with a 
high literacy rate and access to urban amenities and services (Gazdar, 2011; see Appendix 5.1 for 
the history of its development). The larger area has remained peaceful, but the western boundary 
with Orangi Town has been the focus of Pashtoon-Muhajir conflicts since 1985-86 as it forms a 
border between Muhajir and Pashtoon strongholds (Gayer, 2014; Gayer, 2007; Budhani et. al, 
2010). The violence increased during 2007-2013 as part of the city-level political conflicts, 
especially after the opening in 2009 of the dramatic Kati Pahari Road which passes through a deep 
cutting in the Orangi Hill to connect the two towns.  The Kati Pahari area (in UC2) is now one of 
the eight most violent flashpoints in the city as reported by the English-language daily Dawn 
(2013d22). Most of the violence has been around ethno-political conflicts, and SNJ Road Police 
Station alone registered 35 politically-motivated killings during 2011-2012, and Taimuria Police 
Station registered 28 cases during the same period (Hashim, 2012b). However, street crimes and 
rent seeking of all sorts are much higher than that which is reported on any formal platform. 
5.2.1 Socio-Spatial Setting 
The main socio-spatial groupings in the area are shown in Maps 5.3, 5.4 and Table 5.2. UC2, Pahar 
Gunj, is bounded by three roads including Orangi Road, Shahrah-e-Noorjahan Road (SNJ Road) 
and the Nazimabad-Orangi Link Road, also known as the Kati Pahari Road, while, on the fourth 
side the ridge of the Orangi Hill defines the boundary.  
                                                          
22
 The GIS section of Dawn newspaper of Pakistan, developed map of most violent areas of the city based 
on the violence data and given social settings that may lead to future violent incidents as well.  
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Map 5.3: North Nazimabad, socio-spatial composition (Author) 
It is impossible to get an accurate estimate of the population23, so the figures below have been 
derived partly from union council estimates and partly from local knowledge reported by key 
informants.  The breakdown is given in Table 5.1 which suggests that there are around 195,000 
people in the case study area24. 
Informal area: The informal area, I-UC2, consists of three main neighbourhoods, Umer Farooq 
Colony, Deer Colony, and Pahar Gunj Colony. The population of I-UC2 is estimated to be 120,000 
(Table 5.1). 
a. Umer Farooq Colony is the largest with several sub-localities, including: the Balti Colony 
settled by the Balti community; Usman Ghani Colony settled by the Kohistani community, 
Mawara Colony occupied by Hasan Zai Pashtoons (although these are also spread 
                                                          
23
 The last census count took place in 1998, since then many socio-spatial changes have occurred in the 
area, especially in I-UC2. 
24
 According to government estimates in 2005 (KMC-GOS, [No date]), the population of UC2 was 
approximately 65,000 people. The population may well have doubled by 2014, given the 5% growth rate of 
the city, and the rapid increase in population and housing density in I-UC2 during the last ten years and is 
estimated as around 120,000 people (Interviews; Table 5.1; Appendix 5.2 for area and community wise 
breakdown of population). 
144 | P a g e  
throughout the area), and the central area of Chamra Chum behind De Silva Town. The 
area abutting the infamous Kati Pahari Road is now known as Kati Pahari (Table 5.2).  
b. Deer Colony is occupied by Pashtoons from Deer, part of Deer District in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP, formerly North-West Frontier Province).  
c. Pahar Gunj was established on an amenity plot reserved for hospital, and is mainly 
inhabited by Punjabi Christians. There are 3,000 families living in 1,000 housing units in 
Pahar Gunj, according to a local resident and social worker whose NGO conducted 
documentation and research on the settlement (INN 12). 
 Area  
(Sq. Km) 
Population 
2005  
(Approx.)  
Population 2015 
 (Estimate) 
I-UC2  0.45 52,000 100,000 
F-UC2 0.60 10,000 20,000 
UC2 (Total) 1.05 62000  120,000 
UC3 (Case Study) 0.75 30,000 40,000 
UC4 (Case Study) 0.75 25,000 35,000 
UC3-4 (Total) 1.5 55,000 75,000 
TOTAL (Case Study 
Area) 
2.55  195,000 
Table 5.1: Areas and population 
Formal area: To the SW of SNJ Road, UC3-4 comprises of Blocks A and C. The population is 
estimated to contain around 75,000 people in 201525 (Table 5.1). Within Blocks A and C there are 
further sub-settlements, e.g. within Block C, one locality is called Nizari Cooperative Society (or 
Nizari Society), having 200 units for the Ismaili community only. Another part of Block C is 
informally called Bohri Mohalla (Bohri Neighbourhood), which houses the largest concentration of 
the Bohri Community in Pakistan, i.e. around 25,000 people according to local claims (FNN-22, 
FNN 23).  Similarly, in Block-A, there is a specific area controlled by the paramilitary Rangers’ 
Force (Appendix 5.2 for area and community wise breakdown of population).  
 
 
                                                          
25
 The population according to 2005 government estimates totals around 190,000 in UC3 and UC4 
combined, but the part of case study area (UC3-4) is estimated to contain around 75,000 people in 2015 
(Table 5.1). 
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Boundary Status & 
Term Used 
Settlements Sub-Settlements or 
Localities 
Social Composition 
UC2 
 
Informal 
Area 
(Partly 
regularised 
now) 
I-UC2 
Deer Colony - Pashtoons from Deer 
Umer Farooq 
Colony 
Mawara Colony Pashtoons from Kala Dhaka 
Chamra Chum Pashtoons from Kala Dhaka 
Usman Ghani Colony Dominated by Pashtoons from 
Kohistan (Swat), also some 
Hasan Zai and Afridi Pashtoons  
Balti Colony Shia Muslims from Gilgit-
Baltistan 
Kati Pahari Area Dominated by Pashtoons from 
Kohistan (Swat), also some 
Hasan Zai and Afridi Pashtoons  
Pahar Gunj 
Colony 
(Sometimes it is 
considered within 
Umer Farooq Colony) 
Punjabi Christians dominated. 
Also Punjabi-Muslims and 
Pashtoons of Kala Dhaka. 
Formal Area 
F-UC2 
Block U Formally Developed 
Part 
Mixed, predominantly Muhajir, 
Pashtoons 
Deer Colony  Mentioned separately in 
“Informal Area” 
Block P De-Silva Town  
(Formally Developed 
Part) 
Mixed, predominantly Muhajir, 
while previously wealthy 
Christian Dominated, now 
Pashtoons of Kala Dhaka and 
Afridi tribes. Pahar Gunj Colony Mentioned Separately in 
“Informal Area” 
Block Q Formally Developed 
Part 
Mixed, predominantly Muhajir. 
Usman Ghani Colony Mentioned Separately in 
“Informal Area” 
UC3 Formal Area 
Part of  
UC3-4 
Block A Rangers Controlled 
Area 
Federal Govt. institutional 
property for State Bank 
employees. 
Mixed Public Area Mixed, predominantly Muhajir. 
UC4 Formal Area 
Part of  
UC3-4 
Block C Nizari Society Only for Ismaili-Gujrati Muslims 
Bohri Neighbourhood Although open area for the 
public, dominated by Bohri-
Gujrati Muslims. 
Mixed Public Area Mixed, dominantly Muhajir. 
Table 5.2: North Nazimabad, socio-spatial composition (Author) 
The rest of UC3-4 is dominated by Muhajir ethno-political social groups and, although it can also 
be occupied by others, it is seen as a predominantly Muhajir territory in terms of political identity 
(Figure 5.1).  
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The formal area consists of bungalows on plots of 200-2000 Sq. yds. Building regulations permit 
only two stories structures (G+1), however there are many apartment buildings in Blocks A and C 
abutting Sher Shah Soori Road (SSS Road). Many of the families in the formal area are owner-
occupiers.  The informal area mostly consists of irregular plots of 80 sq. yards or below with G+2 
structures with most occupants being tenants in Usman Ghani Colony of the Kohistani Pashtoons 
while owner-occupier dominated in other parts of I-UC2.  
Some of the settlements in UC2 (table 5.2) are complex to be categorised under single head, as 
they are physically part of formal area but, due to social and political reasons, equally belong to 
the informal area (I-UC2). This complexity has important impact on defining territorial boundaries, 
explored in chapter 6) 
5.3. Power and Governance Structures 
This section explores the role of governance in terms of power, suggesting that formal 
government has failed to cater to the needs of the residents creating a context in which existing 
informal structures based around politics, kinship, tribe, and religion develop urban management 
skills have flourished. Furthermore, in areas where communities are not linked by identity, non-
political neighbourhood committees or local political party offices and workers fill this gap (Figure 
5.1).   
5.3.1 Formal Governance Structures  
If it is possible for me, I will never give income tax to the government just 
because the government has given nothing in return, neither services nor 
security!, Why should I give tax when I have to arrange for all the services by 
myself. (FNN26 21) 
FNN 21, a middle-aged male resident of UC3-4 was very disaffected by the government’s poor 
provision of services. Although this statement is not completely true, it sheds some light on the 
opinion of the residents towards the effectiveness of the formal structures.  
                                                          
26
 Names of interviewees have been coded for anonymity reasons. INN refer to interviewees from 
informally developed part (I-UC2) of North Nazimabad while, FNN interviewee from formally developed 
part (F-UC2 and UC3-4). 
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The interviews suggest that the residents of the area assess formal structures based on their 
effectiveness in delivering services, particularly water, and electricity, role of formal civic 
institutions including law enforcement agencies, and activities of elected representatives in local 
government or other tiers. In addition, residents of the informal areas (I-UC2) perceive and refer 
to the majority political party in the city, MQM (and its non-elected and party representatives) as 
formal structures, as the party’s labour unions and workers are influential in many service delivery 
organisations such as the Water Board, Karachi Development Authority (KDA), and Karachi 
Municipal Corporation (KMC) etc. Such government employees-cum-political-affiliates work in 
their informal capacities for the local political offices, or are contacted by them, to provide formal 
services, blurring the formal-informal divide.  
The elected government 
Elected representatives form the most visible link to the formal government, but the last general 
elections were held in 2013 in which two MPAs27 and one MNA28, belonging to MQM, were 
elected in the North Nazimabad constituencies (PS 101, PS 103 and NA 24). There is no elected 
local government at the moment29 as the last local government elections were held in 2004-05, 
which completed its tenure in 2009. In the absence of local government elections, the system 
reverted back to the appointed Commissioner-led bureaucracy, and union councils were 
cancelled, so the local administration has a very weak connection with the locality and residents 
(Box 4.1). The absence of a functioning local government system has created many issues for 
residents.  
The interviewees, both in the formal and informal areas, feel alienated as they cannot reach their 
current elected representatives, and elected representatives rarely come to the area especially in 
I-UC2 due to political and security reasons. Many interviewees reported that the situation was 
much better when union councils and elected local government was operational (INN 6, INN 9, 
INN 12, INN 14, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25).  
Local government elections are a need of common men, without elections 
there is no relief. A common man cannot approach an MNA or MPA, whereas 
                                                          
27
 Member of the Provincial Assembly. 
28
 Member of the National Assembly. 
29
 At the time of the fieldwork, while local government elections are expected to take place in December 
2015, a section on updated situation is mentioned in Box 4.1, and section 8.5. 
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it is always easy to reach the area Nazim and Naib Nazim30, in fact these 
people are usually from our community and family (in I-UC2). (INN 9) 
… at least someone was there to listen to you (during local government), one 
could access people who were answerable for their work, in one way or the 
other, issues used to be resolved, but not any more now – the local 
government system should be there. I am neither satisfied with any public 
service provider nor the police. (FNN 21) 
Formal institutions 
Two attributes that define the presence of formal structures are the effectiveness of utility 
provision, and security. There are significant differences in service provision across North 
Nazimabad, as service quality is good in some settlements catering to certain socio-spatial groups; 
others remain deprived where residents have weak connections to formal government and other 
power bases, resulting in partial failure and intentional inaction of service delivery on 
government’s behalf.  
Utility services 
Although in both administrative and physical terms, trunk infrastructure is available, services are 
poor or non-existent in some localities and the infrastructure is not maintained or serviced. KMC 
(Karachi Municipal Corporation) is responsible for solid waste management, cleaning and 
maintenance of infrastructure, KWSB (Karachi Water and Sewerage Board) for sewerage and 
water supply and K.E (Karachi Electric) for the electricity supply and SSGC (Sui Southern Gas 
Company) for the gas fuel. 
The interviewees revealed a huge gap in the KMC related services. Service provision is not a 
complete failure, as it works when there is pressure from powerful actors in formal structures or 
influential political parties or individuals. In the informal areas (I-UC2), during the JI tenure of local 
government31 (2001-2004), services were reasonable and the Nazims (heads of union councils) 
had enough staff to service the area properly, but the service is almost non-existent now (INN 6, 
INN 10, INN 11, INN 14, INN 16). In the formal areas, UC2, and UC3-4, the situation is also poor, 
although one area of housing for government employees is mainly inhabited by Rangers, the 
                                                          
30
 Administrative head and vice-head of Union Council or Town. 
31
 First local government after the introduction of SLGO 2001, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) assumed the office of local 
government (see Box 4.1). 
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paramilitary force, and is relatively secure and well serviced (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 25), 
highlighting an intentional failure to provide services impartially. 
… we (residents of UC3-4) spend Rs. 4,000 to 6,000 every month on it (sewage 
management and cleaning street and garbage collection). No representative or 
worker of the public agencies comes here… there are no government 
sweepers here, they are appointed, they take a salary but divide it amongst 
their supervisors and themselves and work privately in other parts of the city, 
just like the private sweepers work in our locality whom the residents pay 
themselves to get the street swept and to collect the garbage.  (FNN 20) 
In I-UC2, especially on the hill, the electricity company representatives do not repair street-level 
faults, or disconnect illegal connections because of the difficult terrain and threats to the company 
employees (INN 10; Section 6.3.1). Most residents on the hill have illegal electricity connections 
and do not pay their bills (INN 2, INN 3, INN 6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 13, INN 16, FNN 
19). To recover costs lost to illegal connections, the company now distributes the cost of power 
losses to all paying customers. 
The electricity issue is that the system of distribution and billing is not just. 
Illegal connections are numerous on the hill, you could do a survey there, 
while the people down here have to pay the price because the electric 
company does not go up there, whereas they just recover their charges by 
distributing the losses to the people who pay the bill32. People who don’t steal 
are suffering, while those who steal are enjoying the benefits. (INN 7) 
The residents of I-UC2 are facing an acute shortage of water, which is only supplied every 16-18 
days, whereas all the neighbouring formal areas get piped water on a regular basis. Various 
reasons for the shortage were found, including illegal water hydrants on the supply pipes, and the 
sale of water to nearby industrial areas, allegedly by local political and community leaders. Most 
of the I-UC2 residents blame MQM as the KWSB is thought to be controlled by the MQM workers’ 
union; KWSB and MQM are thus equated with government or as formal structures by the locals.  
The issues of water supply are important and give insights into power dynamics and controls (see 
Section 6.3.3 and Box 5.1 for details).   
 
 
                                                          
32
 It is found that the electric company calculate the power losses of the area, and then they recover their 
losses by charging the residents, irrespective of who is responsible, through bills. Eventually, the residents 
who use legal connections and pay their bills diligently suffer the most.  
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Box 5.1: Water Issue 
Water shortages in I-UC2 are acute and their dynamics reflect the social structure and power 
politics. The supply is provided every 16-18 days, and each settlement within I-UC2 gets water 
for only 2-3 hours on supply days. The residents on the hill are the worst hit, as the water 
supplied does not have enough pressure to reach the top, so residents in these areas use two or 
three suction pumps along a pipeline to get the water, although the water pipelines are there, 
and the pumping station is working. Several reasons for this failure were explained during the 
interviews, and some measures have been taken to control the situation.  
First, the main Karachi water reservoir the ‘Hub Dam’ ran out of water in 2014 when fieldwork 
was being carried out, due to a relatively dry season, but the adjacent formal areas near I-UC2 
were getting water without problems. Second, it was widely reported in newspapers and 
confirmed by local residents, that illegal water hydrants had been established by the 
water/tanker mafia in adjacent informal areas, consuming all the water to be supplied in these 
localities (Mumtaz, 2008; Maher & Ilyas, 2015). The same illegal hydrants then sell water to 
residents from water tankers. Third, many of local community leaders are said to own illegal 
hydrants, and also operate water tanker services.  The only neighbourhood in I-UC2 that gets 
water on a regular basis is Deer Colony, which has a strong leadership and geographical 
advantage of being at the head of the supply line. The leader of Deer Colony had also developed 
several wells and a storage system for the community to get water. Fourth, corruption is 
thought to be the core problem, as the locality received some funds during the second term of 
local government for solving the problem and then the local PPP leader also received funds 
during PPP central government (2008-2013) – piping was installed but was not operational at 
the time of survey and it showed signs of wear and tear already due to long-term non-usage.  
Fifth, residents think that elected representatives and the Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) 
have sold the allocated water to nearby SITE industrial area. Finally, it is alleged that supporters 
of the majority political party in the labour union of KWSB are deliberately depriving the locality 
for political revenge.  
Several attempts have been made to address this issue. Previously, there was no mechanism for 
distributing water when there was shortage of supply, and the valve men had to be bribed to 
get the water to the settlement, as there are 64 valves in I-UC2. This led to many conflicts so the 
elders decided to set up a water management committee to oversee the distribution. The 
committee included representatives of the communities, including the alleged illegal hydrant 
owners (KI). By 2014, supplies had improved, especially for those who live at the bottom of the 
supply line. Some leaders have invested in water wells, and sell water to their communities at 
Rs. 100-200 per hour, for example in Hasan Zai, Kohistani and the Balti neighbourhood. The 
Imam Bargah in the Balti neighbourhood has built an underground water storage tank, supplied 
by water tankers, and permits residents on the hill and beyond the reach of tankers to pump 
water to their homes. (Based on interviews in I-UC2) 
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Law Enforcement Agencies (Police and Rangers):  
Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are important in maintaining the writ of state control and local 
security. It is interesting to note that, throughout the area most residents are sceptical about the 
performance of LEAs, and some even blame LEAs, especially the Police Department, for the 
problems. 
… I think no one in the city would be happy with their (LEA’s) performance and 
they (LEAs) themselves are reason of crime. (FNN 20) 
This lack of trust results from corruption in the police, and it is widely alleged that they demand 
bribes, demand a monthly income from encroachments (squatting and informal street trading), 
and overlook criminal activities (INN 10, INN 12). Several interviewees said that the LEAs do not 
bother to go onto the hill, which has thus become a safe haven for criminals (INN 7) and that SNJ 
Road has also become a no-go-zone at night times due to the high crime rate. Some residents 
consider the presence of LEAs a problem, as although Rangers patrol the streets they try to 
protect themselves from any potential terrorist attack, and do not allow public parking on the 
streets or vehicle delivery to local garages and mechanics’ workshops (Box 5.2; FNN 24, FNN 25). 
Box 5.2: Rangers presence and issues for the residents and businesses  
The Rangers’ residential complex has created many issues for the residents and the businesses 
nearby. The Rangers’ headquarters in Block B has been attacked three times (The Express 
Tribune, 2014c). It was first attacked in 2012 with a bomb and since then the security has been 
heightened. The offices and residential complex in Block A has also been facing threats that led 
to closing of many roads leading to the Rangers’ housing and offices; residents are annoyed but 
cannot complain. Similarly, when the Rangers patrol in the area, especially where they station 
their vehicles at Pahar Gunj Roundabout, they do not want parked vehicles near them, in order 
to avoid terrorist attacks. This badly affects the business of all the mechanics’ workshops in the 
area, as the Rangers do not allow any vehicle to park at the workshops. (INN 10) 
Similarly, a resident of Block A said that the Rangers have developed a guard post near his 
house and now no cars can be parked in that street due to the security risk. When the 
interviewee complained and insisted on parking his and his relative’s vehicles “…they (Rangers) 
said that just follow the orders, otherwise they (Rangers) would make me listen in their own 
way by taking me away and nobody would know where I have vanished”, He was referring to 
the many missing persons in the country but, despite rulings by the Supreme Court ordering 
LEAs to present people who had been detained, the dead bodies of missing people are 
routinely found on road side. The interviewee’s family is now thinking of shifting to a new 
location after that incident (KI interview). 
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The prevalence of illegal weapons, increasing crime and drug gangs, and the ineffectiveness of the 
Karachi Operation33, a military operation that started in 2013 with the aim of purging crimes in the 
city (Section 4.3.1), are also symbols of ineffective security services, as several community leaders 
claimed (INN 4, INN 11, INN 5). The presence of gates, barriers and private security guards 
throughout North Nazimabad is a response to such security issues (Section 6.3.1). 
Spaces of exception: symbol of intentional failure 
The area controlled by the Rangers in Block A (Section 5.2) is an exception. The area is relatively 
safe and usually receives regular services, including sweeping, water supply, electricity and 
policing. The businesses in this area do not have to close during political party strike calls, and 
people from surrounding areas also use facilities there during strikes. In fact, this is the only area 
that demonstrates full control of formal government.  
Water is abundantly available in the (Rangers) neighbourhood…the sweepers 
come in the morning (in certain areas linked with the Rangers 
complex)…electricity supply in this locality is quite good as there are no 
outages…the Rangers-controlled vicinity along with its commercial zones 
remain open throughout strike calls, and only closes on government gazetted 
holidays. (FNN 24) 
Formal government void and informal structures 
Thus, in I-UC2 the performance of the state and its institutions - the formal structure - has been 
either fully absent or partial. Furthermore, political parties in government are found intentionally 
blurring formal-informal divide and channelling public funds through informal means to claim for 
political credit. This failure goes beyond the formal-informal area divide, and only  the area with 
an effective security force - the Rangers  - where their members also live, has full government 
control, good security and regular service supply. Businesses in the area follows gazetted holidays 
and are not forced to close for other reasons, unlike other areas that are controlled by informal 
structures such as political parties. As already established, such state failures are often avoidable 
(Chapter 4). The reasons for the failure are complex and include the politics of ethnicity, political 
party influence and incapacity of the formal institutions.  
Informal structures fill the gap in formal governance and services provision. The concept of 
informal structures was defined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4). In the area, informal structures are 
                                                          
33
 This was reported at the time of survey but the situation has changed after 2015  (Section 4.3.1),  
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varied in terms of their nature, origin, operation and scale. Three categories were found: first, 
district-level political parties including both religious and secular; second, at neighbourhood-level, 
informal structures around social identity, such as tribe/family or kinship (Baradary), religious 
structures and where identity based structures are not there political parties fill the gap through 
its political offices and workers; and third, on street level neutral structures such as 
neighbourhood committees, each discussed below. The district and neighbourhood structures 
combine to form a local level in comparison to the city-level. These local-level informal structures 
work in a complex web, some overlapping and some operating in parallel. The important aspect 
to understand is that informal structures, in addition to community control and service provision, 
contribute to social divisions and conflicts, particularly when working in parallel (Figure 5.1).  
5.3.2 Informal Structures - Political Parties 
Political parties are the most powerful informal structures in the area, because of their formal 
nature, objectives, links and experience with formal governance at city level. Political parties work 
at both the levels in the area, i.e. at district-level by co-opting identity-based structures, and at 
neighbourhood-level, through its political offices and workers (Table 5.3). For example, in the 
Pashtoon-dominated I-UC2 area, residents have a strong political awareness and the political 
parties and their leadership form an extension of their cultural and tribal governance system, 
except in the Christian-dominated Pahar Gunj. However, in UC3-4 the majority political party 
forms district, neighbourhood and street-level informal structure, except in areas under religious 
control and where neighbourhood committees are functional.  As discussed in Chapter 4, in I-UC2, 
ANP was the dominant political party and formed the district level (intermediate level) informal 
structure, along with JI and JUI to a lesser extent, but in 2012-13 ANP has lost power due to 
threats from the Taliban. 
As a Kohistani Pashtoon community leader said, 
People vote for different reasons some vote for religious reasons, some have 
personal reasons, some due to friendship and on a community basis etc. 
Almost all the political parties are here, and since the people are mostly 
Pashtoon and belong to the Deobandi sect of Islam, MQM is not present here 
(I-UC2), and no Barelvi (Sect) political party has any presence here. (INN 5) 
In contrast, in the formal areas of F-UC2 and UC3-4, many interviewees confirmed that residents 
often try to avoid politics (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). Even where the community 
is organised on the basis of ethno-religious identity, such as the Bohri and Ismaili communities, 
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identity does not overlap with politics, unlike I-UC2 (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26). In addition, where 
there are no ethno-religious or kinship bonds, the residents may form their own street-level 
neighbourhood committees to lobby for improved services. There is one dominant political party 
i.e. MQM, that forms district-level informal structure, with JI and more recently PTI (Chapter 4). 
Thus in North Nazimabad political affiliation follows the dividing line between the formal and 
informal areas. In the formal area, the ‘street power’ or the physical control of the neighbourhood 
rests with MQM, irrespective of the presence of other political parties and informal structures 
(FNN 20, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). While in I-UC2, ANP held the active ‘street control’ 
until 2013.  
The concept of ‘street control’ refers to physical control over territory, with the ability to expel 
opponents, enforce contracts or solve problems through informal networks and rules. ‘Street 
power’ actually defines the informal structures in the area. 
…you know that in this neighbourhood, in fact, in the whole city it is like a ‘one 
man show’ there is only one political party (MQM) that is the most powerful in 
terms of street power and control.  (KI, a resident of formal area) 
The political parties, as informal structures, establish control and earn legitimacy in myriad ways, 
including provision of services and welfare work, which also gives them control over resources 
(Section 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 6.3).  
Political parties have strong hierarchical and spatial structures that stretch from city to local-level. 
In ANP the smallest unit of organisation is ‘ward’, whereas in MQM it is ‘unit’. The person in 
charge of a ‘ward’ or ‘unit’ is the person responsible at local level, who links the settlement to the 
city, and the city to the settlement (Table 5.3). Political parties, in the case study area, work both 
as controller and provider of services through already existing structures of identity i.e. Baradary 
based (or tribal) and religious or, where these do not exist through its political offices and workers 
at the neighbourhood and street levels.  
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Political Party Based Informal Structure:  
City-district-neighbourhood-street scale, organised and hierarchical structure 
MQM MQM operates Units and Sectors at district and neighbourhood levels. A Unit is the 
smallest unit of administration headed by a ‘unit in-charge’, the grassroots 
administrator, who is often as powerful as elected political leaders. A Sector 
comprises 15-20 units, and Sectors report to MQM’s central administrative 
committee called the ‘Tanzeemi committee’.  
The Unit -in-charge and Sector in-charge are selected by the central secretariat in 
London on the basis of history, loyalty and abilities. These in-charges run the day-to-
day party activities, from solving people’s problems to carrying out the party- political 
agenda, including collection of welfare funds etc. The workers follow the orders of the 
in-charge, and can be given ‘special tasks’ (Gayer, 2014, p.104-109). 
A ‘Unit’ is usually well aware of minute details of any events in the locality from 
property transactions to political activities, through an informed network of political 
workers and party sympathisers (not registered as workers). However, Gayer (2014) 
mentions that the central command used to give ‘special’ tasks to particular party 
workers bypassing Unit and in-charges. The workers show a keen interest in getting 
political progress in the party, e.g. during strikes they will ensure that businesses 
follow the party’s ‘request’ to shut down. Workers are given duties to collect money 
and sacrificial animal hides for the welfare wing of the party.  
Centrally, there are two administrative hierarchies in MQM, organisational headed by 
the ‘Tanzeemi Committee’, and political headed by the ‘Rabita Committee’. The unit 
and sector links and operationalise the city and national level political objectives of 
the party at the neighbourhood and street levels, it is alleged that, this organisational 
structure form a powerful alternative structure involved in service provision and 
channelling public funds informally for development. 
ANP With headquarters in Northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhua (KPK), political and 
organisational leaders are the same in the party. ANP operates through ‘Wards’ at 
local level, but the role and powers of the ‘Ward in-charge’ are not the same as the 
‘Unit in-charge’. The local leaders are also selected based on their financial and social 
capital. Every political leader of ANP in I-UC2 happens to be community leader as well, 
but not all community leaders and elders are involved in electoral politics. It has also 
been reported that various criminal groups had entered ranks of the ANP party, as 
these were helpful in establishing and defending territory against the opposition 
political parties, but continued their illegal businesses such as extortion rings and 
other rent seeking activities (Section 7.4). 
Table 5.3: Political parties as informal structures 
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5.3.3 Informal Structures – Baradary   
In both types of settlement, communities based on ethnicity and religious identities exhibit multi-
layered affiliation with informal structures, particularly the tribal/family (Baradary) system at the 
neighbourhood level, which is widespread. 
The whole area (I-UC2) is based on Baradary (community/family/ 
tribe/kinship/ethnicity) system, in which each community lives together and 
people are related to each other. In addition, everyone knows each other in 
the settlement and everyone participate at times of happiness and sorrows of 
the family.  (INN 14) 
The concept of Baradary is important in understanding the informal structures. In I-UC2 it is based 
on social relations, family and kinship, ethnicity, and tribes or place of origin of the resident group. 
Baradary is a brotherhood, and implies that the community is linked through tribe or kinship. The 
Baradary forms a unit controlled, supervised or headed by one or more community leader/elders 
that organize the community, and solve problems and conflicts according to unwritten social 
rules, e.g. in Pashtoon tribes the traditional ‘tribal code’ is called ‘Pashtoonwali’ that prescribe a 
particular way of traditional living including the laws governing society and individuals (Table 5.4, 
Box 5.3).  
The Baradary is an important informal structure in I-UC2. Pashtoons are defined by their tribes 
and places of origin, such as the Hasan Zai Tribe, Afridi Tribe, Pashtoons from Deer and Pashtoons 
from Kohistan, and together they form a larger Baradary (INN 10, INN 14, INN 16, INN 18). The 
Punjabi-Christians and Balti-Shia also have a traditional system around Baradary headed by 
community leaders influenced by Pashtoon traditions, adopting the Jirga system (Box 5.3; INN 3, 
INN 10, INN 12, INN 13). Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili communities from UC3-4 also operate as 
Baradary, although their minority religion dominates their ethnic identity, like the Balti Shias in I-
UC2. 
In I-UC2, political relations are subservient to Baradary relations (INN 7, INN 9, INN 11, INN 14), as 
political party structures draw on the existing Baradary structure, to the extent that political 
leaders have to be community elders or leaders to stand in elections (INN 10, INN 11, INN 13). 
Often the community decides collectively whom to support during elections, representatives from 
the tribe making the initial selection (INN 5, INN 6, INN 7, INN 13, INN 18).  
Every community has their leaders, who looks after the matters of the 
community and the people also go to them to get their problems solved... 
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There are also some leaders who are involved in politics and have links in 
government and administration. These political leaders are consulted and 
followed in issues related to civic and political nature… sometimes the 
community and political leadership is the same. (INN 10) 
Box 5.3: JIRGA  
The Jirga is a traditional mechanism of addressing conflicts, problems and decision making 
amongst Pashtoons. 
In Pashtoon communities, they have a Jirga system in which the elders of the community sit 
together and decide about general or problems in the area or community, or an individual’s 
issues brought to them. Each community has their own Dera/Baithak (guest area/community 
area) where elders usually gather informally on regular basis along with the common residents 
(INN 5). 
Jirga means to get together and deliberate on a solution of a problem. In practice, the 
community or tribal elders and wise men are responsible for holding a Jirga; the solution or 
verdict becomes the binding on all parties in a dispute. For community matters, the elders 
decide hold a Jirga, chose a place and all the people/tribe/community involved are responsible 
for the food and other needs of the members of the Jirga. If the issue is between two parties, 
then both the parties approach the elders for justice and they pay a heavy amount for the food 
etc., which is actually a fee to the Jirga members. Usually in tribal areas, both the groups have 
to submit valuables as collateral and that collateral is forfeited as a penalty if any party does not 
agree with the solution/verdict prescribed by the Jirga. (INN 10) 
The concept of Baradary is also a relative concept corresponding to the identities in the area. The 
residents of the UC3-4 describe I-UC2 as the ‘Pashtoon area’ irrespective of the various sub-
identities, while I-UC2 residents consider UC3-4 as the ‘Muhajir area’ (Figure 5.1). This 
generalisation gives a sense of larger community organised under one identity in common 
defence against a competing social group, e.g. Muhajir-MQM, which  shapes social relations and 
eventually physical boundaries (INN 7, FNN 24, FNN 25). The overall socio-spatial identity that 
emerges from UC2 can be termed as informal-Pashtoon-ANP territory versus the formal-Muhajir-
MQM territory (UC3-4); this spatial dimension is addressed in Chapter 6. 
The formally developed bungalows’ area down from here (referring to 
Kohistani Chowk) starting from the restaurant at the corner (the junction of I-
UC2 & F-UC2), from there it’s the MQM area, while above that restaurant, the 
informal settlement starts and they assume it is an ANP-controlled area, 
although all the party members live here (I-UC2) but they think it’s the ANP, 
similarly we also assume the same for their (Muhajir community) area. (F-UC2, 
UC3-4, INN 7) 
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Baradary Based Informal Structure:  
Tribal, family or kinship based structures 
Pashtoons Baradary are characterised by tribal and ethnic identity bonds. Each tribe is headed by 
tribal leaders and elders, usually more than one, with the exception of Deer Colony, 
where the community has one chief, who is also the tribal leader (along with others) and 
the political leader.  
Tribal leaders ensure the people are following the traditional ‘code of living’ or 
‘Pashtoonwali’. The role of the leaders is to guide people, solve problems, resolve 
conflicts and ensure the tribal code of conduct. These tribal social boundaries are strictly 
linked with the original tribal groups in the North, and a collective decision in the North 
is equally applicable here, such as if someone is given a death penalty in the North, it 
could be equally applicable in Karachi as well.   
Tribal leaders emerge for various reasons, including having money, male children and 
family members, or other resources, having links to formal agencies and officials, or 
having knowledge and literacy. Leadership could also be inherited, as seen in the case 
study area. Tribal leaders may be political leaders but not necessarily. Tribal bonds 
transcends political bonds. The strong bonds provide immunity for criminals from the 
tribe, unless a Jirga is called which decides against him/her. 
Table 5.4: Baradary based informal structures 
Community Leaders and Elders 
Each Baradary (Tribe) in I-UC2 is headed by resourceful, knowledgeable and widely accepted 
community elders/leaders. There can be one or more community leaders in a tribal community, 
but only one Chief (Sardar or chieftain), e.g. in the case of Deer Colony while other tribes do not 
have Chieftains.  Several of the interviewees for this research were community leaders and elders 
anonymised for security reasons while they were introduced and given access by the gate keepers 
in the area (Chapter 3).  
Leadership is assumed through various routes. First, there are some specific hereditary tribal 
leaders (INN 5, INN 11, and INN 18). Second, leaders may gain their legitimacy because of their 
personal standing and ability to solve problems (reported by several respondents in I-UC2), while 
others gain the position due to wealth and resourcefulness – several interviewees suggested that 
the Hasan Zai Pashtoon political leaders gained their position this way (INN 5, INN 6, INN 10, INN 
11). The ability of a leader to solve people’s issues, personal or institutional, defines the power of 
the community elder/leader, together with other traits such as having money, personal links with 
formal government, number of sons, male members of their family and number of people they 
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command. Older community leaders are considered as Buzurg or ‘elders’ and gain acceptance 
beyond ethnic or tribal boundaries. The elders are involved in inter-community issues and solving 
large-scale problems. 
Sometimes community leaders and political leaders are the same and 
sometimes not, actually, for being political leader here, one needs to become 
community leader first in order to get the confidence of people. Sometimes 
the community leader is approached by a political party to run an election for 
them, as they are supposed to be respected by many, and have a greater 
chance of winning votes than a common person or outsider. (INN 5) 
5.3.4 Informal Structures – Religious  
Various religious identity-based communities (minorities) exist in both parts of North Nazimabad, 
e.g. Punjabi-Christians and Balti-Shias in UC2, while Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili groups are in 
UC3-4. In such communities, a two-layered governance system exists, the first consisting of the 
religious authority, while the second represents the people from the locality through their 
respective community leaders. There are some smaller groups with narrow influence, such as 
Punjabi-Barelvi Muslims in Pahar Gunj and the Shia families in F-UC2 & UC3-4 (Table 5.5). 
Punjabi-Christians 
The Punjabi-Christians of Pahar Gunj in I-UC2, are distinct from surrounding communities in three 
ways. First their ethnicity, appearance and language contrasts with surrounding Pashtoon-
dominated communities; second being non-Muslim they have different customs and are allowed 
to consume alcohol, and third they were traditionally Bhangi (sweepers and sanitary workers, 
term with derogatory connotations). The origins of the term Bhangi is linked with the Hindu 
lower-scheduled caste reserved for cleaning professions, and it is still a derogatory term. Thus 
Punjabi-Christians are a bit lower in the local social hierarchy and thus a weak community, despite 
being the area’s third largest community with around 5,000 votes, although now the Christians 
have diverse professions (INN 12, INN 13). Politically, most of the Christian residents are linked 
with PPP, although some also support MQM and ANP (INN 10, INN 12, INN 13).  
Punjabi-Christians have a two layered ethno-religious governance and power structure. The first 
layer around family and community is embedded within the community and focuses on solving 
problems, and representing the family and the community in decision-making and conflicts. At a 
higher level, the Church works strategically, directly or through NGOs, to empower the 
community and support literacy and livelihoods (INN 13; Table 5.5).   
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There are four big families in the Christian community (1) Bhatti family, (2) 
Khankey family (3) Tamboli family and (4) Maari family. ‘Bhatti’ is a caste, 
while the Tamboli and Khankey are the names of the village they migrated 
from...Each family has their own family head, usually the older and wisest, 
which represents the family on area level and solve issues of the family when 
brought to him, and the family follows his orders and instructions.  (INN 13) 
Box 5.4: Sunni-Shia Conflict over Water 
In the mid-2013, a conflict took place between Shia and Sunni groups in the area that caused 
five deaths. It started when a Sunni-Pashtoon resident tried to tap water from the supply line 
for the Balti neighbourhood. One of the Balti residents protested but was manhandled. The 
Sunni-Pashtoon man had several brothers, two in the LEAs, and the family was considered 
influential. 
According to different sources, when the conflict over water started, one of the Sunni-Pashtoon 
men went to the mosque and used its loudspeakers to announce that the Balti-Shias had 
attacked the Sunni Mosque by firing gun shots at it. This announcement was then reiterated 
from several mosques in the surrounding areas according to one source, that ignited the 
conflict and several outsiders (possibly SSP or ASWJ activists according to locals) came to fight 
with Balti-Shia community, making it a sectarian conflict. The Balti-Shias were also prepared 
and they retaliated quickly, resulting in the deaths of two Sunni-Pashtoons and three Balti-Shia.  
The police came to the area, but were unable to contain the situation. One of the Sunni leader 
said that the fight was so fierce that even the police ran away, although later the Rangers force 
were called in. 
On arrival of Rangers the fight subsided, the elders came to investigate the allegation of gun-
firing by Sunni-Pashtoons. The case was not taken to the police as per local norms.  Firstly, the 
elders of the two communities met in the presence of other neutral elders. One of the Shia 
leaders mentioned that the Sunni-Pashtoon asked what the Shia wanted – war or peace? He 
replied that the Shias were ready either way. However, the sense prevailed and they started to 
talk about peace. The Jirga was also attended, allegedly, by the local drug smuggler Mr. Afridi, 
as a neutral Jirga elder to enforce the final ‘contract’. 
The Jirga deliberated and formed a committee of four people, which took five days to 
deliberate. It was concluded that both the sides were responsible for the bloodshed, and both 
should forgive each other. To avoid such situation in the future, all the Mosques and their 
leaders were warned that they should not be involved in such situations otherwise an official 
complain would be lodged against them by the police. The people will bring the issue to the 
elders without trying to fight by themselves. While some other Sunni-Pashtoon leaders 
requested that the contract included a restriction of Shia processions to certain parts to avoid 
past the Sunni Mosque, and it was agreed that both groups should avoid using loudspeakers at 
Mosques/Imam Bargah to avoid sermons being heard in other’s territory. Both the parties 
agreed the contract. (KIs) 
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Balti-Shia 
The Balti-Shia community is concentrated near the Kati Pahari area, in I-UC2, and is far more 
religiously controlled and organised than the Punjabi-Christians. The role of religious authority is 
strong and, with the community elders, links religious power structures with the community and 
helps in governing the settlement. The Imam Bargah (Mosque) forms the place of power and 
governance, where all the decisions are made. The prayer leader of the local Imam Bargah forms 
the head of the religious authority, while a committee of local residents helps the prayer leader in 
carrying out various tasks (INN 2). The local committee is powerful enough to make community 
members abide by decisions, and uses punishments such as social boycotts, fines or peer pressure 
to ensure obedience (INN 3). The community elders are always there to help the people on an 
individual basis (Table 5.5).  
The community and the area is controlled by the committee headed by the 
prayer leader of the Imam Bargah. The head is supported or helped by around 
five elders of the area. The head of the committee and Imam Bargah… 
communicate with the higher religious authorities, and communicates their 
instructions to the community. All the donations for religious purposes are 
given to him, who then submits them to the higher authorities. Similarly, 
disputes among the community are solved by this local prayer leader as the 
head of the local committee. The local Balti religious authority is registered as 
the Baltistan Trust. The Shia community follows one Imam in the world and 
acts according to his instructions, at the moment the Imam is in Iraq. The 
prayer leader of the Imam Bargah works as subordinate or representative of 
the Imam. (INN 2) 
Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati Ismaili 
The Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili, in UC3-4, are both guided and governed by their respective 
religious authorities as the informal structures. In both communities there is a Jamat Khana 
(community centre) which forms the centre of power, and is a religious and social gathering space 
where the elders deliberate and decisions are made. Both the communities decide collectively 
about political support and voting (Section 6.3.2).  
In the Bohri community, the religious authority forms the top power layer drawn from an elite 
religiously educated group, while local community members are selected to help the religiously-
trained members (Table 5.5).  
The affairs of the community and the settlement are run by the local 
organisation of the community that is also the local religious authority. This 
local organisation is run by dedicated people, who go through the religious 
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training in the Saifia University (Bohri religious university). Furthermore, the 
whole local organisation is run by the central religious authority, under the 
Imam or Da'I who lives in Soorat, India. The local religious authority follows 
the directives of the central religious authority in Soorat. The decisions, 
instructions or commands cover all aspects of life of the community. 
Sometimes the authority makes recommendations such as to start plantation 
in the area, or to clean the locality through community participation etc. There 
is another organisation that is developed by young educated males of society, 
who are organised around the issue of safety and security, and look after the 
affairs of barriers, watchmen and more recently other services of TV and 
Internet Cable etc. (FNN 23) 
The Ismaili religious governance system works in the same way as the Bohri community, but is 
more formal and multi-layered because they are located in the Nizari Society area, which is a 
registered cooperative housing society.  
There are two administrative layers or institutions in the Society that looks 
after the social and administrative aspects of the community and the locality. 
First is the Nizari Cooperative Housing Society that looks after the issues of the 
settlement, its maintenance, transfer and other day to day tasks, it follows the 
guidelines of the government as per Society’s Act 1860, while socially it 
reports and follows the higher religious authority. The second is the local 
religious authority, the top institution of comprehensive nature that is linked 
with the religious hierarchy of the community. It is formed by the religious 
authority and works from the Religious space (Jamat Khana), the head of 
Jamat Khana forms the head of the local ethno-religious committee that 
communicate with the higher religious authority along with the ‘Mukhi’ (The 
prayer leader) and looks after the overall administrative, social and other 
issues. The administrative heads and office bearers of that authority are 
selected from the locality it is serving … Beyond the confines of the 
settlement, for solving issues of people we have two committees one is called 
the Public Relations Organization (PRO) and the second the Reconciliation and 
Arbitration Board (RAB), people first go to the ‘Mukhi’ of the Jamat Khana, and 
if not satisfied secondly they go to PRO and RAB. If the problem is still not 
solved then they can go to the court. We don’t have any kind of punishment 
system everyone is allowed to live together or separately. (FNN 26) 
The relations of religion-based communities with political parties vary considerably. Communities 
with religious identity in I-UC2, take an active part in party politics in order to survive in the local 
power struggle, due to the importance of political parties in accessing public goods and services 
(Section 5.4.1). In UC3-4, Bohri and Ismaili communities and their religious structures always try 
to remain politically impartial, as they are resourceful enough to address their own issues, but 
they do not challenge the political party ventures and remain subservient to political controls and 
power hierarchy, thus the street control is left with the political party. 
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Religion Based Informal Structures:  
Characterised by dual layer i.e. Religious administration and Baradary based social hierarchy. Punjab -
Christians 
There re four larg  Chri tian families, each having their own elders who look after 
the affairs of the families, just like the Pashtoon tribal elders. There is no such 
tradition as such, but with time this pattern has emerged. There is a strong 
presence of the church that connects the community with the city and country 
context. The Pastor of the church is selected and appointed centrally. 
Balti Shia Balti Shia are organised under the religious structure headed by the prayer leader 
at the local Imam Bargah, who is appointed by the city religious administrations. 
He connects the community with the city level administration and from there to 
country and internationally. The religious leader is supported by locally-selected 
elders from the community, who volunteer and have various social and economic 
capital at their disposal. The religious command binds the people together, guides 
them and solves their problems. Apart from religious administration, the elders 
also help people in their individual capacities. The people follow the instruction as 
part of religious discourse. 
Bohri  The Bohri community has a centralised religious administration, headed by 
religiously educated individuals, who are supported by locally-selected residents to 
create link with community and carry out various administrative tasks. Jamat 
Khana forms the seat of power, and that connects the community with the larger 
community and to the central religious administration in Soorat, India. The 
religious administration carries out community support programs, and helps 
people in times of need. The head of the Jamat Khana called Da’i is appointed by 
the central religious authority. The people follow the authority with religious 
devotion. Ismaili The Ismaili community has a centralised administration, a combination of religious 
leadership and local community representatives who are elected by the 
community to look after the affairs of the community. The Jamat Khana forms the 
seat of power that connects the community to the city administration and to the 
headquarters in France. There exists very strong institutional fabric at city and 
national levels that looks after the needs of the community, while the local 
committee solve their civic problems locally. The head of Jamat Khana called a 
Mukhi is appointed by the central religious authority. The local committee is 
headed by the locally elected resident representative. 
Table 5.5: Religion based informal structure  
5.3.5 Informal Structures – Neighbourhood Committees 
The influence and popularity of political parties in I-UC2 contrast with the formal area. Almost all 
the respondents in F-UC2 & UC3-4 mentioned that the residents avoid help from political parties 
and want to keep away from political control, at the same time they don’t want to challenge 
existing power dynamics. Many residents are resourceful, and have the education and finance to 
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resolve problems without external support (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 23, FNN 24, and FNN 
25). Thus relative wealth and education gives them some freedom. 
… why would they (political parties, especially MQM) help and come to us? 
They only come during the election times and disappear after that… In the 
informal area some people work to become political leaders. Since people 
want to get services without any charge, and since they are many, their votes 
are important, and the political leaders will even undertake illegal work for 
them like laying water pipelines without tax collection, or arranging for leases 
without bringing the settlement up to standard. In our (formal area and 
middle to upper-income community) there is nothing illegal, we pay water tax, 
income tax etc. Had we been stealing or using services without paying, then 
we could ask a political party to help and cover us.  (FNN 20) 
Instead, residents get together and form ‘neighbourhood committees’ to solve their civic 
problems. The concept of neighbourhood committees is quite straightforward; any resident of a 
street talks to other residents over a common issue such as security, and if they agree to take 
measures collectively they involve other residents and form a committee and agree on how it will 
work. Some residents opt out of collective action but these non-subscribers also get services in 
the end (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 25). These neighbourhood committees work without any formal 
recognition. 
Most neighbourhood committees emerged in response to concerns regarding security (FNN 19, 
FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). With the passage of time and success 
of such committees, the scope of work has extended to manage other services including solid 
waste management, street lights etc. (FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 24, and FNN 25). 
The neighbourhood committees work independently without interference from political parties. 
The committees do not pose a threat to political parties either to their territoriality or electoral 
supremacy, and the neighbourhood committee’s security installations are helpful in keeping party 
opponents at bay. Residents of UC3-4 (FNN 19, FNN 21) reported that at times of tension, political 
workers used to sit at the barriers as part of watch-and-ward duty, and also used to take 
information from the hired guards and watchmen on duty.  
5.3.6 Informal Governance; a Paradigm or a Structure? 
Section 5.3 has highlighted how in North Nazimabad, informal structures have in part filled the 
gap left by the absence of elected local government and the non-provision of services including 
security and utilities. The nature and scale of informal structures is defined by political ideology at 
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broad district level, and on an ethnic, tribal and religious basis at the neighbourhood level. These 
social groups in part derive their identity from wider communities, e.g: the Pashtoon of Northern 
Pakistan, or Bohri from Soorat, but the research has also highlighted how each community and 
informal structure is linked to its neighbours in lateral tension.  A schematic framework showing 
in the informal structures is set out in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Matrix of informal structures and corresponding social groups in the area 
 
In the formal areas, residents are generally resourceful, and neighbourhood committees, at the 
street level, formed by groups of relatively influential residents have been able to address 
problems of security by partitioning and guarding streets, although the Ismaili and Bohri enclaves 
protect their communities. In UC3-4, the power structure is vertically hierarchical with the 
majority political party (MQM) topping the power structure overarching the ethno-religious 
structures. The ethno-religious informal structures, Ismaili and Bohri, work in parallel and do not 
have any apparent working relations with each other and the political party. 
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In the informal areas the gap in service provision has left communities vulnerable to the 
influences of pre-existing informal structures including political parties, Baradary, and religious 
authorities, creating opportunities for control around service provision. The informal structures 
vary as set out in Tables 5.3, 5.4 & 5.5. I-UC2 has parallel and overlapping structures, as tribal and 
political leadership are sometimes the same, although the tribal, ethnic or kinship bonds 
supersede that of political bonds which operate more at district rather than neighbourhood level 
(Figure 5.1). The Pashtoon ethnicity links the, otherwise diverse, community as one against the 
Muhajir group, and the ANP as political party represents the overall community in political 
rivalries with MQM. Each tribe has distinct identity and does not marry into each other’s 
community. They also prefer to vote for their own community leader, but with time a few tribal 
leaders have emerged as collectively respected elders and are considered as collective leaders.  
5.4 Evaluating Social Dimensions of Informal Structures 
This section evaluates the social legitimacy created by informal structures to understand 
dynamics of subject-power social relations. The most basic function provided by informal 
structures is to address residents’ problems, whether civic, cultural, political or religious. The 
different types of informal structures correspond to different social identity groups, which accept 
various socio-spatial controls as a trade-off against the provision of services, which thus produces 
and reproduces social relations within and amongst social groups. This section focuses around 
informal service provision and provision of cultural and religious requirements of the minority 
groups in the area. 
5.4.1 Service Provision and Legitimacy 
There are several reasons why residents legitimise and empower informal structures. First is the 
basic need for urban goods and services, and almost all the informal structures earn legitimacy 
and control through addressing this essential gap. The ‘un-resourcefulness’ of residents, especially 
in I-UC2 adds another dimension (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 10, INN 11, INN 16, INN 18):   
The people of this area are mostly illiterate and do not know how to deal with 
government agencies for their needs, so they contact the area leader/elder. 
(INN 4) 
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Second is faith and the discourse around it. As all the religious groups in the area are minorities, 
they incline towards their religious structures, buttressed by the opposition and persecution they 
face in the city34.   
Third is the traditional rural social structure around Baradary, especially in I-UC2, which retains 
active rural connections. The tribal groups want to keep the tribal structure intact as an extension 
of their place of origin. 
Benefits of linking with a political party 
Given the exploitative nature of political parties, the question then arises as to why people 
legitimise and accept such exploitation. The most important reason is the need to access services, 
but also the need for political backing that links an otherwise minority or localised group to the 
city-level political dynamics, decision making and access to services. 
… here (I-UC2) the system runs according to power of the political party (that 
the community supports), whichever party gets water is more powerful while 
those that get less water are not. Since, we are with MQM which is quite weak 
in this area, we have all kinds of issues here, we experience political bias, 
religious bias etc… (INN 3) 
Thus residents of I-UC2, strive to be affiliated with the strongest political party, as affiliation to the 
right political party could bring development and legal land titles, or regularisation of otherwise 
informal settlement (INN 2, INN 4, INN 5, INN 7, INN 10, INN 11, INN 12, INN 13, INN 16, INN 18). 
Some groups in I-UC2 bargained for services in exchange for votes and shifted political loyalty, for 
example Deer Colony, which is not respected amongst the other communities. 
I have been affiliated with different political parties – the reason for this 
shifting affiliation is that all I want is to bring development and funds to my 
area and this is only possible if I am with the ruling party. (KI) 
Residents are ready to give long-term allegiance to whichever political party will solve water 
shortage problems (INN 7). That is why JI is widely supported in the informal areas, since it 
                                                          
34
  Most of the religious communities in North Nazimabad identified the biased behaviour of majority 
groups towards them and the threats they face (INN 2, INN 3, INN 8, INN 10, INN 12, INN 13, FNN 21, FNN 
22, FNN 23, FNN 26). Shia sectarian minorities have been facing targeted killings for many years, while more 
recently Bohri and Ismailies have also been target of the sectarian extremism. 
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brought legal titles, installed water and electricity, and now run schools and various welfare works 
(INN 1, INN 4, INN 7, INN 8, INN 10, INN 12, INN 13).  
Political parties when in government blur the formal-informal divide benefitting both the party 
and its workers. The case of one political leader in I-UC2 is important, who allocated his own 
residence for local government use as the Union Council office when he became Nazim35, but 
several years after the elected local government was abolished in 200936 he continues to run the 
office - he controls the area (Box 6.2) and takes political credit for the formal services provided, 
including issuing National I.D cards and birth certificates (KIs). Similarly, political workers are asked 
to carry out formal tasks in an informal capacity and are paid by the party when in government 
(INN 10).   
Political parties in government are formal structures at city level, but operate informally at local 
level, both in winning electoral support and in co-opting public funds for service provision (Section 
6.3.3). The neighbourhood level political offices are strongly linked to residents and lobby for their 
needs with the elected party members and workers in the service-provision agencies, and channel 
development funds (KIs).  
In I-UC2, community leaders have for a long time been involved in problem-solving and decision-
making, but now political parties are making it part of their role (INN 9, INN 10, INN 12). ANP Ward 
Offices also started to provide such services, copying MQM Unit Offices that started earlier (see 
Chapter 4). 
Previously the conflicts were resolved amicably between the elders, but now 
things are different…now they (Pashtoon leaders) decide at the political office 
(unit/sector/ward), it has become like the Supreme Court. (INN 12)  
Political parties use their numerous followers to safeguard the settlements in both parts of North 
Nazimabad at times of tension and conflict (INN 11, FNN 21; Section 6.3.4), and thus links with a 
political party enables an otherwise weak individual or group to be part of larger network of 
support. 
                                                          
35
 Head of Union Council. 
36
 The elected local government system according to SLGO2001, managing Karachi with 18 towns, was 
abolished in 2009 to be replaced with 5 district system under commissioner and with KMC having 
management of infrastructure and several other services (Box 4.1). 
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In contrast, in the formal areas most residents try to avoid links with political parties as discussed 
in Section 5.3. 
Thus, there is a pragmatic and symbiotic link between ethnic and community groups and political 
parties. The link provides services and some security, but at the same time entrenches divides and 
bypasses formal government and those involved have extensively profited from the hiatus in local 
government resulting from the stalled election process. The political interests are the biggest 
reason for blurring the formal-informal divide and channelling of public funds through informal 
means. 
Benefits of identity based (Religious and Baradary) informal structures 
This section explores services provided by the identity-based Baradary and religious structures, 
which earn legitimacy on an identity bases, advocating for their communities with formal 
structures, and using personal resources and links to solve civic issues, carry out welfare work, 
resolve conflicts, and enforce contracts, explored in detail below.  
Order and consensus 
Creating consensus amongst the community, not only helps people access services but also works 
as a mechanism of control. This covers all domains of life including politics, in which community 
leaders from I-UC2 are very actively involved. Although they may not take part in elections they 
are always instrumental in shaping political decisions (INN 3, INN 6, INN 10, INN 18). The same 
function is performed by the ethno-religious authorities in Balti-Shia, Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-
Ismaili communities (INN 3, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26).  
The community (Kohistani-Pashtoon) meet to decide whom to vote for in the 
election. In the recent election, they had a gathering in which many suggested 
voting for PTI or MQM as they were not happy with the ANP, but the idea of 
voting MQM was vetoed by a Community elder, as it could have created issues 
for the community and the area. (INN 6) 
In addition to influencing electoral politics, the community elders from I-UC2 keep checks on 
politically elected leaders from the community. A one-time elected leader (KI) reported that he 
had to work hard to convince the community elders to join an MQM-based government panel 
during second term of elected local government in 2005-2009. Community leaders also 
collaborate with religious leaders such as Prayer leaders in the mosque to address social issues or 
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arrange demonstrations or rallies. In the case of the wine shop due to be opened in the Christian 
Punjabi area of Pahar Gunj, just before it opened, the shop was destroyed by the locals after 
rallies of protest by Pashtoon residents under the guidance of the religious and community 
leaders (Box 5.5). 
Box 5.5: The shutting of wine shop  
In the late 2000s, a wine shop was about to open in the Pahar Gunj area. Alcohol is banned by law 
following religious prescription, but non-Muslims are allowed to buy alcohol from licenced shops. 
The shop was in a property owned by a Christian in Pahar Ganj, but it was found that the investor 
was a Muslim-Pashtoon living nearby. The Muslim residents of the area protested and asked the 
Christian owner to stop the shop opening, but work continued. One of the prayer leaders of the 
Mosque also visited them and requested the Christian elders to stop. Local residents feared that 
the men from the area would also get addicted once the alcohol became available. In reaction, 
after late afternoon prayers many local Pashtoon residents, led by the local Mosque prayer 
leaders, walked to the area protesting against the shop. Later it was found that a group of 
unidentified men, barged into the shop and destroyed everything. This attack ended plans for the 
alcohol shop in the locality. (Refer INN 8) 
Civic problems  
Community leaders and political leadership overlap in I-UC2. The agency of leaders is far more 
important than the structure of the party, which is why credit for obtaining services always goes 
to the community-political leaders. For example, the JI local leader (INN 4) is widely respected for 
bringing services including water, roads and electricity to the locality, to such an extent that his 
son has now become a political leader (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 14).  
The critical issue of water shortage in I-UC2 has been addressed by community leaders in various 
ways. Several local leaders in Deer Colony, Hasan Zai Pashtoons, Kohistani and Balti-Shia 
communities develop and manage water wells (INN 2, INN 3, INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 10, INN 15, 
INN 18). The previously unorganised and unjust water supply system has now been regulated by 
‘water committee’ of community leaders from all the communities to ensure an equitable supply 
of piped water during times of shortage. Some leaders are still trying to address the issue with 
their links and resources (Box 5.1).  
I have developed contacts, so we have been to see Mr. S. (officer in water 
board and next to Minister for Local Government)… Mr S. has promised to 
provide water pumping machines for the area... I have done everything with 
the water board people in order to get the supply, I have made them happy by 
bribing, I have used force, I have even brought them (lower level KWSB 
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workers) to physically force them to cooperate, but of no use. (KI, Kohistani 
Pashtoon Leader) 
The religious groups also address civic problems in the community. The Imam Bargah helps the 
residents of the Balti neighbourhood and surroundings to get free drinking water through various 
facilities (Box 5.1). Similarly, the Bohri Jamat Khana plays a vital role in urban management e.g. 
finding property, street cleaning etc. while the Ismaili Jamat Khana administration is also involved 
in solving civic issues (FNN 22, FNN 23, and FNN 26). 
Welfare Works 
The tasks carried out by informal structures are both welfare work and a way of earning 
legitimacy. There are no charges, but the social legitimacy earned gives them authority and 
control over resources and helps win elections (Section 5.4.2 and Chapter 6). This political project 
includes bringing services, providing leases, solving the water crisis, guiding people in civic and 
political issues, or conflict resolution, and welfare work such as setting up free clinics or schools. 
I am in full control of the area, I spend almost Rs. 100,000 - 150,000 a month 
on related issues (especially water) and that is why all the people accept my 
leadership and decisions. (Pashtoon Community-Political Leader, see Box 6.2) 
Some welfare initiatives include establishing NGOs. For example, a Kohistani leader set up an NGO 
for civic works (INN 9), the Christian youth leader initiated an NGO for vocational training (INN 
13), and a Pashtoon social worker initiated an NGO for youth and adult education. Another NGO 
supports new converts to Islam from Christianity in the neighbourhood (INN 17). The most 
significant NGO provides for funeral requirements including food for three days for guests and the 
family (INN 7, INN 8). Some local leaders who are trained as doctors have personal clinics where 
they provide free diagnoses and medicines for the poor (INN 4, INN 6, INN 10, and INN 16). Two 
doctors (KIs) help government health workers, on a regular basis, during the anti-polio campaign 
in I-UC2. 
The ethno-religious structures of Bohri and Ismaili communities are highly organised and their 
welfare services are centralised and large-scale. The Bohri authority has several welfare schemes 
for the poor including housing, education and health (FNN 23), while the Ismailies have extensive 
funds to support poor community members in many ways (FNN 26).   
Many of our community (Ismaili) members are migrants from Northern 
Pakistan and from the interior of Sindh. Our welfare board support them in 
172 | P a g e  
getting education and they are given monthly allowances…Our community-
based organizations always have jobs for the people if they are willing to work.  
(FNN 26) 
Conflict Resolution 
Given the variety of social groups present, conflicts are common in I-UC2 (INN 14). Conflicts are 
usually violent, weapons are widely used, and killings may occur. The multi-layered society 
requires diligent community leaders to watch out for social conflicts and stamp out the conflict as 
soon as it occurs, especially religious or sectarian fights (Box 5.2 and 5.6). The communities and 
the leaders in I-UC2, usually prefer not to go the police or courts. 
Box 5.6: Ordinary issues to conflicts on religious basis  
An event told by several interviewees was as follows. In mid-2013, a Christian boy bought some 
food from Pashtoon street vendor, and then he wanted to return the stuff which the vendor 
refused. The boy misbehaved and the vendor reciprocated and slapped him; he got hurt and 
went home to tell his elder brother. His elder brother came to see who started the beating, but 
seeing this two other Pashtoon vendors came in to help their friend, and this resulted in 
attracting Christian young men to the fight. In few minutes the news spread like wild fire, and 
people from the Pashtoon community came with weapons and started firing on people and the 
church. Later when police and Rangers came, the Pashtoons alleged that some Christians came 
and started throwing stones at the Mosque and the Pashtoons just reacted. The allegation was 
unlikely as it is almost impossible for Christians to go into Muslim neighbourhood, throw stones 
at the Mosque, and return unhurt. However, the elders from both the sides sat down and 
resolved the issue amicably. (Refer INN 10, INN 12, INN 13, INN 14) 
Another incident reflects community relations involving religion. There were two partners in a 
business, one Christian from Pahar Gunj area, and a Muslim-Pashtoon from the Pashtoon area. 
The two had a business dispute, the Christian owed money to the Muslim partner but was 
unable to return it after a long time. The Muslim partner turned this fight into religious 
allegations; such allegations affect the whole community, as it can easily turn into organised 
attacks. Because of the sensitivity of the accusations, elders stepped in to investigate on the 
spot, “such incidents cannot be left for tomorrow, one has to clarify everything as soon as 
possible, otherwise the miscreants makes mountain out of sesame seed in minutes” (INN 13).    
 
 … if something happens like this (conflict), we have a committee of elders, we 
solve it and we try our utmost to avoid taking the case to the police station, 
even if the people go to the police station, we get involved and try to get it 
solved amongst ourselves. (INN 8) 
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For Pashtoons, the Jirga is a well-established traditional mechanism for addressing conflicts (Box 
5.3). Community elders and leaders assemble to solve problems presented before the Jirga, or 
selected by elders. The Jirga system is widely practiced in the informal areas, and non-Pashtoon 
communities also subscribe to it, such as the Punjabi-Christians and the Balti-Shia.  
In UC3-4, unlike I-UC2, personal conflicts are rare, but if they happen are never violent (FNN 20, 
FNN 21). In addition to MQM’s Unit offices, all the religious-based communities have conflict-
resolution mechanisms for their own communities, such as the Ismaili community which has a 
Reconciliation and Arbitration Board (RAB) (Section 5.3.4).  
‘Contract’ Enforcement 
Conflict resolution is a kind of contract enforcement, in which decisions of the Jirga or committee 
become a contract between the contending parties which both accept. Contract enforcement 
may also cover business deals, marital agreements, property transactions or house rental, and the 
elders ensure that both the parties abide by the initial contract (refer INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 11, 
INN 18).  
…they (Kohistani Pashtoons) even send their elders to broker the property 
deal, as this creates pressure on both the parties to keep the deal transparent; 
similarly, houses are rented based on personal references from people within 
the community, and estate agents not much involved. (INN 7) 
 Property transactions are not registered at the government offices, it is done 
through stamped paper in which I (the community leader) form the guarantor 
of the transaction, and no one would dare to illegally occupy or grab land or 
the property.  (INN 18) 
Protecting and representing the Community: 
The community leaders protect community interests and represent the community at times of 
conflict, but also face the consequences. For example, as also discussed in Section 6.2, the 
Pashtoon leader (KI) during 2006-2007, confronted the opposite party’s leadership from UC3-4 
about the erection of a barrier at the entrance to the informally developed settlement; this led 
him to drop his support for a local government panel, during second term of elected local 
government 2005-2009, but his brother was then killed in a targeted attack, allegedly in 
connection with the incident (Box 6.1).  
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If someone gives me a threat, it is not because of my personal standing, it is 
because I am community representative. (A local community leader) 
Community leaders help resolve conflicts, and for example the water management committee has 
community representatives from all communities (INN 4, INN 5, INN 10, and INN 12). The ethno-
religious leadership of the Bohri and Ismaili communities also represent the community when 
political delegations want to communicate with the community (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26). 
Absence and weakness of informal structures 
The importance of informal structures can only be fully understood in contrast to areas without 
such structures. INN 1 belongs to a locality that was part of UC2 but was separated after the 
construction of the Kati Pahari link road. The separation caused a power gap, as the political 
leaders from UC2 no longer had an interest in this settlement. A drug gang temporarily emerged 
taking advantage of the power gap, but the gap re-emerged once the drug gang was curtailed by 
the law enforcement agencies..  
There is no leader or resourceful person in the area, whom people could 
approach to get their problems sorted, and since this area was controlled 
famous drug gangs, people try to avoid coming here.  There was a committee 
developed by Afridi people who were also asked by the locals to sit here as 
well and look into matters, but that did not work out…since, there is no leader 
and few political parties take an interest in the area. (INN 1) 
Weak communities, like the Christians and the Balti-Shia, suffer in accessing goods and services. 
The Christians are weak, being a minority as compared to Pashtoons, while MQM and ANP both 
want to benefit from the large number of votes they represent and other resources. Christians 
feel helpless between two contending powers, and cannot support any one political party (INN 12, 
INN 13). The Balti-Shia suffers from injustice in distribution of services such as water, as they are 
politically weak (INN 2, INN 3). 
Thus, informal structures bring various benefits, including services, possibility of regularisation, 
security and stability to areas experiencing inefficient formal government and related services. 
Conversely, such service provisions comes with trade-offs. 
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5.4.2 Trade-off of Informal Structures 
At the core of service provision by informal structures, lies acceptance of implicit socio-spatial 
controls, which help ensure their legitimacy and also establishes a socio-spatial territory and 
keeps it safe and intact from competing informal structures. 
Prevailing social controls in North Nazimabad are of three types: first controls implicit within 
service provision; second controls linked to social identity and the mechanism to differentiate one 
group from another, and third political trade-offs centred around political parties.  The 
practicalities of service provision were discussed in Section 5.4.1 but the trade-offs are analysed 
here. 
Service provision and control 
Service provision by informal structures carries implicit control mechanisms. Such controls may 
include: access to formal agencies; decision-making and punishment; information control and 
demographic control, explored below. 
Controlling access to formal structures of power and governance 
Service provision relieves the pressure on formal institutions to address problems, and bypasses 
formal institutions such as the police, courts, land registry, and utilities agencies. Many residents, 
especially from I-UC2, no longer need such formal services, as discussed in Section 5.4.1. Such 
controls are practiced by most of the informal structures except neighbourhood committees. 
For residents in I-UC2, control over services also limits their choice of leadership, as the leaders 
(and service providers) are usually resourceful enough to exclude anyone challenging the existing 
hierarchy (INN 11). It was also found that leadership and legitimacy can be hereditary (Section 
5.3.3).  
Decision-making and punishment  
Decision-making is executed by an elite group that ordinary community members cannot join. In 
the Bohri community, decision-makers are only those who have a religious education. In political 
parties such as MQM, decision-makers must start as an ordinary worker and work up the 
hierarchy, while in ANP community leaders and affluent members can lead (KIs). 
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The decisions and instructions from political parties and informal structures are binding on 
followers, either because of the internal cultural and religious bonds or through threat of 
punishment to ensure obedience. 
Whenever there is a call for strike or shut down by the religious-political party 
in the area, young men with covered faces ride in on motorcycles and ask 
people to close the shops … shop owners usually don’t want to take risk of 
violating the call as they fear violence.  (INN 10) 
Those who do not comply may suffer extreme reprisals, ranging from being asked to leave the 
settlement in Deer Colony (INN 18), to social boycott in Christian-Punjabi areas (INN 3, INN 10, 
INN 13) or house confinement for a period of time in Pahar Gunj (INN 13). Peer pressure, and 
overall behaviour of the Baradary also ensure compliance (INN 3, FNN 23), while for religious 
groups, religious discourse plays a vital role in disciplining the followers. 
…if someone in the area doesn’t follow the defined rules, then we (the 
leaders) caution him and if still he adopts the same attitude we ask him to sell 
his property to us at market rate and ask him to leave the locality. (Community 
leader, KI) 
Information control 
Seeking information about the community, ideologies or leadership without prior permission is 
considered a violation of power hierarchies and territorial boundaries in most areas of North 
Nazimabad. An outsider needs local reference and permission from the community leaders (INN 6, 
INN 10, INN 11, and INN 18), which made research for this thesis difficult. Photography, especially 
of women and in Pashtoon areas, could lead to extreme consequences37. Information control 
around women in Pashtoon areas is strict. 
Often leaders give selective information, mentioning the positives and avoiding controversial 
aspects of their work. Leaders of minority religious groups avoid talking about their ideologies and 
rituals, which leads to many myths about the more closed Bohri, Shia and Ismaili groups (FNN 20, 
FNN 21).  Leaders also try to avoid mentioning the presence of religious extremists belonging to 
                                                          
37
 Several people cautioned the researcher during the fieldwork in Pashtoon areas. In the Bohri settlement, 
the resource person warned him, while in the Ismaili area (Nizari Society), the watchmen and guards did the 
same. In the Balti Neighbourhood, the local resource person mentioned it, and even Sunni-Pashtoons 
questioned the Balti-Shia resource person about the researchers’ photos. In F-UC-02, the MQM member on 
surveillance duty asked the interviewee about information being gathered by the researcher.  
177 | P a g e  
banned religious outfits, such as Sipah Sahaba or Taliban, in the area although other interviewees 
clearly hinted on such  presence (INN 6, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 16, FNN 21). 
Demographic control 
Demographic control, through various mechanisms, is practiced throughout North Nazimabad, 
but since this topic overlaps with the physical control and territoriality, it is discussed in Chapter 6 
(Section 6.3.2). 
Control over illegal activities and crime 
Given the fragile security and high crime rates, informal structures were asked about their role in 
curbing the crime and ensuring the safety of residents. Most interviewees agreed that there is a 
high crime rate on SNJ Road, but within the Pashtoon settlements (I-UC2) crime rates are at 
minimum (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 14, INN 15, INN 16, INN 
17). Some interviewees suggest that criminals on the run enter the Pashtoon areas where no 
outsider dares follow (INN 4, INN 4, INN 6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 13, INN 18). 
Since, tribes are closely related and everyone knows others, local criminals commit crimes outside 
their tribe and territory. They are also protected by the tribal fellows against formal government 
and other contending ethnicities and tribes (INN 10). 
Social identity and control 
Identity-based informal structures are an outcome of cultural and religious characteristics 
manifest through symbols, ideologies and practices. Such social practices are secured by the 
informal structures through various social control mechanisms, and form the basis for 
differentiating one group from another and for their identity and existence. Such controls also 
influence social relations within and amongst various social groups and thus eventually affect the 
social process of territory making (production of space), explored in Chapter 6.  
Symbols of identity and controls 
There are several symbols of cultural identity, often linked to controls. While cultural and religious 
identities and practices overlap, given the complexity of social identities in the area, the overall 
symbolic identities are clear, and distinguish one group from other and thus help demarcate non-
physical boundaries in the territory, as discussed below.  
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Although there is no specific boundary within these contiguous 
neighbourhoods (UC2), other types of boundary exist… but we know in which 
area we are standing, there is a big difference in culture … we understand by 
language, by the flags in the area and by the wall chalking and graffiti. Another 
one way of looking that boundary is through women. For example, in 
Christian-Punjabi culture women are independent they do not observe hijab, 
move freely and also work, while the Pashtoons are not used to this.  (A 
Christian community leader) 
Languages distinguish people and can enhance social divisions, and are thus essential in the 
project of territoriality. The whole I-UC2 is generalised as a Pashtoon settlement because of their 
common language, irrespective of tribal and religious differences (INN 7, FNN 24, FNN 25). In UC3-
4 residents are widely termed as ‘Urdu speaking’ or ‘Muhajir’ by the Pashtoons (refer INN 7, INN 
8, INN 11). Punjabi and Balti communities have completely different languages, while Bohri and 
Ismaili speak Gujarati because of their origins, but the generalisations ignore such small 
differences.  
Clothing is the most evident cultural aspect, after physical appearance, which distinguishes 
different communities and localities, and helps in non-physical boundary making. This aspect 
leads to cultural conflicts, especially relating to women, but also helps to identify the person, and 
to understand his/her political, ethnic, religious and geographic background.  Clothing is both the 
symbol of identity and is a control exercised through the community. 
Various dress codes can be identified across communities. Muhajir and Punjabi Christians form 
one group, Pashtoons including Balti Shia the second, while Bohri community forms the third. 
Male Muhajir, Ismailies and Christian Punjabis do not have a specific dress code but wear either 
westernised clothing or the local shalwar qameez. The women mostly wearing localised fashion 
trends in shalwar qameez, both at work and at home, but the Sunni/Shia Muslim women may or 
may not wear the hijab, unlike Christian and Ismaili women (field notes, observations).  
Pashtoons, including Balti-Shia men mostly wear shalwar qameez for cultural reasons, while the 
Pashtoons consider it a religious practice. Elders and religious leaders do not approve of 
westernised clothing such as jeans and T-shirts (INN 17). Pashtoon women observe strict hijab 
that includes covering the head and face (INN 10), while Balti-Shia women also observe the hijab 
but covering the face is not mandatory (INN 3, INN 10). 
In the Bohri community, men and women have a religiously prescribed dress code. Men carry a 
particular cap with a long while shirt, while women cover their usual dress with a hijab that 
includes a head cover and a coat-type shirt.  
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… women from the Bohri community are easily recognizable because of their 
particular religious attire, they observe hijab with uncovered face. (FNN 20) 
Funerals are very important community rituals that combine culture with religious prescriptions. 
In almost all the communities, it is a cultural and religious obligation on neighbours, relatives and 
friends to attend the funeral. Skipping funerals is not well received. The Pashtoons are more 
concerned if someone misses the condolence without an excuse, and even enemies offer 
condolences at a funeral (INN 14).  Due to the significance of funerals, an NGO has been set up 
that looks after the whole process and everyone feels connected through the monthly 
contributions to the NGO (see Section 5.4.1). Religious groups also form an invisible boundaries 
for non-community members in such rituals, who may not get fully involved in rituals such as 
funerals, e.g: a Sunni might not take part, or might not be openly invited to a Bohri funeral prayer 
or Ismaili funeral, but they can go to the graveyard, likewise with Christians and Sunni-Pashtoons 
and the Balti-Shia. 
Marriage forms the most important factor in identity, social control and community bonds and 
defines social boundaries. In almost all the communities in North Nazimabad, marrying outside 
the community is forbidden, even across different Pashtoon tribes, and across different religions 
including, Christians Bohri, Ismaili or Shia communities. 
There are increasing cases of marriage between Kohistani Pashtoon boys and Punjabi-Christian 
girls, but usually, the girl has to convert to Islam and elope from her parents’ home (INN 10, INN 
12, INN 13, INN 17). It would be unthinkable that a Pashtoon girl could be involved with a Punjabi-
Christian boy as this could bring disaster to the area (KI, Christian). Previously, even the 
Pashtoon/Kohistani boys, if married to a Punjabi-Christian girl, was boycotted by the community 
(INN 10). 
… A (Kohistani Pashtoon, father of KI) got married to a Punjabi girl in 1970s, a 
very rare happening at that time, as he married out of the community, so he 
was boycotted by his community, and till now the family is not well connected 
with the community. (INN 10) 
A Pashtoon girl marrying outside the community, and without family approval, is very rare. This is 
considered an issue of honour in tribal Pashtoon communities and involves the whole community 
and could lead to killing of the girl and the boy involved. Such incident has happened only once, in 
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1998 when a girl married a Muhajir boy; this was followed by violence, tension amongst the 
communities and even migration of Muhajirs from the Pashtoon areas38.  
Education uniquely reflects the ideology and absence of government in I-UC2. The gap is mainly 
filled by religious seminaries that are run by the community and religious leaders. The religious 
education is so strong that any new non-religious school is considered a competitor; the religious 
seminaries charge a small fee, so given the large number of students, the income is significant.  
In the late 2000s, an educated social worker started an English-medium school with a non-
religious syllabus in I-UC2 (INN 17). He attracted students from the seminaries, especially one 
belonging to the brother of a Pashtoon leader. The leader adopted different tactics to oppose the 
school, including buying the property where the school was started, and distributing pamphlets 
amongst the residents at the local Mosque claiming the new school was anti-religion and a 
conspiracy against Muslims (INN 17). Since the social worker wore western cloths and did not 
wear a beard, he was vilified as being against Muslim culture. The school was shut down but 
started again elsewhere, but the social worker had to start free religious teaching along with the 
general syllabus, however residents understood the importance of education and that there were 
no bad intentions (INN17). In UC3-4, religious schooling is either taught at home or in Mosques 
but forms a second layer of education after the ‘western’ school system. However, in the Bohri 
neighbourhood, the country’s largest religious university for Bohri Muslims, both girls and boys, is 
located.  
                                                          
38
In a famous case in 1998 an Afridi Pashtoon girl got involved with a Muhajir boy and eloped, and the case 
was reported in the national media. The girl’s family registered a case of kidnapping against the boy. 
Although boy’s family had nothing to do with it, the girl’s family also involved them, and the dispute 
became Muhajir-Pashtoon issue. The girl’s family called a tribal Jirga that announced a death penalty for 
the girl, on charges of being involved in extramarital relations (Hussain, 1998b).  This issue also ignited riots 
between Muhajirs and Pashtoons in the city, resulting in two deaths (Hussain, 1998a). 
The couple were arrested and the issue was supposed to be presented before the court. On arrival at the 
court, the boy was attacked, allegedly, by the girl’s father and brother. The boy received several bullet 
wounds but survived. The girl in the court denied any charges of kidnapping, and said that she married 
willingly.  
The couple remained in secure custody and kept applying for asylum abroad.  The girl’s father and brother 
were convicted of attempted murder, and later the couple got asylum (Hurriyet Daily News, 1998). 
The issue also resulted in tension between the two communities in North Nazimabad, especially, the De 
Silva neighbourhood (Block P). Muhajir residents of De Silva town had to flee after selling their houses 
fearing violence against Muhajirs. The Afridi in the area still do not want to talk about this issue (FNN 21; 
Goodwin, 1998; Burke and Pophan, 2009)  
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Religious identities and controls 
Many of the controls discussed above are also used for religious purposes. Such controls include 
of dress code, marriage controls, and gender controls especially in the Pashtoon community, all of 
which have a religious connections. 
Many actions serve to strengthen religious identity. The Balti-Shia and Bohri observe Muharram, 
the first month of the Islamic calendar, with religious commitment. Processions, religious 
gatherings and sermons are arranged in which almost all the community participate. Such 
gatherings bring control, including mandatory closure of businesses in the area (FNN 23), control 
over people’s mobility and erection of more barriers and security gates along with security 
personnel (INN 2). Other communities respect such ceremonial displays but frequent conflicts 
arise amongst Shia and Pashtoon Sunni groups (INN 9). Similarly, any development of new 
religious buildings, such as a mosque, Imam Bargah or Jamat Khana of another community is not 
welcomed. For example, the Bohri Jamat Khana in Block C was built almost opposite a Sunni 
Mosque, and people responded by writing letters to the formal administrative offices of the 
district (previously, Town Office), although the conflict was solved amicably involving the 
community representatives looking after the religious spaces and the religious leadership (FNN 
21, FNN 23). 
The community leaders also ensure that any anti-religious activity is quelled. For example 
protests were organised against the proposed wine shop Pahar Gunj, the Christian area, forcing 
it to close (Box 5.5).  
Status and role of women 
Differences in culture can also be understood through the presence, absence, attire, role and 
status of women, and women’s marriages, mobility, education, work and movement which are all 
important symbols of social control. 
Women from the Muhajir, Bohri, Ismaili and Christian communities are free to move around, can 
access education in any institution of the city and can work alongside men. The Balti women, are 
independent in movement and education but do not usually work as part of their culture. In I-UC2 
part, Christian women are the most independent in terms of mobility, choice of marriage and 
work (INN 10, INN 12, INN 13), while differences in dress codes have already been identified. 
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The Pashtoon women are the ones facing most restrictions, as part of the tribal code. Male family 
members should provide food and other necessities for women, which is considered part of the 
honour of being the family head. Women are not allowed out alone, not usually sent to co-
educational schools, not allowed to work, and in some of tribes not allowed to go to polling 
stations to vote (INN 6, INN 10, INN 12, INN 16). Kohistani Pashtoons are the least strict of all the 
Pashtoons, as many of the families send their girls to school, while a few older ladies are also 
involved in social work (INN 10).  
The agency of women is different in each male-dominated context. Independence is a blessing for 
the Punjabi-Christian women, but it becomes an issue for the Christian leaders (INN 12, INN 13). 
The neighbouring Pashtoon community is not used to women’s independence and that women 
can talk to men in public. Often the Pashtoon young men misbehave with Christian women 
resulting in conflicts amongst the communities, as the KIs explained. The Pashtoons also want the 
votes of Christian women as they do not allow their own women to vote (KI). While, in marrying 
out of community, it is the Christian women who suffer the most, as discussed above. Pashtoon 
young men are also blamed for inappropriate behaviour with Ismaili women, which is why the 
barriers were first erected in Nizari Society (KIs from formal area). 
Pashtoons are not used to this (independent women, moving alone and talking 
to male strangers, and without hijab). Sometimes they misbehave and often 
they talk to each other in shops and elsewhere, so they develop relations and 
sometimes the girl wants to marry the boy. This creates conflict and if any girl 
wants to marry a boy from the Christian area it creates a huge problem…90% 
of Pashtoons do not send their women to vote, and to cover the gap they use 
every possible mechanism over us (Christians) to send our women to vote for 
them. (KI) 
Such restrictions and the limited role of Pashtoon women are also reflected in the lacking 
women’s facilities, including schools, clinics, and a maternity hospital etc. While the women are 
fully aware of the situation and complain about it. 
…the major problem that women talk about is their closed environment and 
restricted mobility, but there are no facilitates like separate girls’ schools or 
proper maternity clinics, so the women have to go the male doctors which is 
frowned on by their families. However, (the interviewee) found a way out and 
developed several seminaries for girls in the locality, and now the women are 
quite happy that at least they have a kind of education, and many young girls 
go to such seminaries regularly. (A female political and social worker, KI) 
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The limited role of women is also reflected in the lack of women social or political workers in I-
UC2.  There are a few in the Kohistani community but it would have been inappropriate for a male 
interviewer to talk to them (INN 10, INN 11). Meanwhile, increasing political violence is 
discouraging women in social or political work (FNN 19). 
Control of political activity 
Social controls also include control over political affiliation and political party activities. Political 
and other identities overlap, so controls are attributed to both the political parties and to 
community leaders.  In I-UC2, community leaders are found to be at the centre of tactics to oust 
rival political parties or communities linked to them. In UC3-4, such controls are usually practiced 
by the dominant political party. 
New political parties 
The emergence of a new political or apolitical structures is usually resisted, while in I-UC2 it is 
resisted if the initiator and followers are not from the same Baradary. There are several NGOs 
operating in I-UC2 but the ‘Christian Development Forum’ (CDF) initiated by youth leaders of the 
Christian community was shut down due to apparent threats from a political party which feared it 
was starting a new, rival party (KIs).  
… we started with putting up a medical camp, trying not to give the impression 
that a new political party was being formed. We were trying to avoid giving 
such an impression to people from other communities and political parties, we 
included people from almost all the political parties as well ... Now there are 
some political hindrances, that I cannot explain (Hesitant to name political 
parties and their tactics, to avoid any possible threat) so we stopped working 
from under CDF. (INN 13) 
However, in I-UC2, the same controls were not felt when a new political party emerged involving 
community members (INN 7, INN 11, INN 9). For example, Pakistani Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) received 
an overwhelming response when it set up in both the formal and informal areas, and it did not 
face any resistance in I-UC2 (INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 18). This is contrasted in 
UC3-4 where PTI leaders and workers do not openly carry out political activities although they 
received good number of votes during general elections 2013, describing how people feel and 
what they expect challenging existing power dynamics (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 25). 
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Control over MQM in I-UC2 
MQM is the largest political party in the city, but it is not welcomed in I-UC2, although residents 
know its importance in control over many civic and development agencies in the city. All the 
Pashtoon Baradary are united against MQM, irrespective of the internal divisions, claimed several 
leaders (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, INN 12, INN 13), and some are quite vocal 
while others take a diplomatic route to negate MQM’s presence. 
     
MQM cannot hold this area, because there are not many supporters and it 
faces strong resistance from the Pashtoons, whereas PPP has less support but 
can work openly as many Pashtoons are also in PPP.  Pashtoons from any 
political or religious party, see MQM as threat. (KI and community leader I-
UC2) 
Pashtoon leaders reportedly make several allegations against MQM to justify its exclusion from I-
UC2. MQM is the dominant party in Karachi influencing civic agencies, and dominated the last 
local government elections during 2005-2009, and was in provincial government till 2008, and 
later as part of coalition provincial government till 2014. However, as I-UC2 is not getting water 
and other basic services, Pashtoon leaders conclude that MQM opposes Pashtoons (INN 7, INN 
10, INN 11, INN 16). Often ‘formal government’ becomes synonymous with MQM in the narrative 
of Pashtoon leaders (Section 5.3.1). It is also assumed that MQM wants to enter Pashtoon areas 
to control land and votes (INN 11) (see also Chapter 6). Any work by MQM is seen as a conspiracy 
against the Pashtoons and their settlements (refer INN 2, INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 11, INN 10, INN 
16).  
…but they (MQM) have carried out so many atrocities on (Kohistani) Pashtoon 
communities that  even, if they dug a canal of milk for us here, they cannot 
win our hearts. Many young men have been killed in the city, just because 
they were Pashtoons. (KI) 
Control over ANP in UC3-4: 
ANP is strongly resisted in the formal areas. A resident of Block C (FNN 21) described the most 
recent attempt by ANP to enter formal areas and the majority political party reaction to halt this. 
…Pashtoons (referring to ANP) started to be found together in these localities, 
wall chalking for ANP started to appear… then flags were seen around. The 
movement of young Pashtoon men increased, which meant there were 
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deliberate attempts to influence or capture Block C… and then the majority 
party reacted and strengthened its surveillance system, even I was affected by 
the controls. I had a Pashtoon friend who used to come and visit and we used 
to walk and sit at the outdoor café to smoke or drink tea. The people from the 
majority party indirectly sent me a message that I should stop inviting this 
Pashtoon guy into the area. There were many deliberate attempts by the 
majority party to stop entry of ANP and Pashtoons in this neighbourhood.  
Later …armed majority party workers started to sit at the entry points of each 
street, they used to come in the evening and would go early morning 
(performing watch and ward duties and to avoid any possible attack). (FNN 21) 
Such physical measures were followed up by rhetoric and even rumours that the Pashtoons are 
going to attack Muhajir settlements (KIs) and that they are targeting the Muhajirs in the city, 
especially in the peripheral areas where they dominate (KIs). The word ‘Pashtoons’ was generally 
used, rather than using the name of the political party, to invoke the ‘Muhajir’ identity of the 
residents. Residents of UC3-4 often assume that crime in the locality is linked with the informal 
areas (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 27) and that there are religious extremists who are against the 
religious minorities like Bohri and Ismailies (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26). This thinking makes the 
residents oppose any Pashtoon political party working in their locality and thus legitimises MQM’s 
stance. 
5.4.3 Trade-offs or Mechanisms of Control? 
This section has explored social dimension of informal structures and how and why communities 
legitimise them and what are the benefits and trade-offs of such acceptance. Various conclusions 
are evident.   
First, the combination of need and identity leads to the emergence of various power-subject 
relations. The informal areas show much stronger links between social groups and their informal 
structures, as they exhibit a need to establish identity, for security and to access services. This 
dual need creates a vertical hierarchy in which identity-based leaders group together under one 
political party. In contrast, residents of formal areas try to stick to one identity i.e. religious or 
non-political structures such as neighbourhood committees, while the political party is accepted 
either to avoid security threats or to avoid being considered as part of the opposition. 
Second, once services are provided the informal structures establish controls and ensure people 
follow their rules. The formal and informal areas again show similar behaviour in terms of 
identity-based informal structures which are accepted by residents, e.g. religious prescriptions 
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and the concept of serving the community. However attitudes to political parties differ, as 
residents of UC3-4 adopt a strategy of avoiding nuisance, while in I-UC2 political support is part of 
the survival tactics in the city.    
Thus service provision and controls define the social relations within and between communities, 
which consolidates social and territorial boundaries of influence. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The North Nazimabad case study has a population of around  195,000 inhabitants living in an area 
of about 2.5 Sq. Km., and has proved to be a highly complex yet interesting case in Karachi. The 
area has at least eight distinct social groups with unique ethnic and religious identity of which five 
are found in the informal area of I-UC2. The socio-spatial complexity is coupled with absence or 
co-option of formal governance and services, resulting in the rise of informal structures to fill the 
service provision gap ranging from civic services to community needs.  
Each identity-based group has its own informal structure located in the area, reinforcing socio-
spatial divisions on the city-level, yet, providing the lacking services on the local-level. Such 
informal structures at the local-level are further linked with the district and the city-level 
respectively, being influenced by the city-level power politics and social issues and vice versa. This 
highlights three aspects; first, informal structures from symbiotic relation with the formal 
structures, second, the informal structures work from ‘between’ connecting the formal structures 
and the common citizens. Third, the power-society-space connection is quite evident, in terms of 
informal structures extracting their controlling powers from the social groups to establish 
territoriality. Such structures are legitimised by the affiliated group due to their cultural, religious, 
social and civic service provision and facilitation, for which the people have to accept certain 
trade-offs that depend on the nature of the informal structures ranging from political to ethnic, 
cultural and religious affiliation and acceptance of rules. These are further explained below. 
The fieldwork has demonstrated the formal-informal symbiotic relation and the work of informal 
structures from ‘between’. There are two levels at which the informal structures work, district 
level and the neighbourhood level - that also includes street level. The district level usually 
involves politically affiliated informal structures, and such structures link the community to the 
city-level drawing on the strength of neighbourhood identity-based groups and their related 
informal structures. In areas without identity-based structures at neighbourhood or street level, 
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political party offices and their workers fill that gap. Such local identity have different levels of 
working relation wit the neighbouring group; in I-UC2 each is in lateral tension with its 
neighbours, while in UC3-4 lower-level structures work in parallel. This network of power 
intermediaries works neither from below nor from above but from ‘between’ as a broker and 
custodian of power and decision making, connecting street-level residents to the city, province 
and the country level. 
Several broad and general, but contextual, conclusions about the social and political factors that 
highlight relation between power and society and that eventually connects with space, which 
underlie informal land controls, can be drawn:  
1. The tribal affiliations and intense territoriality are most acute in the informal areas, which 
are largely associated with Pashtoon-ANP affiliation. This is partly a result of poverty and 
relative social isolation which entrenches tribal and religious ties through the Baradary 
system, partly a result of history which provided the context and setting within which I-
UC2 grew, and partly the failure of corrupt government which blocked local government 
elections and services. Residents are highly dependent on community leaders to direct 
political affiliations and control services.  Conversely, leaders cling to power, using mafia-
style control and using violent tactics where necessary.  This creates a flashpoint between 
sects within the settlement.  
2. The formal areas (F-UC2 and UC3-4) are mainly associated with MQM affiliation and 
operate much like middle class areas in many other places in Karachi. Communities are 
mixed, and residents form neighbourhood committees to lobby government for services, 
which are apolitical, and do not directly challenge existing political and street control. 
Certain religious groups such as Bohri and Ismaili, are well-connected and able to lobby 
for their rights. However, all communities are faced with an ever-present threat of 
violence, and the need to defend themselves against political and criminal 
encroachments, and they are increasingly defensive and develop barriers as a means to 
deter intruders. 
3. Three formal areas form an exception to this rule – Nizari Society, the Bohri community 
and the Rangers’ area - each of which operates highly exclusionary practices to 
compartmentalise the area and exclude strangers, although they also do not challenge 
existing power dynamics, street controls and other political control mechanisms. 
However, such areas also emphasise that how change in social group impacts nature of 
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controlling power e.g. in the case of Ismaili and Bohri communities, similarly, how change 
in controlling power impacts space and service provision e.g. in the case of Ranger’s 
residential area. 
4. Service provision is key.  Water supply networks exist but connections to some areas are 
allegedly blocked, or are deliberately not solved, for political gain. I-UC2 is the least-
serviced and least government-controlled part of the area, and has the most variety of 
informal structures. In contrast, the Ranger’s area is the best-serviced and best-connected 
to formal service providers and thus, has least informal controls.  
5. Political battles at both city and local level are played out in North Nazimabad, with 
intense competition and sometimes extortionary tactics in the battle for votes. This 
benefits the otherwise isolated communities of I-UC2, but drags the otherwise 
introverted communities of UC3-4 into city level politics and issues. 
Informal structures define social relations in the area, and the relations between groups cover a 
wide spectrum from cooperation to antagonism. This also highlight the background dynamics of 
conflict and violence connected with informal areas and informality, especially connecting the 
power structure with the affiliated social group. 
1. Each informal structure has a wide network of overlapping affiliations, being vertically 
linked to home territories in the tribal regions, or international religious networks, and in 
lateral tension with each other, specifically in I-UC2. 
2. Relations within the social groups are hierarchical, both in the informal and formal areas, 
with community or religious leaders exercising strong control.  
3. In I-UC2 communities suppress internal differences to combine under an umbrella 
political party. In UC3-4 identity-based communities join in the political contest, but they 
do not threaten the existing hierarchy. However, both Bohri and Ismailies link to city-wide 
and national networks and are thus, better resourced than their I-UC2 counterparts.  
4. Tribal Pashtoon groups in I-UC2 maintain tribal identities when dealing within other 
Pashtoon tribes, but are united when dealing with non-Pashtoon groups such as Punjabi-
Christians, Balti-Shias and Muhajirs. Similarly, they align politically under the ANP party 
(or other Pashtoon representing party) to oppose the Muhajir-dominated MQM. The 
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Pashtoon versus non-Pashtoon conflicts are almost always violent, thus UC2 is the violent 
part of the area. 
5. Social relations are generally inflexible, violent and non-violent social divisions, which 
becomes evident at times of tension and conflict both locally and at city scale, especially 
when issues are political or related with minority groups, which clearly show the city-local 
level link.  
Social control is evident in both the formal and informal areas but the usual understanding that 
the lack of formal services leaves a void in which political exploitation and patron-client relations 
occur, is a simplification of a complex reality. At local level, agency based on the extent to which 
leaders can build a power and financial base through service charges and extortion, seems to be 
at the centre of power dynamics. Such local agency supports political parties which in turn 
influence the city level structural power base. 
The diversity in North Nazimabad is not unusual in a large urban neighbourhood, but the 
entrenchment of ideology, rigidity of social practice, and violence in street-level control has both 
resulted from and contributed to absences of local government and formal services, and feeds 
political conflict in the wider Karachi setting.  
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Space and Segregation  
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6.1 Introduction  
This chapter considers the spatial and territorial outcomes in the North Nazimabad case study, 
deepening the political and social domains explored in Chapter 5. The objective is to understand 
how geographic boundaries of social influence and control, i.e. territories, are created through 
relations between the informal governance and power structures and the corresponding social 
groups, and to identify the spatial control mechanisms, including control over public resources, 
are used to achieve such territoriality. Furthermore, it also explores how resultant multiple 
territories and the corresponding informal structure and social group interact with each other and 
form hierarchies.   
The chapter argues: first that the production of space in North Nazimabad depends on the role of  
informal structures; second that informal land controls define social relations and thus produce 
space; and third, while informal structures use informal land controls to focus on manipulating 
capitalist land markets in both formal and informal settlements, they superimpose social and 
spatial controls through cultural and religious persuasion or physical force, resulting in acute 
segregation and intense conflicts over space. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explores how space is produced and 
linked to informal structures in North Nazimabad. It explains the concept of territory, its boundary 
and centre, and the variety of socio-spatial territories found. The second section explores the 
spatial control mechanisms used by informal structures to delimit their territories, including social 
groupings based on identity and the material benefits of such territoriality. Furthermore, it also 
explores how different territories interact as a geographic manifestation of power, leading to 
conflicts and attack and defence mechanisms resulting from attempts to encroach on territorial 
boundaries. 
6.2 Territories, Boundaries and Centres 
This section explores how in North Nazimabad a territory becomes a geographic manifestation of 
power, with boundaries defining its extent, and a centre as the functional seat of power. Chapter 
5 has already described the various social enclaves in the area, existing in more or less defined 
locations controlled by distinct informal structures. The processes through which boundaries, 
centres and territories are defined are analysed below. 
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6.2.1 Territory 
Territory is a spatial term, but in North Nazimabad it has both physical and non-physical attributes. 
First, a territory can be defined in relative terms by the resident social group and the informal 
structure that controls it, e.g. ethno-politically defined territories such as Pashtoon or Muhajir 
territories or religiously defined territories such as Sunni or Shia areas, etc. Second, territory can 
be considered as the geographic manifestation of power or the limits of claim e.g. political 
influence, such as in the MQM or ANP area. Third, it can also be defined through physical 
attributes, by planning, plot sizes and street patterns, e.g. the formal areas stand out in contrast to 
the informal areas that are now regularized but have the poorer quality infrastructure. Finally, 
territory can also be defined in terms of governance structures, e.g. government-controlled areas 
versus the informal structure-controlled areas. Each of these divisions is explored below in Section 
6.2.4. 
It is also important to understand the historical context of territories and social groupings, to 
better understand the link between the spatial and social dimensions in the area. Certain groups 
are there because of the physical attributes of the settlements, e.g. the formal areas (F-UC2, UC3-
4) attracted middle to upper middle-income Muhajirs, while I-UC2 attracted poor rural migrants 
including Pashtoons and others. In some cases, social enclaves were established well after the 
early residents moved in, e.g. the Bohri community first came because of the social amenities and 
later create a gated territory. The Ismaili hierarchy, the Agha Khan network, was the first to define 
space by purchasing land through a cooperative society, and the Ismaili community then grew. 
Thus, social groups have shaped the boundaries and similarly have defined the nature of informal 
structures and vice versa (See Appendix 5.1 for the detailed history of development of the area). 
6.2.2 Territorial Boundaries 
Territorial boundaries represent first, the extent of the community, second, the geographic extent 
of social controls practised by its informal structure, and third, the meeting point of two or more 
territories. The nature of boundaries vary and are identified through both physical and social 
attributes (Section 6.2.3). Such boundaries behave as ‘fault lines’ that come into force when 
another community or power structure threatens a change to the status quo, as any infiltration or 
boundary change is considered a challenge to the neighbourhood (Section 6.4.1). For example, 
the Kohistani Pashtoon leader challenged the Muhajir majority party’s leadership in UC3-4 about 
the erection of a barrier at an entrance to the informal area, I-UC2 (Box 6.1). The barrier was 
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erected for security, but residents saw it as an attempt to control access to I-UC2. This conflict, 
during the MQM-led local government in 2005-2009, led him to drop his affiliation with the 
coalition in the then elected local government panel39, but later his brother was targeted and 
killed, allegedly in connection with the incident and ensuing city-level ethnic conflicts (INN 7, INN 
9, INN 11, INN 18; Box 6.1).  
6.2.3 Territorial Centres 
Territories often have a centre, although not always in the strict geographic sense. The centre 
represents the seat of power, the space where decisions are made and controls are implemented 
and the nature of the informal structure that defines the territory. For example, religious/prayer 
space forms the centre of religious territories (INN 2, INN 3, INN 13, FNN 22, FNN 26); political 
offices are the centres of politically defined territories (INN 9, FNN 24, FNN 25); and community 
gathering space, the hujra/baithak, provides the focus for  tribal community centres (INN 15).  
6.2.4 Types of Territories, Corresponding Boundaries and Centres  
The communities in North Nazimabad observe various types of territories, boundaries and 
centres, defined both by physical and non-physical attributes.  
Physical definitions 
This physical definition of territory overlaps with social characteristics, and cannot be seen in 
isolation. As mentioned earlier, the formal area (F-UC2 and UC3-4) attracted specific socio-
economic groups i.e. Muhajirs, compared to the informal areas (I-UC2) where rural migrants 
congregated, especially Pashtoons. The social groupings furthered the social divide that later 
overlapped with the political divide.  
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 The local government elections were held on a non-party basis in which individuals running for seats 
developed and joined panels, which were political parties in reality, to form government or opposition. Any 
member of the council could join government panel and this was the case with this community leader (INN 
11) from I-UC2.  
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Box 6.1: Conflict over installing barrier; access control as change in boundary 
Pashtoon leaders explained a conflict between the majority political party and ANP that 
considerably affected the area. The Pashtoons claimed that the majority party always wanted 
control over the Pashtoon areas, but they were denied even though the local Pashtoon Nazim 
(Union Council mayor) and Naib Nazim (vice-mayor) panel were part of the majority party led 
local government. The majority political party was in conflict with ANP and wanted to control 
movements to find potential criminals, the leader claimed. The majority political party, with the 
agreement of the residents of Block Q (F-UC2), abutting I-UC2, started to install a barrier at the 
access between the two settlements. The Pashtoons thought the barrier would lead to the 
majority political party’s control of their area, and might resulted in targeted killings and other 
security issues.  
When majority party’s workers came to install a barrier, the Pashtoon leader and Naib Nazim 
came heard of the incident. “I rushed there. My friends wanted to stop me, but I kept going so 
my friends called ANP workers to ensure support if a fight broke out. When I reached there and 
ordered them to halt the work, the police were also there, so I asked the Station House Officer 
(SHO) to stop the work and reminded him of the court orders to remove barriers from the city 
rather than to put up new ones. Seeing the tense situation and armed men on both sides, 
police called the Rangers.” (KI). The Rangers’ commander ordered his subordinates to remove 
the barrier at once and to arrest people who obstructed the clear-up.  
After this, the Pashtoon leader resigned from the majority party’s local government panel and 
joined ANP. However, it was alleged by several people that after the incident, the then Nazim 
and Naib Nazim did not receive any development funds for I-UC2, and the brother of that 
Pashtoon leader was also killed, allegedly in connection with the ensuing city-level ethnic 
conflict (KIs). 
Formal vs. informal area territories 
The two largest and most widely-understood territories in North Nazimabad are the formal areas 
(F-UC2, UC3-4) and the informal areas (I-UC2). North Nazimabad locality was formally planned in 
the early 1950s, as part of the federal capital city, and started to develop in the early 1960s. When 
the national capital was moved from Karachi to Islamabad, the neighbourhood was offered on the 
open market, and middle and upper-income Muhajirs mainly bought properties. The informal 
areas of the case study started developing in the 1960s, with the industrial boom that attracted 
labourers from all around the country for whom the formal supply of housing for the poor was 
unable to cater (Appendix 5.1).  
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The formal processes of development and town planning standards have attracted people with 
different socio-economic backgrounds compared to residents of the informal areas. I-UC2 has 
smaller plot sizes, an irregular street pattern and has limited social amenities and planned 
infrastructure, and much of the construction is incremental which reflects the economic and 
cultural divide between the two communities (Section 5.2.1). 
Administrative divisions also define the two territories. The formal areas of Blocks U, P, Q (F-UC2) 
are physically adjacent to informal areas but are considered separate because of the formal-
informal and the social divide, also that because of different land agencies deal with them, i.e. 
formal areas come under KDA for property-related matters, while the informal areas deal with 
KMC and Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA).  
The local government constituency demarcation aptly reflects the socio-administrative divide 
between the two territories, i.e. UC2 and UC3-4. Parts of UC3 and UC4 behave as one territory i.e. 
formally-developed, Muhajir-dominated and MQM-represented, while the formal areas of UC2 
(Blocks U, P, Q) and informal areas become one entity i.e. informally-developed, Pashtoon-
dominated and ANP-represented (UC2 is also called Pahar Gunj). The formally developed part of 
UC2, i.e., F-UC2 does not merge with UC3-4 although both have similar characteristics, partly 
because SNJ Road acts as a buffer between the two and makes F-UC2 part of UC2 both physically 
and administratively. Thus, the Muhajirs of F-UC2 becomes a minority within the larger Pashtoon 
dominated UC2, on one hand they are ethno-politically linked with UC3-4 but cannot be part of it, 
on the other hand, they are unable to merge with the adjoining informal-Pashtoon-ANP 
controlled area. Many interviewees highlighted the resulting divide (INN 7, INN 10, FNN 20, FNN 
21, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). Thus, two larger territories exist in the area; first, informal-
Pashtoon-ANP (I-UC2) and formal-Muhajir-MQM territories (UC3-4) reflecting the area’s complex 
socio-spatial identities, legal status and historical development. 
The centres of power in these territories are complex, especially in I-UC2. The political party 
represents the territory in exchanges with the political opposition and forms district level or 
intermediate informal structures, although normally community leaders (Pashtoon tribal leaders, 
Punjabi-Christian community leaders or religious leaders in the case of Balti-Shia) oversee the 
neighbourhood informal structures. However, the political and community leadership overlaps in 
I-UC2. On the other hand, MQM commands street control in UC3-4, and thus solely represents 
that area politically; although Ismaili and Bohri religious and community leaders do not form part 
in the political power dynamics of UC3-4 and stick to the neighbourhood level control. The political 
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party office works as the centre of political power in the area and links higher echelons of MQM to 
the local community. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Various territories existing in the area 
In this formal versus informal territorial divide roads and streets form the boundaries. In the case 
of I-UC2 and F-UC2, the street morphology divides the area both physically and in terms of 
perception of the residents (INN 4, INN 7, INN 9, INN 11). At the wider level, especially in people’s 
perception, SNJ Road forms the border between the two territories (FNN 21, FNN 23, FNN 24, FNN 
25, FNN 26). 
Non-physical definitions 
While the formal-informal divide coincides with the Pashtoon-Muhajir ethnic and ANP-MQM 
political divides at the broad level, the two territories are further divided by social identities at the 
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neighbourhood level. These territories may be culturally, ethnically or religiously-determined 
territories as discussed in Chapter 5.  
Culturally or ethnically defined territories 
Within I-UC2, several territories are defined by ethnic identities around tribes and places of origin, 
particularly Deer Colony, Chamra Chum, Mawara Colony, and Usman Ghani Colony. Each of these 
territories has a dominant social group, separate informal structure and sense of boundary (Map 
5.2 and 5.3, Table 5.1).  
In I-UC2, Deer Colony forms the strongest of such territories, with its strong leadership provided 
by tribal elders and specific socio-spatial controls (Box 6.2). The community differentiates itself 
from the other Pashtoon communities in I-UC2, i.e. the Hasan Zai and the Kohistani Pashtoons, to 
the extent that there is a constant sense of conflict between them (Section 6.4). Deer Colony has 
an defined boundary marked by a controlled entrance with a barrier and a check post. The former 
Union Council office, which operated until local government was suspended in 2009, was based in 
a building donated by the community leader to the town administration. This building is still run by 
the same community leader as the headquarters of his fiefdom of Deer Colony from where he 
oversees security patrols, service provision and operates various residual government functions 
(e.g: formal documentation processing birth and death certificates) (KIs). The tribal chief has 
issued various rules for social order and local welfare (Box 6.2). 
Hasan Zai Pashtoons are the most dominant ethnic group in I-UC2 in terms of both power and 
population. Their territory covers an extended area in more than one locality, including Chamra 
Chum, Mawara Colony, and other smaller neighbourhoods. The community is characterised by its 
strong history and affiliation with ANP and other religious-political parties, and by its link with the 
historic Pashtoon-Muhajir riots in 1986-87 (Appendix 4.1). Many ANP political workers come from 
the same area (INN 4, INN 5, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 12, JCS 16). It is difficult for other groups to 
mix with Hasan Zai Pashtoons, as they have a strong tribal identity and sense of bonding. They also 
form the largest tribe of Pashtoons in the area, thus draw power over others from their numbers 
and political dominance.  
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Box 6.2: Rules in Deer Colony 
The leader in Deer Colony has developed several rules to control and manage the locality, and 
the community obeys these rules: 
I. There should be no bachelor housing in the area, as this attracts illegal and immoral 
activities that we do not want in this locality. 
II. Conflicts are resolved through us. 
III. We do not allow any tea house or hotel in our locality. This control helps us keep 
unwanted people and activities away from the neighbourhood. 
IV. For strangers in the area, the person whom the stranger has come to meet or stay with 
is considered responsible and answerable for their behaviour.  
V. We tax property transactions, and on each transaction, the owner has to pay 1-2% of 
the property value to the two Mosques and the Seminary, which helps fund  these free 
amenities. 
VI. Property transactions are not registered at the governmental civic agencies, but we 
stamp the contract. I am the guarantor of the transaction, and no-one would dare to 
illegally occupy the land or property.  
VII. If someone in the area does not follow these rules, then we (the elders headed by the 
tribal chief) caution him, and if still he continues we offer to buy his property at market 
rates and ask him to leave the locality. 
VIII. Anyone of any ethnicity can live here, provided that he follows our rules. 
IX. We decide whom the community will support politically in elections, and for whom 
they should vote. (KI interview) 
 
There is no physical boundary or demarcation for Hasan Zai territory. Residents identify fellow 
community members and usually a street forms the boundary between one settlement and 
another, although the community is gradually expanding into other communities including 
Kohistani Area and the Punjabi-Christian area. The central community reception space 
hujra/baithak forms the centre of power. It is a covered public space in the middle of Chamra 
Chum, with many charpoy (low beds) where the community leaders sit, deliberate and decide 
issues (Picture 6.1). The space is also used for funeral and marriage ceremonies (INN 10, INN 15). 
The Kohistani community delineates another territory within the larger UC2, although this is one 
of the most mixed social groups at present due to the increase in rental housing in the 
neighbourhood (INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 11). Kohistani Chowk (cross-roads) is a busy local 
commercial centre and the territory is usually called Usman Ghani Colony (INN 10). No particular 
location is seen as the centre of power, but the leaders use their house’s hujra/baithak (reception 
area) for communal gatherings and meetings. Due to the social mix, the boundaries are blurred, 
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and sometimes determined by neighbouring territories, including Pahar Gunj, Mawara Colony and 
Balti Colony, and it is thus one of the more open and accessible territories in North Nazimabad. 
 
Picture 6.1: Hasan Zai community elders and residents at their Baithak (gathering area) 
Religious based territories  
Religious based territories are the most clearly defined in North Nazimabad. These communities 
have unique ethnic identities that are subservient to the dominant religious identity and all such 
groups are religious minorities in the city. The territories include: in I-UC2 the Punjabi-Christians in 
Pahar Gunj territory, and Balti-Shia in Balti territory, and in UC3-4 the Gujrati-Bohri in Bohri 
Neighbourhood and the Gujrati-Ismaili in Nizari Society (Maps 5.2 and 5.3, Table 5.1). 
Punjabi-Christians occupy Pahar Gunj, and the difference between them and the surrounding 
Muslim-Pashtoons creates a spatial divide that is heightened by the cultural differences including 
holidays, celebrations, the status and the role of women, and the use of alcohol.  
Although there is no specific boundary to Pahar Gunj, it is broadly bounded by Godaam Gali Street 
to the north, the electricity sub-station to the east, the formal area of De Silva Town (Block P) to 
the west, and SNJ Road to the south. The entry point for Pashtoons living on the hills behind is 
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through Pahar Gunj, making it an accessible or a weak territory. However, the Christians have a 
very strong sense of territory and in the past, whenever required, had mechanisms to defend it 
(INN 13). The community elders constitute the informal structure, sitting daily on the street, but 
the Church is the centre of identity and power, and has thus been subject to attack at times of 
conflict (INN 13). 
The Balti-Shia also have no defined boundary but are segregated by the Sunni-Pashtoon groups 
across the street. The territory is defined by Shia residents belonging to Gilgit-Baltistan province in 
the north, who speaks a distinct language and all are related to each other (INN 2, INN 3). 
However, the relations with surrounding communities create social boundaries, as the Shia face 
discrimination from the local Sunni-Pashtoons (INN 2, INN 3, INN 8, INN 10). This division is 
intensified by the presence of anti-Shia religious-political outfits such as SSP and ASWJ (KIs). Given 
the absence of a defensible physical boundary, the community tries to establish a physical 
boundary around its centre and space of power, i.e. the Imam Bargah40, through routine use of 
barriers and gates, and regular processions and religious gatherings (Picture 6.2). The influence of 
the Imam Bargah on social relations is powerful and people would give their lives to defend it 
(Section 6.4). 
We will not leave the area, because of the Imam Bargah and will protect it at 
any cost. Although the situation is not good here, the children are not happy 
and we could afford to leave the area ... and sometimes I think of leaving the 
area but it all depends on the Imam Bargah - again we cannot leave it.  Many 
residents of the area have migrated to other better areas … so that’s why we 
are not leaving just to defend it and keep it intact (INN 3). 
The Bohri Neighbourhood in Block C is one of the largest and strongest religion based territories in 
UC3-4. It is defined by the Bohri community and controlled by their religious authority. Over time, 
the community has ousted most non-Bohri residents through market mechanisms of property 
purchase (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 24) (Section 6.4). The fear of insecurity from 
street crimes and apparent threats from Sunni religious extremists has led them to cordon off 
space using guarded gates and moveable and fixed metal barriers (FNN 22, FNN 23), which also 
means the territory can expand in future (Map 6.1). 
                                                          
40
 Shia religious space comprising of prayer space or Mosque and a space for gatherings involving Majlis and 
other religious rituals. 
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Picture 6.2: Balti area, children on street and the openable barrier 
controlling access to Imam Bargah in the background 
Nizari Society is a formally-developed social enclave and territory, a cooperative housing society 
for the Ismaili community. The cooperative has 200 contiguous housing plots, a Jamat Khana 
(community centre) and a community hall. No other community can buy or rent in the society. 
Previously there was no boundary demarcating the community, but in the last eight years the 
community has been cordoned off using metal barriers to protect against unwanted incursions 
e.g. criminals (FNN 26; Map 6.1). The Jamat Khana forms the centre or space of power, from 
where the community is governed by the community leaders and religious authorities (FNN 26). 
6.2.5 Territories; an Interplay of Physical and Social Dimensions  
A complex variety of overlapping territories exists with varying scales and boundaries 
corresponding to the residents’ social groups, administrative boundaries, physical boundaries and 
political affiliation.  Two scales are evident in this local level case study i.e. district-level that falls 
between the city-level and the neighbourhood-level, (city-level being the largest) which 
corresponds to the physical definition and overlaps political, administrative and social dimensions, 
while the neighbourhood-level corresponds to local group identities. The district-level highlights 
the presence of two territories i.e. (i) informal-Pashtoon-ANP territory and (ii) formal-Muhajir-
MQM territory. The neighbourhood-level, or non-physical definition, highlights sub-territories 
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delineated by the social identities of residents and includes; ethnicity based territories, which are 
largely Pashtoon and the Muhajir territories, and sub-territories corresponding to a variety of 
tribal groups (Baradary based) in I-UC2; religious sub-territories within both UC2 and the UC3-4 
e.g. Punjabi-Christians, Balti-Shia, Gujrati-Bohri and Gujrati-Ismaili territories (Figure 6.1). The 
neighbourhood committees are neutral and operate at street-level; they do not vie for spatial 
control and do not pose a threat to the dominant political control.  
The nature of informal structures, the centres of power and boundaries varies with the territory. 
The political party offices, community gathering spaces and religious spaces form centres of 
power, whereas, streets, roads and residents’ identity create both physical and perceptual 
boundaries. Territories are also relative, in that, they emerge or disappear along with identities, 
for example I-UC2 emerged as a Pashtoon territory in opposition to the UC3-4 Muhajir territory. 
Thus, territories are a socio-spatial construct that combine social groups, physical and 
administrative boundaries and the play of controls enforced by informal structures. The territory 
making also reflects the myriad of ways, involving social and spatial dimensions both, which lead 
to space production.    
6.3 Spatial Controls 
This section explores how the informal structures develop, consolidate and defend territories, and 
how they impose effective control and extract resources, e.g. informal taxes or ‘protection 
money’, from the area. A defined territory is the spatial outcome of the trade-off that 
communities accept in return for services provided by the informal structures (social benefits 
were explored in Section 5.4). The mechanisms through which spatial controls are imposed are 
explored in this section. 
Spatial controls serve two major purposes, first to establish territory around political, ethnic or 
religious identities and exclude alien social groups, and second to extract resources, including all 
sorts of informal rents, from the territory. Spatial controls define the degree of openness or 
closure of a territory, also the degree and extent of inclusion-exclusion measures applied to other 
groups living or entering the territory. The main forms of spatial control include (i) entry and exit 
control, (ii) property control or demographic control, (iii) extracting protection money or informal 
rents (iv) conflicts, leading to attack and defence mechanisms, and (v) control on political activity, 
socio-cultural and religious activity (the latter is been discussed in Section 5.4.2).  
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6.3.1 Access Control – Inclusion or Exclusion? 
Access control may cover activities such as passing through for business and political activities, 
using amenities, or performing state and institutional tasks, and serves several purposes, such as 
political control, crime control, etc. Access control mechanisms can also be understood as both 
physical and non-physical measures. 
Physical Measures 
Perhaps the most distinct forms of physical access control are the gates and barriers, found 
throughout the case study area, but particularly in the formal areas.  Much of the formal area is 
partitioned by a series of metal barriers, some of which are manned, creating a symbol of 
exclusion and fear (Figure 6.3 & 6.4, Map 6.1). Barriers are the most common means of exclusion, 
but there are also some gates and walls. 
  
Picture 6.3: Guard post room at barrier, UC3-4           Picture 6.4: Metal barrier, UC3-4  
  
Use of barriers  
Barriers are used for controlling and regulating both pedestrian and vehicule movements in the 
area. Although some barriers are guarded, the pedestrian movement is often not strictly 
controlled but the barriers show pedestrians that they are entering an observed area. 
The formal and MQM areas (F-UC2 and UC3-4) have the most barriers. In I-UC2 territory only Deer 
Colony and Balti Colony make much use of barriers. All the religious territories also have barriers, 
except Pahar Gunj. In contrast, most of the Baradary-based territories do not have any barriers 
204 | P a g e  
except in Deer Colony, as social signals and the complex street pattern serve as barriers for 
outsiders. 
Interviewees in UC3-4 described the main purpose of barriers as being for security. The 
perception of security changes with the territory and the community while the location of barriers 
highlights the importance and level of collaboration amongst residents. In religious communities, 
the focus of security is the power centre or the religious space, and the Bohri and Ismailies have 
cordoned off their areas effectively making them gated communities (Map 6.1; INN 2, INN 3, FNN 
22, FNN 23). In F-UC2 and UC3-4, excluding the two religious territories, the street level forms the 
neighbourhood and security unit and thus barriers are installed at the entrance of each street 
(FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25, FNN 27). For political leaders, the political territory 
forms the geographic unit of security, which is guarded, e.g. SNJ Road forms both the boundary 
and the barrier between the two territories (INN 7, INN 11). The two major political parties, i.e. 
MQM and ANP, do not erect barriers in their territories, but both the political parties use existing 
barriers installed by residents in their favour, as a tool to exclude their opponents (Section 5.4.2; 
FNN 19, FNN 21).       
The barriers have far greater meaning than just a physical means of access control. First, they are 
linked to the perception of safety and security, as they allow the control over intruders and 
through traffic (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 23, and FNN 25). Second, they define the territorial limits of 
control establishing a boundary, as for the Bohri community and Nizari Society (Ismaili 
community) where barriers give a clear sense of inclusion-exclusion (INN 7, INN 9, INN 11, FNN 
20, FNN 25).  
Putting up barriers means defining a boundary, but this is never done in isolation. A new barrier 
could be a flashpoint for a conflict if the neighbouring informal structure does not approve it, for 
example, the Kohistani leader fought with the majority political party over the installation of a 
barrier on the access road to I-UC2 that goes through F-UC2. The installation of barrier was taken 
as a violation of territory as already discussed (Box 6.1; Section 6.2.2).  
In F-UC2 and UC3-4, neighbourhood committees manage the barriers and have brought previously 
isolated people closer. The committees mean that neighbours meet periodically and are now 
addressing problems other than safety and security, including services and street lights, etc. 
(Section 5.3.5; FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 24, FNN 26).  For example, a middle-aged man from the 
formal area (FNN20) mentioned that they started their neighbourhood committee to hire security 
guards and install barriers and since  they met up every month other civic issues were also raised. 
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They found that they could tackle civic issues better and more economically if they collaborated 
together, so now they are also managing the street lights and solid waste. 
 
Map 6.1: Use of gates and barriers as access control mechanism in UC3-4 (Source: author). 
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Gates and walls 
Gates and walls make another form of physical control, and are more exclusionary than barriers 
as they stop all types of movements. Only a few gates and walls have been built in formal areas 
i.e. F-UC2 and UC3-4, mostly around religion based territories.  
All the gates and walls observed were located at a junction between the main road and a side 
road leading into the territory. In Block Q (F-UC2) residents have built walls and installed gates on 
the streets connecting to the Kati Pahari Road (FNN 19). The Bohri Neighbourhood has metal 
gates at the access to Shahrah-e-Humayun (SH) Road and Cricketers Avenue, while Nizari Society 
has metal gates at its connection with SNJ Road. 
… after building the Kati Pahari Road the whole locality became unsafe, there 
have been several burglaries, as in response the residents of the locality closed 
the street leading to Kati Pahari Road… after constructing the wall, the 
residents have now put in a door that is opened when the local children go to 
school as their bus comes to that road. (FNN 19) 
Street morphology and slopes 
Street morphology and physical features including slopes in North Nazimabad play a central role in 
access control, especially in I-UC2, where the upper hillside is very steep with uneven and 
temporary stairs, making it difficult for outsiders and vehicular access. The irregular street 
morphology was not intentional in I-UC2, but its effect on outsiders is intentionally exploited 
(Pictures 6.5 and 6.6).  
The first impact is on security. Interviewees mentioned that criminals vanish into I-UC2 after 
committing crime on SNJ Road, and no one dares to enter the settlements because of fear of 
getting lost and harmed in the winding streets (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 14, 
INN 15, INN 16). Limited vehicular access in some areas of I-UC2 means that the LEAs cannot use 
vehicles in the area. The physical challenge is also supported by the social landscape as Pashtoons 
are mostly related to each other and support kinsmen in difficulties, even if their difficulties are 
crime-related (INN 7, INN 10).  
… especially on the hill, there are all kinds of criminals, just because no one 
goes up there. Police and Rangers don’t go there, as a result, these have 
become safe sanctuaries for them (criminals), which you call no-go-areas, no-
one can catch them. (INN 7) 
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Picture 6.5: Winding street pattern in Chamra Chum area 
The second impact is on the utilities in I-UC2. It is tough for people living on the higher slopes to 
get water, as water tankers cannot navigate the narrow streets (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 10, INN 
11, INN 15, INN 16, INN 17). However, it is also easy for them to use services without paying as the 
utility services inspectors do not go there either (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 11, and INN 16; Picture 
6.5 & 6.6).  
The UC3-4 and F-UC2 also create the same labyrinthine effects in the street pattern by using 
barriers, so that only locals know the accessible streets. This discourages street crime and 
unwanted movements. 
Making the settlement difficult to navigate makes it safer as strangers cannot pass through and 
are easily identified. However, access control also brings social isolation. Outsiders do not want to 
pass through as they get lost, and friends and relatives avoid coming especially in the formal areas, 
according to an educated middle-aged resident of UC3-4. Map 6.1 elaborates on the labyrinth 
created out of use of barriers and gates that only daily users could understand and navigate.  
… friends and relatives avoid coming to this locality (UC3-4) and if they come 
they always complain about the maze of streets with closed and open barriers, 
it is tough for any new comer to find their way through. (FNN 20) 
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Picture 6.6: Stepped streets, leading to the hill, lined with water pumping equipment and 
the lines in Chamra Chum area 
Making new or blocking existing roads 
Access control is also used for political ends, both to liberate controlled areas and to exclude 
opponents. For example, the decision to build the Kati Pahari Road linking North Nazimabad and 
Orangi Town was taken by an MQM-led local government (2005-2009). The majority of voters in 
Orangi were MQM supporters but had only one access route to the city via Banaras Chowk, a 
long-term Pashtoon-ANP stronghold. Kati Pahari Road was intended to provide a shorter route 
and avoid Pashtoon-controlled Banaras Chowk that would be a no-go zone for Muhajir 
commuters during conflict. However the project had several unintended consequences, as it 
provided criminals with an easy through route to North Nazimabad, the ANP-MQM conflict 
intensified as the Kati Pahari Road still passed through Pashtoon-controlled areas, and it opened 
up North Nazimabad to the historic Pashtoon-Muhajir battle zone of Qasba Colony in Orangi, 
resulting in increased violence and crimes in North Nazimabad (INN 4, INN 10, INN 11, FNN 19, 
FNN 24, FNN 25, PCS 1).  
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Non-physical measures 
Access is also discouraged or regulated using non-physical means including surveillance, the 
watch-and-ward system, policing and questioning a person. This involves a network of people 
supporting the access control mechanisms either working for the community leadership or on 
their own initiative. Other non-physical means are more implicit, built on social perceptions and 
take place involuntarily involving internalisation of differences by the community, such as the 
concept of “us” versus “them” (Tilly, 2004). Such perceptual controls are supported by discourse, 
narrative and rumours. Such non-physical controls work from inside, such that outsiders avoid 
accessing such territories for fear of intimidation or crime. Residents thus internalise protection 
and collectively form a defensive barrier. These are explored in detail below. 
Surveillance 
Policing, surveillance, watch-and-ward, interrogation etc. are all used to regulate access 
(collectively termed surveillance here), by keeping a watch on movement through territorial 
boundaries. There are two types of surveillance in the area i.e. organised and unorganized.  
Organised surveillance involves both people specifically assigned for the task mostly by political 
party workers in both UC2 and UC3-4, and watchmen and guards at the barriers privately hired by 
the residents in F-UC2 and UC3-4. Political party workers are usually assigned tasks of surveillance 
or watch-and-ward duties to control opponents (INN 11, FNN 19, and FNN 21; also refer section 
5.4.2 on information control).  A journalist and local resident confirmed that during an ANP-MQM 
conflict political activists develop signals to check identities, e.g. the journalist, who travelled on 
motorcycle, was asked to blink his bike lights in a particular pattern to get safe access at night (KI). 
The street-level neighbourhood committees and the religious Bohri and Ismaili communities have 
hired street guards, who question newcomers and check the identity of vehicle drivers 
(pedestrians are only checked if suspicious) (FNN 20, FNN 21).   
Organised surveillance in I-UC2 is used at times of perceived threat, as people know each other 
and newcomers are easily identified. A male respondent of Pahar Gunj, mentioned that their 
community also had a system of armed surveillance during times of ANP-MQM conflict to avoid 
any harm to the community. It is understood that the tribal leader of a locality in I-UC2 employed 
an army of 50 local men to safeguard both the locality and himself, after he received an extortion 
threat allegedly from the Taliban (Box 6.3). In the same territory, land use is also controlled to 
avoid unwanted people and the need for surveillance is minimised. 
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There is no bachelors’ housing in the area, as this attracts illegal and immoral 
activities that we don’t want in this locality… We don’t allow any tea house or 
hotel in our locality, this also help us keeping unwanted people and activities 
away from this locality.  (KI) 
Unorganized surveillance is undertaken informally by residents, mostly in the Baradary-based 
territories of I-UC2, where a new person is easily recognized. This works in several ways, 
controlling crime as no outside criminal can enter, and protecting leaders as criminals know the 
local leaders who are usually spared, and thus many local leaders have never experienced street 
crime (INN 4, INN 5, INN 9, INN 14, INN 16). The surveillance works as a network and observations 
are communicated directly to leaders or political workers via their dedicated people, or by 
residents who inform organisation workers usually found at major activity zones and access 
locations.  
Thus there is a lower crime rate in I-UC2 because of the community-based system, as people can 
identify criminals and the criminals cannot enter in these settlements. (INN 14) 
Box 6.3: Extortion demand and defending the leader and the territory 
A tribal leader in one of the Pashtoon settlements received an extortion threat, as he described, 
allegedly from the Pakistani faction of the Taliban. The leader consulted with other elders and 
decided not to fulfil the demand. He called a meeting with the resident tribesmen, who also 
endorsed his decision. The decision was followed up by development of a protection army of 150 
local resident tribesmen to avoid any attack after the refusal. They developed check points and a 
guard system with young men guarding the checkpoints 24 hours a day. The leader used his own 
connections in Waziristan (a Tribal Agency in North West Pakistan, supposedly a Taliban 
stronghold where a military operation is currently taking place) and found that the letterhead 
used was not original. Later it was found, allegedy, that it was somebody from a local political 
party who used the name of the Taliban to extract political revenge on the leader (KI). 
Perceptions 
Perception also plays a role in access control in the area. Perceptions about other groups, political 
parties, spaces and individuals, are developed over time, intentionally or unintentionally, through 
narratives or through the media. Some perceptions are deliberately developed through false 
narrative or rumours, while others are based on evidence, such as the need to avoid access SNJ 
Road due to its high crime rate. 
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Residents on both sides of SNJ Road, avoid going there at night due to increased crime (INN 3, INN 
6, INN 7, INN 9, INN 10, INN 11, FNN 20, FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26) although the reasons 
mentioned vary. Residents from UC2 have no other route except SNJ Road, but UC3-4 have other 
alternatives. The residents of UC3-4 think that crime on SNJ Road is linked to the presence of 
criminals in I-UC2 (FNN 20, FNN 24, FNN 25). The Bohri and Ismaili community link this crime to 
the presence of extremist Pashtoon groups in I-UC2 (FNN 22, FNN 23, FNN 26).  
People fear going out at night on the Road (Shah Noor Jahan). Street crime is high on the road, 
and also there is a fear that somebody might kill on ethnic or sectarian grounds. Para-transit 
vehicles will never bring people here in the area; they refuse to come here late at night. Salesmen 
to this area do not come at night time (INN 10). 
Perceptions are often based on a false premise. The case of Kati Pahari is one example. The north-
western end of Kati Pahari Road, beyond the Orangi Hill, has always been violent but the North 
Nazimabad side was only violent for a short time (INN 11). However, due to a general perception 
people avoid coming to the area (INN 10, INN 6, and INN 5). 
Safety and security in Kati Pahari is not as bad as is portrayed in media … the 
violent area is on the other side of the Kati Pahari hill, not this side … the 
image of the area has been destroyed by the media so that even a rickshaw 
driver in this city is not willing to come to this area at night.  (INN 6) 
Perceptions are also developed deliberately, through narratives, discourse and rumours, which 
are actively used by political parties to strengthen territories. As reported by interviewees, there 
were rumours in UC3-4 that there is a high possibility of Pashtoon attack and that only the 
majority political party could save the area41. Political workers have, allegedly, offered to sell 
residents weapons to counter this threat (KIs). Other political parties also try to shape people’s 
perceptions in the Pashtoon areas. 
 … (The party) did created a hype that Pashtoons are coming to attack the 
Muhajir localities, and we heard that in Block G and Block L they conducted 
neighbourhood meetings and told people about possible threats from 
Pashtoons, arguing that people should buy weapons to protect themselves… it 
was also rumoured that the Pashtoons are identifying Muhajirs in buses and 
                                                          
41
 One of the Muhajir residents of Block C talked about an event during Eid-Ul-Adha when he sacrificed 
some animals. The political party worker came for the collection of hides, on refusal the worker said, 
“…then don’t come to us for help when the Pashtoons will come (to attack, harm or control the locality).”   
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cutting off their ears and fingers, although we have not seen anything like that 
or known anyone an eye-witness or suffered such an event. SNJ Road has 
become a danger zone for many, but in their imaginations. (FNN 25) 
Thus some of the violence is bred from fear and misunderstanding rather than actual threats and 
that eventually helps control access to and from the area. 
Flags, graffiti, wall chalking etc.  
Flags, graffiti and wall-chalking are physical yet perceptual forms of claim, and an important 
symbol of identity and demarcation of territorial boundaries, and thus a means to control 
opponents. All political parties, religious or non-religious, have flags and extensively use wall-
chalking to campaign for a leader or ideology and to lambast opponents. Religious groups also use 
wall-chalking and flags, especially during festivals and ceremonies e.g. the Balti-Shia use black 
flags as a religious symbol and Punjabi-Christians erect Christmas stars.  
Flags are also hoisted to mark a boundary (INN 12). One interviewee showed the researcher the 
symbols of a possible ANP take over in Block C, which otherwise is a MQM controlled area, 
evident through wall-chalking and a display of party flags (FNN 21, see below and Section 6.2). 
Similarly, in an interview, a Pashtoon leader explained his resolve not to allow any MQM offices or 
flags in his area, demonstrating the importance of flags as territorial markers and symbols of 
control (INN 11).  
Access for businesses 
Access control can also affect businesses and create threatening situations. For example, at the 
city-wide famous Karahi Hotel (Box 6.4) the owner allegedly refused to pay extortion money, so 
political party workers made it difficult for customers to dine at the restaurant and created fear. 
The workers had a regular routine of firing aerial gunshots which made the customers flee, and in 
few months the business hit its lowest turnover (INN 10, INN 15, INN 16; Box 6.4). Similarly, when 
the Rangers’ patrol parks their Mobile42 vehicle at the Pahar Gunj Roundabout, they do not allow 
any parking nearby, although the vicinity is famous for its auto-mechanics, auto-part shops and 
garages, but this surveillance has proved to be a disaster for the local businesses as customers do 
not come to the shops as they fear being attacked (INN 10; Box 5.2). In the Bohri neighbourhood, 
during first 10 days of the Islamic month of Muharram, shop owners around the Jamat Khana and 
                                                          
42
 Six to eight Rangers personnel on patrolling duty mounted on four-wheel army vehicle (called a Mobile). 
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along the route of religious processions are asked to shut down their shops to avoid any security 
threat (FNN 22, FNN 23).  
Box 6.4: Karahi Hotel; a case of access and resource control 
The Karahi Hotel is a famous restaurant in De Silva Town, Block P in North Nazimabad (F-UC2). 
The restaurant is well-known for its meaty dish called Karahi Gosht, literally meaning meat in a 
round-bottomed wok. This dish is famous in the northern Pashtoon areas of Pakistan, and has 
been transported to Karachi by Pashtoon restaurant owners, and is particularly popular amongst 
Pashtoons in the transport sector, long-haul drivers and cleaners. The Karahi Hotel in De Silva 
town is well-known throughout Karachi for attracting customers from all ethnicities. Business 
turnover was high till 2011, when the restaurant owner reportedly had to give extortion money as 
a ‘donation’ to the controlling political party in the settlement.  One of the local leaders said that 
that when party workers tried to put up a banner calling for donations of sacrificial animal hides in 
front of the restaurant, the owner did not allow this, so the party workers became angry and 
decided to retaliate, while others allege that the conflict started when the owner was asked to 
increase the extortion money, which he refused. The political workers made a habit of firing aerial 
gunshots in front of the restaurant during busy times, and as a result the business almost folded; 
the customers feared coming to the restaurant (KIs). 
6.3.2 Property Control 
Property control is one of the main forms of spatial control in the area. Property control, like 
access control, has a dual purpose in helping to control both the physical and social dimensions of 
territory, which enables the informal structures to consolidate territories, alter boundaries, and 
exclude people from other backgrounds to avoid any possible threats. Excluding opponents also 
has a political motive, as it results in an increase in favourable votes that may lead to formal 
control.  
Many tactics were being used for property control in North Nazimabad. Tactics include controlling 
property transactions through real estate agents, or through pressure on property owners not to 
rent or sell property to opponent groups. Crime and violence, and fear of crime also affects 
demography and property transactions. Different groups use different property control 
mechanisms as discussed below. 
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Religion based territories  
The religious territories exhibited the strongest property control mechanisms. In UC3-4, The Nizari 
Society is a registered housing cooperative, developed for the Ismaili community members (FNN 
21, FNN 26). Under the cooperative society rules, the cooperative’s elected representatives 
control occupancy. This is the strongest form of formal property control that cannot be 
challenged or changed through informal means. The cooperative frees the community from fears 
of demographic change or losing territorial control, although the market value of cooperative 
properties is correspondingly reduced. 
The Bohri community has used, previously and even now, real estate mechanisms to capture and 
control property. Initially, when a few Bohri residents started living there the religious authority, 
representing the community, bought properties from the government and then from local non-
Bohri residents in the area for the Jamat Khana, the university and related uses, including 
housing, offering them prices higher than market value (FNN 20, FNN 22, FNN 23). The wider 
Bohri community also followed the same tactic and started buying properties at above-market 
rates, and soon Bohris became the majority group in the territory. On one occasion, a non-Bohri 
bought an apartment building on SSS Road that was built overlooking the Jamat Khana; to avoid 
such an event happening again, the Jamat Khana developed a trust through which they bought all 
the commercial properties facing SSS Road at almost double the market prices (FNN 22, FNN 23). 
The Jamat Khana helps community members find sale or rental property, and helps Bohri 
developers in finding Bohri tenants for new apartment projects (FNN 23, FNN 21, and Section 
5.4.1). Blocks A and C are fast being dominated by Bohri residents. 
In I-UC2, the Balti-Shia leaders ensure property control especially around the Imam Bargah. Non-
Shia buyers and tenants are avoided to ensure security (INN 2, INN 3). Residents also become 
aware of property control through discussions and instructions and through peer pressure. 
For every property transaction either buying/selling or for rental (especially 
around Imam Bargah), the newcomer is fully investigated, especially in terms 
of sectarian affiliation. The community do not want to allow anyone who could 
cause harm to the people, neighbourhood or the Imam Bargah, as there are 
many threats around for the Imam Bargah. (INN 2) 
The Punjabi-Christians also want to control their territory, but are unable to lay down effective 
controls as the Pashtoons are buying properties in their settlement (INN 13). Christians think that 
they are being pushed out by Pashtoons, and many are thinking of moving out (INN 12, INN 13). 
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Losing control over property has become a symbol of losing control over society and territory. The 
Church, given its weak position, is investing in nearby property to keep its environs secure, a 
common trend in religious territories (INN 13). 
Baradary-based territories 
The Baradary-based territories exhibit control mechanisms implicit in the bonding around tribe 
and Baradary. The communities emphasise sticking together which leave less room for any other 
community to settle among them. In I-UC2 politically-influenced mechanisms also overlap, and it 
is difficult to distinguish as community leaders are often political leaders as well, although they 
prefer to take credit as community leaders rather than representative of a political party.  
The community leaders in I-UC2, were found to be actively involved in property control through 
both explicit and implicit mechanisms. Social bonding, culture, perceptions, and contract-
enforcement each play a vital role in control mechanisms over both sale and renting of property. 
The political parties, overlapping with Baradary, also play a role by getting the informal 
settlements regularised (‘leased’ local term for regularised i.e: titled), thus ensuring both political 
gains and demographic control. Property control also involves control over land use.  
Many Pashtoon leaders in I-UC2 claim that there is no restriction on anyone coming to live in their 
territory, referring specifically to Muhajirs (INN 6, INN 8, INN 9, INN 11, INN 14, INN 16, and INN 
18). However, there is also an acceptance that the Muhajirs (e.g: in De Silva Town in F-UC2) prefer 
not to live with or adjacent to Pashtoon communities because of differences in culture, fear and 
high crime rates in I-UC2 (INN 7, INN 14). The Kohistani Pashtoon leaders claim that their 
settlement is the most accessible of all, and the elders/leaders now avoid controlling property and 
instead facilitate transactions (INN 7, INN 8, and INN 11). This relaxation of control is partly 
because the rise of rental housing in the neighbourhood is a major source of income for many 
families, so any control that would hinder the business would make the leader’s position 
controversial (INN 11). 
The Pashtoon community leaders are explicitly involved in contract enforcement during property 
transactions. This both gives them credibility as service provider and a contract enforcer, and 
enables them to see and control the transaction (INN 7, INN 8, INN 18; Box 6.2 and Section 5.4.2). 
Cultural differences between communities and tribal traditions, fear around this divide, and 
political conflict have also led to property control and demographic change, which has affected 
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the ethnic mix in the area. For example, in De Silva Town (Block P, F-UC2), the Urdu-speaking 
Muhajir population is leaving the locality because of fear, violence and crime, due to the 
proximity of Pashtoon-dominated I-UC2, so real estate values have fallen, and Pashtoon 
households are buying up the properties at a very low prices (INN 7, INN 10, INN 14, FNN 19, FNN 
20, FNN 21, and FNN 25).  
…many Urdu-speaking people have left the area because there are drug-
peddlers and drug addicts who burgle the bungalows (of Muhajirs), so people 
are worried. People are also afraid that the Pashtoons would attack us if there 
is any clash between MQM and ANP, so that’s why they sold their properties 
very cheaply and left the area. (INN 7) 
Getting the informal settlement ‘leased’ (local term for regularised i.e: titled), and getting formal 
status, has been a mechanism to control property and develop political territory. Firstly, JI, the 
religious political party,  successfully lobbied and got certain parts of I-UC2 regularised (excluding 
Pahar Gunj and housing on the hill) which made JI one of the notable political parties in the area 
and increased its popularity in the settlement (INN 4, FNN 20, FNN 21). However, Pahar Gunj 
could not be regularised because it is on an amenity plot, which by law cannot be changed to any 
other land-use (INN 12). However, the land mafia43, allegedly backed by the city’s majority 
political party, patronised encroachments over parks in F-UC2 and UC3-4, and apartments were 
developed there (Box 6.5). Local interviewees assert that when the MQM-led local government 
subsequently wanted to regularise all the encroachments they regularised all the informal 
settlements in North Nazimabad, even Pahar Gunj, which otherwise were threatened with 
demolition (INN 13). 
Property control also affects commercial properties and their use, mostly in I-UC2. Commercial 
properties act both as an economic asset but also as a symbol of territory, for example a tea stall 
or Carom shop44 which allows many people with the same ethnicity or political affiliation to sit 
                                                          
43
 A commonly used term in Karachi denoting organised individuals or groups involved in the illegal business 
of grabbing public or private land or properties and selling it to the public for profits. Many  times, builders 
or investors may collude with the officers of the civic agencies and the political parties to initiate such profit 
making ventures and are collectively termed as mafia, in press or by individuals, to avoid directly pointing to 
political parties or individuals that may risk their safety. 
44
One Key Informant told the following story about a Carom shop. Carom is a ‘strike and pocket’ table board 
game. There is a Carom shop (locally termed as Dubboo) at the edge of Christian area owned by a Pashtoon 
muscleman, and local young men and children, allegedly some criminals also, come to the shop that 
remains open till late night. The shop owner put benches in front of the shop which extended in front of the 
house of a local Christian man. The people sitting on the benches used all sorts of slang and sang loudly. 
When the Christian man complained to the shop owner, the Christian man was beaten up badly. Local 
Christian leaders had to step in to resolve the issue, after using connections in the Pashtoon communities 
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and hence assert territoriality. Similarly, certain commercial ventures are controlled to avoid 
unwanted people coming to the area who might challenge territoriality45. Deer Colony has very 
strong land-use control rules as Box 6.2 explains (INN 18). The religious leaders of I-UC2 also keep 
an active watch on commercial activities that might contravene religious prescriptions e.g. the 
incident of opening of wine shop explains the control over land use, already discussed. Similarly, 
the Chieftain from Deer Colony described the reasons for not allowing tea stalls and restaurants in 
Deer Colony as these attract outsiders and people that may challenge the territorial integrity of 
the settlement and may be involved in crimes (Box 6.2).  
The interviewees suggested many reasons for the alleged majority-party backed encroachment 
and development of amenity plots. The Pashtoons of I-UC2 see it as an attempt to control their 
territory through votes and as a conspiracy to access their resources (INN 11). Residents from 
UC3-4 look at the encroachments as rent-seeking and a political tactic to increase votes and 
curtail Pashtoon expansion, while some respondents even saw the new apartments as 
surveillance points put up by the majority party to oversee Pashtoon movements (KIs).  
By controlling I meant (the majority party) wanted to have their vote bank 
here, they wanted to build apartment houses like they built just behind the 
Kati Pahari Police Station where they gave the apartments to their 
sympathisers, as they don’t have a large vote bank in this area… There might 
be only around 150-200 votes but they manage to get 1200-1300 votes and it’s 
just because of their (majority party) rigging in the elections. (local Pashtoon 
political leader, KI) 
 The majority party’s political representatives accept the involvement of party members in the 
encroachments. However, they deny that this is party policy and suggest that a few people used 
the party name for personal gain and that the land mafia had infiltrated the party for this 
purpose. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that as street-control lies with the majority party, 
such activities could not take place without the knowledge of its political offices and workers. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the shop owner showed some concern. Now the shop users at least do not sit in front of the door of that 
person.   
45 Similarly, a Pashtoon-run tea and food shop/hotel was set up in the busiest and widest street of Pahar 
Gunj, the Christian neighbourhood, the only street where vehicles could enter the area. The Pashtoon 
hotel-owner arranged customer seating on the road, eventually blocking it. In response, the local Christian 
leaders asked the shop owner to clear the road/street which he refused. The next day the hotel owner 
brought four armed men who sat on the seats on the street to demonstrate power. In response, Christian 
youth leaders asked all the Christian men in the settlement to bring their licenced weapons. On seeing so 
many people with weapons, the four men fled and the hotel was eventually shifted onto SNJ Road.  
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Box 6.5: Encroachments on parks and development of apartments 
North Nazimabad has been experiencing encroachment and illegal construction, both on the hill 
and on the parks. Encroachments allegedly have the backing of political parties: on the hills these 
are linked with Pashtoon leaders and the Pashtoon-based party, while encroachment on parks are 
linked with Muhajir-based party. (INN 4, INN 10, INN 11, FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 
25, and FNN 27). 
The encroachment on parks reduced the parks and playgrounds in the neighbourhood, and 
strengthened political and ethnic divides, thus exacerbating ethno-political conflict. Four parks 
around or abutting SNJ Road have been encroached on for housing development. For example, 
there was an open space/play ground near the new Kati Pahari Road. One of the local 
interviewees, who was part of the JI tenure of local government (2001-2005) mentioned that the 
site was initially occupied illegally by Pashtoons, who had used it for parking buses and large 
commercial vehicles, but around 2004 it was cleared and converted into a park. Later during the 
2005-2009 local government, the new Kati Pahari Road took some land from the park and an 
apartment complex was built on the remaining area. The flats were given to families of the 
martyrs of MQM workers who died during the state-run military operation during 1992-1995 or 
were killed in politically targeted killings. Other interviewees said that the apartment block 
created a rift between MQM and ANP. Some think that MQM used the apartments as a check-
post to oversee opponents and to retaliate during armed conflicts. One of the interviewees 
mentioned that the wall facing the Pashtoon area in the apartments had been constructed of 
reinforced concrete to withstand bullets.  Later a police station was also established on some 
open space abutting the apartment block(FNN 19, FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 24, FNN 25, JCCS 3). 
The encroachment on parks and playgrounds peaked during the 2005-2009 local government 
term, when so-called China cutting took place. As mentioned earlier China cutting refers to illegal 
encroachment and subdivision of amenity plots, parks and play grounds, which are then sold as 
residential and commercial plots - sometimes apartments are built and the flats are sold. The land 
mafia, in connection with political musclemen, provide guarantee and contract enforcement. 
Often, the name of the political party and political leaders are used to enforce contracts, although 
the parties are never mentioned. 
The courts have issued orders to demolish these illegal constructions on cases filed by local 
residents backed by political parties such as JI, but no action was taken until September 2014, 
when one of the apartments (not on SNJ Road) was demolished on court orders by Karachi 
Municipal Corporation anti-encroachment team (The Express Tribune, 2014f).  
Shehri-CBE has done  extensive research documenting the encroached plots in the whole city, and 
has published a book. The book did not go into reasons and dynamics for the encroachments 
probably to avoid possible political issues, but the research identified a very high percentage of 
encroached parks in North Nazimabad, compared to any other developed middle income 
settlement in Karachi (Shehri, 2012; Bhagwandas, 2009). 
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After the 2013 general elections, the majority party’s Chief expelled many such land-mafia related 
members from the party (The Express Tribune, 2013e), while the party administration was 
reshuffled to avoid such events in the future (The Express Tribune, 2013f). 
Regarding the encroachments on parks and playgrounds in North Nazimabad, 
yes, some people linked (with the party) were involved and have created 
illegal situations in the past, but now they have been kicked out of the party 
and it is not the same now. Those people have actually used the party name 
for their own benefit, and once the party name is mentioned nobody can 
oppose ... (KI) 
6.3.3 Resource Control 
Control over productive resources is an important outcome, or even objective, of territoriality. 
Resource control is a broad term that overlaps with other already explored social control 
mechanisms, and covers several wider mechanisms including control over resources such as land 
and property, management of utility services such as water, and rent-seeking of all sorts – from 
extortion to control over formal development funds.    
The control extends to both physical and financial resources of the territory and its people, 
including land and property, informal fees and rent-seeking from residents, diverted government 
development funds, and fees for utility services. Human resources - the number of people on 
which a political party can call - are also important and include both the numbers of potential 
voters, and young men from the neighbourhood without regular employment who provide 
vigilante forces when required.   
Land control 
Control over land, as a physical resource, is practiced in several ways. Mechanisms include 
property control, control over land use, land grabbing and encroachments, as discussed above. 
However, the concept of ‘land controls’ goes far beyond the physical meaning and includes 
control of all the resources linked with land, be it physical aspects such as property, utility 
services, or infrastructure development, and political benefits and human resources etc. In 
addition, it also covers the social aspects explored in Chapter 5, including controlling political 
affiliations, religious practices, marriages and the role of women. 
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Rent-seeking 
Control over financial resources is one of the most critical rewards claimed by informal structures. 
Such controls were found to finance the activities of certain informal structures such as political 
parties, organised crime groups such as land mafia or water mafia that overlaps with community 
and political leaders, and can also be termed ‘rent-seeking’ – including extortion, selling or renting 
out public property or infrastructure, crimes including street crimes, corruption in controlling 
public funds for development etc.; these are discussed below. 
Extortion 
Extortion is the most commonly used rent-seeking tactic in the area, allegedly linked to political 
parties or individuals belonging or using the name of political parties and criminals using the 
names of such outfits such as the Taliban. It has various types, depending on the target, the rent 
seeker, the process of extortion and reason for which the money is extorted46 (see Section 4.4.3 
which discusses city-scale rent-seeking).  
Interviewees identified various types of extortion in the area. The first type is aggressive - the 
extortion demand comes via a phone call or written letter, targeting a wealthy person, with the 
amount demanded instructions not to inform the LEAs, and consequences of reporting the 
demand such as risking the life of the recipient or a family member. In one incident the 
extortionists even included a Rs. 500 note to buy a coffin if the demand was not fulfilled (INN 5). 
In another case, extortionists sent a bullet to threaten the person (Figure 4.2). Usually, the 
recipients do not inform anyone or the LEAs and either meets the extortion demands, or leaves 
the settlement and sells the house as reported in one case (INN 4, INN 5). People rarely ignore 
such demands and take appropriate measures to be safe (Box 6.3), as there are incidences of 
killings. Sometimes in I-UC2, people are asked for cuts of any financial transactions, such as 
property transactions, as reported by the Christian community. In UC2 the Pashtoon-supported 
                                                          
46
 A local community leader reported that… a wave of extortion has arisen in which letters are delivered to 
houses of the well-to-do along with unused bullets demanding extortion money. If the demand is not met, 
they fire gun shots at house and threaten to kill the occupants. Many people just give the money demanded 
without reporting it to other residents or police. The criminals are actually those whom ANP used for 
support and to counter rivals, but now that ANP is dormant they are working by themselves using the 
Taliban’s name since everyone fears the Taliban but none has seen them. The leader saw no difference in 
Pashtoon or Muhajir representing political parties; “… Pashtoon political party has adopted the same 
violent culture that majority political party has.” In the bungalows area (F-UC2) whenever a property 
transaction takes place, they ask for extortion money. Similarly all the fuel stations, schools and other 
commercial businesses around the vicinity are asked for extortion money by Pashtoon political party (INN 
5). 
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political party is blamed along with other gangs and banned outfits as such demands are traced 
back, allegedly, to affiliated party individuals or criminals using the party name or claiming to be 
Taliban (INN 4, INN 5, INN 9, INN 10, INN 13, INN 18). 
The second type of extortion is milder, targeting local shops and small businesses, mostly in UC3-
4. Contributions are demanded under the guise of donations for the welfare wing of a political 
party, or in the name of religious tax (Fitra, Zakat). The case of Karahi Hotel has already been 
discussed, in which the business of the hotel was damaged on denial of paying extortion money 
(Box 6.4). Fear of violence and or damage to the property and business spurs people to pay the 
demand (INN 10, INN 15, INN 16, and FNN 24). Some shop owners report making regular monthly 
extortion payments. 
 …I don’t think any businessmen could refuse to give the money out of fear. 
They just don’t show their political affiliation and give the money silently 
including myself. When they came to ask at my restaurant, my elder brother 
told me that we are doing business and not politics and that we should follow 
what others are doing. He further told me that he did not want the business to 
suffer because of my political affiliation… and told that we will stop giving 
money when the others stop giving. (KI and business owner) 
The third type of extortion, found in both UC2 and UC3-4, is through purloining materials that cost 
money. Sometimes political party workers take stuff that is being sold in the shops, such as tea or 
food from a restaurant (FNN 23). Residents may face demands to donate animal hides during the 
Muslim religious festivals of Eid-ul-Adha (FNN 21). Hides are valuable and sold for leather, but the 
political parties collect the hides, claiming that the earnings will be used for welfare according to 
religious prescription. 
The fourth type of extortion relates to development works, and residents may be charged for 
development that has undertaken with public funds. For example, residents of the Christian 
settlement were reportedly asked for money by MQM party representatives, who laid new water 
pipes over the existing ones and each house was charged a fixed amount for ‘reconnection’ 
without a government receipt (INN 13). A similar case was reported by a Pashtoon resident and 
shop owner in I-UC2 (INN 1).  
Religious and Welfare Collections  
The religious informal structures also collect and distribute money for community welfare 
(Section 5.4.1). However, such donations are voluntary in response to religious discourse, and the 
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religious authorities collect money openly, such as Kohistani leaders’ collections for funeral 
services (INN 6, INN 7, INN 8). Similarly, the construction of Mosques/religious spaces is a 
community effort, usually done by people through contributing money or labour. Both the Balti-
Shia and Kohistani Pashtoon communities have developed Mosques in this way (INN 2, INN 9). 
However, banned religious outfits47 are also said to take donations using religious discourse in the 
mosques in I-UC2 (FNN 21). Political parties also collect money under this head claiming that it is  
used for the welfare wing of the party. 
Development and utilities 
Control over development work benefits the controllers in many ways. Although development 
funds are usually managed by local, provincial or national governments, if a political party is in 
government even the non-elected leaders have access to formal development funds. This is also 
the case for funds for service provision which are often channelled through party or community 
leaders, and used for political gains resulting in a blurring of the formal-informal divide. For 
example as discussed in Chapter 5, 75 million Rupees were granted to the non-elected local PPP 
representative for water improvements in North Nazimabad (Box 5.1), and the leader of Deer 
Colony continues to run an office after the Union Councils were abolished (Section 5.4.1). This 
enables the leaders to find employment for followers in government agencies, give development 
contracts to favoured people, carry out development where they wish, and gain extensive scope 
for rent-seeking.  
MQM is blamed for not carrying out development in I-UC2 (Section 5.3), whereas JI is regarded as 
the champion which brought funds for development to the same area (INN 4, INN 5, INN 7, INN 8, 
INN 10, INN 11, INN 16). The Kati Pahari Road is a symbol of how political parties can direct funds 
for large-scale projects that might benefit their constituencies and side-line opponents (also see 
Section 6.3.1). There are several other benefits of linking with the dominant political party, such 
as access to utility services like water or getting informal settlements regularised and, in other 
cases, to have development in the area (Section 5.4.1).  
                                                          
47
 There are various banned religious outfits working with different names, e.g. Sipah Sahaba Pakistan was 
banned in 2002, due to its alleged violent history against Shia minority; however, the outfit changed its 
name and appeared as Ahle-sunnat wal Jamaat.Similarly, the Shia military outfit Sipah Mohammed is also 
banned, it was developed to counter Sipah Sahaba while SSP had developed links with Taliban for training 
and resources (Yusuf, 2012, p. 17-19).  One of the key informants mentioned that he had witnessed some 
alleged representatives of the Taliban in a mosque in I-UC2 collecting donations for their cause, similarly 
Yusuf (2012, p. 15) mentions that Karachi has become a centre for fund-raising, recruitment and 
collaboration  for such banned outfits.  
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Control over development projects is also used actively to harm opponents as well as benefiting 
parties or leaders. The issue of water supply to I-UC2 is an example – MQM has the resources to 
find a solution as they have two elected MPA48s and one MNA49 from the constituency, and they 
are perceived to have active control over the water board unions (INN 4, INN 5, INN 6, INN 11, 
INN 16). However, the Pashtoon community leaders are more active in their personal capacities 
than the political parties in solving individual water-access problems as they want to take the 
credit (INN 7). 
The water issue in I-UC2 illustrates many dimensions of resource control by leaders and its use for 
their own benefits. On one hand, community leaders are blamed for the water scarcity and for 
corruption in selling the water. Some leaders are supposed to be running illegal water hydrants 
and water tanker supplies, while others are supposedly installing water pipelines selling to the 
nearby industrial area (SITE area) (INN 3, INN 6, INN 7, INN 8, INN 9, INN 10, and INN 16) (Box 5.1).  
There is only one solution to this problem – that the theft of water from our 
quota that is taking place by mafias in collaboration with the Water and 
Sewerage Board, and being supplied to the formally planned areas in North 
Nazimabad, needs to be stopped. We (the community) cannot hold those 
thieves (referring to certain local community leaders in I-UC2) directly to 
account. We don’t have any support while those people are resourceful, they 
have links with gangs, mafias and political parties. We cannot even protest 
since the law does not listen to us. We are waiting for a revolution to come 
and solve these issues. (INN 7) 
This (theft) everyone knows, all the settlement knows. It has been published in 
UMMAT newspaper several times that our water is being sold, our previous 
Nazim has sold our water, and when people from ANP came in power they 
also did the same. All the water is going to the SITE area, to the mills/factories. 
(INN 9) 
On the other hand, the same leaders are made responsible for solving water issues. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, the water management committee set up after a consultation between all the major 
community leaders of I-UC2 to ensure equal water supply of water to all settlements is an 
example (Box 5.1). The committee consists of local community leaders and elders. The 
committee’s task is to ensure fair distribution of water across the neighbourhood, but 
interestingly several leaders blamed for the corruption and water theft are part of the committee 
(INN 4, INN 5, INN 6).   
                                                          
48
 MPA: Member of the Provincial Legislative Assembly. 
49
 MNA: Member of the National Legislative Assembly. 
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How you can expect them (the water management committee) to work 
properly, as there are people of water mafia in the committee, they will 
definitely think about their own benefit. (INN 6) 
Electricity provision also gives an insight into control over resources. Although electricity is 
supplied by a private company, many residents in I-UC2, especially on the hill get away without 
paying bills. Community leaders support them as they are often relatives and poor, and their 
support is a political asset for the leaders who may have paid money to develop land 
encroachments onto the hills. 
… but they (residents on the hill) start pleading that they are poor people and 
can’t afford to pay bills, so how can we install meters? They ask us to pay for it 
and get it installed for them. They just try to avoid payment as much as they 
can. They use two to three water suction pumps, and in the end it is us who 
are paying the full amount who suffer. (INN 7) 
6.3.5 Conflicts – A Spatial Control or Enforcement of Control?  
This section looks at conflicts and explores how various informal structures and related 
communities respond to any change, threat, or violation of territorial boundaries. Conflict works 
as a spatial control to establish, expand or defend territory and also as a way of enforcing control, 
and in either case it demarcates boundaries and consolidates territory. Any attempt at infiltration, 
expansion or change in boundary, use of resources from another’s territory, or harm to spaces of 
power is considered as violation of territorial boundaries, and is followed by conflicts or “attack 
and defence mechanisms” as Tilly (2004) describes it. 
Almost all the communities and their informal structures have shown an inclination to defend and 
increase their territorial boundaries, both physical and social, while any change in the socio-
spatial composition of a territory is vigorously resisted. As already discussed, each community 
member has a community identity which differentiates him/her from others and eventually helps 
define non-physical boundaries. Community members see their community as an extended 
family, and the settlement as their home, and may fight to resist challenge from outsiders, while 
social controls create resistance to any change from within the community (INN 3, INN 7, INN 11, 
INN 13, INN 18). 
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Attack and defence mechanisms 
Conflicts are common in the case study area, especially in I-UC2 (INN 6, INN 10, INN 14, and INN 
16). As noted in Chapter 5, different territories and informal structures show different patterns of 
conflict and conflict-resolution mechanisms (Section 5.4.1). This section focuses on conflicts over 
spatial incursions. 
Conflicts are complex and correspond to the scalar identities of the communities and their 
territories. The local MQM-ANP disputes represent the conflict between two political territories 
which has the city-level link and also local implications. In I-UC2 conflict occurs over territorial 
boundaries, e.g. Hasan Zai Pashtoons have conflicts with the Christians because they share a 
boundary, while Kohistani Pashtoons have conflicts with both Balti-Shia and Christians as they 
share boundaries. Deer Colony and its leadership is in conflict with the Hasan Zai and Kohistani 
Pashtoons and vice versa (INN 3, INN 6, INN 8, INN 10). However, the whole territory (I-UC2) is 
united when Pashtoons (except Punjabi-Christians and Balti Shia) are in political conflict with 
MQM (INN 2, INN 3, INN 7, INN 8, INN 10, and INN 11). Interestingly, conflicts within UC3-4 are 
rare. 
Religion based territories 
Conflicts involving religious communities vary with the community or the formal-informal divide. 
In I-UC2, conflicts involving religious territories are always violent and usually recurring. The 
conflicts often start with a general issue but turn into a religious or sectarian fight, as illustrated 
below.  In contrast, conflicts in UC3-4 involving religious-based territories are rare and non-
violent. Religious spaces are sensitive locations, as the symbolic power centre of the territory, and 
disturbance of these can trigger community-wide attack and defence mechanisms.  
Prayer areas form the centre of power as well as symbolic representation of the territory. Recent 
conflicts have been explored in chapter 5 (Box 5.6), which clearly shows how religious spaces are 
targeted and are used in personal conflicts to make it, first, as community scale conflict by 
exploiting religious feelings..  However, as a result the Christian community obtained weapons, 
which they use whenever they need to defend their territory. 
The cause of conflicts in Pahar Gunj is similar to the other areas, but the majority or the powerful 
group always try to give it a religious colour. This way the party, even if at fault, gets help from the 
community and wins over the weak in terms of numbers. For example there was a conflict in 
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which someone stole fruit from a Pashtoon vendor, but the conflict became a religious conflict, 
Pashtoons attacked the Church, and fired at it etc. (INN 12) 
In I-UC2, the Balti-Shia have been in constant conflict with the surrounding Sunni-Pashtoons for 
many years. The Sunni-Pashtoons also admit a bias against the Balti-Shia amongst the larger 
Pashtoon community (INN 8, INN 10), given the strong presence of anti-Shia religious-political 
groups such as SSP and ASWJ (KIs). Ideologies and religious ritual forms the ideological boundaries 
for the two groups, and violating these can trigger conflict. Similarly, resources within a territory 
also define the boundary, and so violating the boundary could lead to conflict. A recent and 
serious conflict took place over a water connection, which started when as a Sunni-Pashtoon 
resident made an illegal connection to the water pipeline that supplies the Balti-settlement 
reducing the already scarce supply of water, which affected his neighbour the most. The conflict 
between the two neighbours, Shia and Sunni, soon involved the whole community resulting in 
armed conflict in which five people were killed (Box 5.1). In this conflict, again, religious spaces 
played a central role, as the Sunni accused the Shia of attacking the Sunni Mosque and used their 
Mosques to propagate this message to get help from other Sunnis.  
In UC3-4, the Bohri community in UC3-4 have increased their territory and number of residents 
owning property, resulting in a decrease of Sunni residents. The remaining Sunnis have many 
reservations about this expansion (FNN 20, FNN 21, FNN 22), but cannot challenge it as the 
property titles and transactions are formal, and the Sunni-Muhajirs do not have any Baradary-
based bonds. However, religious spaces are still sensitive locations here as well, and in one 
incident the Sunni-Muhajirs objected to the authorities about the newly developed Bohri Jamat 
Khana, which was built by refurbishing a bungalow located just in front of the Sunni Mosque, but 
the issue was resolved amicably (FNN 21, FNN 22). The Bohris also protect the main Jamat Khana 
as in 2012 it was bombed and eight Bohri residents were killed (Shehzad, 2012; Mirza, 2012). 
Another example is that when the apartment housing overlooking the Jamat Khana was bought 
by a non-Bohri it was considered a threat (Section 6.3.2). 
Political party and territory 
The conflicts and attacks between the two politically defined territories – the informal-Pashtoon-
ANP and formal-Muhajir-MQM areas – have been frequent and intense. Fights surfaced after 
MQM assumed control of the city government in 2004-05 and peaked during 2007-2012, although 
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it subsided when the Taliban started to take over ANP territories (Gayer, 2014, pp. 184) and 
ultimately by mid-2013 ANP closed most of its offices in the city (Chapter 4).  
Residents of I-UC2 see the activities of MQM as an attack on their territory and ban MQM in their 
locality. Thus, the dynamics of local political conflict is embedded in city-wide politics (Chapter 4). 
One of the perceptions of Pashtoon leaders and residents is that MQM wants to control I-UC2, 
which is why MQM is opposed in the area, and political or development activities by MQM are 
seen as a conspiracy and attack on the territory (INN 2, INN 4, INN 6, INN 7, INN 11, INN 13). The 
conflict between an ANP leader and local MQM leaders over the erection of a barrier at one of 
the main entrances to I-UC2 is an example (Section 6.3.1). Similarly, the construction of the Kati 
Pahari Road was seen by many locals as a symbol of attack-and-defence between MQM-Muhajir 
and ANP-Pashtoons, as the project was considered an attempt to infiltrate Pashtoon territory and 
was not welcomed by the Pashtoon-ANP groups (INN 2, INN 4, FNN 24, FNN 25). 
Physical attacks have been widely reported by both MQM-Muhajir and ANP-Pashtoons. 
Respondents from both sides confirmed armed conflict and incidents of crossfire between the 
two territories (INN 4, INN 11, FNN 25). In addition, both sides had to develop an armed 
surveillance and watch-and-ward system to avoid attack, especially at night (INN 11, FNN 21). 
MQM used existing barriers in UC3-4 to defend their territory against perceived Pashtoon-ANP 
incursions. Pashtoon leaders interviewed admitted that they carry a pistol on them when they 
leave the territory because they fear attack (INN 9, INN 11).  
Baradary and territory 
Territories defined around Baradary within I-UC2 territory also experience conflict, attack and 
defence mechanisms. For example there are serious conflicts between community leaders from 
Deer Colony and the Hasan Zai and the Kohistani Pashtoon leadership who think that Deer Colony 
is stealing their water (INN 3, INN 6, INN 7, INN 10, INN 11). However, the Deer Colony leadership 
blames its opponents for racial discrimination (INN 18). Other communities do not criticise the 
Deer Colony leadership as they fear a violent response, especially over water (INN 3). 
Cultural conflicts  
Cultural sensitivities also create conflicts, for example over dress codes and role of women (e.g. 
clothing, segregation and marriages) which is an important factor in territorial identity (Section 
5.4.2). One of the reasons why the Ismaili community installed barriers was because the men 
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from I-UC2 used to come and show inappropriate behaviour towards the Ismaili women (FNN 20). 
However, if the researcher had been able to gain better access to women interviewees a different 
picture of territoriality may have emerged.  
Rangers’ territory 
Although the Rangers control an area in Block A, UC3-4, originally built for government-employee 
housing, residents from UC3-4 have serious reservations about their presence and often come 
into conflict with them, according to a leader from the majority political party. Box 5.2 has already 
mentioned that the Rangers are under threat of terrorist attacks so remain on high alert, and 
residents living in and around the Ranger-controlled area in Block A face difficulties as the Rangers 
do not allow on-street parking and close roads. Residents often have to go to the authorities to 
complain, especially on the road closures (KI). Sometimes residents are threatened with illegal 
detention if they protest against illegal and unannounced controls (KI).  
6.3.6 The Overlapping Socio-Spatial Dimensions of Controls 
This section has identified several spatial control mechanisms that help establish, demarcate, 
consolidate, and defend territorial boundaries, and thus, reflect on space production. However, 
the majority of spatial controls overlap with social control mechanisms and are difficult to 
separate e.g. property control and demographic control mechanisms.  
Spatial controls mechanisms highlight the process of space production and relate to the social 
dimension of power, discussed in Chapter 5. The discussion here suggests that that space 
production takes place through myriad ways, involving both physical and non-physical measures. 
For example: access control is practiced through creating barriers, gates and walls but equally 
practiced through perceptions, spreading rumours and establishing invisible systems of 
surveillance; property control uses both market and non-market dimensions, e.g. the Bohri 
community has used market mechanism to buy property, but use discourse around community 
and religion to keep the newly developed properties for the community members only, and use 
barriers and gates to mark their territory. In the case of Ismaili community, establishing a 
cooperative housing scheme only for the Ismaili community highlights administrative dimension 
of space production. 
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The objective of rent-seeking, distinguishes property controls practiced by Baradary-based or 
religious informal structures from the implicit resource control and political endeavours of 
political parties and criminals. The objectives and mechanisms of access control varies across 
different areas; in I-UC2 the religious leaders control access to ensure the security of religious 
spaces, while in UC3-4, the religious communities prefer to be cordoned off using barriers and 
gates e.g. the Bohri and Ismaili communities. The Baradary-based communities of I-UC2 do not 
need physical measures as the complex, organic and narrow street pattern and the steep slopes 
on the hill make it difficult for outsiders to navigate, and unorganised surveillance tactics are 
common. The political parties are not involved in erecting barriers but in UC3-4 they use of the 
existing barriers set up by the neighbourhood committees; instead they make or block off roads 
for access control, but rely mainly on non-physical surveillance, policing or rumours. 
Neighbourhood committees are the ones that work at street-scale, but the political parties also 
benefit.  
Religious leaders are more interested in their minority identity, and are retreating from crime 
through non-violent and formal means, first through property control and later through access 
control. The Baradary-based structures vary in degree to which they use property controls, with 
Deer Colony being the most effective, although non-violent. In contrast, the Hasan Zai territory 
reports non-passive ways of control, e.g. Muhajirs are leaving because of differences in culture 
and fear, but not through active intimidation. Thus identity-based structures, Baradary and 
religious-based, use property control for non-rent-seeking purposes. Political parties are the ones 
that most effectively use property controls for both political and economic benefit, which 
deepens social divisions and territorialisation.  
Any attempt to change, infiltrate or threaten the boundary, real or perceived, leads to conflict 
characterised by attack-and-defence. In I-UC2, small disputes rapidly flare up into religious-based 
violent conflict, while UC3-4 rarely experiences any such conflict partly because they do not mix 
with other communities. In I-UC2, the tribal Pashtoon communities have differences but it rarely 
leads to a larger conflict, as the community leaders are quick to step or as a minority in the city 
they avoid such potential flashpoints.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the spatial dimension of the North Nazimabad case study area, 
corresponding to the political and social domains explored in Chapter 5. It has highlighted the 
complex overlapping nature of social and spatial dimensions both in social controls and in power 
dynamics thus adding to the theoretical understanding of power-society-space nexus. It has 
further highlighted the dynamics of the city to local-evel link, alongwith formal-informal symbiotic 
relation, especially in spatial dimension by highlighting measures of space production and how 
these feed into socio-spatial segregation and conflicts around control over resources, thus 
commenting on the undesirable outcomes of informality. The variety of informal structures and 
their connection to the government and the common citizens has further concretise the 
theoretical understanding of working from ‘between’.` 
It is found that the territories behave as an entity beyond physical dimension operating as a 
combined, yet complex, construct of social groups, physical and administrative boundaries and 
the controls enforced by informal structures, highlighting power-society-space connection. This 
has resulted in a complex variety of overlapping territories with varying scales and boundaries 
corresponding to social, spatial and administrative attributes. Two scales are evident i.e. district-
level (city-level being the largest) corresponds to the physical definition and overlaps with the 
political and administrative dimensions, while the neighbourhood-level corresponds to identities 
of the resident groups, whether ethnic, Baradary based or religious based. Territories are also 
relative, in that, they emerge or disappear in contrast to opposing territories, for example I-UC2 
emerges as one social Pashtoon territory (informal-Pashtoon-ANP) against the UC3-4 Muhajir 
(formal-Muhajir-MQM) territory. Likewise, other local groups emerge as Sunni-Shia, Bohri-Sunni, 
Ismaili-Sunni, Muslim-Christian, and around various tribal affiliations, such as Hasan Zai, Kohistani, 
from Deer, Afridi etc.   
The identity-based informal structures and communities, operational at the neighbourhood-level, 
form hierarchy with the district-level political informal structures, reflected in territorial 
configurations in which politically defined territories contain sub-territories on identity bases 
(Figure 6.1). The Baradary, religious-based and neighbourhood committees all prefer not to 
challenge political controls either because the territories overlap with their areas, e.g. in 
Baradary-based Pashtoon areas, or they do not want to challenge political control out of fear and 
want to remain aloof, e.g. the religious communities and the neighbourhood committees, thus 
the street control and strict spatial controls remains with the dominating political parties. 
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The various communities either internalise or accept the controls which are taken as a trade-off 
against the service provision, as part of tradition, religious bonds or out of fear, depending on the 
type of informal structure. Communities gain some benefits of improved protection and service 
provision, while the leadership (informal structures) profit from improved spatial sovereignty and 
rent-seeking of various sorts, especially political parties who control public funds channelled 
through  the party using informal means to claim legitimacy and the electoral vote, creating a 
formal-informal symbiotic relation by blurring formal-informal divide. 
Resistance to socio-spatial change is followed by conflict, which has various causes that are 
directly or indirectly linked with lacking formal services and controls and rising informality. 
Territorialisation helps religious-based communities to feel secure and to maintain the religious 
hierarchy and practice their beliefs. Baradary-based communities want to retain their traditional 
tribal culture and tribal elders resist any change in power dynamics (INN 11). Political parties have 
obvious reasons for territoriality; for electoral supremacy, to serve their identity-based political 
narrative and to control territory as a resource.  Neighbourhood committees in contrast, are 
reactive – a defence mechanism against an increasingly urban spatial control. 
Conclusively, the absence of effective local service provision, security or oversight through union 
councils, creates space for informal structures to adopt state-like characteristics including spatial 
sovereignty, service provision and security patrols and gain benefits of funding, power, and 
legitimacy. At neighbourhood-level, the informal structures i.e. baradary and religon based, 
initiate spatial controls while political structures benefit from identity divisions to add a further 
layer in the power hierarchy and win politcal support. Local communities gain some benefits of 
service provision, conflict resolution and protection, and yet in a wider context these territories 
add to the socio-spatial segregation in Karachi. 
The identity based divisions at the neighbourhood-level, are not a unique phenomena and many 
other cities in the world experience the same issue, however, it is the overlapping of political 
party structures, blurring of the formal-informal divide, and politicisation of formal structures that 
makes competition in Karachi intense and violent, especially in connection with informality. 
Political conflicts at the city and national levels impact at the street level intensifying socio-spatial 
divisions.  
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Chapter 7 
Supplementary Case Studies:  
Showing Patterns of Power Contestation and 
Related Socio-Spatial Controls 
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 7.1 Introduction 
This chapter also focuses on the local-level and analyses the empirical findings from three 
supplementary case studies, Lyari, PIB Colony and Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33. The objective is 
to add depth to the understanding of informal land controls by firstly, exploring various types of 
enclaves and informal structures that were not found in the North Nazimabad case study. 
Secondly and more importantly, the chapter looks at relations between various informal 
structures competing for spatial and social control over resources in various parts of Karachi, and 
how they use informal land controls to claim resources, produce space and to oust opponents. It 
also aims to explore whether the conclusions from the case of North Nazimabad apply to other 
areas and could be contextually generalised, or whether North Nazimabad forms a unique 
context. 
There were three methodological reasons for selecting these supplementary case studies (Section 
3.3.3 and 4.2.2): first, to cover a range of types of enclaves, informal structures and types of 
informal land controls not covered in North Nazimabad case study; second, to explore whether 
conclusions are representative of the wider socio-spatial processes in Karachi; third, to cover the 
various geographic zones of the city developed over various time periods and representing 
different socio-economic groups.       
The chapter is divided into three sections. First, the chapter looks at the notorious area of Lyari, 
one of the oldest, low-income parts of the city. It introduces drug gangs and politico-criminal 
groups as informal structures which engage in the spatial contests over control of resources 
resulting in ghettoization such that the area has become a no-go area for law enforcement 
agencies (LEAs).  The section documents the process of conversion of various criminal gangs into 
politico-criminal groups that ruled the district and challenged formal power structures. It 
discusses the contest between competing structures, identifies various socio-spatial control 
mechanisms adopted, and demonstrates the rise of informal structures from the local to the city 
level. 
The chapter then examines the area of PIB Colony. PIB Colony is a middle income, post-partition 
area developed by the government, currently, in the geographic centre of Karachi. In this case, 
informal structures had obtained a monopoly over resources and rent-seeking, which was 
challenged and taken over by a competing group when the initial group regained its control. The 
swings of power show the use of various socio-spatial control mechanisms. Furthermore, the case 
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study demonstrates a blurring of the formal-informal divide by the dominant political party as the 
party’s grass root organisation controls the locality, while the formal services and development 
funds are channelled through them.  
The third section looks at the sprawling peripheral area of Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33. This 
case is interesting as a peri-urban area that is part-occupied and part-developing; it is a strong 
example of the government’s weak control over land development processes in the periphery of 
Karachi. Thus competing informal structures contest in the developed part while in the under-
developed part, one group enjoys a monopoly.  Since the Scheme 33 is a sprawling area with 
varying socio-spatial characteristics, sub-areas were identified. The first sub-area covers the fully 
developed part of Scheme-33 around AHI Road, and the second sub-area lies around about 
Dawood Bungalows, a suburban partly-developed locality. These show various examples of 
control, contestation, rent-seeking, and conflicts that result.  
The chapter analyses the three case studies using the same framework as in North Nazimabad, 
but has several areas of departure. First, the methods used were different, as North Nazimabad 
was a detailed study based on in-depth interviews of a large number of local people. However, it 
was unsafe to go into several of the areas, so the case studies in this chapter depend on a few, 
but in-depth key informant interviews and surveys, and local secondary sources, mainly 
newspaper articles. Secondly, the reporting is different, as North Nazimabad required anonymity 
of interviewees and informal structures, especially the community leaders. In Lyari individuals 
could be named where the information was drawn from press reports and names were already 
published. A few detailed press reports were also available for PIB Colony, especially on the rise 
and fall of the Magsi gang. Scheme 33 is explored in a less detail than the other cases, first 
because the area is spread out and second because there is little secondary data, as events in the 
periphery go comparatively unnoticed in the press. The analysis focuses on spatial controls, but 
does not examine the broader cultural, religious, gender or ethnic controls discussed in Chapter 5. 
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7.2 Lyari, A History of Power Contestation and Territoriality 
7.2.1 Introduction 
Lyari is famous as one of the oldest settlements in Karachi. It has an African minority ethnic group, 
a relic of the slave trade, and a population of sports-fans and sportsmen, including footballers and 
boxers that have progressed to international level (Yusuf, 2012). Politically, Lyari has been a 
stronghold for the PPP since the 1970s but is now slipping out of PPP control against a backdrop 
of rising power held by gangs and their mutual conflicts50. The locality is notorious for its gangs, 
violence and criminal activities (Kirmani, 2014).  
“Lyari is referred to by outsiders as ‘the Colombia of Karachi’ because of its 
perceived control by drug mafias. However, the residents of this area proudly 
refer to Lyari as ‘Karachi ki maan’ (the mother of Karachi) because it is one of 
the oldest settlements in the city.” (Kirmani, 2014) 
Lyari describes a unique case of power contests and informal land controls practiced by violent 
politico-criminal gangs. Drug gangs exercise power over different areas, and although Lyari was 
originally settled by Baloch ethnic groups, some areas are now dominated by other ethnic 
immigrants. In the words of a local planning expert, the gang war within Lyari is a reflection of 
power contests at the city level (EC 3). Gang wars of Lyari are characterised by turf wars, illegal 
rent seeking of all kinds and killings. 
Lyari has a long history of gangs, which since 2000 have started to affect both residents of Lyari 
and the city beyond its boundaries (Figure 7.1). Lyari is situated between the port, industry and 
the city centre. To the south-west lies the largest port in Pakistan, to the northwest the Port 
Industrial Area and Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate (SITE) Area, abutting SITE the Shershah 
Recycled Material Market lies to the north, and City’s grain and other wholesale markets and the 
central business district (CBD) are situated to the south (Map 7.1). Thus, Lyari lies at a strategic 
location where much of the city’s financial transactions and business takes place, which boosts 
the power of gangs. Conflicts, amongst gangs, revolve around the drug-smuggling money, crimes 
and the huge possibilities of rent-seeking (Gayer, 2014), whereas, personal vendettas also play a 
crucial role in the power dynamics (Figure 7.1).    
                                                          
50
 At the time of the fieldwork, till mid-2014. The conflict has subsided after the start of the Karachi 
Operation. Criminals have gone into hiding or have been killed. 
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Figure 7.1: The problems in Lyari have made international headlines. (The Economist, 2012) 
 
Lyari has followed a similar path to North Nazimabad, featuring an absence of formal governance 
leading to the rise of competing groups vying for control over public resources, suggesting a 
similar impact of city level power-politics (Chapter 4). However, the recent history of gangs of 
Lyari shows that it has also affected city level politics.  
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Census 1998 estimates in 2005 (KMC-GOS, [no date]) suggest that Lyari Town has a population of 
923,177, and covers approximately 8 Sq. Km. Current estimates put the population at between 
1.5 to 2.0 million. Under the (disputed) Sindh Local Governance Ordinance 2001 (Box 4.1), Lyari 
Town lies within South District and had 11 union councils. It includes two full constituencies of the 
Provincial Assembly, PS.108, PS.109, and parts of two other constituencies, PS.110 and PS.111, 
and one constituency of the National Assembly, NA 248, and part of one other, NA 249, and is 
thus represented by various political parties which share boundaries in Lyari. 
 
 
Map 7.1: Case Study 2: Lyari 
Social characteristics 
Lyari started as Baloch and Sindhi settlement, however, over time other ethnic groups migrated to 
the area, particularly Pashtoons, Punjabi and Muhajirs who together now equal the Baloch and 
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Sindhi populations (Figure 7.1). Smaller enclaves of Hindus and Christians also exist. Irrespective 
of the demographics, PPP has been the dominant political party in the Lyari constituencies since 
1970 (Gayer, 2014, p.144). 
 
Figure 7.1: Population distribution according to the provincial constituencies of Lyari. (Dawn-GIS) 
The population of Lyari is mostly low-income with many people working in jobs directly or 
indirectly related to the port, neighbouring industries, and the wholesale markets nearby. There 
are also Muhajir settlements in the surrounding areas that include parts of Agra Taj colony, areas 
around Gutter Baghicha and Usmanabad. Muhajirs in those settlements are low-income often 
working in the marble industry in Old Golimar, and laundry industry along Lyari River. Kutchi 
Memon, Shia, Khoja-Shia and Ismaili enclaves exist within Lyari Town and the surrounding 
localities. 
Social hierarchy and power dynamics 
Historically several elite Baloch and Memon families lived in Lyari who were often recognised as 
community elders/leaders, for example the Gabol and Haroon families. These families were 
among the richest families in the city before and just after the 1947 partition. Gayer (2014, p.149) 
mentions that the British had to limit the Gabols, an elite Baloch family, buying land as they held a 
majority of the city’s land. The Haroons have been famous for their philanthropy, financing 
schools, colleges, and dispensaries. Both families used to play an active role in local and regional 
politics, but both families moved out of the settlement when crime and violence started to 
increase in the 1980s, or perhaps violence and crimes surged when these elite families moved out 
(EC 1). 
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Map 7.2: Ethnic composition of Lyari 
Gangs and political conflicts have also created a new social hierarchy in Lyari (Section 7.2.2, and 
Appendix 7.1). This has divided the Baloch areas under control of gangs, while it has also seen a 
recent ethnic divide especially among Baloch and Kutchi Memons who have been living together 
since pre-partition times. The Kutchi Memons originally came from area of Kutch, now between 
the Pakistan-India borders near the Arabian Sea, and are a part of larger Memon community in 
Karachi and elsewhere. The community has several denominations that are linked together 
through community organisations that are further linked worldwide51.  
                                                          
51
 Generally, Memon community is a common identity term representing people from different origins in 
Gujrat and Sind region, in actual, there are several sub-communities within Memon community, e.g. Bantva 
Memon, Kutchi Memon, Kru-kru Memons etc. The communities always have a registered community 
organisation that is run through donations and charity and carries out welfare works and keep the 
community intact. The community organisation is further linked vertically to central organisation and to the 
world organisation such as the World Memon Organisation that has country chapters in each country 
(WMOP, [no date]).  
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Spatial characteristics 
The neighbourhood of Lyari is mixed land-use and the internal roads are dotted with convenience 
stores. In addition, cottage industry and warehousing on the north side abutting Lyari River and 
Mirza Adam Khan Road are common. Transport operations, garages, mechanics and auto parts 
businesses have clustered around Lea Market and along Mirza Adam Khan Road. Shopping areas 
includes Jhat Pat market and Lea Market area, and various smaller commercial areas. The mixed 
land-use also makes it favourable for informal rent-seeking activities. 
The plot sizes vary from 50 sq. yds. to around 120 sq. yds. However, in recent times there has 
been a huge demand for housing in the neighbourhood, resulting in increased real estate values, 
and as a result a large area has been turned into a high-density neighbourhood with 3-5 storey 
apartments on small plots, served by narrow lanes (EC 1; Hasan et al., 2013). 
7.2.2 Petty Drug Gangs to City Level Politico-Criminal Groups 
Lyari gangs existed before the 1947 partition, then dealing in contraband items such as liquor (EC 
1), but have now expanded from small groups of drug peddlers and strongmen to city level 
politico-criminal groups. Drug smuggling started in the 1980s during the Afghan-Soviet war and 
more recently criminal activities extended to include kidnapping, extortion, killings, land grabbing, 
and street crimes. Gang warfare developed an ethnic dimension, as the gangs developed links 
with political parties and later became political parties in their own right, as Gayer suggests 
(2014). Till the mid-2013, Lyari was no longer under the control of LEAs, as officials were unable to 
enter the locality. For example there was a famous police operation in April-May 201252 to root 
out the criminals, but after almost a week’s stand-off the police could still not enter Lyari, and the 
operation failed (Gayer, 2014, p.155). The Karachi Operation, launched in September 2013 
(Section 4.3.1) brought relative calm to the area, reducing gang wars and killings, and opening up 
access for all, although this success has been mainly attributed to the extra-judicial elimination of 
alleged criminals by the LEAs (HRCP, 2014, p.75; The Express Tribune, 2015a).   
Laurent Gayer, a French researcher, who specializes in the study of urban dynamics and violent 
mobilisations in India and Pakistan studied Karachi, first as Ph.D. researcher then as scholar 
attached to various research centres, from 2001 till 2013 (SciencesPo Centre de recherches 
                                                          
52
 Sind Police conducted the military operation under the command of famous police officer Inspector 
Chaudhry Aslam, who was later killed in a bomb attack on his car.  
241 | P a g e  
internationals. [No date+). The outcome of the research is a book “Karachi: Ordered Disorder and 
the Struggle for the City” (Gayer, 2014). The material below draws largely on this study, but has 
been triangulated and consolidated through extensive analyses of newspaper reports and Key 
Informant interviews (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, ECCS 2). (See Appendix 7.1 for a detailed historical account 
of this summarised version) 
The origins of modern gang-warfare in Lyari are a direct result of violent rivalries between 
powerful criminal families dating back 30 or 40 years. Gayer (2014, p. 123-158) (and also EC 3) 
gives a detailed account of Lyari’s history from the 1960s when the district was the sole territory 
of Kala Nag (Nabi Bakhsh) the famous muscleman. 
Later in the 1990s, Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo were the main architects of the recent gang 
wars, involving politico-criminals with political ambitions and Baloch rhetoric in Lyari. They 
collaborated until the late 1990s, before becoming arch rivals. Their conflict started a new chapter 
of the rivalry that witnessed the killing of 500-600 people and the emergence and disappearance 
of several splinter groups from 2003 till 2008 (Ali, N. S. 2014). 
The start of the gang war between Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo is said to be the point when 
MQM entered the scene, as Arshad is said to have colluded with MQM against the PPP-supported 
Rehman Dakait (Gayer, 2014).  Arshad Puppo was arrested in 2006. In the absence of Arshad, 
Rehman offered a truce to other gangs, and they joined forces with other sovereign gangs to 
create People’s Aman Committee (PAC) in 2008 (Gayer, 2014, p. 142).  
Under the umbrella of PAC (Table 4.2) and individually Rehman carried out various welfare 
initiatives that made him the undisputed leader for local residents, who called him Khan Bhai (Big 
Brother). Rehman then became the Sardar (Tribal Chief). Changes in Rehman’s popular names 
shows his trajectory of position in the society; first he was renamed from Rehman Baloch to 
Rehman Dakait (bandit), later he was called Sardar Rehman Baloch (The Tribal Chief) while many 
also termed him Robin Hood of Liyari highlighting his social legitimacy and inclinations. During his 
peak of power, he emerged as a challenger for PPP, as he and later PAC dictated the choice of 
electoral candidates and political strategy in Lyari (Gayer, 2014, pp. 139, 142, 158). Rehman was 
killed in a controversial police encounter in 2009 (Gayer, 2014, p.146-147). 
After Rehman’s demise, Uzair Baloch took over the leadership of PAC. PAC started to increase its 
influence and attempted to venture beyond Lyari onto MQM’s turf (Gayer, 2014, p.152; EC 1, EC 
3, EC 4, ECCS 2). During that time PAC had, allegedly, become a de-facto military wing of PPP 
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(Yusuf, 2012, Gayer, 2014, p. 154), and was used to deal with MQM’s street power throughout 
the city resulting high crime rates and violence.   
 
Figure 7.2: History of gangs and their relations 
The Karachi Operation started in September 2013 with the aim of bringing peace to the city 
(Section 4.3.1). Since the Operation entered Lyari, many gangsters have gone into hiding, 
including the PAC leadership, while many of the lower ranking gangsters and other criminals have 
been killed in alleged encounters by the LEAs (Section 4.3.1). Uzair Baloch has been, reportedly, 
arrested by Interpol at Dubai Airport allegedly travelling with a fake ID (Mandhro, 2014c), while 
some sources claim he has been brought back although not officially disclosed, supposedly, due to 
political reasons. 
7.2.3 Performance of Formal and the Informal Structures 
Lyari has been a victim of negligence and blurring of formal-informal boundaries by formal 
government and its agencies over many years, both in social and spatial terms. The emergence of 
informal structures is strongly linked to the lack of effective formal local governance and high 
politicisation of the Sindh Government and its institutions, involving political hiring especially in 
Police Department, that indirectly involves the area, as the residents are die-hard supporters of 
PPP who have been in Sindh Government since 1970s, with a few exceptions ( seeTable 4.2).  
The isolation of Lyari started in the 19th century. Karachi was conquered by British colonial forces 
in 1839 (Hasan et al. 2002, p.15-21) and developed according to a British Colonial pattern of 
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spatial development that distinguished “White Town” from “Black Town” or “Native Town” (Lari 
and Lari, 1996, p. 59). Lyari was designated a “Native Town” and was not allowed representation 
on the Municipal Council, giving rise to the exclusion and class divide that still exists in many 
forms today (Viqar, 2014, p. 370-371).  
Population growth outstripped development over many years. Until 1976, land rights in Lyari 
remained un-regularised, and leases were only secured after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto53 of PPP came in 
power which starting the long-lasting political affiliation for PPP in Lyari (Gayer, 2014, p.143-144). 
During the 1970s, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s regime brought development to the area, many young men 
went to the Middle East as migrant workers, and others were given jobs in government offices. 
During that period violence in Lyari remained low while culture and sports thrived. The PPP 
affiliation continued into the 1980s, and when PPP assumed power in 1988, development projects 
were again announced and Balochi and Sindhis were given employment. However, this time the 
promised development projects never materialised, even after PPP won a second term (Gayer, 
2014, p. 144). From 1997 till 2008 PPP gradually, lost power; first in the centre, later in city 
government/administration and then in Provincial government, so other ruling political parties, 
especially MQM, were blamed for negligence towards Lyari. This period coincides with the 
emergence of violent gang crime and the drug mafias. During this period the area experienced 
intermittent interventions of LEAs to restore control over crime, but limited provision of other 
basic services, the lack of which lead to the violent situation in the first place.   
Provision of political-patronage jobs has benefitted PPP supporters in Lyari but has hampered the 
ability of state institutions to solve wider problems in the city. For example, in the Police 
Department, it is reported that political parties have found jobs for their supporters, which also 
gives them access to security information before any action is taken against politicians. Gayer 
(2014, p.149) suggests that the employment quota in the police was one reason for the conflict 
between Rehman Dakait and Nabeel Gabol, the ex-MNA54 and popular PPP leader from Lyari. 
Reports suggested that Rehman wanted to employ men from Lyari and had already developed 
reliable police connections that enabled him to evade capture by the LEAs, while Nabeel Gabol 
wanted to recruit PPP supporters from all over Karachi (Gayer, 2014, p.149). Influential sources 
within the police were also the reason that Arshad Puppo was  able to run his gang even from jail 
from 2006 till 2012 (Khan 2012a).  
                                                          
53
 Founder of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and father of slain Benazir Bhutto. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was 
hanged in 1979 under the Martial Law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. 
54
 Member National Legislative Assembly 
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From 1998 to 2008, the country was under military rule, but local government was established 
under SLGO-2001 (Box 4.1). MQM controlled local government in Karachi from 2004-2009, and 
with substantial development funds at its disposal the city witnessed unprecedented 
development (Box 4.1), but Lyari remained comparatively deprived. Lyari Town had its own 
development budget and elected representatives affiliated to PPP, however, there was popular 
discontent about the political leadership and the MQM-led local government was considered 
biased (Section 4.4.3). This discontent also formed the core of the PAC narrative against MQM 
and the basis for its political and military developments in both Lyari and other areas. Zafar 
Baloch, the second in command of PAC gave an interview in September 2013, a few days before 
his murder, and mentioned that the city has assets, but MQM was trying to control these, which 
PAC would not allow and would take its due share (Gayer, 2014, p. 124-126; Zahra-Malik, 2013).   
Lack of formal facilities in Lyari, particularly for sports, has also played a role in the making of 
gangsters. Many gangsters were once footballers or aspired to be good sportsmen like Babu 
Dakait (Dawn, 2009a) and Ghaffar Zikri (Hussain, 2015). The lack of opportunities was one reason 
why young men like them ended up as gangsters. Other provincial and federal organisational 
issues also affected residents of Lyari. Banks and other institutions started to close their 
sponsorship for sports teams, and Lyari-based sportsmen lost their livelihoods (Gayer, 2014, 
p.126) while the absence of PPP in provincial government (2000-2008) meant that there were 
limited opportunities for employment in government agencies.  
During the 2000s, MQM dominated local and provincial government through various political 
permutations because of its strong ties to the military regime. MQM dominated local government 
until elections were suspended in 2009, and provincial government until 2008 and then in 
coalition with PPP (Box 4.1). MQM showed strong control over politics and resources during that 
time (2005-2008). MQM’s political control was also coupled with the strong control of service 
institutions such as the Karachi Electric (KE, previously KESC), KWSB (Karachi Water & Sanitation 
Board) and KDA (Karachi Development Authority). The absence of government services and 
development projects in Lyari resulted in very strong anti-MQM sentiments especially from PAC 
(Chapter 4). 
The problem has been exacerbated because of the absence of the elected local government 
system since 2009 (Alam and Waljidi, 2013), keeping residents of Lyari completely out of  formal 
governance of any kind.  
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Thus, the void in formal governance and service provision in Lyari has for many years been filled 
by informal structures led by strong personalities in welfare works. Firstly, it was the Haroon 
family after partition, who supported many services, such as schools, dispensaries and colleges 
(EC 1, Gayer, 2014, p.143). More recently, Rehman Dakait, during his heyday carried out extensive 
philanthropic and welfare work, including financial support for poor families, sports clubs, 
education and educational institutions and funding other welfare-oriented NGOs making him the 
favourite leader in Lyari (Gayer, 2014, p. 142-143). He was termed as the “Robin Hood” of Lyari by 
many, and his murder was not taken as the killing of a gangster but as a blow to Lyari (Rind, 2009). 
Viqar (2014, p.374-376) describes a well maintained park in Lyari that was controlled by 
gangsters, and although funding came from government this was channelled through informal 
structures, a working dynamic common to other political parties in the city.  
7.2.4 Territories, Boundaries and Conflicts 
The historical account of making, splintering and dissolution of gangs in Lyari has corresponding 
spatial and social dimensions. Each gang is associated with a particular territory based on the 
spatial control and social influence.  
Territories play a central role in Lyari as different gangs control different zones. Gayer (2014, 
p.141) identifies various gangs prior to formation of PAC, which includes Rehman Dakait’s Gang, 
the Baba Ladla Group, the Jheango Group, Arshad Puppo’s group and the Ghaffar Zikri group as 
major groups with defined territories (Map 7.3).  
Rehman Dakait purged several gangs to form PAC, including those led by Baba Ladla, Ghaffar Zikri 
and Jheango (Section 7.2.2). His agreement was that all the commanders would retain their 
territory and their resource-generation sources including the drug business, gambling etc., but 
street crime and support for Arshad Puppo was not allowed, as Hussain (2015) reported. The rise 
of PAC made Lyari a single territory with Arshad Puppo’s area as exception. The rise of Kutchi 
Rabita Committee (KRC) and the split within PAC after killing of Rehman Dakait again re-arranged 
the territorial configurations, now with three contenders including KRC, PAC and Baba Ladla’s 
territories – Khan (2013d) has shown this power configuration in a map (Map 7.4). However, the 
boundaries within Lyari were difficult for contenders to cross, as PAC, MQM, KRC, BLA and Arshad 
Puppo’s group were closely guarding their territories (Khan, 2013d).  
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Boundaries of gang control are usually based on the confines of the existing settlements, often 
separated by roads or streets. In the case of the area controlled by Arshad Puppo’s Group, the 
Lyari River separates it from the main Lyari settlement (Map 7.4). In other cases, there are neutral 
buffer zones between two contending gangs, such as the Jhat Pat market where violence 
sometimes occurs when warring gangs attack each other (Khan, 2014b).  In other cases, the 
nature of community also defines a boundary e.g. in KRC, where the Kutchi Memon residents of 
southern Lyari define the territorial boundary (Map 7.4). 
Conflicts amongst the gangs of Lyari have a long history (Section 7.2.2). The reasons for conflict 
are usually clear, including access to resources, rivalry, reaction to the killing of a gang member, 
violation of a boundary or damage to businesses etc. 
Violating territorial boundaries physically or by extracting rent from an opponent’s territory leads 
to conflict. PAC’s ventures into areas beyond its control, like Kharadar and Meethadar, led to 
conflicts with MQM (EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, ECCS 2). For example, the wholesale markets around Lyari 
had been under MQM’s control for a long time, but MQM was challenged by PAC for consuming 
resources that belonged to the natives according to political narrative (Zehra-Malik, 2013).  This 
conflict escalated when PAC joined a peace rally with Awami Tehrik (AT) against MQM’s demands 
for a new province, which passed through the MQM-controlled Kharadar; the peace rally was 
attacked and several people were killed (The Express Tribune, 2012b), and sources alleged that 
the location of the incident was allegedly controlled by MQM. 
Personal vendetta also results in conflict and violence. As mentioned above, Arshad Puppo and 
Rehman Dakait became enemies when Arshad desecrated the grave of Rehman’s father (Section 
7.2.2). Arshad Puppo was also reportedly responsible for killing Uzair’s father, resulting in 
Arshad’s murder allegedly by PAC gangs (Section 7.2.2). The ascent of Ghaffar Zikri is also linked 
with the killing of his cousin and friend Mohammed Ali which forced Ghaffar to give up the 
prospect of becoming a footballer, to become a notorious gangster (see Hussain, 2015).  
7.2.5 Socio-Spatial Controls 
The rise of gangs as informal structures within Lyari has depended on various socio-spatial control 
mechanisms to control territory, with control over resources as the main objective, along with 
political control as a more recent addition. Demographic controls by gangs are also important in 
keeping the support group loyal.  
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Social controls 
It is assumed that the people of Lyari protest when the police try to operate against the gangs. 
Actually people are frightened and they support the law enforcement agencies, and when there 
are protests it is because some innocent has been killed or arrested (EC 1). 
Control over protests is one example of the many social controls imposed by gangs on Lyari 
residents, but controls are also exercised over political activities, anti-social behaviour, street 
crimes, and the ethnicity of residents. Apart from social controls, there have been several social 
impacts of conflicts on the residents of Lyari (Appendix 7.2).  
Control of anti-social activity  
The informal structures are always involved in welfare activities that win legitimacy for them, as 
was found in North Nazimabad (Chapter 5 & 6). Rehman Dakait, when combining various gangs 
and forming PAC, declared that all the gangs would be responsible for curbing street crimes in 
their territories (Hussain, 2015). Later on, Rehman chalked out certain social controls (Gayer, 
2014, p.148-149) within PAC-controlled territory including, banning drug peddling, and firing 
aerial shots at wedding ceremonies, failing which would lead to  20,000 Rupees fine. He also tried 
to curb street crimes through various punishments. He established a system of problem solving 
and conflict resolution that was further enhanced by his successor Uzair Baloch through a Jirga 
system, or council of elders from various influential families of Lyari (Gayer, 2014, p.147-148; 
Viqar, 2014, p. 375-376). 
Forced political support/political control 
Political affiliation and support for the controlling gang is essential. Residents must either support 
the gang or keep quiet, and there is no other option (ECCS 2). Such a situation has been imposed 
several times, for example, in the conflict resulting in eviction of Kutchi families (Section 7.2.2). 
Similarly, the residents of Lyari were ordered by PAC not to attend a PPP rally on 18 October 
2014, supposed to be an important political event (Mandhro, 2014b)55 given that residents of 
Lyari had been diehard supporters of PPP. Later on, two young residents of Lyari were killed as 
they openly showed an inclination towards PPP against PAC directives and attended the PPP rally, 
reported The Express Tribune (2014j). Opposing political groups are not welcomed in a controlled 
                                                          
55
 PAC was against the PPP rally in Karachi while Baba Ladla group was in support (Mandhro, S. 2014b) 
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territory, and for example, MQM’s activists are not allowed to carry out political activity in the 
PAC controlled territories. 
Demographic control 
There have been attempts at demographic controls, either to oust opponents or to control 
resources.  These include attacks on Kutchi Memons in Agra Taj Colony and surroundings, which 
resulted in mass migration of thousands of Kutchi residents (Section 7.2.2). Similarly Hindu and 
Christian minorities have been excluded from their historical residential areas, reported The 
Express Tribune (2013m; 2014a56). In another case, around 200 Shia families moved to Ancholi, a 
Shia enclave in Central District, Karachi (EC 3), which was not reported in the press. However, 
there are doubts whether the forced exclusion was due to conflict over land (ECCS 2) or was 
triggered on the basis of identity.  
Gang management 
One of the important dimensions that distinguish gangs from political parties is that gang 
members work for personal gain, power and thrill. Most gang members are young men or 
teenagers who often receive daily wages for their tasks (ECCS 2), including protection from LEAs 
and arms and ammunition; this is far more than they could earn while working as skilled or 
unskilled labours in any factory (JC 16; See CNBC PAKISTAN, 201357). Furthermore, ethnic rhetoric 
also plays a vital role, as mentioned earlier, PAC excessively claimed to be the actual owners of 
the city and, thus, the legitimate contenders to control city and its resources repealing MQM and 
Muhajir’s claim of being the majority and now the owners of the city (Gayer, 2014). 
Good performance of a gang member is rewarded and makes way for promotion to higher ranks. 
It has also been reported that, during the violent times during 2010-2012, PAC announced a 
                                                          
56
 Hindu and Christian minorities had been facing threats and atrocities by gangsters since long ago, they 
could not do anything as they were weak in terms of power, both human resource wise, money wise and on 
the basis of power of violence. The families were ordered to leave the locality in November 2013, news 
reports informed (The Express Tribune. 2013m). The residents have accused the gangsters of extortion 
demands and of misbehaving and even kidnapping and raping the young girls, The Express Tribune(2014a) 
reported. 
57
  This was also mentioned by one of the main gangsters in an interview to a news channel (See CNBC 
PAKISTAN, 2013).  
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reward of a Honda CG-125 motorcycle for those who brought information on certain MQM 
workers or killed them (JC 16)58.   
 
 
Map 7.3 Gangs and territories before PAC in 2008 
Spatial controls 
Spatial controls are prevalent within and around Lyari through defined territories. The territories 
emerge or disappear with the emergence of a new gang or the defeat of existing gang, or by 
attacks on the neighbourhood. A new territory is usually protected by a watch-and-ward system 
with entry and exit controls, which include oversight of all the drug peddling business, gambling 
dens and extortion from the business within the controlled territory. Once the territory is 
                                                          
58
 Honda CG-125 motorcycle is the favourite bike of Baloch and other young men in the city due to its speed 
and sound, while it has been one of the most stolen/snatched motorcycles in the city. 
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established, the resources within the territory are at the disposal of the controller, and no one can 
resist as the residents/businessmen are already terrorised.  
Access control  
Where gangs develop territoriality, they control the local population’s entry and exit into the 
area, using various tactics including a network of informers, eliminating informers from the other 
groups, and controlling entry of other groups into the locality. The locals are disciplined through 
threats and violence, killing of possible informers or intruders, and intimidating others. New 
people coming into the locality need to have a local sponsor who should know whom they have to 
meet, explains Imtiaz (201359). Outsiders are questioned and asked about their reason for coming 
and their destination, and if suspected can be beaten up and if found to be from rival other group 
could suffer extreme torture or even killing. However, people are excused interrogation if 
accompanied by women or children, whose presence is a statement that the male has no 
intentions of spying, or is not carrying weapons and has family and a reason to be in the locality 
(ECCS 2; Diwan, 2015). 
 ... entry and exit controls always exist in the controlled areas which applies to 
everyone beyond any ethnic divisions, if they have a suspicion about the 
person they can beat or even kill him if not satisfied about his identity …people 
from dominant gangs sit and guard the area and  have mobile phones and 
even walkie-talkies to maintain communication with others; they also have a 
system of informers... their surveillance and information system is so strong 
and they are well versed in the labyrinthine streets of the old area, so that 
whenever the police or Rangers come to raid, they take all of their arms and 
ammunition to other streets through the back-doors of houses, and manage to 
escape the raid. (ECCS 2) 
Lyari is thus accessible and a no-go area at the same time. It is open for local residents and others 
who mean no business with the gangs, but has proved to be a no-go-area for LEAs when they 
mean to attack the gangs. A police operation in April 2012 ended in failure, as the police using 
military force were unable to enter the settlement from 27 April until the operation finished on 4 
May 2012 (Gayer, 2014, p.155). However, the Karachi Operation has improved the situation a bit, 
and now Lyari is more accessible as the majority of gangsters have gone into hiding (Section 
7.2.2). 
                                                          
59
 The reporter explains about how one can enter Lyari, the reason of her links with Zafar Baloch as it 
essential to have a contact in gangs to enter Lyari.  
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Thus, political controls overlap with access controls. Political opponents are usually considered 
enemies, and thus the resultant territories are either dominated by one entity, or the fight 
continues until there is only one successful controller. For example, Nabeel Gabol, ex-MNA from 
PPP and later MQM’s MNA, cannot enter Lyari although his ancestors were considered respected 
elders of the settlement, as reported in newspapers (Baloch, 2013).  
Control over resources, rent-seeking, and reasons of control and conflict 
(Illicit activities includes)...extortion money, drug smuggling and peddling, 
running gambling dens and other crimes that might include kidnapping for 
ransom, but the extortion money tops the list and thus gangs fight to control 
territories. (ECCS 2) 
The strategic location of Lyari makes it attractive for rent-seekers. It lies is between the busiest 
port of the country, a major industrial area, the city’s wholesale markets and the main financial 
district of Karachi (Zehra-Malik, 2013). In addition, even within Lyari, the illicit business 
possibilities are enormous, as it is a hub of inter- and intra-city transportation with links to 
Balochistan. The drug trade and gambling dens have been a feature of Lyari for a long time, while 
cottage industry and small businesses also attract rent-seekers. It was here that the trend of 
issuing extortion slips started.    
“Transporters were a rich community in Lyari, who saw their buses routinely 
being robbed on the way. Their insecurity provided an opportunity for the 
increasingly powerful gangsters, who offered security to the transporters’ 
union in exchange for hefty sums of money. A little-known gangster, 
Aurangzeb Baba, had floated an idea, which the fraternity accepted, and the 
currency of extortion slips and receipts in Lyari was thus instituted.” (Hussain, 
2015) 
Controlling rich territories has been a crucial basis for gang wars. For example, Mauripur Road is 
the main highway connecting the port with the city and up-country and carries most of the freight 
including NATO supplies to Afghanistan. Direct access to Mauripur Road enables gangs to control 
resources from Lyari, as they could threaten the transporters with extortion and could damage 
the businesses if not paid. The presence of KRC, a rival of PAC, attached to Mauripur Road 
representing the Kutchi community in Agra Taaj Colony, has created many hurdles for the other 
groups and has often been a reason for conflict with KRC, Khan (2013c) noted. It was conflict over 
violation of each other’s business boundaries that led to the split between Rehman and Haji Lalu, 
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and then between Uzair and Baba Ladla, (Khan, 2013e) reported, similarly, between Baba Ladla 
and Jheango (Khan, 2012d) and many others.  
 
Map 7.4: Gangs and territories after PAC in 2013 (Khan, 2013d) 
The land market is also a target for rent-seekers in Lyari. The conversion of single-storey houses 
into multi-storey buildings has opened up a huge market for small investors and a potential 
source of money for rent-seekers (EC 1; Gayer, 2014). Similarly, the eviction of Hindu and 
Christian minorities is also linked with the issue of land and rent-seeking as the land they 
inhabited has high market value (ECCS 2). Gutter Baghicha, a large area of urban agricultural land 
adjacent to Lyari, has also been a source of conflict between the larger political parties (Ali, S.I. 
2009) that has resulted in killings60; before partition the land was more than 1,000 acres, but now 
only 400 acres remain due to periodic encroachments. Political parties blame the majority 
                                                          
60
 Nisar Baloch, a social activist who has been trying to save Gutter Baghicha land since long ago was 
eventually gunned down a day after his press conference in which he accused one of the political parties for 
their involvement in encroachment over land. Local print media widely reported (See The Nation. 2009; 
Dawn. 2009). A video introduction of Gutter Baghicha also available online (See Shehri-CBE. 2012) 
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political party for its designs on this valuable land using local government powers, Dawn reported 
(2009b) (also Section 4.4.3). 
The conflict and violence in Lyari became linked to city-level politics when larger political parties 
got involved. As noted earlier, PAC started to venture into territories surrounding MQM 
strongholds that led to violent conflicts with MQM (EC 3). It is clear that the conflict is about rent-
seeking as a representative of PAC was reported saying; 
"Right now we are sitting across the table watching the MQM eat whole cake… 
If this goes on, we will either ruin the cake for everyone or get our slice… The 
problem is that the MQM thinks it has the biggest stake in Karachi… Until the 
MQM learns to share, there will always be chaos." (Zehra-Malik, 2014)  
Such statements also suggest that the ethnic flavour of the conflicts is not the main cause of 
dispute, but rather the contest is over land resources. Most of the gangs in Lyari, except for KRC, 
are in conflict, and at city scale the ethnicity-based political parties engage in ethnic conflict, but 
the residents do not fight along ethnic lines, and so actually the conflict is about the control over 
public resources in the form of land and funds using ethnicity as the political entry (EC 3, ECCS 2).  
Discussion 
This case study of Lyari has identified criminal groups as informal structures supported by 
personal cults and vendettas, which harness disengaged young men and teenagers to win control 
over a rich and illicit trade. It has also identified the process of integration of informal structures 
into the city-level politico-criminal organisations by linking to wider networks and commanding 
public resources to claim legitimacy. The boundaries between formal and informal are blurred in 
the process, especially when political parties deal with local criminal outfits. Lyari also shows how 
the city-level power contestation is played out at the local level and vice versa, and how control 
mechanisms including attack and defence mechanisms and identity discourse is used to claim and 
control resources. 
Several differences are observed between Lyari and North Nazimabad. North Nazimabad had a 
two-layered informal governance structure, with political parties operating at district level, and 
identity-based structures at neighbourhood or street level, whereas in Lyari, there is single local 
tier of operation i.e. gangs work autonomously, they control the streets and their respective 
territories and do not work under larger umbrella groups, or have lateral working relations. 
Secondly, in Lyari, there is no identity-based informal structure, until Kutchi Rabita Committee 
254 | P a g e  
(KRC) started representing the Kutchi community, and there are no apolitical informal structures 
such as neighbourhood committees present in Lyari.  
The nature and scale of conflicts in North Nazimabad and Lyari are also different; North 
Nazimabad had longstanding social divisions, but city level power struggle gave it a violent turn. In 
Lyari conflicts work in the opposite direction i.e. from local level to city level; in that power 
dynamics revolves around personal vendettas, control over informal rents and territories rather 
than political ideologies. PAC was the exception when it scaled up to a city-level politico-criminal 
organisation. However, some of the city-level political parties were backing gangs in Lyari in a 
proxy war, to maintain a stake in the area. 
Lyari also showed a variety of informal land controls, and mechanisms of space production, which 
are more violent than North Nazimabad. Violence and the threat of violence played a central role 
enforcing other controls including rent seeking endeavours and ousting opponents. Furthermore, 
social controls in Lyari did not affect an individual’s freedom as compared to identity-based 
communities of North Nazimabad that have various strict social customs over marriages, dress 
code and the role of women. Access controls are more violent in Lyari and do not involve physical 
installations, but  non-physical means such as surveillance.  Graffiti is found in both Lyari and 
North Nazimabad, but the gangs do not carry flags in Lyari. Property controls have also been 
reported in Lyari as a means of rent seeking and ousting the opponents, and have been violent to 
the extent that the Kutchi community had to evacuate Lyari.  
7.3 PIB Colony – Losing and Re-gaining a Territory 
7.3.1 Introduction 
The case study of PIB Colony is an example of the swing of power between a political party which 
first lost territorial control to a politico-criminal gang and then regained it. It echoes the story of 
Lyari and the evolution of local-level gangs into PAC, i.e. a city-wide politico-criminal organisation 
(Gayer, 2014). It also highlights that power politics and socio-spatial conflicts at the city-level 
impacts local-levels throughout the city and that various local-levels of the city are linked to each 
other, in this case, political issues in Lyari has affected PIB Colony.     
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Pir Ilahi Bakhsh Cooperative Housing Society, also called Pir Colony or PIB Colony, developed for 
the Muslim Indian immigrants after 1947 (Appendix 7.4). It covers an area less than one Sq. km 
(186 Acres) and has an estimated population of 57,224 in 2005 (KMC-GOSc, [no date]). According 
to SLGO 2001 (Box 4.1), PIB Colony covers three union councils in Gulshan Town: UC3 lies 
completely within the settlement, while parts of UC2 and UC4 also lie within the settlement 
(Table 7.1). PIB Colony lies in District Central, which is part of 6-district Commissioner-controlled 
administration. The area is dominated by Muhajirs of different origins including Urdu speakers, 
Memon, Khatri and Gujrati, and several other ethnicities. Pashtoon, Sindhi, and Balochis are in a 
minority and belong to various Muslim sectarian groups, including Barelvi-Sunni, Deobandi-Sunni, 
Shia and Ismailies. 
PIB Colony has always been a well-serviced settlement and there has been functional local 
governance (during 2001-2009), buttressed by the active presence and political monopoly of 
MQM. The residents had never faced political pressure, political violence or extortion until the 
rise of ANP, and later PAC in PIB Colony. The city-level political contests made PIB colony  one of 
the local-level playing fields, as noted in the press (Majeed, 2013). 
MQM had an historic monopoly from the mid-1980s onwards, but during 2007-2013 this was 
challenged by ANP, the Pashtoon-based political party concentrated in Nishter Basti locality, and 
later by PAC (also called the Ahmed Ali Magsi gang) which arose in 2009-10 from Baloch and 
Sindhi enclaves of PIB Colony (Map 7.5). MQM-ANP conflict in PIB was linked with the city-level 
power politics, while the Magsi gang challenged the territorial control of MQM, followed by 
political violence and extreme cases of rent-seeking in the settlement. During the same violent 
period of 2010-2013, politico-religious party Sunni-Tehreek (ST) also appeared supported by the 
Barelvi Sect followers in the settlement. As the violence and extortion increased, residents started 
moving out, property values fell and social and spatial controls were observed for the first time. 
However, MQM then regained territorial control using various informal land control mechanisms 
discussed in this section (Section 7.3.5). 
Socio-spatial settings 
PIB Colony is bounded by important land uses and natural features. Karachi’s Central Prison lies to 
the South, Lyari River and Lyari Expressway to the North, while on the east lies Askari Park 
(previously the city’s fruit and vegetable wholesale market or Old Sabzi Mandi), the Pakistan 
Printing Press Corporation, and the Pakistan Telecommunication Exchange installations and 
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housing (Map 7.5). This setting makes PIB Colony a cul-de-sac with only one main road forming 
the central spine of communication, given there are a few new routes in and out of the 
settlement but for limited use only. 
PIB Colony has more than 3,500 housing units and several distinct neighbourhoods (Table 7.1). 
Some of the neighbourhoods were villages before the development of PIB Colony, whilst others 
developed later as informal settlements. From KIs, informal talks with locals, and through 
secondary data, various socio-spatial characteristics have been identified and are explained 
below. 
The planned areas fall completely within UC3 and include Jabalpur Colony, Nagpur Colony, 
Ameenabad, Nafeesabad, Press Quarters and T&T Colony. Most of the area is middle income 
Muhajir-dominated with various enclaves.  Jabalpur Colony, or J-Block as locally termed, is 
dominated by the Khatri ethnic group, while Nagpur is mixed, with mainly Urdu-speaking 
Muhajirs. The Khatri community is mostly small-scale cloth traders and forms a middle-income 
group61. Press Quarters is a housing colony for employees of Pakistan Printing Press Corporation 
abutting University Road on the east. Similarly, there is a Telephone & Exchange (T&T) colony, 
nearby Pak Printing Press, for the employees of the Telecommunication Exchange installations. 
There is an upper-middle income Ismaili settlement in the west side called Ameenabad, an 
isolated gated community with 200 houses built in 1965 by the Agha Khan Trust for Ismaili 
community (Sadiq et al, 2010).  
Informal areas have a strong presence in PIB Colony. The development of the fruit and vegetable 
wholesale market (Old Sabzi Mandi) in 1964 created a demand for labour and eventually a 
demand for low-income housing that was not met through formal supply (KIs). This resulted in the 
emergence of informal settlements for labourers, mostly Pashtoons, along the Lyari River, 
between the residential zone of PIB Colony and Sabzi Mandi, called Nishter Basti. The labour 
settlement, called SK-Line, extended further along Sabzi Mandi as far as the Pakistan Printing 
Press Corporation, and is mainly a low-income Muhajir locality. The gap between Central Prison 
and the formal residential area of PIB Colony was also occupied by an informal settlement (now 
                                                          
61
 The Khatri are a minority ethnic group known for their entrepreneurial skills, especially in textile related 
businesses in Karachi. Sergey Levin (1973) traces Khatri communities in Pakistan to Indian Punjab, however, 
Muslim Khatris in India live in Gujrat and Rajhastan as well (McLane, 2002, p. 132). This claim is supported 
by the local Khatri community in PIB colony who link themselves to Rajhastan and Gujrat, rather than 
Punjab.  The Khatri community in PIB is an immigrant community who came after partition. They have a 
distinct language and are a close community, and prefer to get married within the community. The Khatris 
of PIB  colony are mostly linked with textile trade in one way or the other, either working in weaving 
factories or clothes shops, and most of their shops are in PIB colony. 
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regularised) called Ghousia colony, again a predominantly low-income Muhajir settlement 
(Shamsi and Ahmed, 1996). The vacant land between government land uses, such as Pakistan 
Printing Press, Pakistan Telecommunication exchange and the planned area of PIB Colony, was 
encroached by poor Sindhi rural migrants and is now called Sindhi Para.  Further west towards 
Teen Hatti, sandwiched between Martin Road and Lyari River, Nafeesabad includes a low income 
informal Muhajir settlement along with apartments for the Ismaili community (Map 7.5). 
Residents of informal areas form the low income group of the settlement.  
 
Area Locality UC no Social Composition 
Formal Areas PIB Colony General UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir 
Nagpur Colony UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir 
Jabalpur Colony 
(Also called Block-J) 
UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Khatri ethnic 
group/Muhajir 
Plot No 14 UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. 
Shia Muhajirs strong presence as well. 
Ameenabad UC3 Ismaili Community. Gated community. 
Pak Printing Press 
colony  
UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. 
Also Shia sect followers as well. Gated 
community. 
Pak 
Telecommunication 
Colony (T&T Colony) 
UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. 
Gated community.  
Karachi Centre and 
A-one apartment 
complexes 
UC2 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. 
Gated communities. 
Informal Areas SK Lines UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. 
Nishter Basti UC4 Dominantly Pashtoon settlement. 
Nafeesabad UC3 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. 
Also Ismaili apartment complex. 
 Ghousia Colony UC2 Mixed, but dominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajir. 
Punjabi Christians also reside. 
Historic Villages  Pir Ilahi Bakhsh 
Residences  
(now Pir Heaven 
Apartments) 
UC3 Previously Sindhi domain, now open for all, still 
Sindhi families residing. Gated community. 
Suleiman Village UC3 Baloch/Sindhi ethnic group. Gated community. 
Sindhi Para UC3 
and 4 
Sindhi low-incom group. Limited physical access, 
cul-de-sac. 
Table 7.1 Socio-spatial setting of PIB Colony 
 
258 | P a g e  
The historic villages include Plot No 14 and Suleiman Village. Plot No 14, the oldest part of the 
settlement, is linked to the Sindhi enclave abutting Pir Ilahi Bakhsh’s62 residence (now Pir Heaven 
Apartment Complex). Plot No 14 is now a Muhajir-dominated settlement with strong Shia 
minority group presence with one of the two Shia Imam Bargah of PIB Colony. A Sindhi/Balochi 
enclave is located further east of the Ilahi Buksh enclave abutting Pakistan Printing Press, officially 
called Suleiman Village but known as Baloch Para or Makrani Para locally. Suleiman Village is 
dominated by Sindhi-Baloch residents and is a gated community or a ghetto within the planned 
PIB colony.  
 
 
Map 7.5 Social enclaves within PIB Colony 
The religious orientation of social groups has a deep impact on the dynamics of PIB Colony. In 
Khatri community, about half of the families belong to the strong Barelvi Sunni sect, while half 
belong to the Ahle-Hadees school, another Sunni denomination with a separate Mosque which 
has split the community. There is ensuing tension between various religious sectarian groups 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Chapter 3 for limitations).  
                                                          
62
 Famous native Sindhi Feudal Lord and a progressive political leader who became the first chief Minister of 
Sindh after partition of 1947. He donated his land to develop PIB Colony for the partition migrants.  
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7.3.2 Power Dynamics in the Settlement.  
The socio-political power dynamics in PIB Colony underlie the process of challenge and change of 
domination for an initially MQM territory. Several factors intensified the socio-political power 
dynamics in the settlement, such as the different ethnic groups, political parties, religious groups, 
cooperative housing society and income groups. 
Social hierarchy, religious and political affiliations 
Within PIB Colony, different ethnic groups represent an implicit social hierarchy and play a vital 
role in the local power play. Muhajirs or Urdu speakers are in the main well-to-do households and 
play a vital political role, generally supporting MQM. The Khatri, although they support MQM, do 
not take an active role as political workers or activists as compared to Urdu speaking 
communities. Similarly, the Ismailies63 of Ameenabad and Nafeesabad remain completely isolated 
from local social activities and power dynamics. Muhajirs from informal areas such as SK-Lines, 
Ghousia Colony, Nafeesabad and the adjoining Martin and Clayton Quarters, all low and lower 
middle-income settlements, form the active manpower for the majority political party. KIs said 
that Muhajirs also control the Cooperative Housing Society Office and MQM has recently started 
to play a role in the selection of staff for the office. Sunni Tehreek, a Barelvi-Sunni political party, 
has also developed its stronghold in the Muhajir informal settlements around PIB colony including 
SK-Lines and Ghousia Colony. Thus, before the rise of PAC in PIB Colony, MQM held street control. 
The Sindhi-Baloch enclaves and some of the Gujrati residents are affiliated with the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP). The Sindhis of Sindhi Para are the lowest income group and have very little 
say in local power dynamics. Sindhi residents of the Pir Ilahi Bakhsh complex are influential 
because of their link with Ilahi Bakhsh family. Baloch residents of Makrani Para are also active 
both in politics and social life, as some of the families are resourceful.  
The rise of PAC in Lyari, during 2008, was also felt in PIB Colony, as in other parts of the city 
having Baloch settlements. In PIB Colony, PAC first rose in Makrani Para because of Baloch ethnic 
connections with Lyari, many of the young men from this locality joined PAC and the locality 
suffered the most in the conflict, discussed in detail in the coming sections. 
                                                          
63
 Ismailies are a Shia Muslim sectarian minority group, also the majority in Karachi belongs to Gujrati 
ethnicity (Also see chapter 6).   
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The Pashtoons in the formal part of the settlement are mostly well-off, as they are traders in the 
fruit and vegetable wholesale Market (now relocated along the Superhighway) and had large 
bachelor-specific-houses (Pashtoon without families that worked for them in Sabzi Mandi) that 
also worked as their offices. These Pashtoons have little say in the political and social life of the 
settlement. They have been affiliated with religious-political parties including Jamiat-Ulema Islam 
(JUI) and Jamat-e-Islami (JI). The Pashtoon areas of Nishter Basti were transformed into a 
stronghold of Awami National Party (ANP) during MQM-led local government from 2005-06, 
which intensified after 2008 general elections.  
Thus Muhajirs are the dominant social group and power base of MQM in the settlement, who 
have an upper hand in all matters of the settlement, be it political or administrative. Informal 
areas and historic villages form an active political base where youth take an active role in party 
politics and where political parties other than MQM exist. Business-oriented communities 
including Khatri and Ismailies do not take an active part in politics, and do not oppose the power 
dynamics in the settlement.  
Social issues/concept of others 
PIB Colony has multiple layers of conflicts, ranging from political to sectarian, however, this thesis 
will focus on political parties and gangs. Politically, the MQM-ANP conflict started after the 12 
May 2007 conflict, allegedly between MQM and collective political opponents including ANP, PPP, 
JI and others that cost more than 50 lives in the city (Section 4.4.3). With the rise of the Pakistani 
faction of the Taliban during 2013, who started targeting ANP workers and offices (Chapter 4), 
ANP had lost its presence in the settlement; however, during its prime it collaborated with PAC 
against MQM. The MQM-PAC rift in PIB Colony started to appear during 2009-2010 with the rise 
of the Ahmed Ali Magsi gang, a Baloch group from Suleiman Village allegedly part of PAC, 
although PAC denies any link with Magsi (Khan, 2012c), and later Magsi collaborated with the 
Pashtoons of ANP in Nishter Basti. MQM’s response meant that PIB Colony supposedly become a 
no-go-area for Balochis and the Pashtoons related to ANP64. The situation calmed down after 
2013, when ANP and PAC lost support in the city (Chapter 4 and Section 7.2.2), and when Magsi 
finally left the settlement, reportedly his house and shops were burnt down. 
                                                          
64
 Informal talks with Baloch and Pashtoons from surrounding localities revealed a growing fear of visiting 
PIB Colony as it was widely rumoured amongst such ethnic groups that they will be held by the MQM 
vigilante groups on duty on allegations of conducting reconnaissance survey before or planning to attack. 
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7.3.3 Service Provision 
PIB Colony has always been a well-serviced settlement as the residents are resourceful and 
politically active. Several national politicians came from the settlement, including the MQM’s 
National Assembly Member Dr. Farooq Sattar, MQM’s city Mayor Mustafa Kamal (lived for a brief 
time), PPP parliamentarian and the murdered politician Zuhair Akram Nadeem, and several 
judges. The list also includes several professors, professionals, literary personalities and 
international sportsmen such as, Dr. Zafar Saeed Saifi the ex-Vice Chancellor of Karachi University; 
Ibrahim Jalees the writer; Anwer Maqsood writer and actor; and Munawwar-uz-Zaman the 
famous field hockey player, highlighting an image of a post-partition progressive Muhajir 
neighbourhood. 
Residents are also active in local politics and lobbied for better services and have never been as 
politically isolated as the Muhajir residents of North Nazimabad, partly because party politics 
never turned violent in PIB Colony. Many of the local political activists are also part of formal 
institutions such as the Electricity Supply Company, Water and Sewerage Board and Karachi 
Municipal Corporation. Furthermore, young Muhajir men have been actively involved in local 
politics at the local MQM unit and sector offices, making it easier for the local residents to voice 
their problems and solve their issues.  
MQM’s services-provision activities mean that they are seen as synonymous with government 
resulting in a blurring of boundaries between formal and informal, as in the other case study 
areas. As in Lyari, public funds for services are usually channelled through the political party 
representatives who, either directly or through the workers union, are present in local 
government, (both the previously elected local government and the currently appointed 
administration), or in other service provision organisations.  KIs mentioned that during the MQM-
led local government, the elected MQM representatives frequently involved party workers from 
PIB Colony in development projects and to maintain the infrastructure in various formal and 
informal capacities. These local workers have enabled MQM to sustain its grassroots support 
through unit and sector offices, while the workers were rewarded during the MQM-led local 
government by formal jobs in service agencies and elsewhere (Gayer, 2014, p. 108).  
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MQM has two unit offices within the wider PIB colony, and the PIB Sector office is located near 
Martin/Jamshed Quarter65. Unit offices use their links with the formal institutions to deal with the 
service-related complaints of residents. They mitigate conflicts, and refer residents’ security 
concerns to the authorities, for example requesting funds for putting up walls or gates, as for 
example in the narrow lanes leading to Nishtar Basti along the Lyari Express Way, which had 
become an easy route for criminals from the adjoining settlements and was perceived as the 
route for any possible attack on Muhajir residents (PB 32). Similarly, complaints related to water 
and sewage are reviewed by the office which has been responsible for allocating infrastructure 
and road-making funds in the settlement, and sent to the elected representatives who are also 
from the same party. In such situations, the party is actually using formal government funds 
channelled through informal means. The sector office also provides the conflict-resolution 
services to deal with issues raised by residents (Section 7.3.5).  
7.3.4 Rise of PAC, Challenge to MQM’s Monopoly 
Before 2005, MQM’s monopoly over street control in PIB Colony was never challenged. There was 
no major political contest and the majority of residents voted for MQM, although the right-wing JI 
always got some votes in elections. Residents were never coerced, and voluntary support was the 
norm. The settlement was shut during strike calls and mourning days announced by MQM while 
calls from other parties would go unnoticed. After 12th May 2007, increased tension at city level 
between MQM and ANP (or Muhajir and Pashtoon) also affected PIB Colony. The tension 
strengthened local support for MQM, which was seen to represent and guard Muhajir interests. 
MQM resorted to several informal land control mechanisms to oust the opponents, anticipating 
an attack on the territory both physically and in terms of political and economic interests, such as 
allocating workers to guard entry and exit points especially those linked with Pashtoon areas 
(Section 7.3.5).  
However, the Pashtoon-Muhajir conflict had less impact on the settlement than the PAC-backed 
Ahmed Ali Magsi gang which fundamentally changed the local power dynamics. The Magsi gang 
challenged MQM’s control from within the settlement, by seeking rent from residents, shoppers 
and other businessmen. The same pattern of control has been highlighted elsewhere in Karachi 
(Gayer 2014, p. 111-117). 
                                                          
65
 Unit office is the smallest political unit in the organisation looked after by the unit in charge. 15-20 unit 
offices comes under the sector office headed by the sector in charge (refer Gayer, 2014, p. 104; table 5.3).  
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Magsi was a resident of Makrani Para (officially Suleiman Village), but later moved to a street in 
the planned area where his family had shops and a house (KIs), also outlined by a report by CNBC 
Pakistan (2012) that introduced him. Many young Baloch and Sindhi residents, also some Gujrati 
residents, were his associates from Suleiman Village, but Magsi created problems by getting 
involved in street crime (KIs) and then, in late 2009 and early 2011, by asking for extortion from 
well-to-do families, shops and businesses (PB 31, PB 32). 
By the end of 2011, Magsi was terrorising both MQM and ordinary residents. A crime reporter, 
interviewed, said that Magsi used to call MQM’s PIB Sector Office to inform them that he would 
come, so the office would shut to avoid him or to be prepared for the attack. Magsi started an 
extortion ring with a strong network of informers throughout the settlement (KIs), who would 
inform him about the families of well-to-do residents and about the businesses, who were then 
given extortion demands. Within a few months, people started moving out, stopped buying or 
selling properties, renovating or constructing houses or buying new cars, as they would receive an 
anonymous call for extortion which would be difficult to reject. July-August were  the most violent 
months of 2011 in PIB (The Express Tribune, 2011a), when almost one person a day was killed or 
injured in PIB Colony in targeted attacks.  
The KI’s from PIB Colony also mentioned that Magsi was pursuing a personal vendetta against 
MQM, apart from PAC’s agenda in the city, as his brother was killed in early 2011 allegedly by 
MQM affiliates. In response, Magsi went on terrorising PIB Colony, according to reports (Khan, 
2012c). However, the rise of Magsi is also linked to the rise of PAC in Lyari in 2008, which 
influenced almost all the Baloch enclaves in the city where young men formed gangs under PAC 
support, challenged MQM and got involved in seeking informal rents (Section 7.2.2). 
Residents, reportedly, complained to MQM’s local representatives, leadership and the unit office 
about the crimes and violence in the settlement and their lack of response to Magsi’s threats. 
However, interviewees noted that since MQM and PPP were in coalition government, the party 
could not take an open action (KIs). Then, in March 2012, MQM’s unit head Mansoor Akhter and 
his brother were attacked and killed in broad daylight in their own house. According to eye-
witness accounts, Magsi was blamed, which resulted in violence throughout the city and was 
widely reported in media (Imtiaz, Gishkori and Khan, 2012). Magsi’s involvement was also 
confirmed by the Interior Minister’s statement (CNBC PAKISTAN, 2012) after which the culprit’s 
name was put on an exit control list to stop him escaping out of Karachi or Pakistan, The News 
reported (29 March 2012). MQM also took a strong stand, the senior leadership convened a press 
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conference and declared Magsi as the killer, and they also alleged his links with PAC and to PPP 
(CNBC Pakistan, 2012). A week after this incident, three policemen on duty in PIB Colony were 
killed (Dawn, 2012a). According to one report, the police arrested an accomplice of Magsi 
involved in the incident who stated that they had to open fire on the police because MQM watch-
and-ward activists were taking up positions to fire on them when the police stopped the gang’s 
car on PIB Main Road (Perwaiz, 2012a). 
The reign of Magsi and his on-off conflict with MQM subsided when he left the area, after MQM’s 
measures to counter him, and under threat of being killed by his rivals or by LEAs, and his paternal 
uncle was subsequently killed (Hasan, 2012). His influence further subsided when, in May 2012, 
his house and the market he owned both caught fire, reportedly a deliberate attempt by his rivals, 
(The Nation, 2012). Since the Karachi Operation started, fear of Magsi has further receded but 
many families are reportedly still paying monthly extortion money (KIs), while the whereabouts of 
Magsi remained unknown at the time of writing. Residents fear that he will take revenge for his 
uncle, brother and the burnt property (KIs). However, with the disappearance of Magsi from the 
contest to control PIB Colony and decline of ANP and PAC throughout the city (Chapter 4), the 
power dynamic has returned to its pre-conflict status and MQM retains a monopoly over politics 
and service provision in the area. 
7.3.5 Socio-Spatial Controls 
The rise of the Magsi gang and regain of control by MQM are both outcomes of various socio-
spatial control mechanisms affecting residents, shoppers in the settlement and commuters 
through PIB Colony.  
Problem solving by MQM, as elsewhere, proves an efficient way of both gaining legitimacy and 
tightening control. The Unit and Sector offices are integral to this process and deal with 
complaints ranging from marital disputes to business-related and neighbourhood-scale conflicts. 
MQM’s conflict-resolution committee at the Sector Office is a powerful entity, made up of MQM’s 
senior workers appointed by the central administration. The committee can summon the accused 
in the area and acts like a local court when a case is brought to them. The resolution is 
determined and both parties are responsible for following the decision while the political party 
makes sure to enforce the contract. Such was the case of Kashif and his wife66 in which the wife 
complained about the husband and in-laws of their insulting behaviour towards her, the issue was 
                                                          
66
 Names have been changed for anonymity.  
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resolved through strict instructions to the husband. The husband then changed his behaviour as 
he knew he cannot get away with violation of the contract.Violence and threat of violence was 
the main way that Magsi was able to dominate the rent-seeking business in PIB Colony. He used 
to send extortion slips and bullets as a threat (Figure 4.2), KIs and local residents reported. 
Victims’ houses were attacked with aerial gunshots, and a shopkeeper who resisted giving money 
was injured, although Magsi’s name had become enough threat to make the residents obey his 
demands (KIs). 
Access control was the first and the most obvious control introduced after the start of the conflict 
in PIB Colony, implemented through policing, the watch-and-ward system, and questioning 
people, while rumours and fear played a vital role in the access control.  
At night, MQM armed men guarded PIB Colony and Suleiman Village was besieged so that the 
PAC men were confined to their territory (KIs). However, Magsi colluded with the ANP in Nishter 
Basti to find a point that was easier for entry and attack (KIs). Such events made Pashtoons from 
Nishter Basti equally suspect in PIB Colony and they were stopped by MQM guards and 
questioned about their identity and reason for coming to PIB Colony67.   
As in the Pashtoon and Baloch settlements, the threats of MQM’s measures to counter ANP and 
PAC were exaggerated which created fear. It was rumoured that Baloch and Pashtoons were 
banned from PIB Colony so that non-resident Baloch avoid the settlement68. Such perceptions did 
help limit unwanted entries into the territory. 
Access control included passers-by, political activists and businesses. Businesses closed during 
calls for strikes or mourning by MQM, but not for such calls by other parties. Several Pashtoon 
teahouse and hotel owners were asked to temporarily close their businesses, as happened in 
other MQM dominated parts of the city, but these were permitted to open after few days with no 
damage to the business or property (KIs). 
Information control is one barometer of control in the settlement. During the MQM-PAC and 
MQM-ANP conflicts, research was difficult, and researchers were supposed to get permission 
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 Pashtoon labours and workers, working in PIB Colony informed. 
68
 The researcher triangulated in nearby Baloch settlements about the perception of PIB Colony. Residents 
of settlements such as Nagman village and Anagara Goth in Liaquatabad area were consulted. These 
formed the nearest settlements and residents  used to visit PIB Colony previously but their visit halted amid 
said rumours of Balochis being targeted in the settlement indiscriminately and that walls have been written 
with instructions for Baloch commuters in the settlement to leave and not come to PIB Colony.  
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from the local MQM representative in order to avoid any misunderstanding that they were acting 
for opponents.  
Information-hiding is one aspect of control, while information-gathering is another. The rise of the 
Magsi gang and his extortion demands were based on detailed information about their target, 
drawn from a network of informers (PB 32). In response, many young male Gujrati residents were 
killed in targeted attacks, accused of being Magsi informers, which was a factor in the gang’s 
decline (PB 31, PB 32; see PPF, 2012); Hussain Ghanchi, a Gujrati owner of a tyre-repair shop, was 
also killed on similar allegations (KIs; Perwaiz, 2012b).  
Demographic control was much less prevalent than in North Nazimabad or Lyari, but people did 
move out on an ethnic basis from certain locations. Many of the Muhajirs in Nishtar Basti 
(Pashtoon-dominated) opted to leave the settlement in the face of perceived or real threats; 
some sources blame ANP for the threats, noted Majeed (2012) of Pakistan Today, while others 
claim it was a voluntary process in the wake of perceived threats on an ethnic basis. Many 
residents of PIB Colony also moved out because of increasing extortion and continued violence, 
without specific group pressure. Likewise, several Baloch families from Suleiman Village and 
nearby also moved out as they feared violence between MQM and PAC activists, such as the 
regular exchanges of gunfire that had killed several young male Baloch residents (KIs). On one 
occasion according to KIs, Baloch representatives met the MQM Member of Parliament, Farooq 
Sattar, to imply that they were not linked with the Magsi gang and that the Baloch residents 
wanted an end to hostilities and to live peacefully (KIs).   
Control over resources forms the ultimate objective of competing groups in the settlement. The 
biggest issue facing PIB Colony residents from both the Magsi gang and ANP was extortion. On the 
other hand, the rise of ANP and PAC in the settlement was a threat to the gang’s political 
stronghold. In contrast, MQM men usually asked for Zakat or Fitra (religious donations/tax) or 
donations for the welfare wing of the party, rather than engaging in direct extortion, however, 
formal political control over the settlement forms a sufficient reward.   
Discussion 
PIB Colony differs from the two previous case studies for several reasons. It is located in the 
centre of the city, and the post-partition middle-income settlement evolved over time, 
incorporating the historic Baloch villages within the planned development. It is also one of the 
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best-served of the case studies for formal governance and services, so absence of formal 
structures is not the issue but rather the blurring of the formal-informal divide. Finally, it is an 
area where MQM first lost and then regained control. In some respects, it mirrors the story of 
Lyari and the evolution of local gangs into city-wide politico-criminal organisations. The residents 
of PIB Colony are not isolated from party politics, unlike F-UC2 in North Nazimabad, and so there 
are no neighbourhood/residents’ committees here. The Ismailies and the residents of informal 
settlements show the same pattern as seen in North Nazimabad in which Ismailies remain 
isolated from the larger community while residents of informal settlements take an active part in 
party politics. However, involvement in party politics is different from Lyari, as party politics 
revolves around service provision where MQM maintains monopoly, except for the period when 
the Magsi gang challenged MQM’s domination.  
The power dynamics in PIB Colony are a bit different than previous case studies. Political parties 
form the local-level (both lower and intermediate level) informal structure, while there is no 
neutral informal structure such as a neighbourhood committee. The religious-based informal 
structures are not that strong as compared to North Nazimabad except for  the Ismaili community 
that is almost isolated, due to locational and social reasons, and being a gated cooperative 
society. The controls have been violent but not that severe as compared to Lyari, the strict non-
physical controls, such as surveillance, resemble Lyari while physical barriers were not used. Lack 
of property controls also differentiates PIB Colony from other cases. However, the role of 
personal vendetta has been evident in the case of PIB Colony, e.g. the killing of Magsi’s brother 
and uncle and burning of his property, and the killing of MQM’s Unit in-charge. 
Resource control plays a central role in PIB Colony as well. MQM regained control because of its 
strong social legitimacy, based on a reputation of problem solving, ability to provide basic 
services, and as the saviour of Muhajirs from crimes attributed to other ethno-political parties; 
while Magsi, although powerful and resourceful, was unable to hold onto his position, despite 
violent control strategies. The case study also highlights that the better service provision was 
claimed by the party as its achievement, since the services are channelled through the party 
representatives, un-elected workers at Unit and Sector Offices, which both consolidated socio-
political control and blurred the formal-informal divide in service provision and urban 
management. In this case, the local level party representatives work as power-intermediaries that 
connecting residents to elected representatives, while government representatives also get 
political benefit out of this flexible system.  
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7.4 Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33 
7.4.1 Introduction 
This section explore the case of Gulzar-e-Hijri KDA Scheme 33 (termed Scheme 33), which is a 
peri-urban area that has been suffering from informal land controls, especially rent-seeking and 
land grabbing, for many years. The area is low-density and varies considerably in terms of physical 
and social characteristics; the area abutting Gulshan-e-Iqbal is fully developed while the outlying 
areas are still only partly built-up (Map 7.6).  
Scheme 33 is one of the largest housing schemes subdivided in the 1980s by the Karachi 
Development Authority (KDA), comprising 38,000 acres and almost 70,000 housing units (KDA, 
1984). Currently, it lies within the jurisdictions of Gadap Town and Gulshan Town, and, before 
boundary reorganisation lay, in East and Malir Districts. PS. 126 Provincial and NA. 253 National 
Constituency cover almost the whole scheme at the moment because of its sprawl. Scheme 33 is 
spread over an area along the Superhighway. 
 
Figure 7.3: Population distribution according to provincial/National constituencies of Case Study 
4. (Dawn-GIS[No date]) 
Until the late 1980s, Scheme 33 was underdeveloped and was inhabited mainly by Pashtoon rural 
migrants and Sindhi villagers (Appendix 7.5). During the 1990s as the city grew, other ethnic 
groups including Muhajirs moved into this area. More recently, during the 2000s, properties along 
the Superhighway have been favoured by Pashtoon investors in transport businesses who 
profited from trade, particularly NATO supplies to Afghanistan, as the area is cheaper with vacant 
269 | P a g e  
land (EC 3). With new power structures representing different ethnic groups, coupled with weak 
formal control over public resources especially land, 60% of the allocated vacant plots have been 
occupied illegally by groups of various affiliations (Hasan et al. 2013, p. 70-74; Box 7.1).  Box 7.1, 
explains a typical story of an expatriate who invested his hard earned money in buying property in 
Scheme 33 expecting better return and a place to live after retirement, however, many of the 
properties were grabbed as these remained undeveloped, and are not monitored by public 
agencies or the owners. 
The historical development has led to the presence of varied social groups, informal structures 
and, subsequently, informal controls and contest to control. In addition to the major political 
parties in the developed areas, other relatively powerful groups are also found in some of the 
older villages away from the Superhighway, include the Sindhis related to PPP and other Sindhi 
nationalist political parties (EC 2). However, several groups operate for rent seeking, especially 
land grabbing, beyond political and ethnic affiliations and attach themselves to the powerful 
groups or parties for mutual benefits. 
Box 7.1: A Muhajir expatriate’s experience of investing in property in Scheme-33 
One of the residents of KDA Scheme 33, is currently living in a developed private housing 
project “Gulshan-e-Maymar” falling within Scheme 33. He worked abroad intending to return 
to Karachi when he retired and start a property business. He bought several open plots in 
Scheme 33 and developed only one plot for his own family in Gulshan-e-Maymar. When he 
came back in 2000, he found all his plots occupied. The plots had boundary walls around them 
with nomadic families living in them. When he approached the families, armed men asked him 
to leave and when he showed his grief, the leader of the men came to meet him. The land 
grabber asked him either to sell the plots to him at very low prices or to pay the same money to 
get his plots released. The interviewee wanted a guarantee that they would not grab the land 
again if he paid money to release the plots, as he was in no position to develop or sell the 
properties. In the end, he did not agree to anything and came back. Later, the interviewee 
along with other owners of the occupied plots formed a group and filed a court case. To date, 
there was no outcome after 4 years, and the other property owners are now in a mood to 
agree to the land grabber’s deal. 
 
Scheme 33 shows an uneven development pattern and thus varied power dynamics. The 
developed areas of Scheme 33 abutting Gulshan-e-Iqbal are an interface between powerful 
groups including the Muhajir-MQM vs. Pashtoon-ANP and the Shia-Muhajir vs. Sunni-Pashtoon 
conflicts.  A monopoly of Pashtoon informal structures exists in areas near Sohrab Goth and along 
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the Superhighway. Thus, two sub-case studies are identified to understand the varying nature of 
informal land controls: 1) the fully developed part at ‘AHI Road and surroundings’, representing a 
contest between MQM versus ANP and Shia-Muhajir versus Sunni-Pashtoons, and 2) ‘Dawood 
Bungalows and surroundings’ located along the Superhighway, a suburban and developing part of 
Scheme 33, representing mainly Pashtoon informal structures of various affiliation (Map 7.6). 
 
Map 7.6: Location of Scheme 33 and its Sub-case studies 
7.4.2 Sub-Case Study 1: AHI Road and Surrounds 
The area of AHI Road and its surrounds is an example of power contest and divided territory 
between middle-income Muhajirs in the formally developed areas (formal areas) and the low 
income tribal Pashtoons in the informally developed areas (informal areas). This case 
demonstrates two types of power contestation and social conflict: the city-level power contest 
between MQM and ANP which affected this area from the mid-2000s to 2012-13, and the Shia-
Sunni sectarian conflict, as many Muhajirs are Shia and live in the Abbas Town ghetto-and-
surroundings abutting the Sunni Pashtoon ghetto of Sohrab Goth-and-surroundings. After 2013, 
the MQM-ANP conflict has largely subsided both in Karachi and Scheme 33, but the sectarian fault 
line is still active between Shia-Muhajirs and the Deobandi/Sunni-Pashtoons, which surfaces 
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during Shia religious processions or when there is a sectarian attack or killing involving either 
group.  
Fault lines of social divide and nature of conflicts 
Fault lines representing the power and social divides are evident in the built environment. The 
residents have a clear concept of such fault lines and their physical and non-physical boundaries. 
The political and sectarian power contests are reflected in two different zones with different 
socio-spatial conditions, termed Zone-I and Zone-II here.  
Zone-I represents the conflicting enclaves of Pashtoons vs Muhajirs at the central part of 
Metroville-III sandwiched between Sikandar Goth-and-surroundings and Baksh Ali Goth-and-
surroundings (Map 7.7). This area also accommodates, to some extent, a formal informal divide 
between the informal Sikandar Goth and its surrounds and Metroville-III, overlapping the social, 
economic and administrative divides involving two different land agencies, the Karachi 
Development Authority (KDA) and Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA). 
Zone-I has seen frequent night-time gun battles between MQM and ANP/other Pashtoon groups, 
as reported by key informant interviewees. The bridge crossing on Songal Nala, which abuts the 
informal residential area for families of martyred workers of MQM and links the Pashtoon-
dominated areas of Baksh Ali-Goth, is where pitched gun battles often take place (see Point A, 
Map 7.7). The bridge was a no-man’s-land during the conflict with a watch-and-ward system 
provided by warring groups on both sides. However, since the areas are mainly residential, the 
potential for rent-seeking is lower than Zone II where commercial activities predominate, KIs 
highlighted. 
Zone-II covers Abbas Town, Sohrab Goth-and-surroundings, and represents multiple conflict 
layers – the MQM-ANP conflict, the Shia-Sunni divide and the formal informal divide (Map 7.7). 
AHI Road near the junction with the Superhighway, opposite the Abbas Town entrance street, 
forms a dividing line between Shia-Muhajir and Sunni-Pashtoons.  Zone-II has been a conflict zone 
for a long time as Pashtoons are Deobandi-Sunni who, supposedly, oppose Shia ideology.  
Zone-II was affected during the 2007-2013 MQM-ANP conflict and saw regular street gun battles. 
The divide used to be evident during the MQM strike calls when AHI Road near the entrance of 
Abbas Town was sometimes blocked with tents (GH 28, GH 29). Similarly, during the MQM-led 
city government Sikandar Goth was to be bulldozed by the City Government (Younus, 2010, p.16-
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17), while opposition parties saved it and lobbied for regularised land ownership, so it became an 
anti-MQM stronghold both in terms of resident’s social groups and the informal structure 
controlling the territory. Press reports noted that the arrest of various criminals by police are 
connected to Pashtoon dominated political party (Ali, M. 2013), who were also reported to be 
involved in torture cells used to control political opponents (Dawn, 2013b69).  
 
Map 7.7: Socio-Spatial setting of Sub-Case study 1, Scheme 33 
Until the end of 2013, the Shia-Sunni violence escalated with violent attacks on Shia settlements; 
it was assumed that the Taliban had developed control over Sohrab-Goth ghetto, with gun battles 
supplemented by bomb blasts. The fiercest bomb blast took place in Abbas Town on 3 March 
2013 when a remote-control bomb was exploded near the Imam Bargah in front of an apartment 
building, killing around 50 and injuring more than 150, mostly Shia residents including women and 
children in their houses (The Express Tribune, 2013a). The police reportedly claimed that the 
culprits were linked to the Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) (Dawn, 2013a). One apartment complex was 
                                                          
69
 A torture cell was found in Sikandar Goth, allegedly, run by ANP.  
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totally destroyed but later rebuilt with government funding, The Express Tribune reported (2013b) 
(Map 7.7). 
Power contestation, its impacts and controls 
This section focuses on the power contestations and conflicts around AHI Road but does not 
explore cultural, religious, gender or ethnic controls which have been illustrated in Chapter 5 and 
6.  
Socio-spatial impacts and controls 
Ethno-political conflicts are characterised by political, access, demographic and property controls, 
in addition to rent-seeking which remains at the centre of all control mechanisms. Sectarian 
conflicts include demographic and access controls, and controls over religious amenities and 
rituals. 
Political controls are obvious and easy to enforce, as the population is divided on an ethnic basis. 
Opposition groups are resisted while carrying out political activities openly in other’s territory, 
and polling stations are controlled on polling day for favourable votes (KIs). 
 Access controls are usually evident at times of political conflict, religious gatherings, processions, 
and funerals. In Zone-I, political access controls are facilitated by the surveillance and watch-and-
ward systems used by political parties (GH 28). The division is particularly evident in Zone-II when 
the road is closed by tents, showing the territorial effect of a political strike call. Beyond the tents, 
business takes place as usual (GH 28). Access controls in Zone-II are also imposed during the 
Islamic month of Muharram, which the Shia community observe fervently with ritual gatherings 
and processions. During such rituals, Abbas Town observes strict access controls including barriers 
and surveillance especially around the Imam Bargah to avoid any security threat.  
Demographic control linked with property control has also been achieved through establishing 
new settlements and leasing property in informal settlements. As noted above, the majority 
political party-affiliated group, reportedly encroached on land along Songal Nala (Point ‘A’ on Map 
7.7) and developed housing for families of martyred party workers (KIs).  In Sikandar Goth, 
political control was established by getting the village regularised, thus winning support from low-
income groups. This village had been partly demolished, and was about to be fully demolished, by 
the MQM-led city government to support their vision of making Karachi a world class city by 
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transforming informal settlements into high-rise apartments, which would have resulted in a 
demographic change (Younus, 2010, p.16-17).  
Box 7.2: A Pashtoon resident’s experience of living in various parts of Scheme 33 
A key informant Pashtoon interviewee, before buying property in Dawood Bungalows had an 
experience of renting and buying properties in KDA Scheme-33. His experience as an educated 
Pashtoon, with a large family, gives insights into socio-spatial issues in the city.  
The interviewee, previously lived in a government house at a university as his father worked 
there. After his father’s retirement, the family had to move out. His father had a small amount 
of money that he got as gratuity after repaying all the loans he had. They bought a plot of 120 
sq. yds. in Sohrab Goth in KDA Scheme- 33 at a very low price.  
Metroville-III 
While in 2010 he was searching for a rental apartment in a better area. He searched in 
Metroville-III and eventually found an apartment in a Muhajir neighbourhood that was 
politically controlled by MQM. When he first met the owner to negotiate the deal he wore 
western cloths, and as he speaks good Urdu,  the owner thought he was a Muhajir so agreed to 
the deal. Later when the interviewee went to pay the security deposit, he was in traditional 
Pashtoon dress and was easily recognizable as Pashtoon, and the owner was reluctant to hand 
over the apartment. On assurance from the property broker about the interviewee’s honesty 
and manners and non-political background, the owner final agreed to the deal.  
A property in Sohrab Goth 
While renting, the interviewee found a very cheap plot behind Sohrab-Goth, a Pashtoon ghetto 
with crime and drug groups and more recently Taliban influence. The plot was sold by a land-
grabber related to ANP at much lower than formal market price. The interviewee bought it and 
kept it unbuilt, as he was arranging construction finance, given that being Pashtoon would give 
him an edge to be adjusted in the area and that his investment would be safe. Later on, he 
came to know that plots in the area, including his own, had been encroached upon by land 
grabbers from another political party (Sindhi nationalists), as ANP had lost its control over this 
area and had to close down its all offices due to Taliban threats. The interviewee went to find 
out what was happening but found armed men guarding the grabbed properties. The 
interviewee then asked for help from his Pashtoon friends who belonged to different political 
parties including ANP and Sipah-Sahaba, a banned Sunni-sectarian outfit, who went together in 
a group of 30 armed men and forced the land grabbers to leave. The leader of the land 
grabbers came and saw the power of the opponent group and offered to buy the land at the 
same price at which the interviewee originally bought it. The interviewee’s friends suggested 
he take the deal as the area is controlled by the land grabber, to avoid similar happening in 
future, so he sold the plot and later invested in a house in Dawood Bungalows. 
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At a local level, Muhajirs try to avoid renting or selling properties to Pashtoons, due to cultural 
differences and recent fears of political affiliations and property grabbing. As a result, neutral and 
higher-income Pashtoons face problems in renting in Muhajir-dominated neighbourhoods (Box 
7.2) and no Sunni-Pashtoon will want to live in Abbas Town, nor be able to get a property in the 
Shia-dominated area (GH 29). 
Rent seeking activities are common and the dominant political party is alleged to take money 
from residences as religious collections to support the party’s welfare wing, including demanding 
the valuable hides of sacrificed animals, zakat70 and fitra71 (KIs). 
Problem solving and welfare work is usually a mechanism of control but in these tense 
surroundings the main problem-solving activity is the provision of security to protégé groups, 
especially Muhajirs and Shias (KIs). The unit and sector offices of MQM involve in various such 
works as already explored in earlier case studies. 
7.4.3 Sub-Case Study 2: Dawood Bungalows and Surroundings 
Dawood Bungalows and its surroundings demonstrate monopoly over power in a peri-urban area 
along the Superhighway, one of the main expansion areas of the city (Maps 7.6 & 7.8), where 
Pashtoon ethnic groups exercise control.  
Dawood Bungalows is a housing project on the Superhighway around 2.5 Km from the junction 
with AHI Road. It is a gated community with 90 two-storey bungalows72 on 120 and 200 Sq. yd. 
plots. The neighbourhood includes several apartment complexes, gated cooperative housing 
societies and non-gated housing by private sector builders and developers. Most of the larger 
land parcels are still undeveloped (Map 7.8). 
                                                          
70
 Annual religious tax on Muslims, fulfilling prescribed financial criteria, to be given to individuals or 
organisations largely for the welfare purposes. 
 
71
 Money given by each affording individual during Ramadan but before Eid prayers day, to the poor with 
the purpose of their welfare and making them able to celebrate Eid. 
 
72
 Note: the term ‘bungalow’ in Karachi refers to a free-standing dwelling, usually single or double storey 
house. 
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Social hierarchy  
Dawood Bungalows and surroundings are mainly Pashtoon-dominated, but since properties were, 
and still are, quite cheap, middle-income Muhajir families have invested in it and during the late 
1990s started moving into the cooperative housing, gated communities and apartments. 
Pashtoons usually work in the employment zone along the Superhighway i.e. the restaurants, fuel 
stations and intercity transport, and at the nearby city’s wholesale fruit and vegetable market, or 
have businesses in the city but live here because of cheaper properties, family and tribal ties. 
Many Pashtoons in this area come from settled areas in northern Pakistan and are relatively used 
to urban living, but those from the tribal regions still follow tribal customs.  
 
Map 7.8: Dawood Bungalows and surrounding areas 
The locality is not completely developed and the area is too large for the local police to cover 
effectively or to face criminals with better training and weapons. Thus the area was dominated by 
Pashtoon informal structures as many areas experience weak government control and MQM was 
not active. However, from 2013 ANP lost control as the Taliban took over and threatened to close 
all ANP offices, and many criminals started operating independently or joined Taliban factions in 
exchange for a cut in profits, as found in North Nazimabad. Sindhi nationalist parties, or Sindhi 
Musclemen and groups claiming to be affiliated with them, are also active in several old Goths 
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who, in league with the revenue department, often grab and convert land and carry out illegal 
subdivisions and sell the plots (Hasan et al., 2013, 70-74). 
Monopoly of power and its controls 
The social hierarchy suggests a monopoly of Pashtoon ethnic informal structures over the area. 
There is no active concept of political parties for welfare; as there is a monopoly, there is no 
competition. Thus the need for political struggle is removed, on the local level and the focus is on 
rent seeking. 
The scale of availability of public resources, including land, serviced plots and services such as 
TV/Internet cable services have shaped politics and social relations in Dawood Bungalows and its 
surrounds. Wider political conflicts were exploited locally by thugs, criminal gangs and local party 
workers so that they could benefit personally from prevalent rent-seeking opportunities.  
Socio-spatial control mechanisms 
Pashtoon key informants provided insight into many socio-spatial control mechanisms within and 
around Dawood Bungalows during the post-2007 MQM-ANP conflict in the city. Dawood 
Bungalows’ 90 units were transformed from a mixed-ethnicity gated community to Pashtoon-
dominated housing within a few years. As ANP was in full control of the area until 2013, local 
Pashtoon musclemen joined ANP’s ranks, but after ANP’s loss of power in the city during 2013, 
these musclemen allegedly joined other criminal groups including the Pakistani faction of the 
Taliban. During this change, informal land controls were kept intact.  
During ANP’s control, KI informed, its affiliated musclemen threatened many of the Muhajir 
owner-occupiers of the newly developed Dawood Bungalows, and their properties were grabbed 
for further options of informal rent-seeking. They were either forced to sell legally at very low 
prices, or the grabbed properties were rented out, with the implicit option that the owner could 
return later after bargaining on higher payment of extortion money. Sometimes properties were 
sold using fake documents, usually to a Pashtoon, which meant that the new owner needed 
contract enforcement for the lifetime, and thus would remain subject to extortion, as happened 
to one interviewee. Co-opting property was thus more profitable than rent-seeking from the 
original Muhajir owners. 
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Threats of violence were widely used for rent-seeking endeavours. In surrounding housing 
projects, criminals would fire at people’s houses to depress the property values so that no-one 
would want to live there, and properties were then bought by the criminals to be sold at high 
prices later (EC 1). Residents were intimidated through threats of violence and the fear of losing 
property, and people with families were vulnerable as there was no political party, police or LEA 
to fight for their cause (GH 28). Examples of such ethnicity driven controls in the periphery were 
largely used by the dominant party in the city, as a narrative, to influence and threaten residents 
to support the party and its mechanisms against minority ethnic groups and parties, and to avoid 
such happenings in Muhajir settlements, including access control, attack and defence mechanisms 
and rent- seeking, as was observed in North Nazimabad and PIB Colony. 
Residents’ associations in Dawood Bungalows and surrounding apartment complexes were also 
compelled to pay for services which were not provided, for example, street cleaning and solid 
waste management. Cable TV and Internet services were also controlled by the group to benefit 
from these businesses. 
By 2013, when the MQM-ANP political rift had stabilised and ANP had shut down its offices in 
Karachi due to Taliban threats, the criminals changed affiliation and started to harass the 
Pashtoon inhabitants as well, especially those who were not powerful or politically connected. 
One Pashtoon interviewee was asked to give extortion money or leave the settlement as they 
claimed that his house was actually a grabbed property with fake documents. However, the 
interviewee found a more powerful Pashtoon sponsor and the threat was avoided. According to 
the interviewee, the party which backed him was a large tribal family with a substantial business 
which employs many men who form both a workforce and manpower – this family was more 
powerful in terms of manpower, money, political connections and arms and ammunition.  
The KIs said that the criminals now operate beyond ethnic or religious bonds, and will not hesitate 
to harm their ethnic or religious fellows. They have a permanent income from the inhabitants and 
from the residents’ associations of apartment complexes, collecting monthly sums for solid waste 
management, TV cable services, safety and security and general maintenance and management of 
these gated communities. Even after the recent Karachi Operation when many known criminals 
have been reportedly killed, lower level informal actors have taken their place in rent-seeking and 
control. 
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Discussion 
The case of Scheme 33 has highlighted an example of a peri-urban, developing area with rich 
public land resources influenced by various criminals and mafias with no consistent political 
affiliation. As with the other case studies, problems are heightened by the weak local government 
and intentional de-regulation by political actors for material and political gains. Exploitation and 
rent-seeking, especially land-grabbing, is at its most extreme in Scheme 33, as 60 percent of plots 
have been encroached as one study suggested (Hasan et. al, 2013, p. 70-74).  
Power dynamics in the developed part follows the same pattern as the case studies of North 
Nazimabad and PIB Colony with an extra layer of Shia-Sunni conflict, adding complexity to the 
existing city level Muhajir-Pashtoon ethnic conflict. In the Muhajir dominant areas, of the 
developed part, political parties form the local-level (both intermediate and lower-level) informal 
structures, and no identity based or neutral informal structures exist, while, in the Pashtoon 
dominant area Baradary based lower-level structures exist topped by the political party or 
banned outfits, such as the Taliban. The peripheral and under-developed areas show a monopoly 
of informal structures and widespread informal control over resources attributed to Pashtoon 
social identity. However, the objective of control over resources in the periphery transcends any 
identity boundaries; given that, the identities are fully exploited if it benefits the objective of rent 
seeking. The organised conflicts in the developed area are part of city-level power politics and 
related dynamics, while in the periphery, city level politics affects things to a low extent. 
The Shia-Sunni and Muhajir-Pashtoon divide is quite strong in both parts of the case study.This 
divide becomes evident when the rental properties are given to families from the same ethnicity 
as that of the owners. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed three different local-level case studies, Lyari, PIB Colony and Scheme 
33, which covered various geographical zones that were developed at different periods in 
Karachi’s history and featured a variety of social groups, conflicts and informal structures. The 
cases explored differed from each other and with North Nazimabad on various levels including 
methodology of data collection, reporting of facts, and anonymity (Section 7.1). They also differed 
in the nature of informal structures, communities and the prevalent informal controls, highlighted 
below. The variety of cases has helped in understanding the phenomena of informal land controls 
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in the diverse context of Karachi, and also these have added to the emerging themes, from 
theoretical framework and North Nazimabad case study, including power-society-space nexus, 
failure of state in service provision, formal-informal symbiotic relation, city to local-level 
connection, power intermediaries working from between and connection of violence with the 
informality.    
Lyari, the oldest part of the city having a majority Baloch population and with a strategic location, 
is conducive for all sorts of rent seeking. This case identified criminal groups as informal structures 
and reported the dynamics of transformation of local-level criminal groups into city-wide politico-
criminal structures by co-option of formal structures. Lyari also illustrated that city-level power 
contestation is played out at local level, however, local level informal structures in turn affect the 
city, as in the case of PAC. The case study highlighted the strong discourse around identity of the 
Baloch communities, who see themselves as owners of the city and the claimants of public 
resources, and thus argue that it is legitimate for them to use tactics to oust their opponents and 
dominate resources. Thus, the conflict appears to be about control over resources and an ethnic 
narrative, pursued through territoriality and violence. There is no identity-based alternative 
structure around Baradary or religion, unlike North Nazimabad; the gangs covers both the street-
level and wider territory and are sometimes linked to political parties and other gangs, but there 
is less of a hierarchy between informal structures in Lyari. Lyari has highlighted the most violent 
case with highest level of local conflicts, rent seeking, torture and killings. The study also found 
that for ordinary residents, ethnic differences are unimportant e.g. Baloch, Muhajir and Kutchi 
Memon do business together and have friendships, although employing someone from a different 
ethnic background whom an employer does not know can create concerns. 
PIB Colony, the post-partition government housing in the middle of the city with a majority of 
Muhajir population, demonstrates swings of power, where monopolistic MQM control was 
challenged by the Magsi gang but shifted back to an MQM monopoly. The majority party regained 
its control because of its strong social legitimacy and influential constituency, and while the 
powerful gangster, Magsi was able to threaten residents, he was unable to claim full control over 
the settlement, and thus, was soon ousted. Political parties in PIB Colony work at both the 
intermediate and lower-levels, while identity-based informal structures are not influential, 
especially in spatial terms like that in North Nazimabad, except for the Ismaili community that 
behave the same as in North Nazimabad. In addition, there are no neutral informal structures 
such as neighbourhood committees or NGOs providing services. In this case, the local-level party 
representatives work as power-intermediaries operating between government and residents. 
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Socio-spatial controls are not as strict as in North Nazimabad, and space is not compartmentalised 
in the larger area of PIB Colony reflecting the number of contenders who claim control, however, 
access control involving non-physical mechanisms operates more like Lyari than in North 
Nazimabad.  Here as well, common residents did not show a sense of antagonism towards other 
social groups, however, employing people from other social groups did create concerns about 
being targeted for rent-seeking. 
The two sub-case studies in Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA Scheme 33 – AHI Road and Dawood Bungalows 
and their surroundings – show how in the peripheral under-developed areas powerful groups are 
able establish monopolistic control over resources early in the development process, which 
transcends identity boundaries and is based on criminal extortion. In the developed part of 
Scheme 33, overlapping political, ethnic and sectarian identities were evident with related conflict 
in the case of Muhajir-Shia and the Pashtoon-Sunni groups and their related informal structures. 
In the developed areas there was concern about social mixing, for example Muhajir owners were 
reluctant to rent to Pashtoon tenants.  
The three case studies, apart from their differences, suggest various conclusions. First, each case 
study showed the presence of social divisions, reflected in space, corresponding to the presence 
of the variety of social groups with different political affiliations and social identities. Second, 
informal structures exist and influence the resident communities, legitimised either through 
ethnic or religious discourse, or on the basis of de facto monopolistic control, emphasizing the 
power-society-space nexus. Third, informal structures compete for public resources and pursue 
threatening or violent means to oust the competing groups, highlighting how informality leads to 
conflicts and violence. Fourth, case studies of Lyari and PIB Colony are characterised by a blurring 
of formal-informal boundaries and the formal-informal symbiotic relation, in that public funds are 
channelled through the political parties or informal structures for political benefits and electoral 
gain. Fifth, various control mechanisms are prevalent including land-grabbing, property-
sequestration, intimidation, rent-seeking and gang warfare; gangs are violent and the majority 
political party is violent when challenged, which brings forward connection between violence and 
informality. The general trend in all the case studies is that informal land controls are not 
dependent on the legality or illegality of the settlement but on the ability of the informal 
structures to establish and maintain street control, thus highlighting the limited role of formal 
land tenure, otherwise seen as basis of safety of tenure and provision of formal services, 
emphasising on the role of informal structures as guarantors of safety of tenure. 
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Chapter 8 
Final Discussion and Conclusions  
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8.1 Introduction and Summary 
This research was motivated by the rising informality, violence, segregation and territoriality in 
Karachi with a spate of killings along ethno-political lines, between 2000 till 2014, and aimed to 
explore the underlying influence of various actors such as the state, the market and various types 
of informal actors (termed informal structures) in this trend, in service provision and governance 
of segregated communities in Karachi.  
The thesis looked at the city-level in Karachi to examine the structural and policy reasons 
underlying the conflicts, and then examined how they are played out at local-level – through four 
case studies of North Nazimabad, Lyari, PIB Colony and KDA Scheme 33 – to highlight how such 
city-level processes are operationalised.  The thesis defines two core concepts to explore the 
issues identified; first, the concept of informal land controls, the means through which spatial 
segregation is achieved, and second the role of informal power structures, the political, ethnic and 
religious power intermediaries which promote segregation, examined further in Section 8.2.  
The research followed a critical realist epistemology that emphasises understandings of reality 
through understanding background relations, structures and mechanisms, and used a deductive-
inductive hybrid methodology (Chapter 3). Under the hybrid approach, the literature review 
provided the theoretical basis and  framework for the exploration, while the empirical evidence 
added contextual learning, specifically about the hierarchies of informal structures from city to 
the local-level and the connection with political and the identity based groupings such as tribal 
and religious based informal structures. The empirical evidence led the research to induced that 
the political claims over resources are operationalised through identity based power politics and 
control mechanisms ‘from between’ connecting both the state and the citizens, further explained 
below. 
The thesis adds to the body of knowledge by addressing two main gaps in the literature explored; 
first, it explored the concept of informality and formality in land and urban development, beyond 
the conventional formal/informal divide in land tenure, as extending to a broad swathe of urban 
development, security and service provision related to the nature of the power structure that 
controls it and provides services. The findings suggest that both areas with formal and informal 
land tenure are experiencing informal land controls. Thus, this also suggests that informality could 
be defined through the status of the controller and service provider to the settlements under 
study, i.e. informal, if informal controls and informal structures are operational irrespective of the 
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land titles and tenure. Second, the thesis challenges the binary view that processes of informality 
are either ‘from above’ (due to state failure, capitalist processes and neo-liberal policies), or ‘from 
below’ as an entrepreneurial project of the poor, the findings suggest that informality is a 
‘symbiosis’, and ‘continuum’ operationalised by ‘power intermediaries’ who work ‘from between’. 
Informal structures behave as ‘intermediaries’ between the two extremes of state and poor 
communities, using both formal and informal channels to usurp a weak state and gain power for 
themselves. 
8.2 Research Objectives and Questions  
This section presents the findings of the thesis and is structured according to the research 
questions. 
Defining informal land controls 
Chapter 2 reviewed an extended body of literature covering concepts and theories around 
informality, production of space, power and socio-spatial controls, broadly addressing the first 
research question:  
1) Drawing on a literature review, how can the concept of informal (non-state) land controls 
be formulated and theorised, and their operation be understood? 
The overall critical discussion draws on the concept of ‘social production of space’, conceptualised 
by Lefebvre (1974), to understand informal land controls. While Lefebvre concentrated on ‘social 
factors and space’, the review suggests that the role of power, originally seen as embedded within 
the social role in construction of space, be considered as a separate factor. Analysing power as a 
separate factor enabled a better understanding of informal structures and formed a basis to 
analyse power structures beyond the state and the market. The resulting power-society-space 
nexus is helpful in linking the actors and processes involved in informal land controls, considered 
through this research, and were used to shape the analysis of the fieldwork.  
The concept of ‘informal land controls’ was the central concept examined in this thesis, which has 
not been widely covered in academic debates. However from the literature review, informal land 
controls were defined as those that: establish control over people and productive assets, both 
physical and non-physical, by delimiting a geographic area through visible and invisible boundaries 
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of influence, wielded by individuals or groups in intense competition. Such competition embraces 
preserving and practising culture, religion or political ideologies, and claiming control over physical 
or financial assets such as informal rent and votes, through bounded territoriality, brought about 
through various social and spatial control mechanisms that range from benign to violent.  
Analysis of the role of ‘informal power structures’ (informal structures) was essential to explore 
the operation of informal land controls. Such ‘informal power structures’ are understood to 
reflect the concept of “substitute power” proposed by Goldhammer and Shils (1939, 174) which 
substitutes for government-held power and operates ‘from between’, spanning both formal and 
informal urban development processes. Such substitute power can be held by either 
organisations or individuals, both legally legitimate organisations such as political parties, or illicit 
structures such as organised crime groups. There are many types of power-holders ‘between’ 
these two extremes, which draw legitimacy from various domains including: “tradition” e.g. tribal 
structures consisting of elders; “discourse” e.g. by religious authorities, or “charismatic 
personalities”, such as individuals with resources and social or religious standing, criminals such as 
drug gangs, and neutral power structures such as neighbourhood committees, civil society 
organisations and NGOs. 
Politicisation of city-level structural and policy agendas 
Chapter 4 examined the structural and policy reasons from wide spread use of informal land 
controls, broadly examining the second research question: 
2) What are the city level dynamics (or structural reasons) behind the operation of informal 
land controls in Karachi? 
In the context of ethnic and sectarian polarisation in Karachi, the research traces the diminishing 
role of the state in housing delivery, policing and security provision, especially in low and middle-
income areas. The findings confirm the analysis by Roy (2005), which suggests that informal urban 
development is both a failure of urban planning processes, but is also a deliberately used by the 
state and its representatives as a “government tool” and “negotiable value” (Weibel and 
McFarlane, 2012) helping to “deregulate” rather than un-regulate, and maintaining flexibility in 
urban development processes through blurring the formal-informal divide for political and 
financial gain (Roy, 2009).  
286 | P a g e  
At city-level, the findings suggest that, lacking devolution of power and decision making e.g. delay 
in local government elections, systems of local government enhancing provincial and national 
political influences and related power politics resulted in a rise of informality and the use of 
formal institutions as an exploiting and negotiating tool. The current polarised socio-spatial 
pattern of Karachi has various origins, including migrations, planning decisions, widespread 
informality in the housing sector and violence related to security concerns. Politics became 
aligned with ethnic and religious identities, with intensive electoral competition over identity-
based enclaves, and conflict amongst ever-increasing claimants over public resources.  
Thus, Karachi represents a “contested city” with resources available for grab and exploitation 
(Gayer, 2014) where various levels – federal, provincial and city level – with political interests 
collide around the control of resources. This competition results in the use of power politics with 
the aim to access formal powers and oust opponents. Power politics is played out at both the city 
and the local-level and in formal and informal domains. In the formal domain, played out at city 
and provincial level, control over government remains the core objective to be achieved through 
electoral politics, following all sorts of policy measures, e.g. reverting back to elected local 
governments and delaying elections by the provincial government to oust the opponent parties in 
the city government. Similarly, delimitation of electoral constituencies, control over decision 
making, development, planning and service provision institutions, also play a crucial role. 
The success of power politics in the informal domain requires efficient, unencumbered processes, 
a loyal following, and the ability to enforce contracts, access formal processes, and impose 
territorial controls, explored in the later section.  The outcomes are often violent, and 
extrajudicial killings are common, but as Gayer (2014, p.13) observed, such conflicts never cross 
the line to become a city level civil war due to the presence of ‘regulatory mechanisms’ that 
ensure order within visible disorder. The fieldwork suggests that such ‘regulatory mechanisms’ 
are found in the relationship between informal structures, once they have established territory 
and are confident of their power and income base. Although the capacity of state institutions has 
diminished over time due to politicisation and corruption, and an anti-poor bias is evident in the 
policies, conversely the market is functioning well, and there is no real political pressure for state 
reform. Thus, state policies and institutions are used to access public resources and oust 
opponents in competition. Finally, the absence of elected local government incorporating all the 
social groups, and loss of effective local service provision, security and oversight creates space for 
informal structures to adopt state-like characteristics including spatial sovereignty, service 
provision and security patrols and gain benefits of funding, power, and legitimacy. 
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Informal structures and land controls at the local-level 
North Nazimabad was chosen as the detailed case study because of the extent of its socio-spatial 
segregation and complexity of segregation on the ground (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 5 looks at 
the power and social dimensions and their operation in North Nazimabad, exploring the operation 
of informal structures and their power base.  Chapter 6 explores the spatial dimensions of 
territoriality in North Nazimabad. These were reinforced by more limited case studies in Lyari, PIB 
Colony and KDA Scheme 33, to examine the spatial aspects of control in a central, city centre and 
peripheral area (Chapter 7). Together these address the third research question – summarised as 
follows: 
3) Through case studies of different districts in Karachi, representing different enclaves 
(exhibiting both spatial segregation and political/ethnic tension), how are informal land 
controls played out? Who are the main actors and what are the main mechanisms of 
control?  
As at city-level, at local-level, the formal-informal boundaries and the interplay of structure and 
agency are equally blurred. Political parties contest control of city resources, accumulate their 
power from the local-level, banking on already existing tribal, ethnic, religious or sectarian 
informal structures, and criminal groups such as land mafias also join in the contest to offer 
‘protection’ and develop a different kind of patron client relation in the field of city-level politics.  
The evidence suggests that territory-making through the operation of informal land controls 
forms the core tool for claiming control over social groups and productive assets, as Sack (1983) 
highlights. This territory-making takes place as part of the intense competition to oust opponents 
(Peluso and Lund, 2001). In addition, keeping territory intact requires the ability to defend against 
threat, and thus “attack and defence mechanisms”, highlighted by Tilly (2004), are integral to 
territorial claim and boundary definition.   
A fascinating finding of the research is that, although the informally developed areas had been 
formalised through issue of land titles many years ago, many other aspects of informal service 
provision remain.  For example, water provision on the hill in North Nazimabad was much worse 
than in the formally planned areas, due to illegal extraction, but a water committee of elders from 
various communities ensured at least some equality in its distribution. Nevertheless, conflicts 
amongst communities are more common in informal areas of the case study, as residents are 
have less connections and knows little about the cumbersome formal processes and also  their 
resources are limited, e.g. in Lyari and I-UC2 of North Nazimabad. Conflicts are far fewer in formal 
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areas. Whereas, conflicts are common between informal structures representing formal areas and 
structures representing informal areas, this pattern is found throughout the case study areas e.g. 
North Nazimabad, PIB Colony and KDA Scheme 33.  
Territory-making exacerbates segregation, either by ‘inclusion’ or by ‘exclusion’. Such territories 
or ‘ghettoes’ can be the location for social contest including social unrest, crime or violence 
(Vaughan and Arbaci, 2011). Implicit in the definition of territoriality is the issue that the group or 
individual claiming the control is not always benign. The case of Lyari is a good example as the 
controlling groups target illicit rent-seeking and violence as the main tool of control. In contrast, 
the monopolistic political control in PIB Colony showed a welfare angle when the controller was 
the service provider, although public services are channelled through informal processes. 
‘Inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ practices remained evident in all the formal areas of the case studies, 
violent in some such as in Lyari, while benign in others such as in the Bohri Neighbourhood of 
North Nazimabad where territoriality is achieved through purchase of properties at above-market 
rates.   
Identity is a core element of territory-making, as discourse around religion and ethnicity plays a 
vital role as the subject “internalises” the control (Durkheim, 1969; Piaget, 1969; Foucault, 1977, 
1982) and thus, ‘external’ measures to control the people are not required, for example the use of 
religious discourse and ethnic narrative that lead individuals to take action, such as property 
purchase by the Bohri community. Similarly, PAC’s claim as the owner of the city challenging 
MQM is another example.  
The ideology and identity of an informal structure in an area is closely linked to the social identity 
of the group living in their territory. For example in I-UC2 of North Nazimabad, all the Pashtoon 
communities, irrespective of their internal differences, support Pashtoon political parties, while 
religious groups direct their followers’ social lives, e.g. in Bohri and Balti Shia communities in 
North Nazimabad, and Ismailies in North Nazimabad and PIB Colony. Territories reflects identities 
and are also relative, and thus, overlap and form hierarchies of identities. As noted above, various 
factional Pashtoon groups in North Nazimabad unite as one territorial entity in politics against the 
identity-based territory of Muhajirs represented by MQM. Thus, territories behave as an entity 
beyond the physical dimensions operating as a combined, yet complex, construct of social groups, 
physical and administrative boundaries and the controls enforced by informal structures. The 
territory-making is also reflected in myriad ways, involving social and spatial dimensions, leading 
to space production. 
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Furthermore, the social groupings in informal areas are far more active than in formal areas, 
where residents avoid political affiliation but may form apolitical neighbourhood committees to 
solve their problems, and residents do not challenge the street control of the controlling political 
party. This is the case, for example, in North Nazimabad and PIB Colony. Conversely in informal 
areas of North Nazimabad, community ties supersede political ties and political leaders are 
usually community leaders. Thus conflict between political parties and the community is never a 
problem.  
Although in most areas of the case studies there were competing informal structures, there are 
also examples of monopolistic controls such as in the case of PIB Colony and Dawood Bungalows 
in Scheme 33. Monopolistic controls either lead to very good service provision and blurring of 
formal informal divides e.g. in PIB colony, or they show no benefits for identity-based residents 
and function purely for rent-seeking, such as in Lyari and in Dawood Bungalows, Scheme 33. 
Informal land control mechanisms 
Informal structures, including political parties, use force, rhetoric, discourse and intimidation to 
delineate and control territory and exercise power. Various measures are employed including: 
control over services such as water and electricity; intimidation by vigilante groups; establishment 
of sectarian religious centres and schools; setting up informal road blocks and gates, flags and 
wall-chalking; and control over property purchase. These measures are already defined here as 
informal land control mechanisms (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). Such mechanisms are used in efforts to 
oust opponents that may involve conflicts, attack and defence mechanisms and violence. 
Together these combine to exacerbate social and spatial segregation and exclusion, particularly in 
low-income and informal settlements, underpinning ethnic and political tension, violence and 
segregation (Figure 8.2). 
Violence is also used as a mechanism of influence during political bargaining, along with its use to 
oust the opponents and claim territorial control. In addition, apparently, the uncontrollable 
violence is found to be a controlled mechanism, suggesting hidden regulatory mechanisms and 
structures that ensure an ‘order’ in this given larger visible ‘disorder’ (Gayer, 2014). Violence has 
influenced the demography of settlements to a large extent and in turn has consolidated 
territorial divides and controls (EC 1, EC 6).  
Different control mechanisms were observed at varying degrees in the case study areas. These 
have been discussed in this chapter within various discussions.  
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The city to local-level connection 
The empirical evidence (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) suggests that there are two scales at which the 
informal structures and informal land controls operate (Figure 8.1). First at the city-level 
mechanisms of power politics involve political parties, formal governance structures, various tiers 
of elected government and the formal private sector (Section 2.4.3 & Figure 2.2). Second at the 
local-level, there are various identity-based informal structures such as Baradary-based and 
religious structures, and some criminal informal structures such as drug gangs and land mafias. 
There are also more neutral informal structures e.g. NGOs and neighbourhood committees. The 
local-level can further be divided into two levels; the intermediate or district-level embracing 
several communities and informal structures (political parties are mostly found at this level), and 
the neighbourhood-level, covering the streets and the smaller communities, in which identity-
based, neutral and criminal informal structures operate. These hierarchies have been explored in 
the North Nazimabad case study (Figure 5.1 & 6.1).The political party offices also work at the 
lower-level where no identity-based structure is strongly entrenched (Table 5.3). Many of the 
neighbourhood informal structures operate under the hierarchy or control of district-level 
informal structures, usually political parties, or try not to challenge their street control (Section 
5.3).  
The city to local-level connection is also highlighted by Gayer’s (2014) analysis that the conflict in 
Karachi over more than a decade has never reached the intensity of a civil war. Despite the 
graveness of the issues identified, Gayer (2014, p. 4-5) sees an order in this apparent disorder. 
This makes it possible for people to live, survive and enjoy life, despite the widespread violence, 
owing to invisible rules, and regulatory mechanisms that keep conflicts under control. Gayer notes 
however that, “such chronically violent social configurations retain a part of uncertainty and 
fluidity that prevent routines for the management of violence from evolving into a full-blown 
habitus.” (2014, p. 4). Gayer (2014, p.13) borrows a term ‘institutional fabric’, covering the actors 
and factors involved, including their ideology and dynamics of working, in many regulatory 
mechanisms. It is these regulatory mechanisms and order, or a veiled institutional and socio-
spatial pattern, that controls the city which this thesis seeks to understand.  
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Figure 8.1: Informal structures, from city to the local-level connection 
Based on the empirical evidence, Figure 8.1 and 8.2 highlight the flow of connection from the city 
to the local-level. The informal structures at the city-level operationalise in informal domains to 
produce space at the local-level. Such operations work in three domains i.e.: social and spatial 
controls; service provision catering to identity as well as service needs; and informal structures 
drawing on  existing identity-based structures (e.g. in North Nazimabad, political parties operate 
at district level but draw support from existing tribal and religious informal structures). 
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Figure 8.2: Informal land controls, from city to the local-level 
 
The research identifies that the outcomes of informal land controls vary with scale. At the local-
level the people can get problems solved, collaborate to get services, develop collective security 
measures, and in some cases access land for housing, e.g. on the hill in North Nazimabad. Local-
level territorialisation has brought similar people together, especially minority groups such as 
Christians, Shia, Bohri and Imailies, and has allowed them to follow their beliefs without fear. 
Conversely, at the city-level such territories have led to segregation and to conflict and violence, 
and also it has further weakened state control, e.g. no-go-areas like Lyari.  
 8.3 Theoretical Propositions and Policy Recommendations 
This research study is contextually embedded and has used a case study methodology, which 
theoretically limits the possibility of generalisation of the conclusions, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Although the nature of informal land controls are context specific, the background dynamics, 
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including objectives and how informal structures, society and space are linked, have yielded some 
important general conclusions. There is always a possibility of a theoretical conclusion, out of case 
study research, that could form the basis for other research exercises (Yin, 2009, p. 15, 43). In 
fact, the theorisation process and the emphasis on a critical realist approach, to look beyond the 
immediate events, has led to the possibility of various theoretical propositions.  
Contribution of deductive-inductive hybrid model  
The deductive-inductive hybrid approach was helpful to form an initial theoretical framework to 
guide the empirical research, while the empirical evidence suggested looking at the various scales 
of informal structures and at various levels they operationalise from city-level to the local-level. 
The approach added to the hypothesis that the segregations and conflicts are around control of 
resources at the city-level involving political power actors, while these conflicts are 
operationalised at the local-level using the existing identity based social groupings thus, the 
reasons for conflicts rest with the leadership and not the common citizens who suffer the most. 
This scaler split is also evident in impacts of informality and informal structures; informal 
processes and informal structures are found to be useful at the local-level in the provision of 
goods and services, however, the overall impact on the city is negative in the form of territoriality, 
segregation and violence. 
8.3.1 Theoretical and Empirical Data Contributions 
This study has contributed to the body of knowledge in two ways, first in terms of theoretical 
contribution and second, empirical data in terms of documentation of the context and ensuing 
processes under study including informal land control mechanisms. 
The theoretical contribution are mostly falling under the larger head of informality, related 
structures and processes, while, power-society-space nexus is the overall theoretical contribution 
that is able to explain many processes including informality, informal land controls, informal 
structures, informal settlements, and connected issues of violence.  
Informality 
The study has contributed to informality in two respects, first by validating existing concepts 
through empirical evidence, secondly by introducing new concepts.  
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Literature review-guided theoretical framework looked at informality as failure of the state in the 
provision of goods and services; the empirical evidence from Karachi on city scale and on local-
level case studies has validated this notion. However, the literature fails to explain, who fills the 
gap in formal service provision? The study concludes that various informal structures, ranging 
from political parties, structures around Baradary and religion, fills that gap by providing goods 
and services.  
Another important theoretical contribution is that; such informal structures work from ‘between’ 
contributing to informality, contrary to the popular notions, which explain informality either from 
‘above’ or from ‘below’. However, the variety of informal structures explored are found to be 
connected to the formal structures (above) directly or indirectly and at the same time have a clout 
among the common citizens (below) either due to cultural, political or religious reasons. Evidence 
also suggests that such informal structures blur the formal-informal boundary to channel state 
funds and resources through informal channels and provide to the affiliated social groups to claim 
for legitimacy. This also suggests that informality is not an isolated process but forms a symbiotic 
relation with formality. 
The study also added to the much overlooked aspect of informality i.e. its nuanced nature in 
connection with the violence, segregation and divisions. Informality, in literature, is either blamed 
on the formal processes or is taken as self-help project and achievement of the poor, and also 
romanticisation of informality is evident. It is found that when the state is weak and is unable to 
provide services, such functions are taken over by informal structures, the more the informal 
structures more the competition over limited resources. This competition makes the informal 
structures to attain more power to be able to appropriate more public resources and also to oust 
the competitors, this also leads to develop territories and vie for spatial sovereignty. This struggle 
often leads to overstepping ones boundary and violating competitor’s territory, both in spatial 
terms and in terms of resources, often leading to conflict and violence. All the case studies has 
shown this pattern, more specifically, Lyari and PIB Colony have been far more violent in the 
background of informality.    
Given the last two nuanced outcomes of informality mentioned above, it is important to note the 
productive nature of informal structures and informality; such structures are providing services to 
the people very efficiently on the local-level. Analysis has already identified that the outcomes of 
informality are variable on two scales, on the local-level; people are catered well by providing 
various services including land and security. Whereas, on the city-level; informality has led to 
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other nuanced results, including segregation and violence. The role of informal structures that is 
embedded in daily lives of the people is really important; who work from ‘between’ to provide 
services in the given context of diverse social groups. The working dynamics and connection with 
people makes such informal structures successfully govern people. Thus, policy recommendations 
are required to learn and benefit from such structures while avoiding any negative impacts on the 
city-level. Such policy recommendations are made in the next section. 
Formal land tenure has been over emphasised in the informality literature as the basic step 
towards security of tenure and to access formal services, the evidence suggests otherwise. Formal 
tenure has limited value in the context of weak state and strong informal structures. In fact, in 
such contexts, formal and informal settlements both experience informal land controls while the 
provision of services is ensured by informal structures or the resourceful residents who come 
together to form associations such as neighbourhood committees. In this background, 
redefinition of informal settlement could also be suggested; formal or informal settlement should 
be defined in terms of their controlling and service providing structure, if the settlement is 
formally serviced and not influenced by informal structures than it should be regarded as formal 
settlement and vice versa. This definition has an ability to make the governments to rethink about 
their performance and control over the city, and could be used as a parameter to persuade 
governments to provide better services and controls rather than limiting themselves to formal 
tenure for political benefits. 
Power-society-space nexus 
One of the major theoretical contributions is the identification of power-society-space nexus. This 
relation has led to look beyond the observable events such as; informality, violence and 
territoriality to understand the background relations instrumental in such processes. From already 
explained concepts of informal land controls to informal structures, and from territoriality to 
redefinition of informal settlements based on the nature of the power structure, and from 
violence to segregation, all are explained through this nexus.   
Power-society-space nexus suggests controlling power, affiliated social group and the space, all 
three are connected. A complete power-society-space nexus gives rise to a territory in socio-
spatial terms in which the extents of power of the controller of territory, or extents of the 
community, define the boundary. While the nature of that territory depends on the nature of the 
controlling structure and the social group affiliated, e.g. Ranger’s controlled area in North 
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Nazimabad represents formal settlement that is formally serviced, while other case studies show 
varying intensities of informal controls irrespective of formal or informal land tenure. It is in this 
background it is suggested to re-define informal settlements with respect to controlling and 
service providing structure, either informal, formal-public or formal-private. 
Power-society-space nexus is materialised through control mechanisms that range from social 
control mechanisms, to spatial control mechanisms. In the background of territoriality and socio-
spatial controls, the nexus is able to explain socio-spatial divisions, conflicts and violence. Thus, 
power-society-space nexus is able to explain the background relations and actors responsible for 
the observable events, as per critical realist approach. 
Empirical contribution 
This study has contributed substantially in terms of empirical data on Karachi, especially the case 
study areas of North Nazimabad, PIB Colony and Scheme 33. These case areas have not been 
explored in detail previously both in socio-spatial terms. Whereas, documentation of specific, 
informal structures, spatial context, and related socio-spatial control mechanisms are 
contributions that might also lead to further research.     
8.3.2 Policy Recommendations 
Conclusions highlight a need of policy interventions in improving governance to address service 
provision at the local-level yet avoid territoriality and violence on the city-level. In addition, it is 
also required to learn from the context and respect the cultural and religious sensitivities of the 
communities and the way these translates into local-governance in order to avoid forcing new 
and conflicting systems of governance. 
Given that the violence is endemic, but has not degenerated into outright war, the critical issue is 
how this can be addressed. Two policy recommendations are evident. First there is a strong need 
for improving service providing institutions, secondly, for an impartial city government in the 
polarised socio-political and spatially segregated context of Karachi. Thirdly, there is a need to 
look at informal structures and their role at neighbourhood level as they hold potential for 
grassroots level self-governance. These are further discussed below.  
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Revival of institutions and mixed community development 
Empirical evidence suggests that the city needs a formal structure without a political or identity 
based bias, to ensure the rule of merit. This could be looked at two levels, first the service 
providing institutions, and second the elected local government.  
Regarding the service providing institutions, de-politicisation in staffing and allocation of funds, 
for development, require special emphasis.  De-politicisation of the LEAs especially the police in 
Karachi would be a giant leap forward. This also requires looking at  various service provisions 
agencies in the city, by examining what kind of services the informal structures are providing, and 
what is lacking on formal structure’s behalf. This specifically requires intervention in relation to 
land and housing, including strict control and easy availability of land and housing for the poor, 
which will ensure avoidance of exploitative controls of informal structures.  
Future policy interventions in planning are also needed to ensure mixed community development 
in new areas, both on  economic and identity basis. Provision of housing for all the income groups 
in a cohesive manner through an appropriate strategy could ensure heterogeneous communities 
living together  and will discourage the development of identity based enclaves and gated 
communities, and will avoid further segregation in the city.  
Revival of local government and assimilation of informal structures  
First and foremost, the city needs a local government system that could address the issues of the 
common citizen. The SLGO 2001 based system atleast ensured representation of all the socio-
economic groups of the city, although, due to the diverse socio-political context, it also added to 
the resentment in the minority groups. The local government should acknowledge the ground 
realities such as Baradary system and religious leadership and should incorporate such structures 
to assimilate and formalise in a way that it does not lead to further segregation and exploitation.  
Along with many authors and experts on the city, the researcher concludes that  informality, 
driven by informal structures, has made up for the deficit of goods and services to the poor at the 
local-level. Keeping in view the negative impacts on the city, in the form of segregation and 
violence, informal structures hold out great promise in the governing of, and service provision to 
communities as a sort of substitute local government. The connection of informal structures with 
their communities is surprisingly strong and result oriented. In addition, the links of such informal 
structures with government representatives, in formal or illicit forms, is also revealing. 
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Furthermore, the hierarchy and the cooperation between different identity-based informal 
structures, e.g. in North Nazimabad is a good example for local governance.  
In this critical connection, local government system needs to be established with more devolved 
powers at Union Council level, and Union Councils could e even be further subdivided to 
strengthen links to the grassroots and ensure that each community, through their representatives 
or leaders, to ensure they have a say in development decisions. More importantly, powers need 
to be devolved as much as possible to the ward level. Such devolution of powers may include 
housing, tax, transport and other basic needs involving development decision making, to enure 
the adequate local service provision. This could also benefit from delimitation of electoral 
constituencies on community basis rather than on fixed geographic basis, giving priority to social 
aspect rather than physical dimension of space. 
 It is important to understand that, as evidence suggests, conflict arises when there is a 
competition over territorial controls and where there are un-clear boundaries. It is recommended 
that to align electoral constituencies according to social groupings, so that minority groups don’t 
consider themselves to be ruled by ‘others’ and the cultural sensitivities remain intact. There are 
two issues attached with this policy proposal; first on the local level, how to avoid exploitative 
nature of the community leaders, secondly, on the city-level, how to avoid resentment in the 
majority political group? The first issue could be resolved by the initial proposal for de-
politicisation of the service provision institutions that will make sure to provide services to all 
without any political influence. Second, the electoral constituencies or the overall system should 
not disturb the city-level political dominance of the majority group, this could be ensured either 
on the basis of election of City Mayor on city level or by overall votes cast for the party. Many 
other permutations could also be identified. The guiding principal should be to minimise 
informality and competition over access to public resources informally, services should be 
available to all formally. 
Limitation, Future Research possibilities  
The literature reviewed has identified several gaps to be taken up in further research. Firstly, the 
literature on informality lacks attention to the role of informal actors and informal power 
structures that would show a different side of informality contrasting with the romanticised 
concept of it as ‘people’s creative response’. Secondly, it has been shown that the informality in 
the housing sector has not considered the concept of production of space, especially in 
299 | P a g e  
connection with the role of informal power structures. Thirdly, specific mechanisms of control 
seem to be the least explored part of the informality literature  related to the production of 
space. This research particularly tried to look at these gaps in the limited context of Karachi, but 
there is a need to research other contexts to further examine the operation of informal land 
controls. 
There have been certain methodological limitations as well, already discussed in Chapter 3. Firstly, 
the research limits itself to only a few types of actors as part of the issue, i.e. political parties, 
local-level religious groups and community organisations. The research does talk about the gangs 
in Lyari and about banned religious outfits, but is based on secondary sources because of security 
concerns. Several important actors have not been considered in detail, such as the recent 
phenomena of the rise of Taliban and other sectarian organisations that developed no-go-areas 
for the LEAs. There is huge scope to look into such actors, their welfare work and informal land 
controls. Secondly, the experience of women in relation to territorial control could not be 
explored because of social restrictions.  
8.5 Recent Political Developments in Karachi 
Two weeks before this thesis was submitted on 5 December 2015, local government elections in 
Karachi had finally been held to reinstate Union Councils (now called Union Committees73). 
However, structural change may be far away. MQM is about to come back to formal power at city 
level after 7 years; as they emerged as the winning political party in all the Districts with 
maximum Union Councils win (132 out of 209). However, it is yet to be seen how much power will 
be vested in the Mayor of Karachi, and in practice how much of their current urban management 
power the Provincial government will agree to devolve (Chapter 4). Second, the most violent 
period of Karachi started in 2001 when MQM formed a majority local government, which 
fomented resentment.  It has yet to be seen how political bargaining unfolds and how it impacts 
the political relations between various power-groups in the city, after MQM’s take over the city.  
The  Karachi Operation suppressed violence in the city more recently (Khan, 2015c), but peace 
may be transient as structural issues remain unresolved, such as the  use of power politics, 
                                                          
73
 The recent local government elections 2015, followed different electoral constituencies and 
terminologies as compared to previously use under SLGO 2001. Now there are 6 districts and the lowest 
division is called Union Committee (UC), although current boundaries of current UC are the same as the old 
ones.  
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politicisation of institutions, corruption, and lacking formal service provision in housing and utility 
services. Citizens still have to resort to informal structures to access the services or to get their 
problems solved. This shows that, once the pressure from the LEAs is removed, the city might 
bounce back to the same violent situation. The conclusion of this research is that non-criminal 
informal structures will need a role in local-level governance and security operations if effective 
peace-building is to succeed. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the empirical evidence endorses the initial hypothesis, with a few caveats. The 
emergence of socially and ethnically distinct enclave-based spatial structures in the formal 
domain of Karachi is to a significant extent a result of historical migration waves coupled with 
formal planning decisions and various development schemes. Moreover, the emergence of 
socially segregated informally developed areas has been largely influenced by rural social 
structures such as Pashtoon tribal structures and minority religious structures such as Christians. 
However, post 1980s, the socio-spatial segregation has consolidated and boundaries have 
emerged between various socio-spatial groups. This was, and is, a result of state failures in the 
provision of goods and services, such as security and housing, creating political and social space in 
which informal power structures emerged to fill this gap. Such informal power structures included 
political, religious, ethnic and other actors, which used informal land controls to define and 
delimit territory through establishment of perceptual and actual boundaries. The result has been 
rising social and spatial segregation, especially in low-income settlements, exacerbating ethnic 
and political tensions and violence. 
The conclusion reached by the research also suggests that power is an essential element in the 
socio-spatial dialectic and should not be subsumed into social aspects as philosophical debates 
suggest.  Understanding the Power-Society-Space nexus is essential in analysing the operation of 
informal urban development processes. 
Karachi is a large and diverse city and it is difficult to generalise results. However, the evidence 
from the four case studies, located at different parts of the city and representing a variety of 
social groups and informal structures, does confirm that the city at the wider level is experiencing 
conflict due to competition over control of public resources in various domains due to weak 
government.  
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The empirical evidence added to the hypothesis that the segregations and conflicts, around 
control of resources at the city-level involving political power actors, are operationalised at the 
local-level using the existing identity based social groupings thus, the reasons of conflicts involved 
rests with the leadership and informal structures and not the common citizens who suffer the 
most. 
Thus, the hypothesis that the emergence of the socially and ethnically-distinct enclave-based 
spatial structure in Karachi is significantly influenced by the emergence of informal land controls is 
largely confirmed. Nevertheless their operation cannot fully be understood without an 
understanding of the city level politics and power base of local communities and their leadership 
expressed through informal structures.   
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Appendix B: Karachi 
Appendix 4.1: History of Enclave Formation (Social Divisions) 
The reasons of concentration of social groups and enclave formation are embedded in History, 
and the history of urban development has been shaped by four factors: First, migrations; second 
the planning decisions; third the religious and political violence in the background of religious 
extremism and ethnicity-based politics; and fourth, the rise of informal settlements. Each is 
discussed further below. 
Migrations and socio-spatial changes 
Karachi developed as a migrant city (Gayer, 2014, p. 23). Each migration wave brought particular 
socio-economic group who settled at specific geographic locations in the city. Regional and rural-
urban social and political realities of Karachi have made migrations towards Karachi as natural and 
unavoidable process (EC 1). The political resentment and conflicts in Karachi are equally 
connected with migrations, as migrations have also been considered as planned and politically 
motivated with the objectives to develop support and power base (EC 3, EC 2, EC 8, EC 9, GC 13). 
The Hindu-Sindhi merchants that arrived as traders after 1729 made Karachi as port town, and 
were the dominant pre-partition and colonial times local population who migrated to India during 
partition (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 15-21).   
During the pre-colonial era, the local Baloch also migrated from various locations along Makran 
Coast (Lari and Lari, 1996, p. 8-10). These groups now reside mainly in Lyari and its surroundings 
(Chapter 8).   
Much before partition, Karachi was captured by British forces in 1839 (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 15-
21). Along with all the developments, the British created the elite vs. the poor divide when they 
developed white (European) town and black (native) town development pattern (Lari and Lari, 
1996, p. 59-66). The colonial forces, civilians, soldiers and their families, lived in protected 
cantonments now fast converting into elite housing in the southern part (Hasan et. al., 2013; EC 
9). The exclusionary elitist development in the south is still continuing and extends as far as DHA, 
connecting it with PECHS, Cantonments along Shahrah-e-Faisal till Malir Cantonment, 
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consolidating the elite vs. poor divide. This British occupation also brought religious groups, such 
as Christians (Goan) and Parsis, as elites who developed several gated communities at that time 
that still exists in the larger socio-spatial settings as exception. 
Since partition in 1947, Waseem (1996, p.623) has identified four waves migrations to Karachi. 
The first wave came during partition, 1947, when the social structure of the city changed in a very 
short period, with the departure of Hindus and arrival of the Muslims from various parts of India, 
later called “Muhajirs” (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 14-21).With the arrival of 600,000 immigrants the 
social dynamics changed completely. The population increased from 450,000 to 1.137 million in 
1951, in that the Sindhi speaking reduced from 61.2% to 8.6%, consequently, Urdu speaking 
population swelled up from 6.3% to 50%, while Hindus reduced from 51% to 2.0% and Muslims 
increased from 42% to 96% (ibid).  At first, the Muhajirs occupied open spaces or houses left by 
the migrating Hindus, bought houses or were allocated housing by the government. Later, they 
developed informal settlements or the government developed housing for them (see next 
sections of planning decisions and rise of informal settlements). This migration created a 
resentment amongst Sindhi locals as Karachi was became the federal capital, and incoming 
Muhajir political leaders controlled many aspects of government (Gayer, 2014, p. 27-28). 
The second migration wave occurred from 1960-1980, when Punjabi and Pashtoons drifted 
towards Karachi. The Pashtoon migrants who mostly settled around industrial areas and 
peripheries including SITE and Orangi Hills and developed informal settlements, are blamed to be 
brought as a political conspiracy turned state policy (Gayer, 2014, p.44, EC 3, EC 8, EC 9). The then 
military dictator needed a support base in Karachi, which did not generally support his bid for 
president, and displaced Pashtoon in Hazara district were encouraged to relocate to Karachi as 
they supported the then president (Gayer, 2014, p.44, EC 3, EC 8, EC 9). Later, these Pashtoon 
enclaves were at the forefront of the first Pashtoon-Muhajir riots after the presidential election of 
1965 and later in 1985-86 in and around Orangi (EC 2, EC 3, EC 9; Gayer, 2003, p. 5-8; Budhani et 
al. 2010, p. 4-7; Baixas, 2.2, 2014). This period also led to the rise of informal settlements due to 
rural-urban migrations (EC 9). During that time rise of Pashtoon and Punjabi power in the federal 
administration also created economic resentment amongst Muhajirs (Waseem, 1996), and in the 
1960s the federal capital was shifted from Karachi to Islamabad, alienating Muhajirs further from 
the spaces of decision-making. 
In the third wave, during the 1970-90s a number of rural Sindhis shifted towards urban areas 
including Karachi which deepened the Muhajir resentment, as Sindhi started to dominate in 
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provincial government jobs due to enforcement of job quota introduced by Mr. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, a Sindhi leader, the then prime minister. This alienated Muhajirs further as they majorly 
depended on public jobs in various services providing institutions and in bureaucracy (Waseem, 
1996). This was the first time when the Muhajirs thought of having a separate province for 
themselves (Gayer, 2014, p. 28) and these separatist thinking exists today (refer Ali, R. 2015). 
Advocacy for separate provinces is repeatedly resonates in political debates and in graffiti in 
public space (The Express Tribune, 2014b). This period also observed various control tactics and 
power politics by provincial government e.g. a Language bill that tried to make all students of 
Sindh study the Sindhi language, which led to Muhajir-Sindhi riots termed “Language riots” 
(Gayer, 2014. P. 83-86; Baixas, 2.1, 2014).  
The fourth migration wave during the 1980s-1990 was the most turbulent time, when the Afghan 
immigrants and others flocked to the city following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This period 
also shaped the ethnicity based politics and the sectarian divide, especially the rise of MQM 
(Gayer, 2014, p. 79-100). Religious and sectarian groups gained power as they got state (army-
controlled) support in recognition of their contribution in the Afghan-Soviet war. This period saw 
the rise of ethnic and sectarian enclaves, and no-go-areas such as Sohrab Goth (EC 9). This was 
also the time when the city saw the fiercest Muhajir-Pashtoon riots, such as the Qasba-Aligarh 
massacre in 1986, when hundreds of Muhajirs were killed in planned attacks by the Pashtoons 
(Gayer, 2003, 5-8; Budhani et. al., 2010, p.4-7).  
The decade of 1990s was period when the state-led military operation in the province against 
criminals turned towards MQM as main target of operation in Karachi (Waseem, 1996, p. 627-
628; Khan, N. 2010, p. 228-229; Baixas, 2.3, 2014). MQM was blamed for hatching a conspiracy to 
set up Karachi as a separate state, running underground torture cells and instigating violence 
against opponents (Gayer, 2003, p. 13-16), and having links with secret agents such as RAW 
(Indian Intelligence agency) which resonates periodically (Dawn, 2015c; Ali, I. 2015b)   
A fifth migration wave can also be identified that started in 2000. Military operations in northern 
Pakistan, the earthquake of 2005, and flooding in 2010 brought a new influx migrants, mainly 
Pashtoons from the north and rural Sindhis (Gayer, 2014, p. 24-27; Gazdar, 2011, p. 4-8). This 
coincided with the emergence of local government system in the city (refer section on local 
government in section 4.3.1). The first term of CDGK was really favourable for Pashtoon migrants 
as the city government was led by J.I. (since MQM boycotted that election) a religious-political 
party known for its Pashtoon support and role during the Afghan Jihad (refer Chapter 6 and 7). As 
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the Pashtoon population swelled, and Karachi had the largest urban population of Pashtoons in 
the country, ANP emerged (the Pashtoon nationalist party) to challenge MQM as the major 
political rival in the city (Gayer, 2014, p. 24-27; Gazdar, 2011, p. 4-8). Both MQM and Sindhi 
nationalist political parties used various political tactics, separately, to examine ways to halt the 
influx of ‘Internally Displaced People’ (IDPs) in the background of military operation in North 
(Dawn, 2014a, Dawn, 2014b). A similar problem emerged when the Sindhi IDPs started to pour 
into the city after the 2010 floods who were opposed by MQM (Haider, 2010), infuriating the 
Sindhi nationalists who consider Karachi to be part of Sindh and as Sindhis they have the first right 
of its land. The opposition to internal migration has always been on the assumption that the 
immigrants come in the city and consume already scarce resources, including jobs, while the 
federal government neither increase budge nor electoral seats in the city despite drastic increase 
in population (also refer 4.2.2). 
Planning decisions 
Formal planning decisions have an important role in the current socio-spatial pattern in the city 
and to shaping of the connected divides (EC 5, EC 8).   
The post-partition planning decisions to rehabilitate Muhajirs ended up in developing Muhajir 
enclaves (EC 5). The initial planning was faced the issue of rehabilitating large numbers of 
homeless partition immigrants, and the resultant planning created dedicated large settlements 
first in the now Karachi Central district and later the areas of Korangi and North/New Karachi 
according to 1958 Master Plan (Hasan et. al., 2002, p. 26-27; EC 5). Political parties, especially 
MQM, relied on these social groupings to win seats from the 1980s onwards (EC 5).  
Formal housing developments for high income groups also shaped the socio-economic divides. 
Clifton, Bath Island, PECHS, later DHA and the more-recent conversion of cantonments into 
housing have created official social divisions (EC 8). The continued failure to provide low-income 
housing has led to development of informal settlements that flourished around high income areas 
because of the employment opportunities in service provision in these areas (Ahmed, S. 2013).   
The formally planned industrial zones and lack of worker housing also spurred the development of 
informal settlements, around zones such as SITE, Landhi, Korangi and Quaidabad (EC 8), where 
migrants especially Pashtoons (who arrived in 1960s) consolidated ethnic enclaves (EC 2, EC 8). 
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Planned housing for the labours at SITE was developed in Orangi and Baldia, but was inadequate 
resulting in the emergence of entrepreneurs providing informal housing (Ahmed, S. 2013).  
Ethnic and religious conflicts and violence 
Safety and security issues around  connected with ethno-political or religious conflicts, are one of 
the major reasons of enclave formations (EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, EC 6, EC 8, GC 10). It is noted that there 
were ethnic and religious groups living separately without any tensions between them (EC 1, EC 2, 
EC 3, EC 8), but formerly open enclaves became closed and gated after the political and sectarian 
violence in the 1980s (EC 2, EC 3, EC 8, GC 10, GC 11, GC 12).  
The enclaves that formed in response to the persecution, forced evictions or 
compound eviction in the city were the most undesirable enclaves of all. One 
of the examples of these types are the enclaves that formed since the 1980s as 
a result of sectarian persecution that forced the Shia community to leave areas 
such as F.B. Area to live in Ancholi Society. This changed the whole complexion 
of the that area which became inaccessible and difficult to live in for other 
groups. Religious leaders also promoted this pattern as it made it easy for 
them to look after the people in one place together. (EC 2) 
Rise of informal settlements 
It is known that most of the rural migrants  usually choose informal settlements for their place of 
living in the city (EC 5). Punjabi and Pashtoons were the earliest low-income rural migrants, and all 
the rural migrants prefers to live with their relatives because of tribal and kinship ties (EC 5, EC 8). 
There have been three phases of development of informal settlements which have emerged as 
mixed or ethnically segregated settlements depending on the actors who facilitated change over 
time (EC 8). 
Several reasons have been identified for the development of informal settlements in the city. One 
reason is availability of vast tracts of vacant government land belonging to different authorities 
(EC 4). Political influence and politicisation of land institutions and corruption in the land 
departments are other issues explored later.  Cumbersome processes of accessing formal housing 
for the poor and lack of housing credit (EC 5, EC 7, Hasan. et. al., 2013) as informal systems 
provide a simple ‘one window operation74’ (EC 7) and also facilitate access to credit (Hasan et. 
                                                          
74
 Commonly used term to refer ease in the documentation and transaction procedures that require the 
customer to deal with only one person and in one go.    
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al.,2013). Lack of formal housing for the poor, missing of target group in government housing 
schemes, speculation by the middle and upper middle income groups, encroachments by the 
informal actors, demand and supply gap, and the rise of private housing (EC 1, EC 2, EC 4, EC 8, 
EC-11, EC-12) have also played their role in development of informal settlements. 
Informal actors are important in facilitating the development of informal settlements, who often 
influence the nature and outcomes of the informal processes and identity-based orientation of 
the emerging settlement. Over time, these informal actors have changed from a neutral 
entrepreneur in collusion with the government officers and the police to organised crime groups, 
mafia and now, political parties that operate at middlemen (EC 8).  
…Regarding the first phase (post partition), it was a “Freak Phenomena” in 
which the migrants just came and they were allowed to encroach on public 
spaces, it was limited to city centre there was no middle man, no political 
influence and no issue of ethnicity, although there was a division (on socio-
economic basis)… The second phase (1960s) deals mostly with in-migration 
due to industrial development and lack of development in rural areas as there 
was a huge demand of cheap labour in Karachi, and when the labour came 
there was no housing for them, so they started to look around the industrial 
sites and started encroaching. Later this task was taken over by “middlemen, 
informal sub-divider or mafia” and that was also beyond any political, ethnic or 
religious division and it involved the police, local musclemen and the 
government officers from the land department … This same second phase also 
absorbed the migrants from Bangladesh in 1971 and later illegal migrants from 
other countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Iran…this point 
can be seen as the start of ethnic enclave formation… The third phase started 
from the mid-2000s when land grabbing appeared … political parties have 
used both formal and informal ways for land grabbing with three objectives, “.. 
first was to earn money, second was to increase the people from the same 
identity background and third was to increase the vote. When MQM did this, 
ANP adopted the same tactic and controlled settlements where Pashtoons 
were living, followed by PPP and the nationalist parties from the interior of 
Sindh, which this led to territoriality and now we have different kinds of issues 
in different geographic locations including extortion, kidnapping etc.” (EC 8) 
Thus, the current socio-spatial pattern in the city is an outcome of historic events that includes 
migrations, formal planning decisions, the security situation and the rise of informal settlements. 
These factors have also influenced the increase of socio-political conflicts, violence in the city, as 
both, the political parties emerged out of this unbalanced development and socio-spatial pattern. 
Alternatively, this segregation embedded in socio-spatial pattern has provided basis for identity 
based political entrepreneurship involving competition to appropriate power and resources.   
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Appendix C: North Nazimabad 
Appendix 5.1: History of North Nazimabad Case Study 
North Nazimabad housing neighbourhood was planned in 1953 as Scheme 2 ‘Taimuria’ of KDA  
(Karachi Development Authority) then known as the Karachi Improvement Trust or KIT (KDA, 1984 
in Dowall, 1991). The neighbourhood was developed for federal government employees as 
Karachi was then the capital city of the country, but the housing scheme was made available to 
other people when the capital was moved to the new city of Islamabad and began to be properly 
developed during the 1960s. Due to its location and planning North Nazimabad remained in high 
demand among middle, upper middle and high income households, mostly Urdu speaking 
Muhajirs.  
The informal areas to the west grew up a little later than the formal areas. These developed on 
either amenity plots or on the vacant steep slopes of the Orangi Hills, partly to satisfy the 
demands for worker housing during the 1960s as the city was going through an industrial boom. 
Labour colonies were first built as formal development for the nearby Sindh Industrial Trading 
Estate (SITE), but later informal housing sprung up in Orangi, Baldia and other adjacent areas 
including North Nazimabad, due to the enormous demand for low income housing for the 
labourers (Ahmed, 2013). The rural migrants who settled during that period later facilitated their 
fellow villagers/tribesmen to settle in the city and this area. This included Hasan Zai Pashtoon 
tribesmen from the Hazara district, who arrived during the construction of ‘Tarbela Dam’75 that 
displaced 96,000 people in Hazara (Teminsky, 2013). Many of the Hasan Zai tribesmen were 
helped in relocating to Karachi, and settled on the Orangi Hills in the case study area.  
Several interviewees from the informally developed areas (I-UC2) had arrived in the 1970s, and 
recall that the hills were controlled by Pashtoon (or Kohistani Pashtoon) strongmen, who ran the 
stone quarries supplying stones to the construction sites, including North Nazimabad (INN 2, INN 
3, INN 6, INN 8, INN 9, INN 11). The Balti and Kohistani tribesmen bought properties from the 
same strongmen. KMC officers allowed the Punjabi-Christians, who were working for KMC as 
sweepers, to have temporary accommodation on an amenity plot adjacent to De-Silva Town 
(Block P in F-UC2) that housed wealthy and educated Goan Christians. As the Christian settlement 
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 Tarbela Dam started in 1968 and completed in 1976. 
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consolidated, other Christian families were also officially relocated there after they were evicted 
from a nearby locality (INN 12).  All of the communities in I-UC2 followed the similar pattern of 
expansion, i.e. first having a few houses that attracted relatives and other families of the same 
community and so on. 
Appendix 5.2: Area wise Population in the Case Study Area 
 Area  
(Sq. Km) 
Population 
2005  
(Approx.)  
Population 2015 
 (Estimate) 
I-UC2 Hasan Zai 0.15 17000 33,000 
I-UC2 Kohistani 0.15 12,000 27,000 
I-UC2 Pahar Gunj 0.06 12,000 18,000 
 I-UC2 Balti Shi 0.04 4,000 6,000 
I-UC2  Deer Colony 0.04 4,000 6,000 
I-UC2 Others  3000 10,000 
I-UC2 (Total) 0.45 52,000 100,000 
F-UC2 0.60 10,000 20,000 
UC2 1.05 62000  120,000 
UC3-4 Bohri   25,000 
 UC3-4 Ismaili   2,000 
UC3-4 Others   48,000 
UC3 (Case Study) 0.75 30,000 40,000 
UC4 (Case Study) 0.75 25,000 35,000 
UC3-4 (Total) 1.5 55,000 75,000 
TOTAL Case Study Area 2.55  195,000 
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Appendix D: Supplementary Case Studies 
Appendix 7.1: Petty Drug Gangs to City Level Politico-Criminal Groups 
The origins of modern gang warfare in Lyari are a direct result of violent rivalries between 
powerful criminal families dating back 30 or 40 years. Gayer (2014, p. 123-158) (and also EC 3) 
explains a detailed account of Lyari’s history from the 1960s when the district was the sole 
territory of Kala Nag (Nabi Bakhsh), soon challenged by his own men, the two brothers Dadal (Dad 
Mohammed) and Sheru (Sher Mohammed). After the demise of Kala Nag, Dadal and Sheru fought 
to control the criminal space of Lyari, but both were soon challenged by the son of late Kala Nag, 
named Kala Nag-II (Allah Bakhsh) supported by Babu Dakait (Iqbal Mohammed). The reign of Kala 
Nag-II and Babu Dakait soon faced the challenge from Babu’s former apprentice, the Haji Lalu (Lal 
Mohammed). Haji Lalu brought Rehman Dakait (Abdul Rehman), Dadal’s son, into the arena to 
fight against Babu Dakait, and introduced his own son Arshad Puppo into business.  Kala Nag-II 
committed suicide in 2008 (Daily, 2015), Haji Lalu breathed his last naturally in 2012 (The Express 
Tribune, 2012a), while Babu Dakait was killed by Rehman Dakait in June 2004 (PIPS, 2009, p. 19). 
Babu’s four sons also faced the same fate by the hands of Rehman Dakait. Mid-2000 brought an 
end to classical Lyari specific drug gang’s war and gave rise to politically oriented gangs that 
aspired to venture beyond the limits of Lyari.  
Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo are supposed to be the main characters of current gang wars, 
who connected the politico-criminals with political ambitions and Baloch rhetoric, in Lyari. They 
collaborated until the late 1990s – their wives were even sisters (Hussain, 2015) – but Rehman 
turned violent and reportedly killed his mother in 1995 (Gayer, 2014, p. 138-139; EC 3) because of 
allegations of adultery or that she was an informer to the LEAs or Babu Dakait. Until the late 
1990s, Rehman Dakait and Haji Lalu were working together, all the groups remained loyal to PPP, 
but the two leaders fell out over a kidnapping and ransom issue (Gayer, 2014, p.140). After the 
split, Arsahd Puppo (Haji Lalu’s son) desecrated Dadal’s grave (father of Rehman Dakait) and killed 
a transport company owner, Faiz Mohammad, the father of the current PAC chief, Uzair Baloch. 
This started a new chapter of rivalry that witnessed the killing of 500-600 people and the 
emergence and disappearance of several splinter groups from 2003 till 2008 in Lyari (Ali, N. S. 
2014). 
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Initiation of gang war between Rehman Dakait and Arshad Puppo is supposed to be the point 
when MQM entered the scene as Arshad colluded with MQM against the PPP supported Rehman 
(Gayer, 2014). The alleged MQM’s support and interest in Lyari gave Lyari gang wars a city-level 
scale. 
Arshad Puppo was arrested in 2006, but his gang was run by his commander Ghaffar Zikri. Ghaffar 
Zikri continued to align the group with MQM, although denied by Ghaffar (Agha, 2013) and 
Arshad (Siddiqui, S. 2011). In the absence of Arshad, Rehman offered Ghaffar a truce, and they 
joined forces with other sovereign gangs including Baba Ladla etc. to create People’s Aman 
Committee (PAC) in 2008 (Gayer, 2014, p. 142).  
Rehman carried out various welfare initiatives that made him favourite leader of residents of 
Lyari, who called him Khan Bhai (Big brother). Rehman then introduced a new social position of 
Sardar (Lord) in this urban context, which was unique in the case of Balochs from Lyari. This 
change became a challenge for PPP, as Rehman continued to dictate the choice or electoral 
candidates and political strategy in Lyari. Rehman’s influence was so broad that he even set social 
rules and regulations and defined punishments (Gayer, 2014, pp. 148).  
Rehman used PAC to bring peace to Lyari and oust MQM, but also to launch his own political 
career. PAC emerged in most of the Sindhi/Baloch settlements throughout the city and started 
challenging MQM’s monopoly in these areas. The rise of PAC and Rehman irked the PPP 
hierarchy, but Rehman was killed in a police encounter in 2009. Some theories link Rehman’s 
killing with his  links with Baloch separatists in Baluchistan while others link it with the power 
politics of leaders of PPP (Gayer, 2014, p.146-147) 
Uzair Baloch took over leadership of PAC after Rehaman’s demise. Uzair took up politics as a 
challenge because his father was cruelly killed, allegedly, by Arshad Puppo. Arshad Puppo met the 
same fate, allegedly by PAC commander Baba Ladla (Noor Mohammed) in March 201376. This led 
to new ventures and conflicts; PAC started to increase its influence and attempted ventures 
                                                          
76
 It was widely reported in local newspapers that Arshad Puppo along with his brother and another 
member of the gang were killed (Dawn, 2013f). The police officers, also witnesses in the case initially 
informed in their statement that, the culprits kidnapped the slain people from Defence area, who were 
brought to Lyari, were tortured and killed. Their bodies were cut into pieces, while the killers cut Arshad’s 
head from body and played football with it. It is also said that the bodies were burned and then drained in 
the sewage channel. The story, is widely accepted as the gangsters also uploaded the videos of the torture 
on YouTube . However, later during the hearing, the eye witnesses retracted from their initial statement, 
allegedly due to political pressure (The Express Tribune, 2015d) 
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beyond Lyari onto MQM’s turf (Gayer, 2014, p.152; EC 1, EC 3, EC 4, ECCS 2), which resulted in 
clashes between the two groups in which several people got killed; the famous massacre of Sher 
Shah Scrap Market by PAC is one example (ibid)77. During that time PAC had become a de-facto 
military wing of PPP (Yusuf, 2012, Gayer, 2014, p. 154), although PPP denies such allegations, 
used to deal with MQM’s street power throughout the city.  
PAC opened another conflict when it started to fight the Kutchi Memons of Lyari (Gayer, 2014, 
p.154). Attacks by PAC on Kutchi Memon localities made the residents flee several times, first in 
July 2011 and then in July 201378. However, the migrants were forced back by other political 
groups including Sindhi nationalist political parties such as JSQM, JSM and JST (The Express 
Tribune, 2013j). Kutchi Rabita Committee (KRC) a politico-military outfit representing Kutchi 
Memons in Lyari, was formed in 2009-2010 in response to PAC to safeguard interests of the 
Kutchi Memons in conflicts over territories and resources (Gayer, 2014, p.153). However, it is 
reported that it colluded with Arshad Puppo and directly or indirectly came under the support of 
MQM (Khan, 2012a), opening another window for MQM in Lyari. Before the 2013 general 
election, Kutchis remained loyal to PPP politically but in 2013 KRC defected as per news reports 
(Mandhro, 2013b). 
PAC continued to open war fronts and make enemies, including with the then local Member of 
Parliament Nabeel Gabol from PPP, making it impossible for him to enter Lyari. Due to shifting 
allegiances between PAC and PPP, Gabol decided to quit PPP and in March 2013 joined MQM (The 
Express Tribune, 2013c). This event coincided with the killing of Arshad Puppo, but the people of 
Lyari in PAC controlled areas, reportedly, celebrated both events  (Mandhro, 2013a), suggesting a 
strong link between the controlling group, the legitimising residents, the common enemy and the 
space. 
PAC had become the king-maker, as was evident during both the 2008 and 2013 general 
elections. PPP, the national political party, had to consult PAC to nominate candidates in its 
former stronghold Lyari. After the 2013 general elections, the newly selected PPP Chief Minister 
of the province visited Lyari and met with Uzair Baloch in a bid to normalise the relations (Tunio, 
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 12 traders were killed mercilessly in Sher Shah Scrape Market, when they refused to give extortion money 
to, reportedly, PAC extortionists as the area is reportedly controlled by MQM (Gayer, 2014, p. 152).  
78
 Around 30000 Kutchi residents of Lyari had to migrate to outside the city, the majority of them had to 
stay in open or makeshift arrangements, as there were no such provisions for taking care of such numbers 
of internally displaced people (IDPs), reported The Express Tribune (2013h). 
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2013). This was widely criticised by the media and political parties, as PAC had been banned by 
the same government and in October 2011 Uzair had been declared a criminal under Anti-
Terrorism Act 1999 (amended) (satp [no date]; The Express Tribune, 2011b). The banning of PAC 
was supposedly due to pressure from MQM as a coalition partner in the Sindh government, 
however, PAC changed its name to the Awami Aman Committee (AAC) and continue operations as 
usual (Khan, 2011). Uzair Baloch’s house was raided by Rangers just one month after the visit of 
the Chief Minister, but Uzair was supposedly pre-warned and was not there (Bhatti, 2013). Even 
after the raid, Uzair was seen in the area and continued tasks such as conflict resolution hearings 
and problem-solving (Gayer, 2014, p.156).  
October 2012 witnessed cracks in the PAC military structure when Baba Ladla, commander of 
military wing of PAC, and Jabbar Jheango, one of his top commanders, had a fight in which six of 
their young fighters got killed (Khan, 2012d). Later in 2013 another turn was reported when Baba 
Ladla defected from PAC to join its archrival Ghaffar Zikri to fight against the PAC (Khan, 2013e). 
Furthermore, it was also reported that Baba Ladla was supposed to be the commander of the 
military wing of PAC, while Uzair and Zafar were political leaders (The Express Tribune, 2013l). 
Baba Ladla’s defection came a few months after killing of Zafar Baloch, the second in command of 
PAC (Dawn, 2013e79). Insiders suspect Baba Ladla’s involvement in Zafar’s murder because he 
condemned Zafar for siding with the LEAs which led to killings of Ladla’s men (Baloch, 2014). The 
new conflict between Baba Ladla and PAC resulted in the mass killing of 16 people in March 2014 
including women and children caught up in the crossfire at Jhat Pat Market (The Express Tribune, 
2013l). It is reported that Baba Ladla was supposedly killed in May 2014, on the Pakistan-Iran 
border while entering Iran illegally (Kharal and Baloch, 2014).  
The Karachi Operation (refer 4.3.1) added another chapter in Lyari’s history. With the start of 
Operation, most of the gangsters have gone in hiding, including the PAC leadership; while many of 
the lower ranking gangsters have been killed in alleged encounters by the LEAs along with other 
criminals in the city (refer 4.3.1). Uzair Baloch was also apprehended and presented before court 
in Karachi, While reportedly, he was arrested by Interpol at Dubai Airport allegedly travelling with 
a fake ID (Mandhro, 2014c). 
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 Zafar Baloch was next to Uzair Baloch in PAC. He was killed in broad daylight in his own controlled area. 
Some of the sources said that the killing was a result of internal rift of power in PAC, others also allege Baba 
Ladla responsible for the murder.  
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Appendix 7.2: Social Impacts of Power Contestations 
Due to power contestation amongst gangs, the residents of Lyari’s complex dilemmas ranging 
from dealing with gangs and LEAs, to countering social prejudice from employers and others 
beyond Lyari. The residents, while living in such an unpredictable situation, need to keep their 
incomes intact even when they cannot reach workplaces or open businesses, and face issues 
about their children and their passion for sports and culture.  
Firstly the residents struggle to escape the crossfire, such as the incident of Jhat Pat Market (See 
Khan, 2014b80) and atrocities and allegations of gangs and the police, Hashim of Aljazeera News 
informed (2012a). They also need to keep their boys away from the attractive gang affiliations 
that bring money and power, and from police allegations of being a gang supporter. Raheel and 
Maher have identified one of the cases (201481), in which a young promising footballer of Lyari was 
allegedly killed by police in an encounter for being a gang member. Similarly, many of the gangsters are 
said to be once good sportsmen such as Babu Dakait (Dawn, 2009a) and Ghaffar Zikri (Hussain, 
2015), but the lack of opportunity paved their way as gangsters.  
Secondly, the daily violence and closure of the neighbourhood prevents people from going to 
work, leading to loss of livelihoods. Extortion demands within Lyari have fuelled the situation 
(Kirmani, 2014), while  employers outside Lyari have started to avoid hiring people from Lyari as 
their attendance is unpredictable which is a problem in industries like textiles in which 
international consignments have to be dispatched on time. The outside world has stereotyped 
people from Lyari as gangsters, influenced mainly by media reports (Dawn, 2011; Kasim, 2012). 
A resident of Lyari and expert on the conflict (CCS-02) mentioned that people are in no way happy 
with the situation, neither with the LEAs nor with the gangs. They protest against both. However, 
although the media shows the women of Lyari protesting against raids and arrests, in practice 
they sometimes protest against the killings of innocents by gangs or LEAs, but may also be forced 
to protest by the gangs. For example, when people protested against the killing of a sportsman-
turned-gangster allegedly in an armed encounter by Rangers, the rally was organised by PAC, The 
Express Tribune reported (2013g).  Thus, when people have protested against the LEAs it remains 
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 Explained earlier, bystanders and common residents are often killed during the cross fire, Jhat Pat Market 
attack is one example where 19 people were killed including children and women.  
81
 A young promising footballer of Lyari was allegedly killed by police in an encounter for being a gang 
member.  
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doubtful as who organised the protests, but Lyari residents against the government actions as 
well as gangsters, as one of the rallies also highlighted (Mandhro, 2014a). One ethnic group is also 
found to protest publically against another, for example KRC organised a protest against PAC that 
was met with violence both by LEAs and the opponent gang, as Khan reported in The Express 
Tribune (2013c)  (refer Figure 7.2 for graphical representation of all the gangs and their links). 
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Appendix 7.3:  Historical Development of Lyari 
Lyari is situated at the confluence of Lyari River82 and the Karachi port on the Arabian Sea. Lyari 
got its name from Lyar, a tree said to be found in graveyards (Gayer, 2014), while others connect 
the name with the River Lyari. Lyari and surrounding areas are one of the oldest localities of the 
city, developed as an unplanned settlement. The first settlement can be traced back to 1729 when 
it was inhabited by Sindhi fishermen and Baloch nomads (Gayer, 2014, p.127-131).  
The village started developing after the silting-up of the port of Kharakbandar, and the 
establishment of the nearby settlement at Dirbo and port near the present-day Lyari (Lari and 
Lari, 1996, p. 8). The new port followed and a walled settlement occupied by Hindu merchants 
was called Kolachi or Kolachi-jo-Goth, named according to legend after a local woman, Mai 
Kolachi. The village then saw several waves of migrations from the surrounding regions, including 
Balochs from current day Balochistan and Iran, Kutchi Memons from Gujarat, and the African 
slaves (known as Makrani or Sheedi) from the slave trade at that time. The population reached 
14,000 in 1813 (Lari and Lari, 1996, p.76) increasing to 81,768 in 1941, and then 360,000 in 1956 
making it the largest quarter of the city of that time (Gayer, 2014, p.129).  
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 Sweet water river then, used for cultivation and fishing, but now has converted into the largest open 
sewage drain of Karachi. 
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Appendix 7.4:  Historical Development of PIB Colony 
PIB colony was planned and developed in 1948, as the first planned settlement offered to the 
migrants from India after partition of 1947. The PIB Co-operative Housing Society was a brain 
child of the then Local Sindhi Feudal Lord Mr Ilahi Bux, an educated person who became the first 
Chief Minister of Sindh after partition (Ahmed et. al. 2014).  Mr Ilahi Bakhsh lived in PIB colony 
abutting the Lyari River beside a small Sindhi village connected with Pir Ilahi Bakhsh residential 
complex. That Sindhi village still exists, along with its extension named 14-Number Plot. Most of 
the land has been converted into an apartment complex (called Pir Heaven) by the heirs of Mr Pir 
Ilahi Bakhsh. This old Sindhi enclave is one of the two enclaves in the wider Muhajir-dominated 
PIB colony, the other Sindhi/Baloch enclave is further east of the Ilahi Buksh enclave away from 
the river, commonly called Baloch Para or Makrani Para, although its official name is Suleiman 
Village.  
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Appendix 7.5: Historical Development of Scheme 33 
Scheme-33 was allocated for development in 1967, but was reallocated in 1980 with added land 
as it was not fully developed (Ahmed et. al. 2014). According to the plan large land parcels were 
sold to cooperative societies and builders, as KDA was supposed to provide trunk infrastructure 
and developers to complete the internal infrastructure. The result was that land lay undeveloped 
for a long time, much of which got encroached. This resulted in gated communities that eroded 
the public character of the scheme.  
Areas abutting Gulshan-e-Iqbal started to develop during the late 1980s and early 1990s when  
people started to move out of central Karachi against the background of a state-led operation 
against MQM that mainly targeted Muhajir areas. Meanwhile, there was an increase of 
Pashtoons, especially around Sohrab Goth, who started to arrive during the 1980s in connection 
with the Afghan war and the transportation business.  An Afghan refugee camp was also set up 
nearby. Sohrab Goth and surrounding areas have remained a Pashtoon stronghold, and the 
infamous Muhajir-Pashtoon riots of the mid-1980s were ignited when a bus carrying MQM 
workers was shot at, and later a state-led military operation against drug smugglers in Sohrab 
Goth, by then a no-go area for local authorities, added to the conflict.  
During the mid-2000s, the land market in Karachi was booming, and prices were reaching all-time 
limits. Many experts thought it was a bubble that would soon burst, but during the boom people 
invested in land, especially on the outskirts of Karachi. However, this also attracted a ‘Land Mafia’ 
connected to political parties, and government employees of the land department and police 
(Hasan et al, 2013, p. 70-75). Land grabbing in Scheme-33 was the highest because of the 
presence of infrastructure and undeveloped plots bought for investment; “Sixty per cent of 
allotted plots in KDA Scheme-33 are occupied today. Land grabbers rent entire families to illegally 
occupy land and premises, paying them about PKR 15,000 (US$ 167) a month to do so. These 
families usually belong to the traditional ‘lower castes’, which have a seminomadic culture” 
(Hasan et al, 2013, p. 72). This was a large market for the informal actors that they utilised fully; at 
the same time, it gave rise to contestation between competing groups and their supporting 
political parties that often lapsed into violence. In addition, the informal control by ethnic 
identity-related groups resulted in the development of socially divided neighbourhoods (Hasan et 
al, 2013, p. 70-74). 
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Appendix E: Abbreviations and Terminologies 
Table 1: Political parties 
Abbreviation Full Form Explanation 
MQM Muttahida Qaomi 
Movement (United 
Nations Movement) 
Previously called Muhajir Qaomi Movement.  A political 
party came into being in mid-1980 with the claim of 
bringing back deprived rights of the Muhajir ethnicity, and 
this party is now the major representative of the Muhajirs. 
Not all Muhajirs want to link with it but the party claim 
they represents Urdu Speaking Muhajirs of Sindh, majorly 
dominating in Karachi. It’s a fact that MQM has remained 
the dominating political party of Karachi in any kind of 
elections since late 1980s. 
ANP Awami National Party 
(Public National Party). 
Pro-Pashtoon ethno-political party, mostly dominating in 
the northern Province of Pakistan, got electoral wins in 
2008 elections in north and won 2 seats in Karachi, a rare 
happening. Since it is anti-Taliban and a secular political 
party, it has come under target of Taliban due to which 
almost all of its political offices closed down in Karachi and 
the leadership and workers stopped working openly. 
Between 2008 till 2012, it gave a very tough time to MQM, 
and both remain fighting in that period. 
PPP Pakistan People’s Party Initially a leftist political party emerged in 1970s, 
previously had representation across the ethnic divide; 
since late 1990s has become a representative for Sindhi 
population, while this limitation over emphasised since 
2008 elections.  
PAC People’s Aman 
Committee 
Initially developed by a gang leader of Lyari in mid-2000, 
which is Baloch community oriented, and Baloch’s have 
been diehard supporters of PPP in Karachi. After the killing 
of the initial leader, it was alleged that the reins were 
controlled by PPP, till it became a fierce opponent of 
MQM, having young men as workers represented across 
Karachi present in historic Baloch/sindhi villages in the city. 
It is alleged that PAC actually became a military wing of 
PPP, to deal with MQM and to remain alive in the politics 
of violent Politics of Karachi. PPP has always denied such 
allegations. 
KRC Kutchi Rabita Committee An ethnicity based political Party, military outfit, of ethnic 
Kutchi community of the Lyari area, to counter PAC. 
Supported by MQM. 
PTI Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf 
(Movement for Justice 
Pakistan) 
Gained popularity across the country since 2012-13, and 
emerged as 3
rd
 largest political party in 2013 general 
elections. Lead by the famous cricketer turned politician, 
Imran Khan, the party has gain popularity across the ethnic 
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divide because of its anti-corruption and equality slogans. 
However, it is not a complete leftist party; whereas huge 
numbers of Pashtoons have an inclination towards it, at 
the same time, huge numbers of Muhajirs especially youth 
voted for it. It is supposed to be an emerging power in the 
city of Karachi. 
JI Jamat-e-Islami Religious Political Party, with long history, has been the 
majority party of Karachi before MQM, however, it still has 
very strong and organised administrative structure across 
the country, while it is supposed to be pro-establishment 
as it has been involved in Afghanistan War along with the 
Pakistan Army. Subsequently, has very strong 
representation amongst Pashtoons, while it used to 
dominate in local government before MQM and assumed 
the local government from 2001 till 2004, as MQM 
boycotted that elections, it is supposed to be pro-informal 
areas, as majority votes comes from there. 
JUI Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam Religio-Political Party, A Deobandi-Sect dominated, majorly 
found in Pashtoon areas of Karachi while it is also widely 
presents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the northern Province of 
Pakistan. 
SSP Sipah Sahaba Pakistan Anti-Shia community Militarised Deo-bandi sect outfit, 
banned in 2000s dominated by Pashtoons, changed its 
name to Ahle-sunna,t-wal Jamat (ASWJ) and became 
religio-political party. Have been involved in several Shia-
clerics and citizens. Mostly found in Pashtoon informally 
developed settlements. 
ASWJ Ahle-sunnat-wal Jamat Changed version of SSP, now into politics as well, however, 
the main anti-Shia agenda remains the same. 
L.J Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Banned anti-Shia Military outfit, has claimed for several 
incidents of Shia Massacre in Karachi and other parts of the 
country. 
SMP Sipah Mohammed 
Pakistan 
Shia military outfit, developed to counter SSP, also banned 
now, however, it continue its operations. 
MWM Majlis-e-Wahdat-ul-
Muslimeen 
A Shia political aprty, a recent development in late 2000, 
after Shias  found that they are not actively represented by 
any political party. The party has staged protests and rallies 
across the city, usually after sectarian based killings of Shia 
community members. 
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Table 2: Social Groups and identities. 
Group Sub-
Group 
Explanation 
Sunni  Sunni is a sect of Islam, which denotes its division with another sect called 
Shia-sect. 
Deobandi Debandi, follows a school of thought developed in a seminary-university 
situated in Deoband-India. The religious scholars of that school played a 
vital active religious role against British colonial rule over India, the same 
active (physical struggle based) role continued during Afghan War, when 
the scholars of the sect were officially taken on board to recruit people to 
train and fight in Afghanistan against he Russia. Subsequently, the 
majority followers are Pashtoons, and are supposed to follow strict rules 
of Sharia law. Many of them are found to be anti-Shia like SSP, ASWJ and 
Lashkar-e-Jhangivi.  
Barelvi Sub-sect of Sunni sect, softer as they follow and believe in Sufis. They are 
supposed to be not involved in Jihad or anti-Shia activities, Deobandi are 
equally involved in conflicts (theoretical) with this sect. 
Shia  Shia forms one of the two major sects in Islam, follows the 12 Imams, and 
differentiated with the Sunni Islam. 
Shia 
(Jafferia) 
As above. 
Bohri A sub-sect of Shia Sect, also called with other names, but for the study, 
this group follows its Imam of the time who is in Soorat-Gujrat-India. 
Majority of the followers in Karachi are Gujrati speaking population 
migrated from India. 
Ismaily A sub-sect of Shia Sect, this group follows its Imam of the time the “prince 
Karim Agha Khan” who lives in France. Majority of the followers in Karachi 
are Gujrati speaking population migrated from India. 
Pashtoons  Pashtoons are characterised by Pashto language and live in the Northern 
parts of Pakistan, including Afghan territories. The whole of KPK province 
is considered as Pashtoon dominated, while other ethnic groups also live 
there including Hazara community, and there are several tribes that 
reside in the independent territories of 08 agencies abutting Afghanistan. 
These tribes follow their own tribal rules, however, they are part of 
Pakistan and are controlled by administration through Political Agents 
and the tribal elders. The usual judiciary system and other laws does not 
apply there, while many of the institutions also do not work there include 
Police, while they have their own system of levies force and frontier 
constabulary. 
Deer  Deer is part of KPK province, while many tribes live there. The Pashtoons 
in Deer Colony in the case study area are from that unique socio-spatial 
setting. 
Hasan Zai Hasan Zai tribes are from Kala Dhaka, district Torghar (Previously district 
Hazara) of KPK province. These people came to Karachi after the 
construction of Turbela Dam in 1960s, due to which majority of the lands 
in Kala-Dhaka were inundated because of the rising stored water. The 
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effectees were never compensated, instead their settlement in Karachi 
was facilitated. At that time, Karachi was going through an industrial 
boom and required huge numbers of labour. Secondly, the president 
Ayub Khan at that time was from the same district and was facing strong 
political opposition in Karachi as he was a Martial Law administrator; 
however, bringing these Pashtoons balanced votes for him to gain some 
support in Karachi. The same Pashtoons were involved in the first  
Pashtoon-Muhajir violence in the city after the after and winning of Ayub 
Khan. Furthermore, the same Pashtoons were involved in second deadly 
riots in the city in mid 1980s in Orangi and the hills of the case study area, 
which led to the riots lead to rise of MQM. The Hasan Zai are mostly 
linked with the transport industry, especially para-transit that include 
Rickshaws and Taxis in the city. They mostly comprise of low income 
groups. 
Afridi Afridi Pashtoon are from the Khyber Agency, one of the famous Pashtoon 
agencies in which famous Khyber Pass is located. They are mostly, 
peaceful, related to transport business, own large vehicles that they ply 
for the commercial enterprises etc., and are supposed to be a well-to-do 
group of Pashtoons. 
Kohistani Kohistani Pashtoons are basically from SWAT valley in KPK province. They 
are  more liberal than the Hasan Zai Pashtoons, however, they form the 
same income group. 
Gujrati Gujrati-
Bohri 
Gujrati are the people who migrated from Gujrat and speak Gujrati 
language; the Bohri community is a Gujrati speaking ethnic group. 
 Gujrati-
Ismaili 
The Ismaili sectarian group is basically a Gujrati speaking ethnic group as 
well. 
Punjabi  Punjabi people are the people who migrated from Punjab, the province of 
Pakistan. 
Punjabi-
Christians 
These Punjabi rural migrants are characterised by having Christian 
religion, in addition they are supposed to be linked with job of solid waste 
management and cleaning, and the majority still continue the same 
profession and are mostly employed in Karachi Municipal Corporation 
(KMC) as sweepers or related staff. Both men and women work. 
Punjabi-
Muslims 
These live along with the Punjabi-Christians and are difficult to be 
distinguished on appearance and physical characteristics. However, these 
Muslims follow the Barelvi Sect of Sunni Islam and hence are unique in 
Deobandi-Pashtoon dominated surroundings. 
Sindhi Sindhi represents the people of Sindh province, within which Karachi is 
situated. Sindhi speak Sindhi language, and are inclined towards PPP and 
other Sindhi Nationalist Political Parties. Many Sindhi villages are found in 
the outskirts of the city, which now have become part of the city. 
Baloch Baloch are the ethnic locals that existed before the rise of Karachi as a 
Port city. They mostly existed along the sea coast, however, many Baloch 
villages developed, that still exist,  along the River Lyari and River Malir. 
Lyari and Malir areas, currently, are the dominated by the Baloch ethnic 
group. 
Muhajir Muhajir literally means “Immigrant”, the term was officially used for the 
people who migrated from India after partition and came to Sindh, 
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although many came to Punjab as well, but they were mostly Punjabi 
Speaking and so they became part of the culture and province. Muhajirs 
in Sindh were characterised by “Urdu” language; however, many spoke 
more than one language like that of Gujrati, etc, but the term defined 
them together. 
Balti Balti community represents the people from Gilgit-Baltistan Province in 
the North, they have their unique language, culture and lifestyle, but, the 
Balti in the case study area have dominating Shia identity. 
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Table 3: Miscellaneous Terms 
Term/Abbreviation Explanation 
Masjid/Mosque Prayer Space for Muslims. Sunni use the term mostly. 
Imam Bargah Prayer Space, Shia-Muslims use the term for their prayer space. 
Jamat Khana Jamat Khana represents socio-religious space, literally meaning community 
place. For bothBohris and Ismailies, Jamat Khana is a religious-come- social 
space. In Bohris, Jamat Khana include Prayer Space, Community Gathering 
Space where religious and Social gathering like marriages take place, the food 
is also served and cooked here and along with it is administration facilitates as 
well.  
Muharram Muharram is the first month of Islamic calendar, respected by all sects; 
however Shia sect have very strong affiliations and perform several rituals 
including city wide processions, religious gathering called “Majlis” etc.  
Muharram 
Procession 
A religious congregation of Shia Muslims, observed during first 10 days of 
Muharram and other days of the year as well, in Muharram to mark and mourn 
the killings of the Grand son and family member of the Prophet (Peace Be 
upon Him). 
Case Study Area The limited area under study, marked socially and geographically. 
Estate Agents Also known as estate brokers. Dealing in properties and facilitating and guiding  
property transactions. 
Community 
Leaders 
Community leaders refer to representative of the community, irrespective of 
political or tribal standing and affiliations, usually involved in problem solving. 
People approach him for guidance and support. They can also have political 
affiliations and tribal or religious affiliations and powers as well. 
Community Elders Community elders represents the elders of the structures of family, kinship or 
tribe. They are usually old men, supposed to be having power and authority, 
and are widely respected. They are consulted for community matters, and they 
guide people and solve their issues including conflict resolution. 
Baradary System The “Family System” based on bindings of tribe and kinship, in which the family 
and tribe is supposed to be one entity and everyone is linked with other, every 
one participate at times of happiness and sorrow and supports each other, and  
problems are internally solved with the help of community leaders and elders.  
China Cutting  China Cutting refers to illegal subdivision of public amenity land and its sale for 
residential or commercial purposes. The plotting on parks in North Nazimabad 
town is one of many examples. 
SITE Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate. The largest industrial estate in Karachi, 
established just after the independence, and has been booming in business till 
today. 
DHA 
(Karachi) 
Defence Housing Authority. Housing authority under the auspices of the army. 
An on service brigadier heads the authority. Initially developed as a 
cooperative housing society with the aim to benefit army men, and later  
became one of the largest real estate businesses in the country, mostly 
catering to the high-income group housing needs.  
DHA City Defence Housing Authority city, a new housing project of housing for the upper 
middle and upper income group far away from the city, comprising of more 
than 20 thousand acres of land. 
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Bahria Town Private sector builder and developer. Providing gated communities targeting 
housing needs of the upper middle and upper income groups across the major 
cities of the country. 
PECHS Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society. A housing society 
established for the employees of the government, and mainly consisting of 
upper middle and upper income group. 
SNJ Road Shahrah-e-Noor Jahan; The road that separates the major formal and informal 
areas of North Nazimabad Case Study Area. 
Da’i The spiritual leader of the Bohri Muslims 
Mukhi The Prayer leader of Ismaily Muslims 
SSS Road Sher Shah Soori Road 
SH Road Shahrah-e-Humayun Road 
AHI Road Abul Hasan Isphahani Road 
PIB Colony Pir Ilahi Bakhsh Colony 
I-UC2 Informally developed area of Union Council 2 
F-UC2 Formally developed area of Union Council 2 
UC3-4 Parts of Union Councils 03 and 04 combined together as one territory within 
the case study area 
MYLS Molana Yousuf Ludhyanvi Shaheed Road 
AHI Abul Hasan Isphahani Road 
PMT  Pole Mounted Transformer 
KMC Karachi Municipal Corporation 
K.E Karachi Electric. (Previously, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation) 
KWSB Karachi Water and Sewage Board 
Sui Gas The cooking gas  company. 
MNA Member National Assembly 
MPA Member of Provincial Assembly 
MDA Malir Development Authority 
LDA  Lyari Development Authority 
LEA Law Enforcement Agencies 
 
 
